.

John L. Slimm

Senior Counsel

JLSlimm@mdwcg.com

Portrait of John L. Slimm

Jack is a member of the Professional Liability Department where he concentrates his practice in complex litigation, with emphasis on the defense of professionals, including lawyers, accountants, architects and engineers, insurance brokers, real estate professionals, and directors and officers in matters pertaining to malpractice, negligence, fraud, and defamation.  He is also a fellow in the American College of Trial Lawyers, and has tried over 150 cases and argued scores of appeals. 

Jack is admitted to practice in New Jersey, the District of New Jersey, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, and the United States Supreme Court. He has also been admitted to try cases in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the Eastern District of New York, and the Southern District of New York, as well as the Supreme Court of the State of New York.

A graduate of the University of Notre Dame Law School, Jack subsequently served as Law Secretary for the Honorable Thomas F. Dalton, J.S.C., Superior Court of New Jersey.

Jack is a frequent speaker for the New Jersey Institute for Continuing Legal Education and the American College of Trial Lawyers on legal malpractice matters.

In 2025, Jack was recognized by the New Jersey Judiciary for his exemplary pro bono work and unwavering commitment to serving the public.

    • Notre Dame Law School (J.D., 1970)
    • La Salle University (B.A., 1967)
    • New Jersey, 1970
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
      The Martindale-Hubbell rated attorney list is issued by Internet Brands, Inc. A description of the selection methodology can be found here. No aspect of this advertisement has been approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
    • The Best Lawyers in America®, Legal Malpractice Law - Defendants; Professional Malpractice Law – Defendants; Philadelphia "Lawyer of the Year" Legal Malpractice Law - Defendants, 2015 (2010-2027)
      The Best Lawyers list is issued by Woodward & White. A description of the selection methodology can be found here. No aspect of this advertisement has been approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
    • New Jersey Super Lawyer List (2005-2009, 2011-2021)
      The Super Lawyers list is issued by Thomson Reuters. A description of the selection methodology can be found here. No aspect of this advertisement has been approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
    • American Bar Association
    • American College of Trial Lawyers
    • Camden County Bar Association, Civil Practice Committee
    • New Jersey State Bar Association
    • Legal Malpractice Update, NJICLE Seminar, April 23, 2026
    • Legal Malpractice Update, NJICLE Seminar, June 14, 2024
    • The Defense of Appellate Counsel in Legal Malpractice Actions, Client Webinar, June 4, 2024
    • NJ Business Rule and Its Application to Lost Profits, NJICLE Business Litigation Year in Review Seminar, November 1, 2023
    • Strategic Approaches to Handling Lost Profit Claims Under New Jersey's New Business Rule, Client Webinar, September 7, 2023
    • Mediation Process & Techniques in Civil & Chancery Disputes: Producing the Best Results for Your Client, Camden County Bar Association’s Civil Practice Update, June 5, 2023 
    • Criminal Defense Bar and Their Exposure to Legal Malpractice & Cross-Examining an Expert in a Legal Malpractice Case, NJICLE 2023 Legal Malpractice Update, March 25, 2023 
    • Virtual Jury Trials in New Jersey: The Good, The Bad and The Ugly, Client Webinar, March 25, 2022
    • NJICLE Annual Legal Malpractice Conference, March 27, 2021
    • De Bene Esse Depositions, NJICLE Deposition College Seminar, March 26, 2021
    • What Can Go Wrong At Trial?, New Jersey Institute for Continuing Legal Education, April 2014
    • Where Has All the Privity Gone?, New Jersey Institute for Continuing Legal Education, March 2013
    • Legal Malpractice, New Jersey Law Journal Continuing Legal Education Series, December 2012
    • Examining Non-Traditional Claims Against Lawyers, The Hartford, May 2012
    • Non-Traditional, Complex Professional Liability Claims, PLUS, April 2012
    • New Jersey's Litigation Privilege, How It Applies and Can Be Used In Defense of Attorneys in Actions Filed in Both State and Federal Courts in New Jersey, New Jersey Institute of Continuing Legal Education, April 2012
    • Civil Practice, Camden County Bar Association, November 2011
    • Legal Malpractice, Mercer County Bar Association, November 2011
    • False Arrest and Malicious Prosecution, CNA Insurance Company, October 2011
    • 2010 Review of the New Jersey Environmental Law Seminar: Issues of Legal Malpractice and Ethics Arising Out of the Handling of Transactions in Which Environmental Issues are Involved, New Jersey Institute for Continuing Legal Education, March 2010
    • Defense Perspective of Civil Practice Under the Rules of Court, Camden County Bar Association Civil Practice Committee, November 2009
    • Legal Malpractice Seminar, Burlington County Bar Association, November 2009
    • Civil Practice, Camden County Bar Association, February 2009
    • "Strategic Defenses to Appellate Malpractice Claims," PLUS Blog, April 19, 2024
    • "Strategy is Key for Opening Statements and Closing Arguments," New Jersey Lawyer, June 2021
    • "The Liability of Trial Counsel for Strategic and Tactical Judgments Made During Trial,"New Jersey Law Journal Professional Malpractice Supplement (page 6), January 13, 2020
    • "How to Avoid Liability For Your Clients' Representations,"New Jersey Law Journal, Professional Malpractice Supplement, January 9, 2019
    • "The Immunity of Attorneys for the Occasional Bad Result,"New Jersey Law Journal, Professional Malpractice Supplement, January 15, 2018
    • "When Attorney Fees Can Be Awarded in Legal Mal Actions Brought by Non-Clients," New Jersey Law Journal, January 24, 2017
    • "Disgruntled Beneficiaries and Claims Against Estate Planning Attorneys," New Jersey Law Journal, January 18, 2016
    • “New Jersey's Litigation Privilege Does Not Bar a Claim By a Client for Legal Malpractice Against Defense Attorneys,” Defense Digest, Vol. 19, No. 1, March 2013
    • “The Litigation Privilege In Claims Against Attorneys,” New Jersey Law Journal, Vol. 203, No. 11, March 14, 2011
    • "New Jersey Holds Comparative Negligence Defense Unavailable in Broker Malpractice Actions," Defense Digest, Volume 7, No. 6, December, 2001 
    • "Hashing Out the Broker -Dealers Duty of Disclosure," Pennsylvania Law Weekly, September 27, 2001
    • "Discharge of At-Will Employees in New Jersey," Defense Digest, Volume 7, No. 4, August 2001 
    • "The Architect's Conditional Privilege to Interfere with the Construction Contract of its Principal," Defense Digest, Volume 7, No. 4, August 2001 
    • "New Jersey Appellate Division Concludes that the Manifest Trigger Applies for Only First-Party Property Damage Coverage Involved," Defense Digest, Volume 6, No. 5, October 2000 
    • "New Jersey Limits Accountants Liability in Securities Fraud Actions," Defense Digest, Vol. 6, No. 4, June 2000
    • "New Jersey Rejects Claims for Bad Faith Settlement of Asbestos-Related Personal Injury Claims," Defense Digest, Vol. 6, No. 4, June 2000 
    • "Federal Court, Under Judicial Estoppel Theory, Rejects Plaintiff's Claims For Disability Under the ADA and NJLAD," Defense Digest, Vol. 6, No. 2, April 2000 
    • "New Jersey Limits Accountant's Liability in Review Engagements," Defense Digest, Volume 6, No. 1, February 2000 
    • "Proving the Empty Chair Defense In New Jersey Product Liability Actions," Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 2, 1999 
    • "New Jersey Accounting Malpractice Update," Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 3, 1999 
    • "New Jersey Supreme Court Rejects Learned Intermediary Doctrine," Defense Digest, Oct. Vol. 5, No. 5, 1999
    • Successfully defended an action in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County, and obtained dismissal of a legal malpractice action involving $12 million in liquidated damages arising out of two underlying Law Division actions, two bankruptcy matters, a Federal District Court action, an Appeal to the Third Circuit, underlying foreclosure and Note actions, and an appeal to the Appellate Division. Jack represented a well-known bankruptcy practitioner in connection with claims made by the plaintiff borrower against the lender bank, its officers, and counsel.
    • Obtained a defense verdict in an action recently tried in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County, in which Jack represented a boutique New York firm in connection with their representation of a money manager in a construction defect case involving millions of dollars in damages.  Jack, during trial, was successful in getting the malpractice claims dismissed.  Jack then proceeded to argue the insured’s Counterclaim for fees due and owing.  The jury found in our favor, and entered a Judgement against the plaintiff on our Counterclaim in the approximate amount of $250,000.00.  Then, the Court awarded contractual interest (which is discretionary), taking the total award in favor of our client against the plaintiff to almost $500,000.00.
    • Obtained a defense verdict in a matter tried in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Burlington County, involving a New York firm who was sued in connection with the failure to properly prosecute a Title 7 retaliation case.  Jack tried the case-within-a-case Title 7 case, and the jury found that there was no causation for the legal malpractice action because the plaintiff’s employer rightfully terminated the plaintiff, and that there was no retaliation by the employer.
    • Obtained a defense verdict in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Gloucester County in favor of a land use planning attorney arising out of claims of negligent land use planning and land development, which arose out of the faulty design of a drainage system for a new development.
    • Successfully defended in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hunterdon County, an architect in connection with claims asserted by homeowners for water infiltration, mold growth, personal injuries, and permanency in a multi-defendant action against builders, developers, architects, and engineers relative to the design of a solar panel system.
    • Successful at trial in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County in the defense of manufacturers of keyboards, and in defense of claims for orthopedic injuries against the manufacturers of keyboards.  This was the first test case tried in New Jersey. Jack tried this case for weeks, resulting in a defense verdict for the computer keyboard industry.
    • Successful at trial in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Cape May County, in a complex legal malpractice action where the Court entered a direct verdict after a trial lasting months involving claims by a developer against the lending bank and bank counsel for lender liability and fraud.
    • Successfully obtained a dismissal in a Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County, case on behalf of a County Utilities Authority in an action by a developer against Municipalities, the Utilities Authorities, the Freeholders, and the Counties arising out of the developer’s claim, in an affordable housing development, that the Municipalities refused to provide consent to permit water service for the property, and failed to facilitate the development of affordable housing.
    • Successful at trial in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Ocean County, in a complex legal malpractice action arising out of a claim that the real estate/business law firm failed to properly document a multi-million dollar transaction, failed to properly ascertain the true owner of the property, and failed to properly investigate the Title to the property and undertake a Title search. Jack successfully argued at trial that the real estate attorney had a limited scope of engagement, and was only required to draft transaction documents based upon information provided by the clients.
    • Cureton Clark, P.C. v. William H. Lewis, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of Irma B. Lewis, Superior Court of New Jersey, Burlington County, Chancery Division – Probate Part, Docket No:  2008-0644. In this case, Jack defended the Counterclaim filed by the Administrator of an Estate against the attorneys who handled the probate litigation. The attorneys were retained to defend the probate case which involved the challenge of gifts. Following the resolution of that litigation, the attorneys filed an action against the Estate for non-payment of fees.  The Estate filed a Counterclaim and a Third Party Complaint against the attorneys, alleging legal malpractice, fraud, and misrepresentation in connection with the attorney's handling of the underlying probate case and their billings. The Complaint and Counterclaim were tried in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Burlington County, Chancery Division – Probate Part. Jack defended the Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint. After a trial spanning several weeks, the Court issued its opinion on October 18, 2013 dismissing all claims in the Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint, and also awarding fees to our clients. The Court found that the services performed by our clients were not performed in bad faith or for the purpose to gain fees in the underlying case. The Court found that there was no dishonesty, fraud or deceit on the part of the attorneys in their billings. The Court did not find any deceit, fraud, or dishonesty by the attorneys. Also, the Court agreed with our position, pursuant to Camden Iron v. Klehr, 384 N.J. Super. 172 (App. Div. 2006), that there is no independent cause of action in New Jersey based upon the Rules of Professional Conduct. The Court also found that there was no showing by clear and convincing evidence of any material misrepresentations by the attorneys.
    • Johnson v. McClellan, 468 N.J. Super. 562 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 249 N.J. 76 (2021). Jack was retained by a prominent law school to represent on appeal one of its professors who had been charged with the unauthorized practice of law, which resulted in the Trial Court entering a Judgment against the professor for hundreds of thousands of dollars, including treble damages and attorneys’ fees because of his acceptance of a referral fee in a malpractice case.  The plaintiff argued, and the trial Judge found, that the professor violated New Jersey’s Criminal Statute for the unauthorized practice of law.  Jack was retained to brief and argue the appeal.  The Appellate Court reversed the Trial Court, reversed the finding that the professor engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, and reversed the Trial Court’s Judgment which had been entered against the professor for treble damages and fees.  The Supreme Court denied plaintiff’s Petition for Certification.  This decision could spare others from criminal prosecution under New Jersey’s Criminal Statute related to the unauthorized practice of law.
    • Schwartz v. Cooper Levenson, 251 N.J. 556 (2022).  Jack argued before the New Jersey Supreme Court in this precedent-setting case in connection with whether the New Business Rule constitutes a per se bar on all lost profits claimed by new businesses.  This opinion applies in any type of case in which a new business is making a claim for lost profits.  The Supreme Court agreed with Jack’s argument that if the Court intended to amend the rule, then they should follow the New York and Illinois rule, which provides that such claims must be proven by reasonable certainty.  Jack convinced the Supreme Court to apply New York and Illinois law to find that, with regard to a new business, the reasonable certainty standard applies to claims for lost profits.  This decision will apply to all cases in which a new business is making a claim for lost profits.  The Supreme Court ruled, pursuant to Jack’s argument, that Trial Courts must now “carefully scrutinize” a new business’  lost profits claim, and should bar that claim unless it can be proven with reasonable certainty.  
    • Mystic Isle Development Corp. v. Perskie & Nehmad, 142 N.J. 310 (1995). This case is a precedent-setting case in New Jersey juris prudence. Jack successfully argued before the New Jersey Supreme Court that the Entire Controversy Doctrine applied to attorneys and law firms. This case is regularly cited in opinions by the Appellate Division and the New Jersey Supreme Court regarding the application of the Entire Controversy Doctrine.
    • Lynch v. NJ Education Association, 161 N.J. 152 (1999). Jack successfully argued in the New Jersey Supreme Court on behalf of an editor, in a public figure defamation case, that the plaintiff, a State Senator, was a public official and public figure. The plaintiff argued that the campaign literature was defamatory, including an article entitled “Boss of Bosses,” which was published in a local newspaper.  The Senator alleged that the advertisement described him not merely as associated with organized crime, but as its top official.  The Supreme Court held that the statement in the newspaper was not defamatory.  The Supreme Court also held that the facts in the newspaper advertisement that the Senator had been a partner and an officer in three mob-owned companies, and had mobsters as business partners and clients, did not support the assertion that the Senator was the boss of bosses of the mafia.  The Court found that readers of the newspaper articles would understand the statements to be hyperbole and name-calling, emanating from a rough-and-tumble political campaign.  The Court found that the Senator’s proofs did not demonstrate that a jury could find by clear and convincing evidence that the editor published the statements with actual malice.
    • 2820 Mt. Ephraim Ave. v. Brown, A-2694-19/A-2699-19 (App. Div. July 13, 2021).  Jack successfully argued pre-trial Motions for Summary Judgment in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Camden County, in a $10,000,000 tortious interference and defamation case filed on behalf of investors against an attorney and bank counsel arising out of a multi-million dollar loan for a commercial land transaction. The allegations against the attorney included claims of slander for allegedly calling the plaintiff a “wannabe gangster” in front of a potential investor, as well as a claim for tortious interference with prospective economic advantage for a contract that plaintiff entered into with the investor.  The Trial Court granted the Motions, and found that calling plaintiff a “wannabe gangster” was name-calling, and not actual defamation.  On appeal, the Appellate Division affirmed the Trial Court’s holding, and held that the statement “wannabe gangster” does not constitute slander per se because it did not impute a criminal offense, and did not necessarily assign the plaintiff a characteristic that was incompatible with his business or trade as an attorney and accountant. The Appellate Division agreed with the Trial Court that the statement fell within the litigation privilege.  The Appellate Division affirmed the Trial Court’s Order which granted the attorneys’ Motion for Summary Judgment because the defamation claim was barred by the litigation privilege.
    • Camden Iron & Metal, Inc. v. Klehr Harrison, 384 N.J. Super. 172 (App. Div., certif. denied), 187 N.J. 83 (2006). This is a seminal case in New Jersey in which Jack successfully appealed the decision of the trial court. The Appellate Division ruled that New Jersey courts do not have the authority to regulate attorney conduct in Pennsylvania simply because the attorneys are admitted in New Jersey and have offices in New Jersey. Also, the court ruled that forum non conveniens Motions for Disqualification must be filed in the jurisdiction where the underlying litigation is pending. The court also ruled that the Rules for Professional Conduct do not provide a basis for a legal malpractice action. The New Jersey Supreme Court denied plaintiff's petition for certification. 
    • Morris Properties, Inc. v. Jonathan Wheeler, et al., A-2653-20 (App. Div. February 28, 2023). Jack successfully argued on appeal, in a legal malpractice action arising out of an underlying complex insurance coverage litigation in the United States District Court, that in legal malpractice actions, proximate cause requires an initial determination of cause in fact, which requires proof that the result complained of probably would not have occurred but for the negligent conduct of the defendant.  Also, Jack made the point that a plaintiff must then present evidence to support a finding that the defendant’s negligent conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about plaintiff’s injury, even though there may be other concurrent causes of the harm.  In addition, Jack successfully argued that a plaintiff must show what injuries were suffered as a proximate consequence of the attorney’s breach of duty, ordinarily measured by the amount that a client would have received but for the attorney’s negligence.  Also, the client must have sustained actual damage that is real, not merely speculative.  It is the plaintiff’s burden to show what injuries were suffered as a proximate consequence of the attorney’s breach of duty.  In Morris Properties, at the trial level, Jack argued that plaintiffs did not present expert testimony to demonstrate that the plaintiff would have prevailed in its coverage case against the carrier, or would have received a greater settlement had the attorneys met the standard of care.  The Appellate Division agreed that plaintiffs failed to establish proximate cause as a matter of law, and that expert testimony was necessary to prove proximate causation and damages. Plaintiffs did submit an expert report.  
    • Borough Construction, Inc. v. Lenape Reg. High School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. DiGeronimo/Mikula Assoc., 445 Fed. Appx. 498 (3d Cir. 2011). Jack Slimm and Dante Rohr had the privilege of representing the nationally recognized expert in the design of running tracks in an action in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey.  Our client developed the standards used in the industry for running tracks, including those at the Olympic level where he has designed running tracks.  In the litigation, the school district brought suit against numerous contractors, designers, etc. for defects in the high school.  The co-defendants settled at mediation leaving in the case the general contractor for his retainage, and our client, who designed the running track.  The school district alleged, through their expert, that the running track was not properly certified, was not properly built, and was not certifiable.  Therefore, the school district had a new track installed at considerable expense.  This track was a "double bend" or "broken-back" configuration.  (You might recall seeing that design when you watched the Olympics on television).  In any event, the case involved some courtroom drama because the school district took the risk of re-calling their expert engineer on rebuttal.  When he was re-called, he changed his opinion.  When asked by the Federal judge why he changed his testimony, the plaintiff's expert testified, "I was confused by Mr. Slimm's cross-examination."  That cross-examination came through the geometric calculations which were done at counsel table by New Jersey's resident electrical engineer, Dante Rohr, who gave Jack the numbers on the fly so that Jack could cross-examine plaintiff's expert.  It worked, and the expert was discredited.  The court, after findings of fact and conclusions of law, rejected the opinions of plaintiff's expert, and entered Judgment in favor of our client dismissing all claims.
    • Shapiro v. Rinaldi, A-1753-14T4 (App. Div. March 18, 2016). Jack successfully argued at the Trial Court and on appeal that the law firm had no liability for the actions of the non-lawyer assistant to advise clients with respect to their legal rights, including advising clients of deadlines to file a claim. Jack was successful in arguing that the plaintiff’s expert’s reliance on the Rules of Professional Conduct was not sufficient to make out a cause of action for legal malpractice. Also, this opinion is significant because, in the same, the Appellate Division held that, with solo practitioners, the attorney took responsibility to ensure that his secretary/paralegal complied with his professional obligations. In addition, the Appellate Division rejected the plaintiff’s claim that the attorney should be held vicariously liable for his secretary’s oversight. Significantly, the Court held that the attorney’s secretary was not an attorney, and owed no duty to the plaintiff.
    • Broadway Family Practice v. Willitts (Successful defense of appeal in App. Div. under Docket No: A-3700-04T1) (App. Div. 2005). In this Appellate Decision argued by Jack, the court held that the Entire Controversy Doctrine does apply to bar legal malpractice if the attorney commits malpractice in the course of handling a case and the client becomes aware of the facts supporting the potential claim while the case is still pending. The malpractice action against the attorney must be joined with the underlying lawsuit, or it will be barred by the Entire Controversy Doctrine. The Entire Controversy Doctrine applied in that case because in April of 1997, when the underlying Chancery Division action was pending, the law was such in New Jersey that the attorney could have and should have been joined as a defendant pursuant to Mystic Isle Development Corp. v. Perskie & Nehmad, 142 N.J. 310 (1995), a case which Jack successfully argued in the New Jersey Supreme Court. 
    • Shamrock Lacrosse, Inc. v. Klehr, Harrison, Harvey, Branzburg & Ellers, LLP, 416 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2010). Jack successfully argued in the Appellate Division in a complex legal malpractice action arising out of the allegedly negligent omissions made by a patent attorney who had worked, in succession, at two law firms.  The Complaint alleged that the attorney failed to assure that certain renewal fees necessary to maintain plaintiff’s patent were paid to the United States Patent & Trademark Office (the “USPTO”).  Consequently, the patent expired, and plaintiff was unable to get it reinstated.  As a result, plaintiff claimed that it suffered economic harm.  In this precedent-setting case, the Appellate Division held that under New Jersey’s Affidavit of Merit Statue, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-26 to -29, law firms are “licensed persons” for which an Affidavit of Merit is required under the Statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27.  The Court held that it would be anomalous to allow a plaintiff to evade the Affidavit of Merit requirement by suing only the professional entities (here the law firms), and not the principals, partners, shareholders, and employees of those firms who actually provided the professional services in question.  In addition, the Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the Complaint fell, at least in part, outside the scope of N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-27 because it substantively asserted various other causes of action in additional legal malpractice.  The Court found that the other claims were “simply labels for a cause of action, the essence of which is one sounding in legal malpractice.  Accordingly, the Affidavit of Merit obligation applied to the entire Complaint.
    • Soult v. Mattioni, Ltd., A-A-2619-07T2 (App. Div. February 20, 2009), Jack successfully argued at the trial level, and then on appeal, that attorneys handling toxic tort cases do not have an obligation to shop for a new expert when they receive an unfavorable opinion. In this key case, the Appellate Division held that there is nothing to support a plaintiff’s claim and a plaintiff’s expert opinion that it is the standard to continue to shop for a favorable expert once unfavorable reports are rendered. The Court made the point that without liability, damages are pointless. This is the only Appellate Division case on this issue. Attorneys are not required to shop around for a better or different expert in order to prove liability. Once the attorney receives an opinion from a competent expert (whether on the defense side of the plaintiff side), there is no continued duty to shop for a favorable expert in an attempt to get a better or different opinion.
    • Merrick Wilson; Presidential Hill, LLC;  and Pennington Hills, LLC v. Robert A. Gladstone, Esq. and Charles J. Casale, Jr., Esq., A-1774-11T1 (App. Div. May 17, 2013). In this case, Jack successfully argued at trial, and on appeal, in this multi-million dollar land use planning matter, where plaintiffs brought a legal malpractice claim against the defendant zoning counsel, who was retained to challenge Hopewell Township’s Zoning Ordinance. In the case, the plaintiff/developer argued that the attorney failed to Subpoena NJDEP personnel to testify at trial that the Town used improper methodology to support its conclusions as to the availability of water for residential development on the property. The Appellate Division held that it was speculative for plaintiffs to argue that the DEP would have provided a letter opinion or testified at the trial. It was purely speculative as to what the DEP engineer would have testified to at trial, and whether it would have been favorable to the plaintiffs’ position.
    • Twp. of Gloucester v. Maryland Casualty, 702 F. Supp. 1126 (D. N.J. 1987). Jack was lead counsel in this environmental coverage case. This was the first case in New Jersey to establish the doctrine of known risk in Law Division cases. The case involved $100 million in damages to the township property. 
    • Monsanto v. Lacy's Express, 5 F.3d 1490 (3d Cir. 1993). Jack argued as lead counsel and was successful in obtaining a dismissal based upon New Jersey's entire controversy doctrine. 
    • Trivedi v. Martin-Simmonds, A-3166-05T5 (App. Div., May 14, 2007). The Appellate Division affirmed an order for Summary Judgment obtained by Jack in a legal malpractice action against Allstate's defense counsel, where there was an underlying excess verdict. Jack successfully argued that the opinions of plaintiffs' experts were net opinions. The Appellate Division found that expert testimony is necessary in professional malpractice cases in order to establish both the applicable standard of care and whether damages were proximately caused by the alleged negligence of the attorney. This case is significant because in it the Appellate Division affirmed the order for Summary Judgment granted by the trial court in favor of the defense attorneys appointed by All State to defend their insured in the underlying litigation. Unfortunately, there was an excess verdict, which resulted in a legal malpractice action. Nevertheless, Jack was successful and the Appellate Division ruled that plaintiffs' experts referenced no judicial or statutory authority establishing the existence of a standard of care for defense attorneys when the client's monetary exposure over the policy limits places the client in jeopardy of substantial excess verdict. 
    • Torban v. Obermayer Rebmann Maxwell & Hippel, LLP, A-3660-05T3 (App. Div., June 27, 2007). Jack obtained a dismissal at trial, which was affirmed on appeal, on behalf of the law firm in connection with duty of attorneys regarding post-mortem tax planning. The case was decided pursuant to the Estate of Fitzgerald v. Linnus, A-6626-98T3 (App. Div. Jan. 22, 2001). This matter was affirmed on appeal. Jack was successful in arguing that the attorneys had no duty to the testator's son for post-mortem tax planning. The Court found that the estate plan drafted by the attorneys would have been affected had the testators followed the attorney's instructions regarding retitling certain assets. This case holds that attorneys retained to counsel an executor during administration of an estate are under no duty to advise regarding post-mortem estate planning options. 
    • Liberty Travel v. Friedman & Siegelbaum, A-4136-07T1 (App. Div. July 14, 2010).  In Liberty Travel, the legal malpractice action arose from a class action suit filed in Pennsylvania, arising out of claims for retaliatory termination, and violation of the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act.  In the malpractice action, Liberty claimed that the attorneys failed to obtain an extension of time to Answer the employee's Complaint, and that a default was entered and not vacated, resulting in a Judgment of $1,406,117.58 against Liberty.  The Court held that under the case-within-a-case Doctrine, Liberty was legally liable in the class action suit.  Although there were deviations from the standard of care, nevertheless there was no causal connection under Froom v. Perel, 377 N.J. Super. 298 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 185 N.J. 267 (2005).
    • Chulsky v. Hudson Law Offices, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29781 (D.N.J. March 22, 2011).  In this case of first impression, the Court granted the Motion to Dismiss with respect to the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act and the Truth In Consumer Contract Warranty & Notice Act claims brought by a debtor against a collection attorney arising out of the attorney's purchase of and attempts to collect a consumer debt.  The Court held that the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act does not reach the debt collection activities of a debt buyer of defaulted credit card debt.  It found that a debt buyer, while subject to regulation under the FDCPA and, perhaps, New Jersey's Collection Act or Criminal Statutes, is not a "seller" whose subsequent performance falls within the ambit of the NJCFA.
    • Morse v. Kaplan, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61201 (D.N.J. June 8, 2011).  In this Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claim against a collection attorney, the Court granted Summary Judgment when suit was brought stemming from two debt collection letters written by the attorney to the debtor.  
    • ACBB-BITS v. Clancey v. Lombardo, A-2734-09T1 (App. Div. November 21, 2011). Jack successfully defended an appeal in a complex economic dispute between a property owner, a commercial landlord, a real estate broker, and the attorney who represented the plaintiff-owner in Lease negotiations for an office building in New Jersey. In the Law Division, Jack was successful in obtaining an Order for Summary Judgment.  After the other defendants obtained dismissals, the matter was appealed. The Appellate Division agreed with Jack's argument that the Third Party Complaint filed by the real estate broker against the attorney did not state a claim because the broker and the attorney could never be deemed joint tortfeasors under New Jersey's Joint Tortfeasors Contribution Law.  Their alleged torts were separate in nature and time. The broker could not claim that he relied upon any representations of the attorney for the owner, nor that his firm represented them. New Jersey law does not provide a cause of action under these circumstances which the broker could pursue. Therefore, although the case was remanded in connection with the owner's claims against the broker for tort, breach of contract, and consumer fraud, the Appellate Division affirmed the Judgment.
    • 2025 New Jersey Judiciary Pro Bono Award Recipient

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Successful Defense of High‑Profile Condo Board Election Challenge as Court Dismisses Claims With Prejudice

Dismissal Obtained in a Complex Legal Malpractice Case

After four hearings, we obtained the dismissal of a complex legal malpractice action arising out of litigation in the U.S. District Court over the failed purchase of a Kia dealership in New Jersey. The plaintiff’s claims against our client, a well-known transactional lawyer with one of the largest firms in the United States, involved hundreds of thousands of dollars in fees and losses related to the investment in the dealership. Following the hearings, and a re-hearing, we obtained the dismissal because the plaintiff’s expert failed to tie in the damages to the alleged deviations in connection with the handling of the underlying transaction. Following the hearings, the court rejected the expert’s opinion on damages and then granted our application for a dismissal of the entire case.   

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Legal Updates for Lawyers' Professional Liability

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

July 29, 2026

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.

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New Jersey Appellate Division Affirms Exclusion of Legal Malpractice Expert as Impermissible Net Opinion

July 23, 2026

Jack Slimm and Jeremy Zacharias obtained a favorable decision on behalf of their client in a case centering on the admissibility of expert testimony in legal malpractice actions. In Martin v. Loury, the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed the exclusion of a plaintiff's legal malpractice expert, holding that the expert's opinions on causation and damages were too speculative to support the malpractice claim. The legal malpractice action arose from an underlying employment dispute involving claims for damages stemming from the breach of an employment agreement. The plaintiff alleged that defense counsel committed malpractice during a second trial by failing to recall the plaintiff as a rebuttal witness after the employer's CEO testified. According to the plaintiff's expert, additional rebuttal testimony would have bolstered the plaintiff's damages claims and led to a more favorable result. Both the trial court and the Appellate Division rejected that theory. The courts found that the expert could not explain how the proposed rebuttal testimony would have altered the outcome of the underlying case or resulted in any additional recoverable damages. Notably, the trial judge in the underlying employment matter had already rejected the CEO's testimony as not credible and had accepted the damages analysis advanced by the plaintiff. The court had also determined that the amount of damages was not genuinely disputed. As a result, the expert's opinion that additional rebuttal testimony would have produced a better outcome was unsupported by the record and based on speculation rather than evidence. The Appellate Division agreed that neither the plaintiff nor the expert could identify any actual damages attributable to the alleged malpractice or demonstrate the required element of proximate causation. The court further upheld the trial court's application of New Jersey's net opinion doctrine, finding that the expert failed to provide the necessary "why and wherefore" supporting his conclusion that the attorney's conduct caused a compensable loss. Because the opinions rested on unquantified possibilities rather than demonstrable facts, they were inadmissible. Key Takeaway for Legal Malpractice Defendants For attorneys and firms defending legal malpractice claims, Martin v. Loury underscores the importance of closely scrutinizing an opponent's expert report on the critical elements of proximate causation and damages. The decision demonstrates that a malpractice claim cannot survive where an expert merely speculates that different litigation tactics might have produced a better result. Instead, the plaintiff must present admissible expert testimony grounded in the record that explains how the alleged attorney error probably changed the outcome of the underlying matter and resulted in measurable damages.

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Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.

Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter

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Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter

Event

CLM 2026 Focus Conference

Allison joins three insurance industry leaders to discuss how cyber coverage disputes, the growing impact of social inflation on bodily injury claim valuation, and the use of artificial intelligence are reshaping the bad faith landscape. The panel will examine emerging sources of extra-contractual exposure, including evolving cyber insurance coverage issues and the challenges of accurately valuing bodily injury claims. Practical approaches to claim evaluation using AI, along with defense strategies designed to help prevent or successfully defend against bad faith litigation, will also be addressed. 

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Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

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The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.

Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

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Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

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Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

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Summary Judgment Obtained in Insurance Coverage Case

Marshall Dennehey Named a Standout in Litigation by BTI Consulting Group

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Marshall Dennehey Named a Standout in Litigation by BTI Consulting Group