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Insurance Agents & Brokers Liability

The Insurance Agents and Brokers Defense Practice Group at Marshall Dennehey is nationally recognized for its skillful representation of insurance professionals in complex civil litigation. With decades of collective experience, our attorneys provide sophisticated, results-driven defense to insurance agents, brokers, managing general agents, and other intermediaries facing professional liability claims. We understand the intricate regulatory frameworks, contractual obligations, and industry standards that govern the insurance marketplace, allowing us to craft defenses that reflect both legal prowess and practical business insight.

Our team regularly defends clients in claims alleging negligence, misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, failure to procure coverage, and errors in policy placement or renewal. We also handle disputes arising from alleged bad faith, premium miscalculations, claims denial and compliance violations. Whether the matter involves a single claim or a multi-jurisdictional class action, our attorneys have the depth of knowledge and trial experience necessary to protect our clients’ reputations and minimize their exposure.

Beyond litigation, our practice group emphasizes proactive risk management and claim prevention. We partner with insurance agencies and brokerages to conduct internal audits, develop best practices, and deliver training on evolving industry risks, emerging coverage issues, and regulatory developments. This preventative approach reflects our broader commitment to supporting our clients as trusted advisors, not just defenders, throughout the life of their businesses.

At Marshall Dennehy we understand that every claim against an insurance professional carries significant professional and reputational consequences. Our clients rely on us for strategic, efficient, and discreet representation that aligns with their long-term business goals. By combining deep industry knowledge with vigorous advocacy and an unwavering commitment to service, our Insurance Agents and Brokers Defense Practice Group stands at the forefront of protecting the professionals who keep the insurance industry moving.

Results

Philadelphia Commerce Court Grants Summary Judgment, Dismissing $2M Unfair‑Competition and Tortious‑Interference Claims

We obtained summary judgment dismissal, following Oral Argument, in a Philadelphia Commerce Court commercial litigation matter involving allegations of unfair competition and tortious inference with contract and business relationships, brought by one adult day care center against our client, a competing adult day care facility.  The plaintiff’s suit stemmed from alleged violation of regulations set forth by the Pennsylvania Department of Aging and its Office of Long-Term Living. The plaintiff’s final demand was $2 million, and no settlement offers were made before the trial court granted summary judgment.

Montgomery County Court Dismisses Lawsuit Against Insurance Broker

We obtained dismissal of our insurance broker client on Motion for Summary Judgment in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, Pennsylvania, on the basis of no duty breached, and lack of causation. Claimants asserted a professional negligence theory for allegedly allowing a commercial insurance policy to lapse, failing to notify the policyholder claimant of the lapse or cancellation, and allowing a subsequent gap in coverage to exist after the policy cancelled, when an underlying loss occurred. However, after completed discovery depositions and expert discovery, we successfully moved for summary judgment, arguing the policy cancelled because of the policyholder’s own failure to comply with premium audit requirements, rather than any liability or breach of standard of care by the insurance broker.

Thought Leadership

Legal Updates for Insurance Agents & Brokers

New Jersey Supreme Court Clarifies That Insurance Brokers, Producers, and Agents Are Not Exempt from Consumer Fraud Act Liability

August 25, 2026

On July 15, 2026, the New Jersey Supreme Court issued an opinion in James G. Lowe, M.D. v. Bernard Audet, wherein the Court addressed many prior conflicting opinions and held that insurance brokers, producers and agents are not exempt from the Consumer Fraud Act (“CFA”), N.J.S.A. 56:8-1, et. seq., under the “learned professional” exception as “semi-professionals” or otherwise. This opinion reversed a decision from the trial court and Appellate Division where the trial judge determined that insurance brokers, producers, and agents are exempt. The Supreme Court further indicates in a footnote “to the extent there is any distinction between insurance brokers, insurance producers, and insurance agents, none of those occupations are exempt from the CFA under any exception.” Plaintiff was a neurosurgeon who co-owned the medical practice he worked at, as well as several other unrelated businesses. The defendants were insurance brokers and producers who marketed, sold, produced and procured policies to and for Plaintiff and his medical practice for thirteen years. Such policies included loss related to disability. The defendants failed to advise plaintiff that business interests that were not related to his medical practice may have an effect on any benefits claims. However, plaintiff alleges he was advised by the defendants that, should he become disabled, he would receive maximum benefits under the policies. In 2021, plaintiff was diagnosed with a permanent vision condition that prevented him from performing neurosurgery. When the claim was made for maximum benefits under the policies plaintiff purchased from the defendants, only partial benefits were paid due to the other business interests plaintiff was involved in that were unrelated to his medical practice. Plaintiff filed suit against the defendants, which included a claim for violation of the CFA by negligently failing to obtain sufficient disability insurance for the plaintiff.  At the trial court level, the judge relied upon Plemmons v. Blue Chip Ins. Serv., Inc., 387 N.J. Super. 551 (App. Div. 2006) (holding that insurance brokers are “semi-professionals,” and are “excluded from liability under the CFA for the services they render within the scope of their professional licenses”),but acknowledged the competing appellate decision of Shaw v Shand, 460 N.J. Super. 592 (App. Div. 2019) (holding that the “learned professional” exemption is limited to “those professionals who have historically been recognized as ‘learned’ based on the requirement of extensive learning or erudition”).   The Supreme Court went through the history of opinions which addressed and set the standards for which the CFA applies and where there are exceptions for both “learned professionals” and “semi-professionals.” Ultimately, the Court ruled that insurance brokers do not fall under either the learned professional or semi-professional exception, and that semi-professionals like insurance brokers, producers and agents are not exempt from the CFA. 

Legal Updates for Insurance Agents & Brokers

Florida Second DCA Clarifies the Timing of Negligence Claims Against Insurance Brokers

August 25, 2026

One of the recurring issues in insurance broker malpractice litigation is determining when a negligence claim against a broker becomes ripe. The Florida Second District Court of Appeal recently addressed that question in Bullington Insurance Group, LLC v. Gordon, 427 So. 3d 632 (Fla. 2d DCA 2026), reaffirming that a negligence claim against an insurance broker does not accrue while a related coverage dispute with the insurer remains pending. In Bullington, the plaintiff was employed as a driver and was involved in an auto accident. His employer's insurance broker had requested that he be added to the employer's commercial policy, and the insurer confirmed the addition. However, when the policy renewed, the plaintiff was not listed as a driver and was not covered at the time of the accident. Default judgments were entered against the plaintiff and his employer in litigation arising from the accident. The plaintiff then filed suit against the insurer for breach of contract and policy reformation, and separately against the broker for negligence. The broker moved to dismiss the negligence count as premature, arguing the coverage dispute with the insurer had to be resolved first. The trial court denied the motion. The Second District granted certiorari and quashed the order. Applying its 2014 decision in Wells Fargo Insurance Services USA, Inc. v. Blackshear, 136 So. 3d 1235 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014), the court held that the negligence claim against the broker was entirely dependent on a finding that the accident was not covered under the employer's policy. If coverage were established, the claim against the broker would fail as a matter of course. Because the breach of contract and reformation claims against the insurer remained pending, the negligence count against the broker had not yet accrued. The court further addressed the appropriate remedy, rejecting the plaintiff's argument that abatement was warranted. The court distinguished cases holding that abatement is proper in the bad faith context, where an insured brings both an underlying coverage claim and a bad faith claim against the same insurer. Here, the broker and insurer were separate defendants, and Blackshear squarely held that dismissal without prejudice, not abatement, is the proper remedy for a premature broker negligence claim. This decision reinforces the practical significance of sequencing in insurance-related litigation. Where a plaintiff asserts simultaneous claims against both a carrier and a broker, defense counsel for the broker should promptly move to dismiss the broker negligence count as premature. Failure by the trial court to grant such relief constitutes a departure from the essential requirements of law.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

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Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.