Philadelphia
Located just blocks away from iconic City Hall, Marshall Dennehey is proud to call Philadelphia home. The growth and entrepreneurial spirit of our firm is paralleled by the innovative business spirit of Philadelphia, the epicenter of many life sciences, legal, energy, manufacturing, technology, financial, and biomedical and pharmaceutical enterprises.
The attorneys in our Philadelphia headquarters office represent a vast array of clients in civil litigation across virtually every practice area of the firm. We are leaders in the Philadelphia and Pennsylvania Bar Associations, the Philadelphia Association of Defense Counsel, the Lawyers’ Club of Philadelphia, the Insurance Society of Philadelphia and dozens of other regional, statewide and national legal and defense organizations.
We are deeply dedicated to the social, business, and charitable aspects of the Philadelphia metropolitan community and provide annual financial support to the United Way, the Philadelphia Bar Foundation, the Philadelphia Support Center for Child Advocates, and many other regional causes.
We invite you to visit us in Philadelphia, or in any of our 19 offices, where you will find an inclusive and winning corporate culture–we have been voted a “Best Places to Work” by the Philadelphia Business Journal for 13 consecutive years–and outstanding attorneys devoted to providing you with excellence in legal services.
Thought Leadership
Pennsylvania Supreme Court Holds Self-Referral Prohibition Does Not Cover Prescriptions Written by Physicians with Ownership Interests in Dispensing Pharmacies
June 19, 2026
700 Pharmacy v. Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Fee Review Hearing Office (State Workers’ Insurance Fund); Nos. 97, 98, 99, 100, 101 MAP 2024; decided June 16, 2026; by Justice Mundy. In this case, Drs. Miteswar Purewal and Shailen Jalali, treating physicians for workers’ compensation claimants, wrote prescriptions for various medications that were filled by 700 Pharmacy. The worker’s compensation insurer refused to pay for the prescriptions on the basis that they were illegal self-referrals under the Act. 700 Pharmacy subsequently filed fee review applications with The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Medical Fee Review Office. At a fee review hearing, both physicians stipulated they had a financial interest in the pharmacy. The physicians argued that the Anti-Referral Provision of the Act does not bar self-referrals on prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services, since the provision does not specifically identify prescription drugs. The Fee Review Hearing Officer rejected this argument and found that prescriptions for medications are prohibited under the “goods or services” language included in the provision. 700 Pharmacy appealed to the Commonwealth Court, and the court affirmed, agreeing with the Hearing Officer’s interpretation of “goods and services” as encompassing prescriptions. 700 Pharmacy appealed to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the Hearing Officer and the Commonwealth Court, holding that the term “goods and services” in the Anti-Referral Provision of the Act did not include prescriptions. According to the Court, “goods and services” was not a catch-all, but simply explanatory as to the eight enumerated categories in the provision. The provision (Section 306(f.1)(3)(iii)) reads, in pertinent part: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it is unlawful for a provider to refer a person for laboratory, physical therapy, rehabilitation, chiropractic, radiation oncology, psychometric, home infusion therapy or diagnostic imaging, goods or services pursuant to this section if the provider has a financial interest with the person or in the entity that receives the referral. The Court said that if the General Assembly wanted to specifically include prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services in the Anti-Referral Provision, they would have done so. They pointed out that prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services were included by the legislature in Section 306 (f.1)(3)(vi) of the Act as to reimbursement, and claimed that their omission from the Anti-Referral Provision supports the conclusion that those services are not included in the Anti-Referral Provision’s self-referral prohibition.
The Quarterly Dose
Pennsylvania Superior Court Clarifies Legal Standard for Jury Instruction on Increased Risk of Harm in Medical Malpractice Cases
June 11, 2026
Matthews v. Hosp. of the Univ. of Penn., 2026 WL 537727 (Unpublished) (Feb. 26, 2026) In this appeal, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania clarified in an important unpublished opinion, the requirements for plaintiffs to obtain a jury instruction on increased risk of harm in medical malpractice actions. At trial, the plaintiff presented expert testimony from a maternal fetal medicine expert that the attending physicians deviated from the standard of care by delaying C-section delivery after monitoring fetal heart rate decelerations. The plaintiff also elicited testimony from a pediatric neurologist that minor-plaintiff was at risk for stroke based on diminished fetal heart tracings and blood flow. Importantly, the plaintiff failed to present any expert testimony that the defendants’ alleged failure to timely initiate a C-section delivery caused or increased the risk of harm of minor-plaintiff’s injury. Prior to the jury charge, the court denied the plaintiff’s request for an instruction on increased risk of harm. Ultimately, the jury found that the defendants’ conduct was not the factual cause of minor-plaintiff’s harm and awarded no damages. The plaintiff appealed, asserting that the trial court’s decision to not charge the jury on increased risk of harm was a clear abuse of discretion and error of law. The Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Civil Jury Instructions provide for a “relaxed” causation charge under specific circumstances. This instruction on increased risk of harm provides, in relevant part, as follows: Where the plaintiff presents expert testimony that the negligent act or failure to act or delay on the part of the defendant has increased the risk of harm to the plaintiff, this testimony, if found credible, provides a sufficient basis from which you may find that the negligence was a factual cause of the injuries sustained. Pa. SSJI (Civ.) 14.20. On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed the trial court’s decision denying plaintiff’s request for an instruction on increased risk of harm. The court held that in order for plaintiffs to be entitled to the jury charge, they must provide expert testimony, to a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that the acts and omissions complained of could cause the type of harm suffered. Since the plaintiff failed to present expert testimony that the defendants’ alleged failure to timely initiate C-section delivery caused or increased the risk of harm of the brain injury suffered by minor-plaintiff, the plaintiff was not entitled to the increased risk of harm instruction at trial. The Superior Court’s decision is helpful for health care defendants, as it clarifies the legal standard necessary for plaintiffs to demonstrate a basis for instructing the jury on increased risk of harm, which has been diluted over time. Litigants in medical malpractice cases should cautiously analyze each element of expert testimony at trial to ensure this standard has been satisfied when it is anticipated the plaintiff will request an instruction on increased risk of harm.
Results
News
Veteran Trial Attorney Joseph M. Toddy Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Casualty Department in Philadelphia
June 22, 2026

Marshall Dennehey Again Earns Recognition in Distinguished Chambers USA
June 4, 2026

John J. Hare Featured in Pennsylvania & Delaware Super Lawyers Magazine
May 26, 2026 – Pennsylvania & Delaware Super Lawyers 2026
