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Mount Laurel

Our firm established its first office in New Jersey in 1984. Since that time, the office has experienced consistent growth. The Mount Laurel office is staffed by many long-time residents of New Jersey who handle professional liability, product liability, property and casualty and workers' compensation litigation. The counties covered by this office include Mercer, Monmouth, Ocean, Burlington, Camden, Middlesex, Gloucester, Atlantic, Salem, Cumberland and Cape May.

The Mount Laurel office provides our clients with a dedicated defense litigation team of professionals backed by the intellectual property and broad-based experience of the entire firm, permitting localized and economical representation of insurers and self-insured clients.

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Case Law Alerts

Fifth Circuit Enforces Deception Fraud Sublimit in Email Spoofing Loss Case

November 3, 2026

In Blue Compass RV, L.L.C. v. Twin City Fire Insurance Co., No. 25-10894 (5th Cir. June 5, 2026), the Fifth Circuit affirmed dismissal of a policyholder's suit seeking full crime-policy coverage after it wired $1,251,068.34 to a fraudster who had spoofed an email from its contractor with revised banking instructions. Blue Compass argued the loss should fall under its policy's higher-limit Computer and Funds Transfer Fraud provisions ($2,000,000), rather than the narrower Deception Fraud Insuring Agreement ($100,000, subject to a $25,000 retention), on the theory that the fraudster wasn't impersonating a "Vendor" as the policy defined that term. The court disagreed, holding the scheme fit squarely within Deception Fraud — an email impersonating a known business relation to induce payment — and that the policy's exclusion barring recovery under other insuring agreements for losses "resulting directly or indirectly from Deception Fraud" controlled, capping recovery at the $100,000 sublimit the insurer had already paid; the insurer's early tender of that amount, paired with a clean denial of the balance, left the insured without a viable bad-faith claim once the court read the policy's defined terms literally, and the case is a useful reminder for carriers to keep Deception/Social Engineering Fraud definitions and their cross-referenced exclusions tightly drafted, since that precise interplay is what defeated both the coverage and bad-faith claims here.

The Quarterly Dose

Medical Malpractice and AI: How the Federal Court’s Holding in United States v. Heppner Impacts HealthCare Litigation

August 26, 2026

For more than a century, civil law in the United States has protected the communications of litigants under a number of protections, including attorney client privilege and the work-product doctrine. That longstanding framework began to shift on February 17, 2026, when Judge Rakoff of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York took the first step toward modernizing privacy and confidentiality rules to address the ever looming issue of generative AI. In the landmark case of United States of America v. Bradley Heppner, 820 F. Supp. 3d 292 (2026), Judge Rakoff held that the documents a criminal defendant generated using Claude, a publicly available generative AI platform operated by Anthropic, were not privileged or protected as work product. The facts of Heppner include an indictment for a variety of alleged frauds and falsification of corporate records, which arose out of his alleged misconduct as an executive of multiple corporate entities. In conjunction with Mr. Heppner’s arrest, the FBI executed a search warrant of his home and seized numerous documents, including 31 documents which memorialized his communications with Claude. These documents covered particularly pertinent topics, such as defense strategies, possible arguments to specific facts or law he anticipated to be included in the indictment, and were prepared without any suggestion from his counsel to do so. By and through his counsel, Mr. Heppner asserted privilege over the documents generated by Claude. He argued (1) that the documents included information he had learned from his attorney; (2) were created for the purpose of speaking with counsel to obtain legal advice; and (3) had all been shared with counsel after they were created. Following oral argument on the government’s motion seeking a determination that the AI-generated documents were neither protected nor privileged, the court granted the motion on February 10, 2026. In issuing his opinion, Judge Rakoff determined that the AI documents lacked two, “if not all three,” of the elements required for attorney-client privilege—namely that the communications were not “between a client and his or her attorney,” the documents were not “intended to be” or were “in fact” kept confidential, and the AI documents were not prepared by Mr. Heppner “for the purpose of obtaining legal advice.” Put simply, Judge Rakoff noted that, “Because Claude is not an attorney, that alone disposes of Heppner’s claim of privilege.” Ultimately, Judge Rakoff concluded that, as the generated documents were not prepared at the request of Mr. Heppner’s counsel and did not disclose his attorney’s strategies, they failed to merit protections as work-product and were thus discoverable by the government. The ramifications of Heppner will likely cause many changes in litigation practices as a direct result of the increased use of generative AI. Indeed, use of generative AI has exploded as of late. Recent data from Sciencedirect.com shows that the top 40 generative AI tools received nearly 3 billion monthly visits worldwide in March 2024 alone. Even Judge Rakoff noted the ever-growing prevalence of AI use, stating that “more than half of United States households have adopted AI in some form.” While Heppner involved a criminal case, the holding will similarly be applicable to civil matters. It is incumbent on health care litigators to thoughtfully engage in discovery to determine whether plaintiffs consulted a generative AI platform in relation to their case. In practical use, this could be completed by questioning plaintiffs at deposition regarding whether they have asked ChatGPT, Claude, or one of the dozens of other generative AI platforms regarding the possible value of their cases, advice on what to say during a deposition, or a number of other queries. Likewise, these questions could be directed to a plaintiff via an Interrogatory or Request for Admissions. Regardless the avenue of questioning, it is paramount for attorneys to test the boundaries of courts across the country which are only now braving the new world intersections of AI, privacy, and privilege.

Results

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Jury Defense Verdict Secured in High-Profile Employment Law Case in New Jersey

Jury Defense Verdict Secured in High-Profile Employment Law Case in New Jersey

Dismissal Obtained in New Jersey Realtor Liability Case

Dismissal Obtained in New Jersey Realtor Liability Case

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Firm Highlights

Marshall Dennehey Shareholders Recognized as Florida Trend Legal Elite Notable Women Leaders in Law

News

Marshall Dennehey Shareholders Recognized as Florida Trend Legal Elite Notable Women Leaders in Law

Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

News

Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

Result

Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

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Result

Summary Judgment Obtained in Insurance Coverage Case

Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter

Result

Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter

Marshall Dennehey Named a Standout in Litigation by BTI Consulting Group

News

Marshall Dennehey Named a Standout in Litigation by BTI Consulting Group

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Event

CLM 2026 Focus Conference

Allison joins three insurance industry leaders to discuss how cyber coverage disputes, the growing impact of social inflation on bodily injury claim valuation, and the use of artificial intelligence are reshaping the bad faith landscape. The panel will examine emerging sources of extra-contractual exposure, including evolving cyber insurance coverage issues and the challenges of accurately valuing bodily injury claims. Practical approaches to claim evaluation using AI, along with defense strategies designed to help prevent or successfully defend against bad faith litigation, will also be addressed.