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Disciplinary Board Representation

Representing attorneys and professionals in disciplinary actions is a unique area of litigation and requires understanding of disciplinary boards and how they function.  

While everyone likes surprises, not all surprises are well-liked, and this is especially true if you receive notification from a state disciplinary board that your actions have been reported as violating the code of conduct governing your profession. Should you receive notification from a disciplinary board, court or agency that you are being reported or investigated for potential violations of the code of conduct governing your profession, turn to Marshall Dennehey.

Our attorneys are well-versed in the procedures and process of defending attorneys and professionals from allegations of ethics violations, and understand the delicate balance between vigorously contesting discipline and accepting responsibility for errors that is required in this area of practice.   

We defend and advise all manner of licensed professionals facing potential professional discipline before the disciplinary boards, courts and/or agencies in Pennsylvania, Ohio, New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, Delaware and Florida.

In addition to lawyers and judges, we represent accountants, realtors, property managers, medical professionals, and more. As a trusted leader in this area of law, clients can rely on the depth of our experience defending these matters, combined with our physical office presence in each of the above jurisdictions.

Our ability to collaborate on legal strategy and coordinate defense efforts between our respective offices allows our clients to realize significant cost-savings. We facilitate timely outcomes in disciplinary matters so that our clients can continue their professional activities with minimal interruption. Our goal is to effectively advocate for clients throughout the disciplinary process, while also being cognizant of the client's cost and time expenditures.

We welcome the opportunity to work with you in addressing any disciplinary matters that you may be faced with, and will strive to ensure that your options are understood and your interests are protected.

Results

Thought Leadership

Legal Updates for Lawyers' Professional Liability

Legal Updates for Lawyers’ Professional Liability - 2023 to Present

December 31, 2025

Legal Updates for Lawyers' Professional Liability, September 2025 Legal Updates for Lawyers' Professional Liability, July 2025 Legal Updates for Lawyers’ Professional Liability, April 2025 Legal Updates for Lawyers’ Professional Liability, February 2025 Legal Updates for Lawyers’ Professional Liability, November 2024 Legal Updates for Lawyers’ Professional Liability, September 2024 Legal Updates for Lawyers’ Professional Liability, July 2024 Legal Updates for Lawyers’ Professional Liability, May 2024 Legal Updates for Lawyers’ Professional Liability, February 2024 Legal Updates for Lawyers’ Professional Liability, November 2023 Legal Updates for Lawyers’ Professional Liability, September 2023 Legal Updates for Lawyers’ Professional Liability, August 2023 Legal Updates for Lawyers’ Professional Liability, May 2023 Legal Updates for Lawyers’ Professional Liability, April 2023 Legal Updates for Lawyers’ Professional Liability, January 2023

Legal Updates for Lawyers' Professional Liability

Legal Updates for Lawyers’ Professional Liability – RESULTS*

September 1, 2025

Alesia Sulock (Philadelphia, PA) obtained a defense jury verdict in a legal malpractice matter in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. Plaintiff had retained an attorney to represent her in a personal injury matter. At the plaintiff’s instruction, the attorney settled the personal injury matter pre-suit, after which the plaintiff complained that the attorney should have waited for additional medical records and/or filed suit before advising her to settle her claims. After a one-week trial, the jury returned with a verdict in favor of the defense, finding that the attorney defendant had not committed legal malpractice in the form of negligence or breached the attorney’s contract for legal services with the plaintiff.  John ‘Jack’ Slimm (Mount Laurel, NJ) and Thomas Specht (Scranton, PA) successfully defended an appeal in the Third Circuit Court. This appeal arose out of an order for summary judgment we obtained in the District Court which dismissed a teacher’s complaint against the school district and the school district’s counsel arising out of tenure charges, which had been affirmed by the New Jersey Superior Court.  Jack was also successful on behalf of a well-known estate practitioner before the New Jersey Disciplinary Review Board. The Board found no clear and convincing evidence of unethical conduct and dismissed the plaintiff’s appeal.  Kimberly House and Oswald Clark (both of Philadelphia, PA) successfully defended the plaintiffs’ appeal from a verdict obtained by Aaron Moore and Alesia Sulock (both of Philadelphia) for our client in a legal malpractice claim. During the case, the trial court partially granted our motion for judgment on the pleadings, which dismissed several tort claims and a claim for unfair trade practices. The matter then proceeded to trial on the remaining breach of contract claim. The jury returned a verdict in favor of our client. The plaintiffs appealed, challenging the rulings on the motion for judgment on the pleadings and a motion in limine that purportedly precluded the plaintiffs from introducing certain evidence. The Superior Court affirmed in a unanimous decision, holding that the plaintiffs’ tort claims were barred by the statute of limitations and that the plaintiffs’ argument regarding the trial court’s decision on the motion in limine was waived because they failed to properly develop the argument in their appellate brief.  Matthew Flanagan (New York, NY) succeeded in obtaining a pre-answer dismissal of malpractice claims against a Brooklyn attorney who allegedly failed to advise his former client of the exposure he faced in a fraud lawsuit. The former client claimed that he understood the risk of losing at trial, but his attorney failed to advise him that he would be liable for pre-verdict interest, which amounted to over $389,000. Additionally, the plaintiff alleged the attorney failed to seek a set off based on a co-defendant’s settlement. We argued that documentary evidence, including emails the plaintiff denied receiving, established his awareness of the potential exposure. We also argued that the plaintiff would need to pay the amount of the judgment, less the set off which he would have received, before he claimed to have been damaged by the failure to seek the set off. The court agreed with both arguments and dismissed the complaint against our client.  Michael Jacobson (New York, NY) successfully secured the dismissal of fraud, RICO, and civil conspiracy claims against a New Jersey attorney and law firm sued in New York. In a pre-answer motion to dismiss, Michael effectively argued that the court lacked jurisdiction over our clients because they lacked sufficient contacts with New York under New York’s general jurisdiction and long arm jurisdiction statutes. The court agreed and dismissed the claims against our clients.  Scott Eberle (Pittsburgh, PA) secured dismissal of a surcharge complaint filed in Orphans’ Court against an attorney for the administrator of the estate. The surcharge complaint was filed by a beneficiary of the estate under a third-party beneficiary theory. The beneficiary alleged the attorney for the administrator was negligent in his representation of the administrator in his capacity as fiduciary to the estate. The Orphans’ Court granted our preliminary objections and dismissed the surcharge complaint against the attorney on the basis that the Orphans Court did not have statutory authority over the attorney for the fiduciary in order to impose a surcharge for alleged loss to an estate. The court also found that the beneficiary could not plead facts to establish a third-party beneficiary claim under Guy v. Liederbach. Jeremy Zacharias (Mount Laurel, NJ) tried an arbitration before a three-member panel of the Fee Arbitration Committee. The allegations in response to the failure to pay the legal fees owed involved allegations of ethical violations in the handling of a highly-contested matrimonial matter. A large portion of the representation involved responding to the allegations of RPC violations and failure to communicate with the client regarding the litigation status and marital support. This matter was originally tried, and the Disciplinary Review Board remanded and referred this matter to the Office of Attorney Ethics to investigate the allegations of RPC violations. The hearing on remand addressed the proprietary of the fee and ruled in favor of our client for 100% of the fee. *Prior Results Do Not Guarantee a Similar Outcome    Legal Updates for Lawyers’ Professional Liability – September 2025 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Holds Self-Referral Prohibition Does Not Cover Prescriptions Written by Physicians with Ownership Interests in Dispensing Pharmacies

700 Pharmacy v. Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Fee Review Hearing Office (State Workers’ Insurance Fund); Nos. 97, 98, 99, 100, 101 MAP 2024; decided June 16, 2026; by Justice Mundy.   In this case, Drs. Miteswar Purewal and Shailen Jalali, treating physicians for workers’ compensation claimants, wrote prescriptions for various medications that were filled by 700 Pharmacy. The worker’s compensation insurer refused to pay for the prescriptions on the basis that they were illegal self-referrals under the Act. 700 Pharmacy subsequently filed fee review applications with The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Medical Fee Review Office. At a fee review hearing, both physicians stipulated they had a financial interest in the pharmacy.  The physicians argued that the Anti-Referral Provision of the Act does not bar self-referrals on prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services, since the provision does not specifically identify prescription drugs. The Fee Review Hearing Officer rejected this argument and found that prescriptions for medications are prohibited under the “goods or services” language included in the provision. 700 Pharmacy appealed to the Commonwealth Court, and the court affirmed, agreeing with the Hearing Officer’s interpretation of “goods and services” as encompassing prescriptions. 700 Pharmacy appealed to the Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the Hearing Officer and the Commonwealth Court, holding that the term “goods and services” in the Anti-Referral Provision of the Act did not include prescriptions. According to the Court, “goods and services” was not a catch-all, but simply explanatory as to the eight enumerated categories in the provision. The provision (Section 306(f.1)(3)(iii)) reads, in pertinent part: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it is unlawful for a provider to refer a person for laboratory, physical therapy, rehabilitation, chiropractic, radiation oncology, psychometric, home infusion therapy  or diagnostic imaging, goods or services pursuant to this section if the provider has a financial interest with the person or in the entity that receives the referral. The Court said that if the General Assembly wanted to specifically include prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services in the Anti-Referral Provision, they would have done so. They pointed out that prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services were included by the legislature in Section 306 (f.1)(3)(vi) of the Act as to reimbursement, and claimed that their omission from the Anti-Referral Provision supports the conclusion that those services are not included in the Anti-Referral Provision’s self-referral prohibition.

Thought Leadership

Perlmutter Provides Predictability for Punitive Damages Claims in Florida

In a much anticipated decision, the Florida Supreme Court provided clarity for the standards of proof for punitive damages claims in Perlmutter v. Federal Insurance Company, SC2024-0058 (Fla. June 11, 2026). Litigants and trial judges must be mindful of the standards laid out by the Court. And, defense practitioners must be prepared to alter their strategies to defend against such claims. Perlmutter came to the Court from the Fourth District, based on conflict jurisdiction with decisions from the Second and Fifth District and on certification of a question of great public importance as to the standard of proof for punitive damages claims at the pleading stage. Fed. Ins. Co. v. Perlmutter, 376 So. 3d 24, 29 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023). In the underlying case, the Fourth District made two conclusions. First, it held that a “trial court must consider the evidentiary showing by all parties at the hearing on the motion to amend, that is, evidence ‘in the record’ and evidence ‘proffered by the claimant.’”  376 So. 3d at 33. Second, the Fourth held that it “interpreted section 768.72(1) and (2) to require the trial court to make a preliminary determination of whether a reasonable jury, viewing the totality of proffered evidence in the light most favorable to the movant, could find by clear and convincing evidence that punitive damages are warranted.  Id. at 34 (underscoring in the original). In making these conclusions, the court cautioned trial courts that the “preliminary determination” analysis did not entitle the trial court to decide whether the evidence is clear and convincing and noted that the trial court should not weigh evidence and should not determine witness credibility. Id. The Florida Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction and answered the certified question in the negative. It quashed the decision below and remanded the case for application of the following standards: The trial court should consider only the evidence identified or proffered by the claimant; it should not entertain an evidentiary counter-submission from the opponent. The trial court should consider whether a reasonable person could conclude based on the claimant’s evidence, that the defendant committed “intentional misconduct” or “gross negligence” as defined in section 768.72(2) or section 768.72(3). The trial court must review the request for punitive damages in the context of the underlying claims. The trial court should not apply the clear and convincing standard of proof in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence at the pleading stage. The trial court does not act as a fact-finder; the trial court must not weigh the claimant’s evidence—it cannot decide the truth of the matter. The trial court must consider the record evidence and the proffered evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, but the allegations in the proposed amended complaint are not themselves evidence. Perlmutter, SC2024-0058 at 13-15 (emphasis added). In explaining these standards, the Court interpreted the text of the statute and compared it to a related statute which governs punitive damages in the nursing home context. The nursing home statute expressly calls for evidentiary submissions by “the parties” and expressly tells the trial court to determine whether there is a reasonable basis to believe the claimant could satisfy the “clear and convincing evidence” standard at trial. Id. at 17-18 (comparing the text of section 768.72(1), Florida Statutes, with section 400.0237, Florida Statutes). Without that express language in section 768.72, the statute could not be applied in the same manner. With these standards specially delineated for the trial courts, the Court is “confident that its interpretation of section 768.72(1) will not frustrate the effectiveness of the statute in accomplishing the Legislature’s textually evident purposes.” Id.  at 22 (cleaned up). This remains to be seen. While Perlmutter provides predictability and clarity for trial courts when reviewing the evidentiary submissions in support of a punitive damages claim, the decision will not likely impact the numbers of punitive damages motions filed. Rather, these new parameters will change the way claims are defended, reminiscent of a time when rulings on punitive damages were only subject to certiorari review and appellate courts were limited in reviewing procedural errors. This decision will likely deflate the level-playing field that Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(G) addressed by allowing appeals of orders granting and denying punitive damages amendments. Further, Perlmutter may have impliedly created a call to action for the Legislature to amend section 768.72(1) in the same manner it amended section 400.0237 to allow the courts to analyze “admissible evidence submitted by the parties” and determine at a hearing whether there is a reasonable basis to believe the claimant at trial would be able to demonstrate by “clear and convincing evidence” that the recovery of punitive damages is warranted. Until then, defendants must adjust their strategies. To adapt to these new standards, defense practitioners will need to tailor their strategy for defending punitive damages claims since they can no longer submit a counter-proffer or urge a court to apply the clear and convincing standard at the pleading phase. Instead, defendants will need to attack the deficiencies in the claimant’s pleadings and proffer. If the trial court fails to serve as a gatekeeper, and does not apply the above standards, then defendants can pursue an interlocutory appeal under Rule 9.130(a)(3)(G). If a nonfinal appeal is taken, then defendants should move to stay any intrusive financial discovery while the appellate court analyzes the issues on appeal. Finally, defendants should utilize Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510 to serve as a screening device to allow the trial court to analyze all evidence and prevent nonmeritorious punitive damages claims from proceeding to a jury.

News

Marshall Dennehey’s John J. Hare Brings Home Attorney of the Year Honors; Firm Named Litigation Department of the Year in Two Categories

Marshall Dennehey took home top honors in three categories at the The Legal Intelligencer’s 2026 Pennsylvania Legal Awards, held June 11 in Philadelphia. The first place awards include: Attorney of the Year: John J. Hare, Chair of the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post-Trial Practice Group and Executive Committee member, together with Charles “Chip” Becker of Kline & Specter Litigation Department of the Year, Appellate – Third Win in a Row! Litigation Department of the Year, Product Liability/Mass Torts “There is no one more deserving of Attorney of the Year honors than John. This award is a testament to his exceptional skill, dedication, and leadership—qualities that truly exemplify the very best of our firm,” said G. Mark Thompson, Marshall Dennehey’s President & CEO. “These honors also reflect the strength and depth of our product liability, mass torts, and appellate practices across Pennsylvania and beyond, underscoring our ongoing commitment to delivering outstanding results for our clients.” Attorney of the Year – John J. Hare, Marshall Dennehey, together with Charles “Chip” Becker, Kline & Specter Over the past year, John and Charles were opposing counsel in many of the highest-profile civil appeals in Pennsylvania. John is renowned as a preeminent appellate lawyer on the defense side, and Chip on the plaintiff's side. They have opposed each other repeatedly, exhibiting peerless professionalism and exceptional civility, while zealously litigating under the unremitting pressure of high-profile litigation and record-setting verdicts totaling more than $3.5 billion. They have also collaborated, outside of litigation, on many commissions, committees, and projects of importance to the Pennsylvania judiciary and legal community. Litigation Department of the Year – Appellate Law, Winner (previous winner, 2025 and 2024) 2025 was another standout year for the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post‑Trial Practice Group, led by John J. Hare, which was retained to challenge many of Pennsylvania’s “nuclear” verdicts—awards exceeding $10 million. Notably, the department persuaded the Pennsylvania Superior Court to reverse a Philadelphia judgment of $1.09 billion, the largest judgment ever overturned by a Pennsylvania appellate court. The group’s 11 full‑time Pennsylvania‑based appellate lawyers are at the center of Pennsylvania’s most high-profile matters, bringing more than 150 years of combined appellate experience. They routinely handle post‑trial and appellate matters and are frequently engaged to participate in and monitor trials in high‑exposure cases to ensure that critical legal issues are properly raised and preserved for appeal. Litigation Department of the Year – Product Liability/Mass Torts, Winner This marks the first win for the firm’s Pennsylvania Product Liability and Mass Torts practices, which operate within our Casualty Department, managed by Matthew Schorr and Jeff Rapattoni. For almost five decades, Fortune 500 product manufacturers/distributors and their insurers have turned to these groups to defend their litigation. Led by Bradley D. Remick and Vlada Tasich, our Product Liability group’s success can be attributed to its commitment to keeping abreast of ever-changing legal theories, judicial viewpoints, and evolving technology impacting the product liability landscape. Our attorneys have successfully handled thousands of product liability matters in all jurisdictions across the state. Likewise, our mass tort litigation practice – divided into Asbestos & Mass Tort, and Environmental & Toxic Tort Litigation –  has defended manufacturers, distributors, contractors, and premises owners in thousands of personal injury and other claims. Led by Kevin E. Hexstall and Patrick T. Reilly, most attorneys in these groups have more than 20 years of experience, and our seasoned trial team has tried hundreds of cases to verdict, consistently achieving strong results through both trials and settlements. In addition to these awards, Marshall Dennehey was a Litigation Department of the Year finalist for Professional Liability.

Thought Leadership

Unanimous New Jersey Supreme Court Holds That Personal Emails of Public Employees and Officials are Subject to OPRA

In Rosetti v. Ramapo-Indian Hills Regional High School Board of Education, the New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously held that government-related emails, which are contained within personal email accounts, are government records under the Open Public Records Act (OPRA), and a log of those emails must be produced when requested. In reaching this decision, the court conducted an analysis of the OPRA and cited previous cases that held that emails do in fact fall within OPRA’s definition of a record and must be produced when requested pursuant to the Act. The court in Rosetti then had to answer the question as to whether public officials’ personal email accounts that are used for government purposes are subject to OPRA, and found that they are. Rosetti made an OPRA request to the Board of Education seeking email logs from Board members’ personal email accounts. The Board refused to produce the logs and indicated that it was not under any obligation to produce personal email account logs, only from government-related email accounts. The issue was whether a log had to be produced for Board members’ personal email accounts, which they used to conduct Board business. The Board argued that while it was possible to create a log for government-related email accounts through its IT Department, it was not possible to do so for personal email accounts. The court rejected this argument and ruled that Board members are required to search their personal email accounts and create a log of government-related emails housed in those accounts. Once completed, each Board member then must submit a certification detailing the searches that were conducted. The court went one step further with a suggestion to government employees and officials, stating, “[g]overnment agencies should strongly advise their employees, elected officials, and others engaged in government-related business to refrain from using their personal email accounts when conducting government-related business.”  Please do not hesitate to contact me with any questions regarding this case and others pertaining to the OPRA.