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Danielle M. Vugrinovich

Chair, Consumer Financial Services Litigation Practice Group

Portrait of Danielle M. Vugrinovich

Danielle serves as the chair of the Consumer Financial Services Litigation practice group, litigating Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claims brought by debtors against the collectors assigned to recover the debt.  Danielle also defends collectors in suits alleging claims for the violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act and Telephone Consumer Protection Act. She is frequently called on to speak nationally on topics related to the collection industry. She also dedicates a portion of her practice to mass and toxic torts relating to asbestos exposure.  Danielle’s asbestos practice includes all phases of litigation throughout the life of a case.  She also is experienced in handling premises liability, automobile accident cases, construction and general insurance defense.

Additionally, Danielle practices in the area of employment law relative to public and private entities. She has litigated federal claims brought pursuant to Title VII, the Family Medical Leave Act, Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, as well as pendant state law claims for whistleblower activities and violations of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. Danielle also has experience litigating employment cases at the administrative level before both the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission. Danielle also defends various professionals when they are sued for matters relating to their employment.   

In 1998, Danielle graduated from Duquesne University with a Bachelor of Arts in psychology. In 2001, she earned her juris doctor from Duquesne University School of Law.

    • Thomas R. Kline School of Law of Duquesne University (J.D., 2001)
    • Duquesne University (B.A., 1998)
    • Pennsylvania, 2001
    • U.S. District Court Western District of Pennsylvania, 2001
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit, 2017
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania, 2021
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2022
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyer Rising Star (2016)
    • ACA International (The Association of Credit and Collection Professionals)
    • Allegheny County Bar Association
    • The National Creditors Bar Association (NCBA)
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Stop! Gavel Time!:  A Collection and Cross Claim Mock Trial,  National Creditors Bar Association, Fall Convention, Nashville, TN, October 2018
    • We Don't Know Where We Are, But We Are Making Really Good Time:  Keeping Up with Ever Changing Technology and the Conundrums It Presents, National Creditors Bar Association, Spring Convention, Austin, TX, May 2018
    • Solving the "Meaningful Involvement" Puzzle, National Creditors Bar Association, Washington, D.C., Fall Convention, October 2017
    • Recent Litigation Trends and How to Avoid Them, National Association for Retail Collection Attorneys Spring Convention, May 2015
    • Primer on the Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pennsylvania Bar Institute, June 10, 2014
    • "Reasonable Investigations" under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, ACA International Convention, San Diego, CA, July 2013
    • Primer on the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pennsylvania Bar Institute, June 18, 2013
    • Employment Liability in the Cyber Age, Marshall Dennehey / AIG Employment Seminar, Pittsburgh, PA, May 2, 2013
    • Primer on the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pennsylvania Bar Institute, 2011
    • The FDCPA: Jerman v. Carlisle and the Impact on the Bona Fide Error Defense, Pennsylvania Bar Institute, 2010
    • Primer on the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pennsylvania Bar Institute, 2010
    • "Pennsylvania Supreme Court Strengthens Legal Protections for Home Inspectors," PLUS Blog, October 28, 2025
    • “‘Because of an Individual’s Sex’—The Supreme Court of the United States Holds that Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Qualify for Protection Under Title VII,” Defense Digest, January 2021, Vol. 27, No. 1
    • "Best Practices Regarding Stacking Waivers in Pennsylvania," Legal Updates for Insurance Agents & Brokers, June 2019
    • "The Need for Clarity in Counseling Customers," Legal Updates for Insurance Agents & Brokers, November 16, 2018
    • "Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Are Not Protected Classes under Title VII…Or Are They?," Defense Digest, Vol. 23, No. 2, June 2017
    • "No Proof That Firing Was Retaliation for Intent to Promote Black Employee,"SHRM Court Reports, March 4, 2016
    • "Qualified Immunity Not Strictly for Governmental Employees Anymore," Defense Digest, Vol. 18, No. 3, September 2012
    • "The Supreme Court Considers the Privacy Rights of a Public Employee's Communications on an Electronic Device Provided by the Public Employer," Defense Digest, Volume 16, No. 3, September 2010 
    • Obtained summary judgment in favor of a Borough, its Chief, a Detective, a Lieutenant and a School Resource Officer, in a civil rights lawsuit alleging that no probable cause existed to charge the Plaintiff, a local high school teacher, with witness intimidation arising from an alleged incident involving a female student in his class who was a victim of institutional sexual assault by another teacher.
    • Obtained summary judgment on behalf of a life insurance agent in a fraud and negligence action. The agent was alleged to have forged certain policy documents in an effort to "churn" the existing policies the plaintiffs possessed into additional policies rather than increase the amount of coverage of the original policies.
    • Obtained summary judgment on behalf of an alleged joint employer in a Family Medical Leave Act and Americans with Disabilities Act case, successfully arguing that the entity did not qualify as a joint employer; thus, it was not subject to liability under either Act.
    • Obtained summary judgment on behalf of a real estate agent for allegedly failing to disclose that the property at issue did not have public sewer system.
    • Summary judgment granted for insurer in a claim for breach of contract and bad faith where the homeowner made a claim for vandalism when his tenant did not finish renovating the leased premises.  The Court held that the damages were not "sudden and accidental" and that the policy exclusions for faulty workmanship and renovations were applicable as a matter of law.
    • Obtained summary judgment in a civil rights case in which the plaintiff alleged a violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights claiming excessive use of force was applied during his arrest and detention. 
    • Obtained favorable decision based upon governmental immunity in municipal tort action alleging negligence of the municipal authority's contractor in the connection of the water line to the plaintiff's residence. 
    • Summary judgment granted in a private entity employment case in which the plaintiff alleged gender and age discrimination while employed as a diagnostic imaging marketing representative. 
    • Summary judgment granted in a civil rights case in which the plaintiff alleged a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure and claimed that he was subject to racial profiling. 
    • Summary judgment granted in a civil rights case in which the plaintiff alleged the violation of his First, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, violation of 1985 and state law claims of malicious prosecution, false arrest/false imprisonment, and conspiracy against a municipality for its police officers' response to a call from his residence. 
    • Summary judgment granted in municipal entity employment case in which the employee alleged she was subjected to race and disability discrimination after she was terminated following a reduction in force. 

Results

Dismissal of Class Action Against a Retailer

Our retail client faced a class action suit alleging claims it charged Pennsylvania state tax on face masks/coverings during the COVID-19 pandemic (when they were not subject to sales tax). The plaintiff on his own behalf and on behalf of the putative class alleged claims for violations of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices Consumer Protection Law and the Pennsylvania Fair Credit Extension Uniformity Act, as well as common law claims for unjust enrichment, fraud and misappropriation/conversion. The plaintiff claimed that face masks and coverings became exempt from Pennsylvania sales tax as of March 6, 2020, when the governor issued a Proclamation of Disaster Emergency. Prior to the Proclamation, non-medical face masks/coverings were subject to sales tax because they were classified as ornamental wear or clothing accessories. The court held that the plaintiff failed to state a claim for any of the causes of action alleged and held that amendment would be futile.

Defense Prevails in Civil Rights Lawsuit.

We obtained summary judgment in favor of a borough, its police chief, a detective, a lieutenant and a school resource officer in a civil rights lawsuit. ​The plaintiff, a local high school teacher, alleged that no probable cause existed to charge him with witness intimidation, arising from an alleged incident involving a female student who was a victim of institutional sexual assault by another teacher. In its opinion granting summary judgment, the court determined that the Affidavit of Probable Cause, which was the basis for charges against the plaintiff, was supported by the evidence at the time the affidavit was prepared. The court also held that, because no violation of Section 1983 existed, all claims against the individuals and the municipality must be dismissed. Finally, the court ruled that the individual defendants enjoyed qualified immunity because no constitutional violation existed.

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Slams Door Shut on Claims Filed Against Home Inspectors

December 1, 2025

Key Points: PA Supreme Court affirmed that home inspectors in Pennsylvania are protected by a one-year statute of repose under the state’s Home Inspection Law. Any lawsuit against a home inspector must be filed within one year of the inspection, regardless of when the problem is discovered. Decision provides an important tool for defending claims brought against home inspectors more than one year after delivery of the inspection report. This article originally appeared in the October 28, 2025, issue of PLUS Blog.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently affirmed that home inspectors in Pennsylvania are protected by a one-year statute of repose under the state’s Home Inspection Law. This means that any lawsuit against a home inspector must be filed within one year of the inspection—regardless of when the problem is discovered.      In Gidor v. Mangus d/b/a Mangus Inspections, 2024 WL 80950 (Pa. Super. Jan. 8, 2024), the Superior Court found that Section 7512 of the Pennsylvania Home Inspection Law (68 Pa.C.S. § 7512) operated as a statute of repose, not a statute of limitations, and thus was not tolled by the discovery rule.  Ms. Gidor’s petition for allowance of appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court focused on the designation of Section 7512 as a statute of repose, arguing that the statute is ambiguous and places the burden of commencing an action on a plaintiff as opposed to a defendant, raises constitutional issues, and violates legislative intent. In response, Mangus analogized Section 7512 to the Construction Statute of Repose and raised public policy considerations as to the intent of the General Assembly to limit claims against home inspectors.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the argument that the language was ambiguous and that a statute of repose requires a precipitating event by a defendant. The court unequivocally concluded that Section 7512 is a statute of repose “because it plainly, unambiguously, and without equitable exceptions, requires a plaintiff to commence an action within a specified time period after the occurrence of a definitely established event, regardless of when the claim accrues.” Id. at *13. As set forth by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, “unlike a statute of limitations, a statute of repose ‘is not related to the accrual of any cause of action’ because the injury need not have occurred, much less been discovered.” Id. at *8 (citing Abrams v. Pneumo Abex Corp., 981 A.2d 198, 211 (Pa. 2009)). To be sure, the date of accrual and preclusion of the discovery rule is a key distinction between a statute of limitations and statute of repose, and has clear implications for the viability of a litigant’s claim.  This decision provides an important tool for defending claims brought against home inspectors more than one year after delivery of the inspection report. Best practices for home inspectors include: •    Treat the date of report delivery as the critical cutoff for potential litigation. •    Deliver reports promptly to start the one-year clock running. •    Use time-stamped delivery methods—such as email or certified mail—to establish proof of delivery. •    Maintain clear records of both the delivery date and the report itself for an extended period, ensuring documentation is available if a claim is later filed. The litigation process can be lengthy and tedious, particularly in the context of complicated real estate transactions. The Gidor decision will force claimants to expeditiously decide whether to pursue claims, and may limit future litigation to the extent purported defects are latent or undisclosed beyond the one-year statute of repose period. Dana is Chair of our Real Estate E&O Liability Practice Group. She works in our Philadelphia, PA office and can be reached at 215-575-4556 or DAGittleman@mdwcg.com. Danielle is Chair of our Consumer Financial Services Litigation Practice Group. She works in our Pittsburgh, PA office and can be reached at 412-803-1185 or DAGittleman@mdwcg.com.  Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 4, December 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Legal Updates for Real Estate E&O Liability

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Strengthens Legal Protections for Home Inspectors

November 1, 2025

This article was originally posted by PLUS Blog on October 28, 2025, by plushq. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently affirmed that home inspectors in Pennsylvania are protected by a one-year statute of repose under the state’s Home Inspection Law. This means that any lawsuit against a home inspector must be filed within one year of the inspection—regardless of when the problem is discovered. In Gidor v. Mangus d/b/a Mangus Inspections, 2024 WL 80950 (Pa. Super. Jan. 8, 2024), the Superior Court found that Section 7512 of the Pennsylvania Home Inspection Law (68 Pa. C.S.A. § 7512) operated as a statute of repose, not a statute of limitations, and thus was not tolled by the discovery rule. Ms. Gidor’s petition for allowance of appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court focused on the designation of Section 7512 as a statute of repose, arguing that the statute is ambiguous and places the burden of commencing an action on a plaintiff as opposed to a defendant, raises constitutional issues, and violates legislative intent. In response, Mangus analogized Section 7512 to the Construction Statute of Repose and raised public policy considerations as to the intent of the General Assembly to limit claims against home inspectors. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the argument that the language was ambiguous and that a statute of repose requires a precipitating event by a defendant. The court unequivocally concluded that Section 7512 is a statute of repose “because it plainly, unambiguously, and without equitable exceptions, requires a plaintiff to commence an action within a specified time period after the occurrence of a definitely established event, regardless of when the claim accrues.” Id. at *13. As set forth by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, “unlike a statute of limitations, a statute of repose ‘is not related to the accrual of any cause of action’ because the injury need not have occurred, much less been discovered.” Id. at *8 (citing Abrams v. Pneumo Abex Corp., 981 A.2d 198, 211 (Pa. 2009)). To be sure, the date of accrual and preclusion of the discovery rule is a key distinction between a statute of limitations and statute of repose and has clear implications for the viability of a litigant’s claim. This decision provides an important tool for defending claims brought against home inspectors more than one year after delivery of the inspection report. Best practices for home inspectors include: Treat the date of report delivery as the critical cutoff for potential litigation. Deliver reports promptly to start the one-year clock running. Use time-stamped delivery methods—such as email or certified mail—to establish proof of delivery. Maintain clear records of both the delivery date and the report itself for an extended period, ensuring documentation is available if a claim is later filed.   Legal Update for Real Estate E&O – November 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Featured Conversations... Key Takeaways from A.M. Best’s Webinar on the Misuse Defense in Product Liability Claims, Featuring Michael Salvati

Michael Salvati, shareholder in our Philadelphia office, was a panelist for the April A.M. Best webinar, “The Misuse Defense: Strategic Approaches to Defending Product Liability Claims for Insurers.” During the program, Michael and his fellow panelists offered practical, jurisdiction‑specific guidance on how misuse and failure‑to‑warn theories intersect in modern product liability litigation. Michael emphasized the unique challenges these claims present—particularly in states like Pennsylvania, where evidentiary rules diverge sharply from those applied in many other jurisdictions. Failure to Warn as the “Flip Side” of Misuse Salvati explained that failure‑to‑warn allegations often arise as a direct counter to a misuse defense. As he noted, “If our misuse defense is that the plaintiff didn't use a product properly or safely, then the failure to warn claim is that we didn't tell them how to use it properly.” He emphasized that these claims can stem from either the absence of warnings or criticisms of existing warnings, such as insufficient specificity or lack of clarity about risks. Pennsylvania’s Unique Evidentiary Landscape One of Salvati’s most notable points was the stark difference in how Pennsylvania treats evidence of compliance with industry standards. He highlighted that Pennsylvania is “one of the only states…where that evidence is not admissible” in strict liability cases. Manufacturers cannot rely on compliance with ANSI, UL, ISO, or even federal safety standards to defend the product against a strict liability claim—because the focus is solely on the product itself, not the manufacturer’s conduct. Salvati acknowledged the challenge this creates for defense counsel and clients who expect such compliance to carry weight. Understanding the Three Defect Theories Salvati also walked through the three primary defect theories recognized in many jurisdictions: - Design defect – a flaw in the product’s intended design - Manufacturing defect – a deviation affecting a specific unit - Failure to warn – inadequate instructions or warnings He noted that warnings claims are increasingly significant and sometimes stand alone when design or manufacturing theories are weak. As he put it, plaintiffs often default to warnings claims because “the default position seems to be, ‘If I got hurt, there must be something wrong.’” Warranties and State‑by‑State Variations Salvati addressed how breach‑of‑warranty claims fit into the broader framework, explaining that implied warranties—such as merchantability—often overlap with strict liability in Pennsylvania. He emphasized the importance of understanding local nuances, as warranty law and admissibility rules vary widely across states. Looking Ahead: The Growing Importance of Warnings In his closing remarks, Salvati stressed that warnings should never be treated as an afterthought in product liability defense. He observed that warnings‑only claims are becoming more common and urged manufacturers and insurers to continually evaluate the clarity and completeness of their instructions and warnings. His takeaway: “We should always be talking about what are the instructions that come with our products…to bolster a misuse defense.” Listen to the complete webinar here: https://www3.ambest.com/conferences/events/eventregister.aspx?event_id=WEB1074.

Thought Leadership

The Enforceability of Online Arbitration Agreements Remains Unresolved in Pennsylvania, But the Pennsylvania Superior Court has Provided Substantive Guidance on the Issue

Key Points: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court confirms that an order compelling arbitration is not immediately appealable as collateral orders. The outcome of Chilutti II has generally left the substantive enforceability issues with browsewrap agreements unresolved in Pennsylvania. Until this issue is resolved by the Pennsylvania courts, companies operating in the Commonwealth should strive to ensure that their registration websites and/or application screens conspicuously present arbitration agreements in manners which ensure their users and consumers assent to the terms of the agreements by following the standards set forth in Chilutti I. Browsewrap agreements have been defined as agreements “‘in which a website offers terms that are disclosed only through a hyperlink and the user supposedly manifests assent to those terms simply by continuing to use the website,’ and typically do not require an electronic signature.” See, Cobb v. Tesla, Inc., 2026 WL 458470, at *1 n. 2 (Pa. Super. Feb. 18, 2026) (citation omitted). They are largely regarded as the “if you keep using this, you agree to everything buried in this link” terms embedded into almost every online agreement consumers and users sign before proceeding with purchases of goods and/or services. While consumers are generally aware of them, many almost never click on the link, nor read them in their entirety. This leaves many consumers and users ignorant of the terms and impact of such agreements. However, one’s ignorance of the otherwise neatly-tucked-away terms rarely renders them unenforceable. The issue of the enforceability of browsewrap agreements has been up for debate for some time in many jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania. Indeed, Pennsylvania had a brief grip on this issue for a period in time. Specifically, in 2023, an en banc Superior Court set forth heightened standards for companies to meet in order to secure assent and enforce browsewrap arbitration agreements. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 300 A.3d 430 (Pa.Super. 2023) (en banc) (“Chilutti I”) Chilutti I involved a husband and wife who sued Uber and its subsidiaries after the wife, a wheelchair bound passenger using Uber’s rideshare service, fell, struck her head, and lost consciousness due to her uber driver failing to provide a seatbelt and making an aggressive turn during the trip. The Chilutti’s filed a negligence lawsuit against Uber and its subsidiaries. In response, the defendants moved to compel arbitration, arguing that “the couple’s conduct on the company’s website and application — when they registered for the ridesharing service — signified that they agreed to be bound by the mandatory arbitration provision found in the hyperlinked terms and conditions.” The trial court granted the defendants’ petition and stayed the proceedings pending the results of arbitration, and the Chilutti’s appealed. On appeal, the Superior Court addressed two issues. First, it addressed the issue of whether it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. A divided Superior Court determined that it did, with its basis for the holding being that the order from which the Chilutti’s appealed was a collateral order. Next, the Superior Court set out to address the merits of the Chilutti’s substantive claim. The Superior Court concluded that the parties lacked a valid agreement to arbitrate. Its rationale was that Uber’s website and application did not provide reasonably conspicuous notice of the terms to the Chiluttis. In reaching this decision, the en banc Superior Court held that browsewrap arbitration agreements are enforceable in Pennsylvania only if the registration website and application screens explicitly inform consumers that they are waiving the right to a jury trial, the registration process cannot be completed until the consumer is fully informed of this waiver, and, when the agreement is available via hyperlink, the waiver appears at the top of the first page of the terms in bold, capitalized text. Since the ruling, Pennsylvania courts have applied Chilutti I to determine if browsewrap agreements are enforceable.  For instance, the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas invoked Chilutti I to reject an agreement that lacked an express jury-trial waiver on the assent screen.  See Miller v. Festival Fun Parks, LLC, 92 WDA 2025 (C.P. Alleg. Cnty. Mar. 24, 2025). Similarly, the Superior Court has held that notice which failed to explicitly state the consumer was waiving a jury-trial right did not “me[e]t the strict burden set forth by our en banc Court in Chilutti I.” Pierce v. FloatMe Corp., 348 A.3d 1077, 1088 (Pa. Super. 2025). While the issue of enforceability of browsewrap agreements appeared to have been resolved by Chilutti I, Pennsylvania courts’ grip on this issue has been slackened by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s January 21, 2026, opinion in Chilutti II. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 349 A.3d 826 (Pa. 2026) (“Chilutti II”). Therein, the Supreme Court did not address the merits of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim, but rather the issue of whether the Superior Court had appellate jurisdiction to immediately review the orders staying litigation pending arbitration. The Court ultimately vacated the en banc opinion on jurisdictional grounds, holding that the Superior Court did not have appellate jurisdiction because the trial court’s order from which the Chiluttis appealed did not qualify as a collateral order and, thus, the Superior Court erred in holding to the contrary and lacked jurisdiction to entertain the merits” of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim. As such, Chilutti II has rendered Chilutti I nonbinding, and the issue of enforceability of online arbitration agreements remains unresolved. However, in light of the fact the Supreme Court did not address or comment on the merits of the Chiluttis’ appeal, Chilutti I is still meaningful. Specifically, it provides guidance as to the standards a company should strive to meet to ensure they have obtained users’ assent so that they are able to enforce online arbitration agreements. Additionally, it may serve as persuasive authority in judges’ evaluations of petitions and/or motions to compel browsewrap arbitration agreements until this particular issue is properly put before our appellate courts. Keanna works in our Pittsburgh, PA office. She can be reached at (412) 803-1174 or KASeabrooks@MDWCG.com.