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Danielle M. Vugrinovich

Chair, Consumer Financial Services Litigation Practice Group

Portrait of Danielle M. Vugrinovich

Danielle serves as the chair of the Consumer Financial Services Litigation practice group, litigating Fair Debt Collection Practices Act claims brought by debtors against the collectors assigned to recover the debt.  Danielle also defends collectors in suits alleging claims for the violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act and Telephone Consumer Protection Act. She is frequently called on to speak nationally on topics related to the collection industry. She also dedicates a portion of her practice to mass and toxic torts relating to asbestos exposure.  Danielle’s asbestos practice includes all phases of litigation throughout the life of a case.  She also is experienced in handling premises liability, automobile accident cases, construction and general insurance defense.

Additionally, Danielle practices in the area of employment law relative to public and private entities. She has litigated federal claims brought pursuant to Title VII, the Family Medical Leave Act, Age Discrimination in Employment Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act, as well as pendant state law claims for whistleblower activities and violations of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. Danielle also has experience litigating employment cases at the administrative level before both the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission. Danielle also defends various professionals when they are sued for matters relating to their employment.   

In 1998, Danielle graduated from Duquesne University with a Bachelor of Arts in psychology. In 2001, she earned her juris doctor from Duquesne University School of Law.

    • Thomas R. Kline School of Law of Duquesne University (J.D., 2001)
    • Duquesne University (B.A., 1998)
    • Pennsylvania, 2001
    • U.S. District Court Western District of Pennsylvania, 2001
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit, 2017
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania, 2021
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2022
    • The Best Lawyers in America©, Mass Tort Litigation / Class Actions - Defendants (2027)
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyer Rising Star (2016)
    • ACA International (The Association of Credit and Collection Professionals)
    • Allegheny County Bar Association
    • The National Creditors Bar Association (NCBA)
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Stop! Gavel Time!:  A Collection and Cross Claim Mock Trial,  National Creditors Bar Association, Fall Convention, Nashville, TN, October 2018
    • We Don't Know Where We Are, But We Are Making Really Good Time:  Keeping Up with Ever Changing Technology and the Conundrums It Presents, National Creditors Bar Association, Spring Convention, Austin, TX, May 2018
    • Solving the "Meaningful Involvement" Puzzle, National Creditors Bar Association, Washington, D.C., Fall Convention, October 2017
    • Recent Litigation Trends and How to Avoid Them, National Association for Retail Collection Attorneys Spring Convention, May 2015
    • Primer on the Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pennsylvania Bar Institute, June 10, 2014
    • "Reasonable Investigations" under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, ACA International Convention, San Diego, CA, July 2013
    • Primer on the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pennsylvania Bar Institute, June 18, 2013
    • Employment Liability in the Cyber Age, Marshall Dennehey / AIG Employment Seminar, Pittsburgh, PA, May 2, 2013
    • Primer on the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pennsylvania Bar Institute, 2011
    • The FDCPA: Jerman v. Carlisle and the Impact on the Bona Fide Error Defense, Pennsylvania Bar Institute, 2010
    • Primer on the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Pennsylvania Bar Institute, 2010
    • "Pennsylvania Supreme Court Strengthens Legal Protections for Home Inspectors," PLUS Blog, October 28, 2025
    • “‘Because of an Individual’s Sex’—The Supreme Court of the United States Holds that Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Qualify for Protection Under Title VII,” Defense Digest, January 2021, Vol. 27, No. 1
    • "Best Practices Regarding Stacking Waivers in Pennsylvania," Legal Updates for Insurance Agents & Brokers, June 2019
    • "The Need for Clarity in Counseling Customers," Legal Updates for Insurance Agents & Brokers, November 16, 2018
    • "Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity Are Not Protected Classes under Title VII…Or Are They?," Defense Digest, Vol. 23, No. 2, June 2017
    • "No Proof That Firing Was Retaliation for Intent to Promote Black Employee,"SHRM Court Reports, March 4, 2016
    • "Qualified Immunity Not Strictly for Governmental Employees Anymore," Defense Digest, Vol. 18, No. 3, September 2012
    • "The Supreme Court Considers the Privacy Rights of a Public Employee's Communications on an Electronic Device Provided by the Public Employer," Defense Digest, Volume 16, No. 3, September 2010 
    • Obtained summary judgment in favor of a Borough, its Chief, a Detective, a Lieutenant and a School Resource Officer, in a civil rights lawsuit alleging that no probable cause existed to charge the Plaintiff, a local high school teacher, with witness intimidation arising from an alleged incident involving a female student in his class who was a victim of institutional sexual assault by another teacher.
    • Obtained summary judgment on behalf of a life insurance agent in a fraud and negligence action. The agent was alleged to have forged certain policy documents in an effort to "churn" the existing policies the plaintiffs possessed into additional policies rather than increase the amount of coverage of the original policies.
    • Obtained summary judgment on behalf of an alleged joint employer in a Family Medical Leave Act and Americans with Disabilities Act case, successfully arguing that the entity did not qualify as a joint employer; thus, it was not subject to liability under either Act.
    • Obtained summary judgment on behalf of a real estate agent for allegedly failing to disclose that the property at issue did not have public sewer system.
    • Summary judgment granted for insurer in a claim for breach of contract and bad faith where the homeowner made a claim for vandalism when his tenant did not finish renovating the leased premises.  The Court held that the damages were not "sudden and accidental" and that the policy exclusions for faulty workmanship and renovations were applicable as a matter of law.
    • Obtained summary judgment in a civil rights case in which the plaintiff alleged a violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights claiming excessive use of force was applied during his arrest and detention. 
    • Obtained favorable decision based upon governmental immunity in municipal tort action alleging negligence of the municipal authority's contractor in the connection of the water line to the plaintiff's residence. 
    • Summary judgment granted in a private entity employment case in which the plaintiff alleged gender and age discrimination while employed as a diagnostic imaging marketing representative. 
    • Summary judgment granted in a civil rights case in which the plaintiff alleged a violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure and claimed that he was subject to racial profiling. 
    • Summary judgment granted in a civil rights case in which the plaintiff alleged the violation of his First, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, violation of 1985 and state law claims of malicious prosecution, false arrest/false imprisonment, and conspiracy against a municipality for its police officers' response to a call from his residence. 
    • Summary judgment granted in municipal entity employment case in which the employee alleged she was subjected to race and disability discrimination after she was terminated following a reduction in force. 

Results

Dismissal of Class Action Against a Retailer

Our retail client faced a class action suit alleging claims it charged Pennsylvania state tax on face masks/coverings during the COVID-19 pandemic (when they were not subject to sales tax). The plaintiff on his own behalf and on behalf of the putative class alleged claims for violations of the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices Consumer Protection Law and the Pennsylvania Fair Credit Extension Uniformity Act, as well as common law claims for unjust enrichment, fraud and misappropriation/conversion. The plaintiff claimed that face masks and coverings became exempt from Pennsylvania sales tax as of March 6, 2020, when the governor issued a Proclamation of Disaster Emergency. Prior to the Proclamation, non-medical face masks/coverings were subject to sales tax because they were classified as ornamental wear or clothing accessories. The court held that the plaintiff failed to state a claim for any of the causes of action alleged and held that amendment would be futile.

Defense Prevails in Civil Rights Lawsuit.

We obtained summary judgment in favor of a borough, its police chief, a detective, a lieutenant and a school resource officer in a civil rights lawsuit. ​The plaintiff, a local high school teacher, alleged that no probable cause existed to charge him with witness intimidation, arising from an alleged incident involving a female student who was a victim of institutional sexual assault by another teacher. In its opinion granting summary judgment, the court determined that the Affidavit of Probable Cause, which was the basis for charges against the plaintiff, was supported by the evidence at the time the affidavit was prepared. The court also held that, because no violation of Section 1983 existed, all claims against the individuals and the municipality must be dismissed. Finally, the court ruled that the individual defendants enjoyed qualified immunity because no constitutional violation existed.

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Slams Door Shut on Claims Filed Against Home Inspectors

December 1, 2025

Key Points: PA Supreme Court affirmed that home inspectors in Pennsylvania are protected by a one-year statute of repose under the state’s Home Inspection Law. Any lawsuit against a home inspector must be filed within one year of the inspection, regardless of when the problem is discovered. Decision provides an important tool for defending claims brought against home inspectors more than one year after delivery of the inspection report. This article originally appeared in the October 28, 2025, issue of PLUS Blog.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently affirmed that home inspectors in Pennsylvania are protected by a one-year statute of repose under the state’s Home Inspection Law. This means that any lawsuit against a home inspector must be filed within one year of the inspection—regardless of when the problem is discovered.      In Gidor v. Mangus d/b/a Mangus Inspections, 2024 WL 80950 (Pa. Super. Jan. 8, 2024), the Superior Court found that Section 7512 of the Pennsylvania Home Inspection Law (68 Pa.C.S. § 7512) operated as a statute of repose, not a statute of limitations, and thus was not tolled by the discovery rule.  Ms. Gidor’s petition for allowance of appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court focused on the designation of Section 7512 as a statute of repose, arguing that the statute is ambiguous and places the burden of commencing an action on a plaintiff as opposed to a defendant, raises constitutional issues, and violates legislative intent. In response, Mangus analogized Section 7512 to the Construction Statute of Repose and raised public policy considerations as to the intent of the General Assembly to limit claims against home inspectors.  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the argument that the language was ambiguous and that a statute of repose requires a precipitating event by a defendant. The court unequivocally concluded that Section 7512 is a statute of repose “because it plainly, unambiguously, and without equitable exceptions, requires a plaintiff to commence an action within a specified time period after the occurrence of a definitely established event, regardless of when the claim accrues.” Id. at *13. As set forth by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, “unlike a statute of limitations, a statute of repose ‘is not related to the accrual of any cause of action’ because the injury need not have occurred, much less been discovered.” Id. at *8 (citing Abrams v. Pneumo Abex Corp., 981 A.2d 198, 211 (Pa. 2009)). To be sure, the date of accrual and preclusion of the discovery rule is a key distinction between a statute of limitations and statute of repose, and has clear implications for the viability of a litigant’s claim.  This decision provides an important tool for defending claims brought against home inspectors more than one year after delivery of the inspection report. Best practices for home inspectors include: •    Treat the date of report delivery as the critical cutoff for potential litigation. •    Deliver reports promptly to start the one-year clock running. •    Use time-stamped delivery methods—such as email or certified mail—to establish proof of delivery. •    Maintain clear records of both the delivery date and the report itself for an extended period, ensuring documentation is available if a claim is later filed. The litigation process can be lengthy and tedious, particularly in the context of complicated real estate transactions. The Gidor decision will force claimants to expeditiously decide whether to pursue claims, and may limit future litigation to the extent purported defects are latent or undisclosed beyond the one-year statute of repose period. Dana is Chair of our Real Estate E&O Liability Practice Group. She works in our Philadelphia, PA office and can be reached at 215-575-4556 or DAGittleman@mdwcg.com. Danielle is Chair of our Consumer Financial Services Litigation Practice Group. She works in our Pittsburgh, PA office and can be reached at 412-803-1185 or DAGittleman@mdwcg.com.  Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 4, December 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Legal Updates for Real Estate E&O Liability

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Strengthens Legal Protections for Home Inspectors

November 1, 2025

This article was originally posted by PLUS Blog on October 28, 2025, by plushq. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently affirmed that home inspectors in Pennsylvania are protected by a one-year statute of repose under the state’s Home Inspection Law. This means that any lawsuit against a home inspector must be filed within one year of the inspection—regardless of when the problem is discovered. In Gidor v. Mangus d/b/a Mangus Inspections, 2024 WL 80950 (Pa. Super. Jan. 8, 2024), the Superior Court found that Section 7512 of the Pennsylvania Home Inspection Law (68 Pa. C.S.A. § 7512) operated as a statute of repose, not a statute of limitations, and thus was not tolled by the discovery rule. Ms. Gidor’s petition for allowance of appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court focused on the designation of Section 7512 as a statute of repose, arguing that the statute is ambiguous and places the burden of commencing an action on a plaintiff as opposed to a defendant, raises constitutional issues, and violates legislative intent. In response, Mangus analogized Section 7512 to the Construction Statute of Repose and raised public policy considerations as to the intent of the General Assembly to limit claims against home inspectors. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected the argument that the language was ambiguous and that a statute of repose requires a precipitating event by a defendant. The court unequivocally concluded that Section 7512 is a statute of repose “because it plainly, unambiguously, and without equitable exceptions, requires a plaintiff to commence an action within a specified time period after the occurrence of a definitely established event, regardless of when the claim accrues.” Id. at *13. As set forth by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, “unlike a statute of limitations, a statute of repose ‘is not related to the accrual of any cause of action’ because the injury need not have occurred, much less been discovered.” Id. at *8 (citing Abrams v. Pneumo Abex Corp., 981 A.2d 198, 211 (Pa. 2009)). To be sure, the date of accrual and preclusion of the discovery rule is a key distinction between a statute of limitations and statute of repose and has clear implications for the viability of a litigant’s claim. This decision provides an important tool for defending claims brought against home inspectors more than one year after delivery of the inspection report. Best practices for home inspectors include: Treat the date of report delivery as the critical cutoff for potential litigation. Deliver reports promptly to start the one-year clock running. Use time-stamped delivery methods—such as email or certified mail—to establish proof of delivery. Maintain clear records of both the delivery date and the report itself for an extended period, ensuring documentation is available if a claim is later filed.   Legal Update for Real Estate E&O – November 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Appellate Division Affirms Recreational Immunity for County Under Landowners' Liability Act

In a recent unpublished decision in Matthew Kuzma, etc. v. Middlesex County Parks Department, et al., the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed summary judgment in favor of Middlesex County Parks Department, holding that the county was immune from liability under New Jersey's Landowners' Liability Act (LLA), notwithstanding its failure to plead the immunity as an affirmative defense in its answer to the Complaint. The case arose from injuries sustained by fourteen-year-old plaintiff, Matthew Kuzma, while playing basketball at Spring Lake Park in South Plainfield on August 23, 2019. The plaintiff observed a crack in the basketball court before beginning to play but did not consider it dangerous. During the game, his foot became caught in the crack, causing him to fall and suffer a significant ankle injury. The plaintiff alleged that the injury resulted in ongoing physical limitations and deprived him of the opportunity to play collegiate basketball. The plaintiff filed suit alleging that the defendants negligently maintained the basketball court. Although the county did not assert LLA immunity as an affirmative defense in its answers, it later moved for summary judgment on that basis. The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that the county had waived the defense by failing to plead it. The county maintained that the plaintiff had received sufficient notice of its intent to rely on the LLA through discovery and therefore suffered no unfair surprise or prejudice. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment, concluding that the county should be permitted to invoke statutory immunity notwithstanding its failure to formally plead the defense. Relying heavily on the New Jersey Supreme Court's guidance in Arias v. Cnty. of Bergen, holding a county park was subject to the immunity of the LLA, the Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the county's failure to plead LLA immunity did not preclude reliance on the defense under the circumstances presented. The court determined that the plaintiff had received adequate notice of the immunity claim through discovery and that permitting the defense furthered the public-policy objectives embodied in the LLA. In affirming dismissal, the Appellate Division acknowledged the seriousness of the plaintiff's injury and the general societal interest in maintaining parks and recreational facilities in a safe condition. However, the court emphasized that both the legislature and the New Jersey Supreme Court have expressed a clear policy choice to limit liability for public and private landowners who make recreational property available for public use. The decision reinforces the courts' continuing adherence to the Landowners' Liability Act and the principle that recreational lands and facilities should be broadly protected from liability exposure, even in cases involving significant personal injuries.

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.