Serving our clients' needs in the automobile field is one of the oldest practice areas at Marshall Dennehey. From the inception of our firm, we have serviced the insurance industry by both representing its insureds as well as the carriers directly in the first-party, PIP and third-party auto cases.
Our attorneys represent insurance carriers directly in UM/UIM, PIP, and other first-party automobile issues. In the UM/UIM arena, our unique regional presence allows the carrier to be represented by local counsel who are intimately familiar with the protocols and nuances of each county's local procedures and practices. For those who are familiar with the UM/UIM arena, this local presence and knowledge of affiliated members of the Bar can have a substantial impact on the final result of a claim. The Automobile Liability Practice Group works closely with members of the firm's Insurance Services and Special Investigation Practice Groups. Together, these groups provide practical solutions for all types of claims arising out of the use and operation of automobiles.
The attorneys in our Automobile Liability Practice are well experienced and established in third-party automobile liability cases, including the specific nuances with limited insurance policies, tort restriction statutes, and joint and several liability. They have litigated thousands of automobile liability third party cases, many of which have been taken to verdict.
We are aware of today's focus on securing sound legal services at reasonable fees. Our firm has grown because of our sensitivity in this area. Our trial lawyers take a practical, result-oriented approach to the cases with which they are entrusted. The firm retains competitive rates through task-appropriate delegation, which is consistent with the overall close supervision and client responsiveness required in automobile matters. We are also very willing to discuss, develop and implement alternative billing formats wherever possible.
Results
Thought Leadership
Case Law Alerts
Court Allows Recklessness and Punitive Damages Claims to Proceed After Work‑Zone Crash
July 21, 2026
In a case where a defendant filed preliminary objections against allegations of recklessness and punitive damages, the Susquehanna County Court of Common Pleas denied these preliminary objections. This case stems from a motor vehicle accident, where the defendants car struck the plaintiffs car after the defendant allegedly fell asleep at the wheel, going at a high rate of speed, through a construction work zone. Defendant first objected to the general allegations throughout the plaintiff’s complaint pertaining to “reckless” conduct contending that there were insufficient factual allegations to support the claim of reckless conduct. Defendant next objected to the plaintiffs claim for punitive damages, as punitive damages may only be assessed against a motorist for falling asleep while driving if there is further evidence to prove driver was aware of their drowsiness and risk of falling asleep. Lastly, defendant objected to plaintiffs complaint, claiming it lacked specificity. The court here found that the plaintiff had included in the complaint specific allegations related to the defendant’s alleged recklessness, including allegations regarding speeding in a work zone, almost striking the flagger, falling asleep at the wheel, and striking the plaintiffs vehicle which was stopped. Additionally, the court noted that falling asleep does not come without warning. The court found that these allegations were sufficient to support an allegation of recklessness at the pleadings stage.
Case Law Alerts
Commonwealth Court Affirms Defense Verdict for SEPTA, Clarifies Limits of the Jerk‑and‑Jolt Doctrine
July 20, 2026
In a personal injury case, the plaintiff alleged that she was injured after falling on a SEPTA bus when it began moving before she was fully seated. An appeal followed and the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the trial courts judgment in favor of SEPTA. Musser v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 354 A.3d 593 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2026). In this case, the plaintiff claimed that the bus restarted aggressively and asserted the legal theory of liability known as the jerk and jolt doctrine, under which a common carrier, such as SEPTA, may be liable for negligence that causes an injury to a bus passenger who falls because the bus experiences a sudden, unusual, or extraordinary jerk or jolt. SEPTA presented video evidence contradicting Musser's account and testimony from its Chief Training Officer (CTO) that drivers are trained not to wait for passengers to be seated unless requested. The jury attributed 74% fault to Musser and 26% to SEPTA, barring Musser from recovery under Pennsylvania's comparative negligence statute. On appeal, plaintiff contended that the trial court erred in admitting testimony from SEPTA’s CTO regarding driver training without proper notice and relevance; that the trial court abused its discretion by limiting plaintiffs cross examination of the CTO regarding Federal Transit Administration (FTA) standards; and that the trial court abused it’s discretion by including a non-standard jury instruction clarifying that a bus driver is not required to wait for passengers to be seated unless asked. The court reasoned that Musser's opening statement and testimony raised the issue of restarting before she was seated, making SEPTA's training testimony relevant. The brief duration of challenged testimony in context of multi-day trial was insufficient to demonstrate prejudice. The non-standard jury instruction properly clarified that mere restart before seating doesn't satisfy jerk and jolt doctrine, consistent with established precedent. In a case where a defendant filed preliminary objections against allegations of recklessness and punitive damages, the Susquehanna County Court of Common Pleas denied these preliminary objections. This case stems from a motor vehicle accident, where the defendants car struck the plaintiffs car after the defendant allegedly fell asleep at the wheel, going at a high rate of speed, through a construction work zone. Defendant first objected to the general allegations throughout the plaintiff’s complaint pertaining to “reckless” conduct contending that there were insufficient factual allegations to support the claim of reckless conduct. Defendant next objected to the plaintiffs claim for punitive damages, as punitive damages may only be assessed against a motorist for falling asleep while driving if there is further evidence to prove driver was aware of their drowsiness and risk of falling asleep. Lastly, defendant objected to plaintiffs complaint, claiming it lacked specificity. The court here found that the plaintiff had included in the complaint specific allegations related to the defendant’s alleged recklessness, including allegations regarding speeding in a work zone, almost striking the flagger, falling asleep at the wheel, and striking the plaintiffs vehicle which was stopped. Additionally, the court noted that falling asleep does not come without warning. The court found that these allegations were sufficient to support an allegation of recklessness at the pleadings stage.
