.

Christian A. Weimann

Portrait of Christian A.  Weimann

Christian is a member of the Casualty Department, primarily handling cases involving product liability, product warranty, motor vehicle liability, and toxic tort litigation.  Prior to joining the firm in 2016,  Christian was an associate attorney at a mid-sized law firm in Philadelphia where his practice focused on defending the interests of insureds and self-insured businesses in complex suits, including toxic tort cases, product liability cases, premises liability cases, and transportation and trucking cases.

Christian graduated from Loyola Marymount University in 2006 with a Bachelor of Arts degree in English.  Christian received his juris doctor in 2010 from Villanova University School of Law.  During law school, Christian clerked for the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office where he primarily worked in the Victim Impact Program, addressing the needs of victims with unique vulnerability, including the elderly, children, and victims of hate crimes, sexual abuse, stalking, and domestic violence.  Christian was also a Staff Writer and Associate Editor of Student Works for the Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Inclusive Committee Representative for the Latin American Law Students Association, and a 2009 Public Interest Fellowship Program Summer Fellow.

    • Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law (J.D., 2010)
    • Loyola Marymount University (B.A., 2006)
    • New Jersey, 2011
    • Pennsylvania, 2012
    • New York, 2023
    • California, 2011
    • The Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch®, Mass Tort Litigation/Class Actions - Defendants (2021-2025)
    • The Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch©, Transportation Law (2024-2025)
    • “The Hills and Ridges Doctrine: A Property Owner’s Best Friend When Conditions Get Slippery,” Defense Digest, June 2021, Vol. 27, No. 3
    • "Potential Implications of Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court and BNSF Ry. v. Tyrrell on Mass Tort Litigation In Pennsylvania," Defense Digest, Vol. 24, No. 1, March 2018
    • Obtained a defense verdict after a masked and socially distanced two day trial in Bucks County in favor of an automotive manufacturer. Approximately one year after purchasing a new vehicle, the plaintiff complained several times that the Start/Stop function shuts off and does not restart. The manufacturer identified the problem and was working on a solution. Meanwhile, the dealership told the plaintiff to turn off the Start/Stop function until a software update came out. The software update came out in early May of 2019, less than 80 days after the plaintiff’s first complaint. The plaintiff asserted claims under the Pennsylvania Automobile Lemon Law, Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, Uniform Commercial Code, and the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law that the vehicle’s repair history was all related to an intermittent and still unrepaired Start/Stop issue with the car. The defense successfully proved through witness and expert testimony that the vehicle’s mechanical problems were fixed in a timely fashion. The repair work done by the dealership under the warranty was effective, and reliable, and the problem was permanently repaired. After trial, the judge requested each side provide a memorandum with findings of fact and closing arguments. Upon review of same, a ruling was issued in our client’s favor.
    • Obtained summary judgment in Delaware County, Pennsylvania for a slip and fall during an active snowstorm case.  Plaintiff alleged after finishing work, she fell in snow during an active snowstorm and was injured while walking in the parking lot toward her car.  Plaintiff's own admission, as well as cell phone video footage taken by a co-worker, confirmed that she fell during an active snowstorm.  Plaintiff went to work that day wearing snow boots because she knew the weather was supposed to turn bad later that day. Plaintiff admitted that some plowing had already been performed by the time she  left work.  The court found that the meteorological evidence, cell phone video footage taken by Plaintiff's co-worker, and Plaintiff's own admission all triggered the application of the "hills and ridges" doctrine to this case. Pursuant to this doctrine, the defendant did not have an absolute duty to clear the premises of ice and snow while the snowstorm was occurring.  Moreover, intervention through snow removal processes does not necessarily bar application of the hills and ridges doctrine.  Where a landowner takes steps during the course of a snow event, he does not divest himself of the protections afforded to him under the hills and ridges doctrine.

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Defense Digest

Tsunami or Business as Usual: What Does the New Motorcycle Lemon Law Hold for Pennsylvania?

June 1, 2025

Key Points:  Effective May 18, 2025, purchasers of new motorcycles in Pennsylvania may bring Lemon Law suits.  A nonconformity in a newly-purchased motorcycle must manifest “within a period of one year following the actual delivery of the motorcycle to the purchaser or during the term of the warranty, whichever may occur first.”  The applicable Lemon Law period for newly-purchased motorcycles in Pennsylvania will typically be one year. After multiple legislative attempts and years of effort, effective May 18, 2025, purchasers of new motorcycles in Pennsylvania may bring Lemon Law suits. Most recently reintroduced in the Pennsylvania State Senate by Republican State Senator Michele Brooks in January 2023, Pennsylvania’s Lemon Law now provides similar consumer protections to purchasers of new motorcycles in Pennsylvania as those afforded to purchasers of new cars. Receiving bipartisan support, the addition of motorcycles to Pennsylvania’s Lemon Law was signed into law by Governor Josh Shapiro in November 2024. Pennsylvania is far from the first state to allow buyers of new motorcycles to bring Lemon Law suits. Pennsylvania now joins Arizona, Hawaii, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming as states that permit the filing of motorcycle Lemon Law suits. State Lemon Laws throughout the country, including Pennsylvania, are intended to supplement federal consumer protection remedies—such as the Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act and the Uniform Commercial Code—and to provide stronger protections for consumers. Under these state laws, consumers are given an avenue in civil court to enforce warranties issued by manufacturers of new motor vehicles.  In Pennsylvania, manufacturers have a duty to “repair or correct, at no cost to the purchaser, a nonconformity which substantially impairs the use, value or safety” of a new motor vehicle purchased for personal, family, or household use. 73 Pa.C.S. § 1954(a). If there is a nonconformity in a new motor vehicle within the first 12 months or 12,000 miles of ownership, whichever comes first, and the manufacturer fails to repair the nonconformity after more than three repair attempts, or if the vehicle is out of service by reason of any nonconformity for a cumulative total of 30 or more days, then the vehicle is a presumptive lemon. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1956. Under Pennsylvania’s Lemon Law, a purchaser of a new motor vehicle that is a presumptive lemon can demand a repurchase of the vehicle by the manufacturer or have the vehicle swapped with a vehicle of comparable value. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1955. As of May 18, 2025, purchasers of new motorcycles in Pennsylvania for personal, family, or household use can now make the same demand if there is a nonconformity in the newly-purchased motorcycle. A distinct difference, however, is that the nonconformity in the motorcycle must manifest “within a period of one year following the actual delivery of the motorcycle to the purchaser or during the term of the warranty, whichever may occur first.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 1954. As most motorcycle manufacturers provide limited warranties for newly purchased motorcycles ranging from one to three years, the applicable Lemon Law period for newly purchased motorcycles in Pennsylvania will typically be one year. So what does this change to Pennsylvania’s Lemon Law mean for motorcycle manufacturers? Will motorcycle manufacturers be swept up in a tsunami of Pennsylvania Lemon Law suits now that the Commonwealth’s Lemon Law covers motorcycles? While it is too soon to say for sure, the answer is likely no.  Recent motorcycle registration data is instructive. In 2021, there were 8,575,569 motorcycles registered in the United States, but only 18,226 new motorcycles were purchased that same year, or 0.2% of all registered motorcycles. Eric Teoh, Motorcycles Registered in the United States, 2002–2021, 7 (Insurance Institute for Highway Safety) (March 2021). By way of stark contrast, there were 15,016,030 new cars and light trucks sold and leased in the United States in 2021. New and Used Passenger Car and Light Truck Sales and Leases, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, https://www.bts.gov/content/new-and-used-passenger-car-sales-and-leases-thousands-vehicles.  While the addition of motorcycles to Pennsylvania’s Lemon Law is worth highlighting and keeping an eye on, at this juncture, motorcycle manufacturers need not panic. Rather than lawsuits, perhaps motorcycle manufacturers should really be worried that they are not selling enough new motorcycles.   Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 2, June 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Defense Digest

The Hills and Ridges Doctrine: A Property Owner’s Best Friend When Conditions Get Slippery

June 1, 2021

Key Points: The “hills and ridges” doctrine imposes a heightened burden on a plaintiff who slips and falls on snow and ice, and it can insulate a property owner from liability altogether. The “hills and ridges” doctrine protects a property owner from liability for generally slippery conditions resulting from snow or ice where the property owner has not permitted the snow or ice to unreasonably accumulate in ridges and elevations. Under the “hills and ridges” doctrine, property owners are not obligated to plow, salt or shovel their property until a reasonable time after a snowstorm has ended. With the arrival of spring and winter in the history books, property owners will be braced for another round of lawsuits alleging slip and falls on snow and ice. In Pennsylvania, however, the “hills and ridges” doctrine imposes a heightened burden on a plaintiff who slips and falls on snow and ice, and it can even insulate a property owner from liability altogether. Biernacki v. Presque Isle Condominiums Unit Owners Ass’n, Inc., 828 A.2d 1114, 1117 (Pa. Super. 2003). Generally, in order for a plaintiff to recover for a fall on a snow- or ice-covered surface, the plaintiff must prove that: (1) snow and ice had accumulated on the sidewalk in ridges or elevations of such size and character as to unreasonably obstruct travel and constitute a danger to pedestrians; (2) the landowner had either actual or constructive notice of the condition; and (3) it was the dangerous accumulation of snow or ice which caused the plaintiff to fall. Morin v. Traveler’s Rest Motel, Inc., 704 A.2d 1085, 1087-1088 (Pa. Super. 1997). The “hills and ridges” doctrine protects a property owner from liability for generally slippery conditions resulting from snow or ice where the property owner has not permitted the snow or ice to unreasonably accumulate in ridges and elevations. Morin, 704 A.2d at 1087-1088. However, what if a winter storm passes through and drops a considerable amount of snow and ice on a landowner’s property? If a pedestrian slips and falls on that fresh snow and ice, will the property owner be held liable? Under the “hills and ridges” doctrine, a property owner will not be held liable for general slippery conditions when these conditions prevail in the community. Tonik v. Apex, 275 A.2d 296, 298 (Pa. 1971). Further, under the “hills and ridges” doctrine, property owners are specifically not obligated to plow, salt or shovel their property until a reasonable time after the snowstorm has ended. Collins v. Philadelphia Suburban Dev. Corp., 179 A.3d 69, 75 (Pa. Super. 2018). In other words, under the “hills and ridges” doctrine, there is no duty to remove the snow and ice while the snowstorm is still active. Rinaldi v. Levine, 176 A.2d 623, 625 (Pa. 1962). Pennsylvania courts have made clear that there is no absolute duty on property owners to keep their properties completely free of snow and ice at all times. In one instance, the court found it was not reasonable to require a property owner to remove snow and ice from its parking lot by 7:45 a.m., when it had only begun to fall the night before. Biernacki, 828 A.2d at 1117. What if the property owner, or a snowplow company on behalf of the property owner, plows, salts, shovels or otherwise intervenes to remove snow and ice while the snowstorm is still active? Will the property owner or snowplow company lose the protections afforded under the “hills and ridges” doctrine? No. When a property owner, or a snowplow company on behalf of the property owner, takes steps to remove snow and ice during the course of a snowstorm, the property owner or snowplow company does not lose those protections. Moreover, when there is snowfall immediately prior to a slip and fall on snow and ice, intervention through plowing, salting or shoveling does not bar the application of the “hills and ridges” doctrine. Beck v. Holly Tree Homeowners Ass’n, 689 F. Supp. 2d 756, 765 (E.D. Pa. 2010). Additionally, in the absence of a claim grounded in contract, a snowplow company is protected by the “hills and ridges” doctrine to the same degree as the property owner. Biernacki, 828 A.2d. at 1117. Lastly, when there is evidence of rain on the date of a slip and fall and temperature change leads to an accumulation of ice, the “hills and ridges” doctrine is triggered even in the absence of snow. Beck v. Holly Tree Homeowners Ass’n, 689 F. Supp. 2d 756, 765 (E.D. Pa. 2010). In one such instance, the court held there would be no liability imposed on the owner of a parking lot which had icy patches in some areas of the lot where other areas of the lot were free of ice. Carrender v. Fitterer, 469 A.2d 120, 124-125 (Pa. 1983). *Christian is an associate in our Philadelphia, Pennsylvania office. He can be reached at 215.575.2737 or caweimann@mdwcg.com Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 3, June 2021 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

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Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.