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Thomas F. Brown

Office Managing Attorney

Co-Chair, Rideshare Liability Practice

Portrait of Thomas F. Brown

Tom is a member of the Casualty Department and serves as the Managing Attorney of the Orlando office. He devotes his practice to civil litigation defense, advocating for corporations in claims of premises liability, wrongful death and product liability. He has handled hundreds of cases on behalf of a variety of corporations, many involving catastrophic injuries. During his career, he also has handled cases involving employment law, labor law, negligent security, trucking and transportation, motor vehicle accidents, sexual abuse and workers’ compensation. He also has experience handling cases involving allegations of mold resulting in personal injury and/or property damage. As part of his amusement and entertainment practice, Tom represents venues including theme parks, golf courses, water parks and retail stores. Tom is an active member of the International Amusement and Leisure Defense Association (IALDA).

Tom co-chairs the firms Rideshare Liability practice where he represents some of the nation’s leading ridesharing companies, their independent drivers and insurance carriers. In this capacity, he assists in managing the unique legal issues that often arise with rideshare claims, including insurance coverage, direct and vicarious liability and statutory compliance challenges.

Tom began his career at a civil litigation firm in Miami where he worked with one of the presidents of the Florida Bar. In 2006, he moved to Orlando where he joined a statewide defense litigation firm. Tom continues to dedicate his practice to defending corporations in civil litigation here at Marshall Dennehey.

Tom obtained his undergraduate degree from Rollins College where he made Dean’s List and President’s List. In 2001, he graduated cum laude from the University of Miami School of Law. As a law student, he made Dean’s List and earned the Dean’s Certificate of Achievement as well as the CALI Excellence for the Future Award.

Tom is a member of the Florida Bar and is admitted to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

    • University of Miami School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 2001)
    • Rollins College (A.B., 1998)
    • Florida, 2001
    • U.S. District Court Southern District of Florida, 2008
    • The Best Lawyers in America®, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants (2023-2027)
    • Florida Bar - Member, Workers' Compensation Section
    • International Amusement and Leisure Defense Association, Inc. - Member
    • Orange County Bar Association
    • Mock Trial, Trial Run, Tabletop Role Playing – Guilty or Not Guilty?, Bus Industry Safety Council (BISC) Annual Summer Meeting, Orlando, FL, July 22, 2024
    • Sharing Economy: Carshare and Rideshare Litigation, Florida Defense Lawyers Association (FDLA) webinar, February 9, 2023
    • The Complexity of Rideshare Claims, AM Best Insurance Law Podcast, June 2021
    • Defending Catastrophic Injury Claims - How to Stack the Deck in Your Favor, Marshall Dennehey Florida Claims Symposium – Casino Royale, Tampa, FL, September 20, 2018
    • Legal RoundTable, Amusement Industry Manufacturers & Suppliers International Conference, Orlando, FL, 2015
    • Blitz on Damages: Challenging Medical Bills, Marshall Dennehey Florida Claims Symposium - The Best Defense is a Good Offense, Orlando, FL, September 17, 2014
    • Analyzing Slip and Fall Claims, Gallagher Bassett Services, April 2014, co-presenter
    • Legal Round Table, IAAPA Convention, 2012
    • Reducing The Risk & Severity of Claims, Athletic Business Conference, 2011
    • Roller Skating Association and International Laser Tag Association Convention, 2011
    • Legal Round Table, IAAPA Convention, 2011
    • Successfully resolved a wrongful death action involving a 14-year-old boy who tragically fell from an attraction at a major entertainment complex in Orlando, FL. Representing the ride's owner/operator, Tom was able to navigate the complexities of a concurrent criminal investigation, a State of Florida administrative review, and widespread international media coverage.
    • Obtained Judgment on the Pleadings on behalf of plaintiff's employer in a matter involving alleged intentional tort where demand was $250,000.
    • Successfully argued a Motion to Dismiss for Fraud on the Court in a matter involving alleged electric shock where demand was over $100,000.
    • Played an active role in the investigation, discovery, and motion phases of a product liability case that settled during deliberations in the second phase of trial where demand to jury was over $500,000,000 but award against client after first phase of trial was less than $50,000.
    • Prepared a successful Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on a negligent hiring and negligent supervision in a matter involving an employee that shot an innocent bystander, and the matter settled shortly thereafter.
    • Obtained defense verdict in workers' compensation case involving alleged permanent total disability.
    • O'Rourke v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 65 So.3d 529 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011)
    • Edwards v. Cornelius, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79587 (M.D. Fla. June 8, 2012)

Results

Thought Leadership

Case Law Alerts

Florida Appellate Court Affirms Dismissal with Prejudice of a Claim Against Lyft Based on Statutory Immunity

July 20, 2026

Plaintiff, Louise Haddad, sued Lyft for damages after allegedly being assaulted by her Lyft driver. The plaintiff asserted claims for negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation against Lyft based on statements from its website which led her to believe the ride would be safe. Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed dismissal of her claims with prejudice, finding that they were barred by the broad immunity conferred to Transportation Network Companies (TNCs) under § 631.918, Florida Statutes. To plead an exception to TNC immunity, the plaintiff would have to allege sufficient facts, such as a violation of antitrust laws, bad faith, malicious purpose, or wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property. Since the plaintiff failed to adequately plead an exception, the court found her claims were barred by Florida’s TNC immunity statute. This case highlights the importance of legislative immunity in defending rideshare cases even at the pleadings stage.

Case Law Alerts

Florida Court Affirms Dismissal of Claims Against Lyft, Clarifying TNC Immunity at the Pleading Stage

April 1, 2026

Florida’s Third District Court of Appeal affirmed a trial court order dismissing a lawsuit against Lyft, arising from a motor vehicle accident. The plaintiff asserted claims of negligence and vicarious liability against Lyft. The trial court dismissed those claims, and the appellate court entered a per curiam affirmance, citing Florida’s TNC Statute and pleading rule. On appeal, the major point of contention was whether Lyft had to put forth evidence to support its argument for immunity under the TNC statute. Lyft argued no evidence was required, because the trial court concluded they could not be held liable based on the facts alleged in the complaint. While the Third District did not write an opinion, it presumably accepted Lyft’s position. This case suggests that a motion to dismiss can be an appropriate vehicle for rideshare companies to have trial courts determine applicability of TNC immunity.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Appellate Division Affirms Recreational Immunity for County Under Landowners' Liability Act

In a recent unpublished decision in Matthew Kuzma, etc. v. Middlesex County Parks Department, et al., the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed summary judgment in favor of Middlesex County Parks Department, holding that the county was immune from liability under New Jersey's Landowners' Liability Act (LLA), notwithstanding its failure to plead the immunity as an affirmative defense in its answer to the Complaint. The case arose from injuries sustained by fourteen-year-old plaintiff, Matthew Kuzma, while playing basketball at Spring Lake Park in South Plainfield on August 23, 2019. The plaintiff observed a crack in the basketball court before beginning to play but did not consider it dangerous. During the game, his foot became caught in the crack, causing him to fall and suffer a significant ankle injury. The plaintiff alleged that the injury resulted in ongoing physical limitations and deprived him of the opportunity to play collegiate basketball. The plaintiff filed suit alleging that the defendants negligently maintained the basketball court. Although the county did not assert LLA immunity as an affirmative defense in its answers, it later moved for summary judgment on that basis. The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that the county had waived the defense by failing to plead it. The county maintained that the plaintiff had received sufficient notice of its intent to rely on the LLA through discovery and therefore suffered no unfair surprise or prejudice. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment, concluding that the county should be permitted to invoke statutory immunity notwithstanding its failure to formally plead the defense. Relying heavily on the New Jersey Supreme Court's guidance in Arias v. Cnty. of Bergen, holding a county park was subject to the immunity of the LLA, the Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the county's failure to plead LLA immunity did not preclude reliance on the defense under the circumstances presented. The court determined that the plaintiff had received adequate notice of the immunity claim through discovery and that permitting the defense furthered the public-policy objectives embodied in the LLA. In affirming dismissal, the Appellate Division acknowledged the seriousness of the plaintiff's injury and the general societal interest in maintaining parks and recreational facilities in a safe condition. However, the court emphasized that both the legislature and the New Jersey Supreme Court have expressed a clear policy choice to limit liability for public and private landowners who make recreational property available for public use. The decision reinforces the courts' continuing adherence to the Landowners' Liability Act and the principle that recreational lands and facilities should be broadly protected from liability exposure, even in cases involving significant personal injuries.