.

Thomas F. Brown

Office Managing Attorney

Co-Chair, Rideshare Liability Practice

Portrait of Thomas F. Brown

Tom is a member of the Casualty Department and serves as the Managing Attorney of the Orlando office. He devotes his practice to civil litigation defense, advocating for corporations in claims of premises liability, wrongful death and product liability. He has handled hundreds of cases on behalf of a variety of corporations, many involving catastrophic injuries. During his career, he also has handled cases involving employment law, labor law, negligent security, trucking and transportation, motor vehicle accidents, sexual abuse and workers’ compensation. He also has experience handling cases involving allegations of mold resulting in personal injury and/or property damage. As part of his amusement and entertainment practice, Tom represents venues including theme parks, golf courses, water parks and retail stores. Tom is an active member of the International Amusement and Leisure Defense Association (IALDA).

Tom co-chairs the firms Rideshare Liability practice where he represents some of the nation’s leading ridesharing companies, their independent drivers and insurance carriers. In this capacity, he assists in managing the unique legal issues that often arise with rideshare claims, including insurance coverage, direct and vicarious liability and statutory compliance challenges.

Tom began his career at a civil litigation firm in Miami where he worked with one of the presidents of the Florida Bar. In 2006, he moved to Orlando where he joined a statewide defense litigation firm. Tom continues to dedicate his practice to defending corporations in civil litigation here at Marshall Dennehey.

Tom obtained his undergraduate degree from Rollins College where he made Dean’s List and President’s List. In 2001, he graduated cum laude from the University of Miami School of Law. As a law student, he made Dean’s List and earned the Dean’s Certificate of Achievement as well as the CALI Excellence for the Future Award.

Tom is a member of the Florida Bar and is admitted to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

    • University of Miami School of Law (J.D., cum laude, 2001)
    • Rollins College (A.B., 1998)
    • Florida, 2001
    • U.S. District Court Southern District of Florida, 2008
    • The Best Lawyers in America®, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants (2023-2026)
    • Florida Bar - Member, Workers' Compensation Section
    • International Amusement and Leisure Defense Association, Inc. - Member
    • Orange County Bar Association
    • Mock Trial, Trial Run, Tabletop Role Playing – Guilty or Not Guilty?, Bus Industry Safety Council (BISC) Annual Summer Meeting, Orlando, FL, July 22, 2024
    • Sharing Economy: Carshare and Rideshare Litigation, Florida Defense Lawyers Association (FDLA) webinar, February 9, 2023
    • The Complexity of Rideshare Claims, AM Best Insurance Law Podcast, June 2021
    • Defending Catastrophic Injury Claims - How to Stack the Deck in Your Favor, Marshall Dennehey Florida Claims Symposium – Casino Royale, Tampa, FL, September 20, 2018
    • Legal RoundTable, Amusement Industry Manufacturers & Suppliers International Conference, Orlando, FL, 2015
    • Blitz on Damages: Challenging Medical Bills, Marshall Dennehey Florida Claims Symposium - The Best Defense is a Good Offense, Orlando, FL, September 17, 2014
    • Analyzing Slip and Fall Claims, Gallagher Bassett Services, April 2014, co-presenter
    • Legal Round Table, IAAPA Convention, 2012
    • Reducing The Risk & Severity of Claims, Athletic Business Conference, 2011
    • Roller Skating Association and International Laser Tag Association Convention, 2011
    • Legal Round Table, IAAPA Convention, 2011
    • Successfully resolved a wrongful death action involving a 14-year-old boy who tragically fell from an attraction at a major entertainment complex in Orlando, FL. Representing the ride's owner/operator, Tom was able to navigate the complexities of a concurrent criminal investigation, a State of Florida administrative review, and widespread international media coverage.
    • Obtained Judgment on the Pleadings on behalf of plaintiff's employer in a matter involving alleged intentional tort where demand was $250,000.
    • Successfully argued a Motion to Dismiss for Fraud on the Court in a matter involving alleged electric shock where demand was over $100,000.
    • Played an active role in the investigation, discovery, and motion phases of a product liability case that settled during deliberations in the second phase of trial where demand to jury was over $500,000,000 but award against client after first phase of trial was less than $50,000.
    • Prepared a successful Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on a negligent hiring and negligent supervision in a matter involving an employee that shot an innocent bystander, and the matter settled shortly thereafter.
    • Obtained defense verdict in workers' compensation case involving alleged permanent total disability.
    • O'Rourke v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 65 So.3d 529 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011)
    • Edwards v. Cornelius, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 79587 (M.D. Fla. June 8, 2012)

Results

Thought Leadership

Case Law Alerts

Florida Appellate Court Affirms Dismissal with Prejudice of a Claim Against Lyft Based on Statutory Immunity

July 20, 2026

Plaintiff, Louise Haddad, sued Lyft for damages after allegedly being assaulted by her Lyft driver. The plaintiff asserted claims for negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation against Lyft based on statements from its website which led her to believe the ride would be safe. Florida’s Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed dismissal of her claims with prejudice, finding that they were barred by the broad immunity conferred to Transportation Network Companies (TNCs) under § 631.918, Florida Statutes. To plead an exception to TNC immunity, the plaintiff would have to allege sufficient facts, such as a violation of antitrust laws, bad faith, malicious purpose, or wanton and willful disregard of human rights, safety, or property. Since the plaintiff failed to adequately plead an exception, the court found her claims were barred by Florida’s TNC immunity statute. This case highlights the importance of legislative immunity in defending rideshare cases even at the pleadings stage.

Case Law Alerts

Florida Court Affirms Dismissal of Claims Against Lyft, Clarifying TNC Immunity at the Pleading Stage

April 1, 2026

Florida’s Third District Court of Appeal affirmed a trial court order dismissing a lawsuit against Lyft, arising from a motor vehicle accident. The plaintiff asserted claims of negligence and vicarious liability against Lyft. The trial court dismissed those claims, and the appellate court entered a per curiam affirmance, citing Florida’s TNC Statute and pleading rule. On appeal, the major point of contention was whether Lyft had to put forth evidence to support its argument for immunity under the TNC statute. Lyft argued no evidence was required, because the trial court concluded they could not be held liable based on the facts alleged in the complaint. While the Third District did not write an opinion, it presumably accepted Lyft’s position. This case suggests that a motion to dismiss can be an appropriate vehicle for rideshare companies to have trial courts determine applicability of TNC immunity.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.

Thought Leadership

Delaware Superior Court Clarifies Pleading Standard for Legal Malpractice Claims

In the matter of Edelstein v. Kirschner, No. N25C-09-018 FJJ, 2026 Del. Super. LEXIS 45, at *1 (Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2026), the plaintiff law firm sued its former client for unpaid legal fees in the amount of $4,399.35. The former client asserted a counterclaim alleging legal malpractice. More, specifically, the former client claimed that his lawyer committed malpractice be recommending that he settle an underlying lawsuit by entering into a stipulated judgment for an excessive amount with interest that was accruing at “an outlandish” interest rate. The law firm moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the basis that its former client had not alleged facts reflecting that he could prove the case within the case. That is, facts reflecting that his attorneys caused him to lose the underlying case. The Superior Court held that while a legal malpractice plaintiff in cases arising from underlying litigation must prove the case within the case to survive a summary judgment motion, he does not need to plead facts reflecting as much in order to survive a motion to dismiss. While this case addresses the pleading requirements of a legal malpractice case in Delaware, it also serves as reminder that chasing unpaid legal fees from a former client can often give rise to a legal malpractice counterclaim. Attorneys seeking to collect unpaid legal fees should ensure that the fees they seek are for a significant amount, which would be recoverable if a judgment is obtained. Otherwise, the effort could backfire.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Takes Up the Gist of the Action Doctrine

The gist of the action doctrine has been a hot topic in legal malpractice cases in Pennsylvania over the last several years.  Beginning in 2014, the Pennsylvania courts applied the gist of the action doctrine to professional liability actions, following the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s opinion in Bruno v. Erie Ins. Co., 106 A.3d 48 (Pa. 2014).  In Bruno, the court applied the gist of the action doctrine to a professional negligence claim, and found that a negligence claim was not barred simply because the parties were in a contractual relationship where the gist of the claim sounded in negligence. Thereafter, courts in Pennsylvania applied the gist of the action doctrine to breach of contract claims as well, finding that where the allegations sounded in negligence, a plaintiff could not recast a negligence claim as one for breach of contract. This was important because of the distinction between statutes of limitations: negligence claims must be brought within two (2) years, while breach of contract claims can be brought within four (4) years.  Then, last year, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the gist of the action doctrine does not apply to breach of contract claims as seen through two opinions. These opinions were Swatt v. Nottingham Village, 342 A.3d 23 (Pa. Super. 2025) and Poteat v. Asteak, et al., 350 A.3d 198 (Pa. Super. 2025). That is, the gist of the action doctrine can bar a negligence claim but it cannot bar a breach of contract claim.  This month, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted the petition for allowance of appeal in Poteat.  The Supreme Court phrased the issue for consideration as follows: Whether the Superior Court majority’s holding conflicts with this Court’s holding in Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co., 160 A.3d 48 (Pa. 2014), as well as Superior Court opinions that applied Bruno, and departs from almost 200 years of controlling precedent that distinguishes between causes of action in contract and tort based upon the nature of the duty that was allegedly breached? Attorneys on both sides of legal malpractice matters no doubt look forward to clarification on these issues from our Supreme Court.