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Sarah B. Cole

Office Managing Attorney

Portrait of Sarah B. Cole

Sarah is a member of the Casualty Department where she focuses her practice in the areas of general commercial liability, including premises liability and residential group home liability.  As managing shareholder of the Wilmington office, Sarah oversees the day-to-day operations for the entire office, ensuring that client matters are handled promptly, professionally and effectively. She also serves on the firm's Board of Directors.

For the past decade, Sarah has defended hundreds of clients in the defense of personal injury litigation in the Delaware courts, with many cases tried successfully to verdict. In addition, she has defended clients in insurance coverage disputes as well as property damage litigation.

As a member of the Fraud/Special Investigative Unit (SIU) Litigation Practice Group, Sarah continues to develop her skills litigating and investigating claims of insurance fraud.  She also has experience handling PIP disputes throughout the state of Delaware on behalf of our clients.

Sarah graduated from Bryn Mawr College in 2001 with a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science. She received her juris doctorate from the University of Maryland in 2005.  During law school, Sarah was an intern with the Delaware Court of Chancery.  After graduation, Sarah served as a law clerk to the Honorable Arlene Minus Coppadge and the Honorable Robert B. Coonin.

After her clerkship, Sarah went into private practice at a civil defense litigation firm where she successfully defended individuals and businesses in many jury trials in the Delaware Superior Court. 

Sarah is active with local animal welfare organizations in Delaware, including the Delaware Humane Association and Faithful Friends Animal Society.

    • University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law (J.D., 2005)
    • Bryn Mawr College (B.A., 2001)
    • Delaware, 2005
    • U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware
    • Top Lawyer, Insurance Law, Delaware Today, (November 2026)
    • The Best Lawyers in America®, Litigation - Insurance (2023-2027)
    • Top Lawyer, Tort Law, Delaware Today (November 2024)
    • American Board of Trial Advocates, 2026
    • Delaware State Bar Association
    • New Jersey Contractual Indemnity and Additional Insured Issues, Zurich Insurance, April 2015
    • "What Del.'s Legal Leaders Are Keeping an Eye on For '24," Law360, January 4, 2024
    • Defense verdict in Delaware Superior Court in a personal injury lawsuit arising out of a slip and fall at a commercial shopping center where liability and significant damages were in dispute.
    • Successful defense of a residential group home in relation to personal injury claims resulting in efficient and well-informed settlement of all claims prior to the filing of suit.
    • Defense verdict in Delaware Superior Court in a personal injury lawsuit arising out of a motor vehicle accident.  Damages and liability were in dispute.  The strategic defense theory presented  at trial resulted in the jury awarding a sum that was vastly below the plaintiff's pre-trial demand. Thereafter, the defense successfully argued in opposition to motions for additur and for a new trial.
    • Defended a first-party lawsuit for underinsured motorist coverage before a jury in Delaware Superior Court. Received a defense verdict when the jury awarded damages that equated to less than what the plaintiff received from the underlying tortfeasor.  Thereafter, the defense successfully argued in opposition to motions for additur and for a new trial.
    • Defended a hotel owner in a premises liability claim brought in Delaware Superior Court with alleged damages approaching nearly $1 million. Through the course of discovery, it was demonstrated that  the hotel owner had significant defenses to the plaintiff's claims. Settled the case for a fraction of the original demand.
    • Defense verdict in Delaware Superior Court in a personal injury lawsuit arising out of a motor vehicle accident.  After extensive expert and lay witness testimony, the jury found in favor of the defense on liability.  Thereafter, the defense successfully argued in opposition to motions for additur and for a new trial.  Jury's verdict upheld in both Delaware Superior Court and the Delaware Supreme Court.

Results

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

On the Pulse…Working In the “First State” – Spotlight on Wilmington

March 1, 2024

Wilmington, Delaware, is small but mighty. It is a city on the upswing and a great place to practice law. Many companies choose to incorporate in Delaware and, as a result, the courts and litigators keep plenty busy with disputes that originate in and out of the state.  The Delaware office of Marshall Dennehey opened in 1995 and, since that time, has represented clients in casualty, professional liability, workers’ compensation, and medical malpractice matters. For the first 25-plus years of its existence, this office was led by Kevin Connors, who maintains a busy practice to this day. During his tenure, the office grew to roughly 20 attorneys in the firm’s four major departments. Our Wilmington office maintains a robust practice throughout all three counties in the state.  The strength of the Delaware office is in its people. The office, like the firm itself, makes a commitment to each person who joins us to provide apprenticeship, guidance, comradery, and support. We want people to succeed here, and we are committed to their advancement. If you were to walk down the hallways of our office, you would see open doors, friendly faces (for the most part), some odd artwork, and fantasy football draft posters. You will also likely come across our main kitchen and probably find some donuts and a vending machine that works fairly well. Most importantly though, you will find a welcoming atmosphere that serves as the foundation for our firm’s and our office’s success.  The attorneys in our office have a few time-honored traditions, most notably, the annual Crab Trip. Every June, attorneys board a bus (hopefully equipped with a bathroom) and make the journey down to Leipsic, Delaware, for an afternoon of crabs, hush puppies, fried-everything, and Prairie Fires. The bus then usually takes a meandering route back to Wilmington, stopping at various well-heeled establishments along the way. It is on this trip that bonds are formed and friendships are solidified. We are a team, and we enjoy each others company. The Wilmington office is growing, both with the type of litigation work we take on and the attorneys who come on board. We added a new shareholder and three associates in all four litigation departments in the last two years and hope to add more in 2024. The future is bright. We welcome you as well and invite you to come and visit. Feel free to bring donuts. *Sarah is a shareholder and the managing attorney of our Wilmington, Delaware, office. She can be reached at (302) 552-4364 or SBCole@mdwcg.com.    Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 1, March 2024, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.   Defense Digest, Vol. 30, No. 1, March 2024

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.