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Fraud/Special Investigation

In response to the high demand for aggressive trial attorneys to defend against insurance fraud, Marshall Dennehey has significantly expanded its Fraud/Special Investigation Practice.

Insurance fraud is, understandably, no longer tolerated or in any way compromised by insurance companies and self-insureds. We work very closely with our clients in furtherance of that philosophy through relentless investigation, aggressive defense and prosecution in response to false and inflated insurance claims.

Our members supplement their litigation experience with up-to-date knowledge of the current trends in insurance fraud detection and prosecution areas by regularly attending and participating in seminars given by such educational agencies as the National Insurance Crime Bureau, International Association of Special Investigation Units and Certified Fraud Examiners. In addition, they also attend numerous local conferences and association meetings throughout Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware, Ohio, Florida and New York.

Aggressive Fraud Defense

As a part of an overall aggressive fraud defense, the members of the Fraud/Special Investigation Practice believe that the "best defense is a good offense." Our trial attorneys are quite experienced in the investigation, defense and affirmative prosecution of fraudulent claims. The scope of their practice is focused on the individual claimant as well as organized groups or "rings." We routinely file suits and collect judgments against perpetrators of insurance fraud including both insureds and medical providers.

We have considerable experience with cases involving:

  • Medical provider fraud
  • Claimant fraud
  • Insurance claim inflation
  • Staged accidents
  • Application/rate evasion fraud
  • Workers' compensation fraud
  • Vehicle "give ups"
  • Suspicious jewelry losses and arsons

We maintain a centralized "fraud library" of fraud scams, investigations and perpetrators. Dissemination of this information to the group members, as well as a constant dialogue between attorneys, allows them to immediately incorporate current law and recent events in the fraud industry into defense strategies. We, in turn, enable our clients to incorporate this knowledge and experience into investigations by providing them with updates concerning recent developments in the industry. Our clients greatly appreciate the fact that we collaborate with them in the course of investigations in order to coordinate efforts and ensure that the goals of fighting fraud are met.

Results

Thought Leadership

SIU Spotlight

The Age of Automated Fraud: Defending Against Documentation Cloning and AI-Generated Claims

May 15, 2026

For years, healthcare payers have treated note cloning—the practice of copying and pasting electronic health record (EHR) text—as a primary red flag in fraud, waste, and abuse (FWA) investigations. Today, as the industry races to embrace Artificial Intelligence (AI) for documentation, the threat of "cloning" is not disappearing; it is simply evolving. For insurance carriers facing healthcare fraud costs estimated to exceed $400 billion annually in the U.S., understanding this new and evolving technological risk is paramount to effective claims denial and successful defense litigation The core issue with cloned documentation is its immediate challenge to the medical necessity of billed services. When medical records contain identical or near-identical entries across multiple dates of service, the documentation cannot support the premise that unique, individualized care was provided at each encounter. This practice undermines the credibility of the entire record. Traditional copy-and-paste charting, where clinicians simply copy-forward prior entries or borrow from templates, was quickly identified by the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) and the Office of Inspector General (OIG) as a priority for audit and enforcement. Its misuse often results in a form of fraud known as up-coding—the insertion of false or irrelevant details to justify a higher, more expensive level of service than was actually rendered. Simply put, manufactured records support inflated billing. Cloning 2.0: AI and the New Red Flags The rapid adoption of AI-assisted documentation tools presents carriers with a new, but strikingly familiar, compliance pitfall. Just as a keyboard shortcut once generated a suspiciously repetitive note, a sophisticated machine learning algorithm can now produce a grammatically flawless but equally generic summary. Insurance carriers must equip claims auditors with a new playbook for identifying these high-tech red flags: Repetitive and Boilerplate Phrasing: Like cut-and-paste, AI tools tend to reuse stock language verbatim—for instance, identical descriptions of a patient's presentation across many different encounters. The presence of uniform, verbose, or overly formal language that clashes with an experienced auditor's knowledge of a physician's typical "voice" should raise suspicion. These generic statements does not reflect individual patient encounters, creates the assumption that the narrative was manufactured to support, higher E/M coding and supports the appearance of a systematic inflation by a provider, not an isolated error. Overly Complete Documentation: A hallmark red flag for potential upcoding is extreme documentation thoroughness. Unlike human clinicians, who focus on relevant positives and negatives, AI systems frequently generate exhaustive, boilerplate reviews of systems. Such documentation can misrepresent the scope of the encounter, creating the appearance of higher-level services and automatically inflating the reported E/M code—despite no corresponding increase in clinical work. An example of this would be a patient presenting with a sore throat and congestion, but the note documents a 14-system Review of Symptoms (ROS), all marked negative. A routine upper respiratory complaint does not clinically justify a full multi-system ROS. This level of detail artificially supports a higher E/M level without corresponding medical necessity. Internal Inconsistencies: Because AI relies on patterns, it can fail to reconcile contradictory information or carry forward fabricated or outdated details. For instance, one section of an AI-generated note might state "no extremity pain," while another later mentions "episodes of upper extremity discomfort". These internal contradictions are destructive to a record's credibility and are prime targets for counsel in deposition. Metadata Trails: Crucially, the technology that enables AI documentation also leaves an audit trail. Carriers must leverage the power of discovery to review system logs and timestamps that reveal when AI tools were used to generate text. This metadata can prove the extent of a provider's reliance on automated shortcuts, flagging instances of potential overreliance. Fighting Fire with Fire: The Carrier's AI Defense The growing sophistication of provider fraud demands that insurance carriers evolve beyond static, rules-based fraud detection to advanced analytical models. The best defense against AI-driven fraud is often the strategic use of defensive AI. Carriers must transition to modern FWA prevention strategies by: Pre-Payment FWA Preventive Analytics: Moving beyond traditional post-pay audits, carriers are now leveraging machine learning models to score and flag claims for high-risk behavior before adjudication. This shift prevents the improper payment from ever being made. Leveraging Natural Language Processing (NLP): NLP is essential for analyzing the unstructured data in medical records, specifically clinical notes. These tools can scan millions of provider notes to detect the subtle anomalies that human auditors might miss, such as:Identification of repetitive and cloned phrases across a provider's patient roster. Flagging medical codes that do not align with the narrative diagnosis or description in the note. Predictive Behavioral Modeling: AI systems can track a provider's historical billing and documentation patterns, automatically identifying statistically significant deviations from their peers. When a provider suddenly increases their volume of complex E/M codes (a classic up-coding indicator) or exhibits unusual service combinations, the system flags the provider as a high-risk outlier for focused investigation. Network Link Analysis: Advanced analytics can uncover collusive networks of providers who might be sharing patients or services to perpetrate fraud. In conclusion, the ultimate lesson for carriers is that documentation is not merely about filling space; it is about telling the patient's distinctive and current story. Anything—whether a copy-paste command or a machine learning algorithm—that dilutes that unique story and creates repetitive or over-documented records is a pathway to claims failure and potential fraud. Insurance carriers must treat AI documentation with the same rigorous scrutiny once reserved for chart cloning, updating audit protocols to focus on individualized clinician attestation, customization, and metadata that reveals overreliance on automation.

SIU Spotlight

The "Inherent Risk" of Staged Collisions and the Limits of Sentencing Stipulations

May 15, 2026

In a significant win for law enforcement and the insurance industry, the Tenth Circuit recently affirmed a 48-month sentence for a defendant who orchestrated a sophisticated, multi-year insurance fraud scheme involving staged car wrecks. The court’s ruling in United States v. Brown, No. 25-7026 (Dec. 30, 2025) underscores a powerful legal precedent: the act of staging an automobile collision is inherently dangerous and justifies strong sentencing enhancements, regardless of whether a particular crash resulted in actual injury. A. Background Defendant Sebron Dejuan Brown operated a four-year conspiracy involving odometer tampering and staged accidents. The scheme was twofold: Vehicle Value Inflation: Brown replaced or "rolled back" odometers in high-mileage vehicles to artificially inflate their market value. Orchestrated Crashes: He and his co-conspirators then deliberately crashed these vehicles—sometimes involving unsuspecting third parties—to submit fraudulent insurance claims for vehicle repairs and bodily injuries. While the parties initially stipulated to a lower loss amount and offense level, the district court rejected the stipulated guidelines. Instead, the court applied a two-level sentencing enhancement for an offense involving the "conscious or reckless risk of death or serious bodily injury" and imposed an 11-month upward variance, resulting in a four-year prison term. B. The Tenth Circuit’s "Inherent Risk" Ruling On appeal, Brown argued that the "serious bodily injury" enhancement (U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(16)(A)) was misapplied because there was no evidence that anyone was actually at risk of grave harm during his "controlled" low-speed collisions. The Tenth Circuit rejected this "semantic and evidentiary over-demand.” The panel held that because cars are "big pieces of machinery traveling at speed," the risk of serious injury is intrinsic in any deliberately caused accident. The court clarified that sentencing judges do not need to quantify the specific degree of risk for each individual collision; the criminal method itself—staging wrecks—is enough to trigger the enhancement. Takeaways 1. The Power of "Inherent Risk" in Litigation The most important takeaway for carriers is the judicial recognition that staged accidents are inherently dangerous. Carriers can leverage this "inherent risk" logic in civil litigation—especially in RICO or fraud counterclaims—to emphasize the egregious nature of the claimant’s conduct. By framing staged accidents as acts of reckless endangerment rather than mere paperwork fraud, carriers can more effectively push for punitive measures and deter future schemes. 2. Beware of Sentencing Stipulations Brown highlights that courts are not bound by the stipulations between prosecutors and defendants regarding loss amounts or offense levels. Carriers, often acting as victims in these cases, should ensure their "actual loss" statements are strongly documented. Even if the parties agree to a lower loss figure for a plea deal, the carrier’s impact statement can lead the court to apply enhancements or adjustments that better reflect the true scope of the harm. 3. Identifying the "Sophisticated Means" Red Flags Although Brown’s scheme was simple in its execution (crashing cars), the court noted the "repetitive and consistent nature" of the fraud for over four years as a reason for the upward variance. Carriers should look for these patterns early in the Special Investigations Unit (SIU) process: Commonalities in Vehicle Acquisition: Vehicles with high mileage that have recently "lost" significant mileage on their odometers. Recruitment Patterns: Schemes involving five or more participants often share common medical providers or legal representatives. Frequency Limits: Tracking how often the same individual appears as a passenger or "witness" across different claims. 4. Proactive Defense Strategies: Beyond Affirmative Defenses Carriers should move beyond simple denials of claims. As seen in Brown, the criminal justice system is increasingly willing to treat these cases as serious threats to public safety. In civil court, carriers should consider: Declaratory Judgment Actions: Seeking an early court ruling that no coverage exists due to the fraudulent nature of the incident. Aggressive Counterclaims: Filing counterclaims for fraud or RICO violations rather than just asserting fraud as an affirmative defense. This shifts the burden and signals that the carrier will not settle "low-value" nuisance claims. Accordingly, United States v. Brown serves as a solid reminder that the "staged accident" is not viewed by the courts as a victimless white-collar crime. By affirming that these schemes pose an inherent risk of death or serious injury, the Tenth Circuit has provided insurance carriers with a potent rhetorical and legal tool to use in the ongoing fight against organized fraud rings.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Unanimous New Jersey Supreme Court Holds That Personal Emails of Public Employees and Officials are Subject to OPRA

In Rosetti v. Ramapo-Indian Hills Regional High School Board of Education, the New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously held that government-related emails, which are contained within personal email accounts, are government records under the Open Public Records Act (OPRA), and a log of those emails must be produced when requested. In reaching this decision, the court conducted an analysis of the OPRA and cited previous cases that held that emails do in fact fall within OPRA’s definition of a record and must be produced when requested pursuant to the Act. The court in Rosetti then had to answer the question as to whether public officials’ personal email accounts that are used for government purposes are subject to OPRA, and found that they are. Rosetti made an OPRA request to the Board of Education seeking email logs from Board members’ personal email accounts. The Board refused to produce the logs and indicated that it was not under any obligation to produce personal email account logs, only from government-related email accounts. The issue was whether a log had to be produced for Board members’ personal email accounts, which they used to conduct Board business. The Board argued that while it was possible to create a log for government-related email accounts through its IT Department, it was not possible to do so for personal email accounts. The court rejected this argument and ruled that Board members are required to search their personal email accounts and create a log of government-related emails housed in those accounts. Once completed, each Board member then must submit a certification detailing the searches that were conducted. The court went one step further with a suggestion to government employees and officials, stating, “[g]overnment agencies should strongly advise their employees, elected officials, and others engaged in government-related business to refrain from using their personal email accounts when conducting government-related business.”  Please do not hesitate to contact me with any questions regarding this case and others pertaining to the OPRA. 

News

Marshall Dennehey’s John J. Hare Brings Home Attorney of the Year Honors; Firm Named Litigation Department of the Year in Two Categories

Marshall Dennehey took home top honors in three categories at the The Legal Intelligencer’s 2026 Pennsylvania Legal Awards, held June 11 in Philadelphia. The first place awards include: Attorney of the Year: John J. Hare, Chair of the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post-Trial Practice Group and Executive Committee member, together with Charles “Chip” Becker of Kline & Specter Litigation Department of the Year, Appellate – Third Win in a Row! Litigation Department of the Year, Product Liability/Mass Torts “There is no one more deserving of Attorney of the Year honors than John. This award is a testament to his exceptional skill, dedication, and leadership—qualities that truly exemplify the very best of our firm,” said G. Mark Thompson, Marshall Dennehey’s President & CEO. “These honors also reflect the strength and depth of our product liability, mass torts, and appellate practices across Pennsylvania and beyond, underscoring our ongoing commitment to delivering outstanding results for our clients.” Attorney of the Year – John J. Hare, Marshall Dennehey, together with Charles “Chip” Becker, Kline & Specter Over the past year, John and Charles were opposing counsel in many of the highest-profile civil appeals in Pennsylvania. John is renowned as a preeminent appellate lawyer on the defense side, and Chip on the plaintiff's side. They have opposed each other repeatedly, exhibiting peerless professionalism and exceptional civility, while zealously litigating under the unremitting pressure of high-profile litigation and record-setting verdicts totaling more than $3.5 billion. They have also collaborated, outside of litigation, on many commissions, committees, and projects of importance to the Pennsylvania judiciary and legal community. Litigation Department of the Year – Appellate Law, Winner (previous winner, 2025 and 2024) 2025 was another standout year for the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post‑Trial Practice Group, led by John J. Hare, which was retained to challenge many of Pennsylvania’s “nuclear” verdicts—awards exceeding $10 million. Notably, the department persuaded the Pennsylvania Superior Court to reverse a Philadelphia judgment of $1.09 billion, the largest judgment ever overturned by a Pennsylvania appellate court. The group’s 11 full‑time Pennsylvania‑based appellate lawyers are at the center of Pennsylvania’s most high-profile matters, bringing more than 150 years of combined appellate experience. They routinely handle post‑trial and appellate matters and are frequently engaged to participate in and monitor trials in high‑exposure cases to ensure that critical legal issues are properly raised and preserved for appeal. Litigation Department of the Year – Product Liability/Mass Torts, Winner This marks the first win for the firm’s Pennsylvania Product Liability and Mass Torts practices, which operate within our Casualty Department, managed by Matthew Schorr and Jeff Rapattoni. For almost five decades, Fortune 500 product manufacturers/distributors and their insurers have turned to these groups to defend their litigation. Led by Bradley D. Remick and Vlada Tasich, our Product Liability group’s success can be attributed to its commitment to keeping abreast of ever-changing legal theories, judicial viewpoints, and evolving technology impacting the product liability landscape. Our attorneys have successfully handled thousands of product liability matters in all jurisdictions across the state. Likewise, our mass tort litigation practice – divided into Asbestos & Mass Tort, and Environmental & Toxic Tort Litigation –  has defended manufacturers, distributors, contractors, and premises owners in thousands of personal injury and other claims. Led by Kevin E. Hexstall and Patrick T. Reilly, most attorneys in these groups have more than 20 years of experience, and our seasoned trial team has tried hundreds of cases to verdict, consistently achieving strong results through both trials and settlements. In addition to these awards, Marshall Dennehey was a Litigation Department of the Year finalist for Professional Liability.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Perlmutter Provides Predictability for Punitive Damages Claims in Florida

In a much anticipated decision, the Florida Supreme Court provided clarity for the standards of proof for punitive damages claims in Perlmutter v. Federal Insurance Company, SC2024-0058 (Fla. June 11, 2026). Litigants and trial judges must be mindful of the standards laid out by the Court. And, defense practitioners must be prepared to alter their strategies to defend against such claims. Perlmutter came to the Court from the Fourth District, based on conflict jurisdiction with decisions from the Second and Fifth District and on certification of a question of great public importance as to the standard of proof for punitive damages claims at the pleading stage. Fed. Ins. Co. v. Perlmutter, 376 So. 3d 24, 29 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023). In the underlying case, the Fourth District made two conclusions. First, it held that a “trial court must consider the evidentiary showing by all parties at the hearing on the motion to amend, that is, evidence ‘in the record’ and evidence ‘proffered by the claimant.’”  376 So. 3d at 33. Second, the Fourth held that it “interpreted section 768.72(1) and (2) to require the trial court to make a preliminary determination of whether a reasonable jury, viewing the totality of proffered evidence in the light most favorable to the movant, could find by clear and convincing evidence that punitive damages are warranted.  Id. at 34 (underscoring in the original). In making these conclusions, the court cautioned trial courts that the “preliminary determination” analysis did not entitle the trial court to decide whether the evidence is clear and convincing and noted that the trial court should not weigh evidence and should not determine witness credibility. Id. The Florida Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction and answered the certified question in the negative. It quashed the decision below and remanded the case for application of the following standards: The trial court should consider only the evidence identified or proffered by the claimant; it should not entertain an evidentiary counter-submission from the opponent. The trial court should consider whether a reasonable person could conclude based on the claimant’s evidence, that the defendant committed “intentional misconduct” or “gross negligence” as defined in section 768.72(2) or section 768.72(3). The trial court must review the request for punitive damages in the context of the underlying claims. The trial court should not apply the clear and convincing standard of proof in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence at the pleading stage. The trial court does not act as a fact-finder; the trial court must not weigh the claimant’s evidence—it cannot decide the truth of the matter. The trial court must consider the record evidence and the proffered evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, but the allegations in the proposed amended complaint are not themselves evidence. Perlmutter, SC2024-0058 at 13-15 (emphasis added). In explaining these standards, the Court interpreted the text of the statute and compared it to a related statute which governs punitive damages in the nursing home context. The nursing home statute expressly calls for evidentiary submissions by “the parties” and expressly tells the trial court to determine whether there is a reasonable basis to believe the claimant could satisfy the “clear and convincing evidence” standard at trial. Id. at 17-18 (comparing the text of section 768.72(1), Florida Statutes, with section 400.0237, Florida Statutes). Without that express language in section 768.72, the statute could not be applied in the same manner. With these standards specially delineated for the trial courts, the Court is “confident that its interpretation of section 768.72(1) will not frustrate the effectiveness of the statute in accomplishing the Legislature’s textually evident purposes.” Id.  at 22 (cleaned up). This remains to be seen. While Perlmutter provides predictability and clarity for trial courts when reviewing the evidentiary submissions in support of a punitive damages claim, the decision will not likely impact the numbers of punitive damages motions filed. Rather, these new parameters will change the way claims are defended, reminiscent of a time when rulings on punitive damages were only subject to certiorari review and appellate courts were limited in reviewing procedural errors. This decision will likely deflate the level-playing field that Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(G) addressed by allowing appeals of orders granting and denying punitive damages amendments. Further, Perlmutter may have impliedly created a call to action for the Legislature to amend section 768.72(1) in the same manner it amended section 400.0237 to allow the courts to analyze “admissible evidence submitted by the parties” and determine at a hearing whether there is a reasonable basis to believe the claimant at trial would be able to demonstrate by “clear and convincing evidence” that the recovery of punitive damages is warranted. Until then, defendants must adjust their strategies. To adapt to these new standards, defense practitioners will need to tailor their strategy for defending punitive damages claims since they can no longer submit a counter-proffer or urge a court to apply the clear and convincing standard at the pleading phase. Instead, defendants will need to attack the deficiencies in the claimant’s pleadings and proffer. If the trial court fails to serve as a gatekeeper, and does not apply the above standards, then defendants can pursue an interlocutory appeal under Rule 9.130(a)(3)(G). If a nonfinal appeal is taken, then defendants should move to stay any intrusive financial discovery while the appellate court analyzes the issues on appeal. Finally, defendants should utilize Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510 to serve as a screening device to allow the trial court to analyze all evidence and prevent nonmeritorious punitive damages claims from proceeding to a jury.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Holds Self-Referral Prohibition Does Not Cover Prescriptions Written by Physicians with Ownership Interests in Dispensing Pharmacies

700 Pharmacy v. Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Fee Review Hearing Office (State Workers’ Insurance Fund); Nos. 97, 98, 99, 100, 101 MAP 2024; decided June 16, 2026; by Justice Mundy.   In this case, Drs. Miteswar Purewal and Shailen Jalali, treating physicians for workers’ compensation claimants, wrote prescriptions for various medications that were filled by 700 Pharmacy. The worker’s compensation insurer refused to pay for the prescriptions on the basis that they were illegal self-referrals under the Act. 700 Pharmacy subsequently filed fee review applications with The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Medical Fee Review Office. At a fee review hearing, both physicians stipulated they had a financial interest in the pharmacy.  The physicians argued that the Anti-Referral Provision of the Act does not bar self-referrals on prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services, since the provision does not specifically identify prescription drugs. The Fee Review Hearing Officer rejected this argument and found that prescriptions for medications are prohibited under the “goods or services” language included in the provision. 700 Pharmacy appealed to the Commonwealth Court, and the court affirmed, agreeing with the Hearing Officer’s interpretation of “goods and services” as encompassing prescriptions. 700 Pharmacy appealed to the Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the Hearing Officer and the Commonwealth Court, holding that the term “goods and services” in the Anti-Referral Provision of the Act did not include prescriptions. According to the Court, “goods and services” was not a catch-all, but simply explanatory as to the eight enumerated categories in the provision. The provision (Section 306(f.1)(3)(iii)) reads, in pertinent part: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it is unlawful for a provider to refer a person for laboratory, physical therapy, rehabilitation, chiropractic, radiation oncology, psychometric, home infusion therapy  or diagnostic imaging, goods or services pursuant to this section if the provider has a financial interest with the person or in the entity that receives the referral. The Court said that if the General Assembly wanted to specifically include prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services in the Anti-Referral Provision, they would have done so. They pointed out that prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services were included by the legislature in Section 306 (f.1)(3)(vi) of the Act as to reimbursement, and claimed that their omission from the Anti-Referral Provision supports the conclusion that those services are not included in the Anti-Referral Provision’s self-referral prohibition.