.

Ray C. Freudiger

Portrait of Ray C. Freudiger

Ray Freudiger is a highly experienced litigator, having represented and defended clients in over 100 bench and jury trials in the state and Federal courts of Ohio. He has spent his career defending businesses and public entity clients in a wide variety of professional and general liability claims and suits brought against them. 

As a member of the firm’s Professional Liability Department, Ray has experience defending school districts in a wide array of matters including allegations of wrongful termination and discrimination and has knowledge of Special Education laws needed to appear in due process hearings before independent hearing officers. He also defends employers against allegations of discrimination based on race, gender, ethnicity and/or national origin. He represents these clients before the Ohio Civil Rights Commission, the EEOC, and in the federal and state courts. Ray additionally defends insurance agents and brokers, amusement park operators, real estate brokers & agents, architects, engineers, surveyors and homeowners associations in errors & omissions claims. Since joining the firm, he has had 11 jury trials, 10 of which resulted in a defense verdict and the other verdict substantially less than the pretrial offer. 

Ray has defended clients before administrative agencies such as in the Ohio Division of Real Estate, Ohio Civil Rights Commission, and Department of Urban Development (HUD). He also regularly conducts seminars for real estate brokers and their agents on real estate law issues, as part of their continuing education requirements and to help them to avoid litigation. Prior to attending law school, Ray obtained his property and casualty insurance license, which has served him well in representing clients in insurance coverage and bad faith matters.
 

    • University of Cincinnati College of Law (J.D., 1991)
    • University of Cincinnati (B.B.A., 1982)
    • Ohio, 1991
    • U.S. District Court Southern District of Ohio, 1993
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 6th Circuit, 2017
    • U.S. District Court Northern District of Ohio, 2018
    • Supreme Court of the United States, 2019
    • Cincinnati Bar Association
    • Ohio State Bar Association, Education Law Committee
    • Dayton Bar Association, Civil Trial Practice Committee
    • Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys, Alternative Dispute Resolution Committee
    • DRI (Defense Research Institute)
    • Education Law Association
    • An Overview of Commercial Auto Insurance in Pennsylvania & Ohio, Marshall Dennehey Client Presentation, January 26, 2021
    • Risk Management Best Practices for Engineers, Client Presentation, January 25, 2018
    • Secured a decision from the United States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, which affirmed a jury verdict in favor of our client, a housing authority in Ohio.  After written Briefing and oral argument, The Sixth Circuit affirmed the jury verdict in which the Appellant developer failed to prove that the Housing Authority discriminated against it (in violation of ADA and FHA) by refusing to apply to HUD for VASH vouchers on behalf of the developer. The developer failed to prove it asked the housing authority for VASH on behalf of disabled persons, the request was not reasonable, and the request was not necessary to enable disabled persons to enjoy their residents as non-disabled persons could.
    • Secured dismissal on behalf of our client, an insurance agency in Hamilton County, Ohio. The plaintiff entity alleged that it suffered monetary damages by having to pay for claims made against its California employees. It alleged the agency failed to obtain Employment Practices Liability insurance for the company’s California employees. In our Motion to Dismiss, Ray successfully argued that the “economic loss doctrine” barred all claims against the agency. 
    • Successfully argued in Motion for Summary Judgment that Plaintiffs' claims were precluded by law because the general grant of immunity pursuant to R.C. §2744.01 applied to them as a political subdivision and no exception to immunity existed. Plaintiffs, a minor student and parent, filed suit against the school district, school board, supervising teacher, and principal alleging they were negligent when an afterschool science project (through the STEM program) caught fire causing burn injuries to the student. This included the exception that allows for negligence claims when there is a physical defect within or on the grounds of the entity.  Further, the individual employees were also granted immunity because they were acting in their official capacities and thus the same analysis afforded to the school applied to the individuals. The Judge ultimately granted our Motion and dismissed Plaintiffs' claims.  
    • Obtained dismissal of an Ohio insurance agent who was sued by a condominium association.  The allegation was that the insurance agent inappropriately and unlawfully inserted himself into the insurance company’s investigation and tortuously interfered with the contract that resulted in the insurance company paying far less than the $1.3 million in damages alleged by the condominium association.  After taking depositions of the individuals from the condominium association, the insurance company, and defending his client’s deposition, Ray convinced Plaintiff’s attorney to dismiss all claims against the insurance agent.
    • Obtained a summary judgement in a slip and fall matter involving a liquor store, where the plaintiff slipped and fractured her wrist upon stepping into the store on May 18, 2018. Heavy rain that evening allegedly caused water to be blown inside, which Field claimed as the cause of her fall. A wet floor sign was present, but she did not see it. We argued that the rainwater was an open and obvious condition, which under Ohio law, they had no duty to warn against. The court, citing similar cases, agreed, noting that a property owner is generally not liable for injuries from open and obvious conditions like rainwater. As Field failed to establish that the defendants breached their duty of care, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants.
    • Obtained a summary judgement for a general contractor insured by our client. Plaintiff was working for his employer at a fracking site when he was struck in the head by a hose that came off an above-ground storage tank. He sustained serious and permanent injuries. Plaintiff claimed the general contractor was liable for his injuries because it actively participated on the work site and controlled the unsafe condition which caused his injuries. We moved for summary judgment arguing that the general contractor relinquished complete control over the site to a sub-contractor and, thus, it had no control over any unsafe condition which caused the Plaintiff’s injuries. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of our client.
    • Secured significant victory in wrongful death commercial liability action at both trial and appellate court levels in suit involving death of 18-year old woman who was struck and killed by a commercial truck that was backing up an access ramp to deliver product at a grain receiving facility at the same time the woman traversed onto the ramp.
    • Obtained a defense verdict in a jury trial where the case involved a rear end car accident. The plaintiff alleged serious and permanent injury, and while our client admitted fault, their contention was that the impact was of a minimal nature. The plaintiff incurred over $69,000 in medical expenses after the accident, and made a settlement demand of $200,000. The plaintiff rejected our nominal offer to settle the case before trial. Through the use of medical expert testimony, the defense contended that plaintiff's treatment was fueled by her subjective complaints, but there was no objective evidence of injury. The jury ruled in favor of the defendant.
    • Obtained a summary judgment on behalf of an insurance agent and the insurance agency. The agent and agency helped a business procure property and liability insurance on its business. A fire loss occurred and the insured discovered that it did not have business interruption coverage. It sued the agent and the agency for negligence, breach of contract and estoppel in failing to procure business interruption coverage for the insured. We convinced the Court that an insurance agent only has a duty to seek coverage which has been requested by the insured. Although the agent reassured the insured the day after the fire that the insured had business interruption coverage, the fact that this statement was incorrect, there is no evidence of any reliance by the insured, any reliance would have been unreasonable and unforeseen and the insured would have know that the agent's statements were incorrect if it had looked at the policy in its possession.
    • Successfully defended EEOC Charge of Discrimination brought against charter school client for alleged disability discrimination and failure to provide reasonable accommodation in violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act, as well of claims of FMLA interference and retaliation, resulting in finding of No Probable Cause in favor of employer.
    • Obtained summary judgment on behalf of insurance agency and insurance agent clients in insurance agent/broker professional liability action involving alleged failure to procure business interruption coverage for insured's start-up restaurant, which subsequently sustained uncovered fire loss.
    • Obtained summary judgment on behalf of one of nation’s largest grocery store chains in significant federal rights action that received considerable media attention venued in federal court in Cincinnati involving unruly patron and patron's right to open carry weapon on private premises.
    • Secured dispositive dismissal on behalf of national insurance carrier in breach of contract and bad faith action involving residential fire that occurred at insureds' residence. In addition, as a result of in-depth investigation and discovery in civil suit, insureds were charged with and pled guilty to crimes of arson and insurance fraud.

Results

Summary Judgment Secured, Preserving $750,000 in Coverage for Insured in Major Trucking Liability Dispute

Ray Freudiger and Michael A. Roberts (both of Cincinnati) successfully obtained summary judgment on behalf of their client in a coverage dispute arising from a May 19, 2022, motor vehicle accident. A permissive driver operated a box truck for an interstate trucking company and caused severe injuries to two tort victims. Prior to the accident, the insured had procured a commercial auto policy for the trucking company with stated limits of $1,000,000. Following the accident, the insurer initiated a declaratory judgment action asserting that only reduced bodily injury limits of $25,000/$50,000 applied and later counterclaimed, alleging it would not have insured the driver had he been properly submitted for approval under the policy. After extensive discovery, briefing, and oral argument, the court rejected the insurer’s attempt to shift responsibility for the $750,000 in coverage it was legally required to provide for permissive drivers under Ohio law, granting summary judgment in favor of the insured and preserving $750,000 in liability exposure.

Summary Judgment Secured in a Design Defect Case

We won summary judgment on behalf of a company that provided software for the overall design of roof trusses in a design defect case. The plaintiff owned the apartment complex being built and hired Turnbull Wahlert to construct the building. 84 Lumber was subcontracted by Turnbull to build and install the roof trusses. 84 Lumber contracted with our client to use its software for the design of the roof trusses and to provide truss connect plate hangers. The building experienced severe water damage allegedly because the roof trusses were not sloped properly and the HVAC units were misplaced on the roof. Damages were estimated at over $1.2 million. 84 Lumber demanded that our client defend and indemnify it against Turnbull’s allegations. The court granted our motion for summary judgment.

Thought Leadership

Legal Updates for Real Estate E&O Liability

New Ohio Law Targets Real Estate Wholesaling Practices

May 7, 2026

Effective March 2, 2026, the Ohio Department of Commerce Division of Real Estate and Professional Licensing (REPL) now requires real estate wholesalers to clearly disclose their intention and business model when contracting with a property owner and seller.  This was part of Ohio Senate Bill 155, which passed unanimously in the Ohio Senate in June 2025, and was signed into law by Governor Mike DeWine on December 1, 2025.  Real estate wholesalers serve as intermediaries in property transactions. They enter into a purchase agreement with a seller with no intent to buy the property themselves. Instead, they assign the contract to another buyer or investor at a higher price or charge a fee, typically 5% to 10% of the sale price, to earn a profit. The REPL, in partnership with the Ohio Department of Aging (ODA), and Ohio District 5 Area Agency on Aging in Richland issued a Consumer Alert in March 2025, on wholesalers, citing a rise in unsolicited real estate offers targeting older Ohio homeowners, often offering complex financial arrangements that include hidden risks, leaving older homeowners financially vulnerable. Under this new legislation, real estate wholesalers in Ohio are required to disclose their status to sellers or property owners and clarify that they do not represent the seller in the transaction. The law mandates that this disclosure be made through a clear and conspicuous written statement informing the seller that the individual is acting as a wholesaler. This disclosure must also be separate from the purchase contract or agreement between the parties and must be printed in bold type with a font size of at least 12 points. In the event a wholesaler fails to provide proper notice to the seller, the seller may cancel the purchase contract at any time before the close of escrow without penalty, giving the wholesaler 30 days to return any earnest money or deposits to the seller. Wholesalers who do not clearly disclose their role or properly inform the seller may also face disciplinary action from the Ohio Superintendent of Real Estate. This can include penalties such as suspension or revocation of their real estate license, as well as potential civil liability, monetary damages, and responsibility for attorneys’ fees.

Legal Updates for Special Education Law

Ohio Law Does Not Conflict with the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act

April 1, 2025

The Ohio Department of Education and Workforce (DEW) oversees Ohio’s implementation of the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA), a federal law that entitles children with disabilities to a free appropriate public education (FAPE). In a recent lawsuit, DEW argued that a state court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over an IDEA claim because the state’s administrate code conflicted with the IDEA and, therefore, was preempted by federal law. State ex rel. Governing Bd. of Warren Cnty. Educational Serv. Ctr. v. Ohio Dept. of Education & Workforce, 2024-Ohio-6061 (12th Dist.). The specific conflict advanced by DEW was that the IDEA complaint procedure applied to any “public agency, while Adm.Code 3301-51-05(K)(5) and (6) is more circumscribed by applying only to a disabled child's ‘school district of residence.’ ” At the trial level, the court disagreed with DEW’s argument, holding that IDEA complaint procedures set forth in 34 C.F.R. 300.152 and 34 C.F.R. 300.153 and those set forth by Adm.Code 3301-51-05(K)(5) and (6) are “virtually identical,” with the exception that the C.F.R. uses the term “public agency” while the Adm.Code uses the term “school district of residence.”  The Twelfth District Court of Appeals agreed that Ohio’s complaint procedures were not in conflict with federal law. The appeal court explained that the IDEA and 34 C.F.R. 300.152 and 300.153 were crafted with general language to accommodate the variations of 50 states’ educational systems. As such, it makes sense that C.F.R. used the broad term “public agency” in the IDEA regulations. Adm.Code 3301-51-05(K)(5) and (6) do not truncate the IDEA or limit its protections; thus, they are not in conflict. In summary, the IDEA does not preempt Ohio’s administrate code regarding the procedure for filing an IDEA claim.    Legal Update for Special Education Law – April 2025 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.