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Joan Orsini Ford

Co-Chair, Catastrophic Medical Injury Practice

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Portrait of Joan Orsini Ford

Joan focuses her practice exclusively on medical malpractice litigation involving the defense of hospitals, doctors, nurses, physicians' assistants, nursing homes, long-term care facilities and behavioral health treatment facilities. She also handles other healthcare-related issues. Throughout her career, Joan has handled in excess of 1,000 medical malpractice cases, including numerous high-exposure cases involving catastrophic injuries and death in infants and adults. She has taken more than 50 major jury cases to verdict in state and federal courts with overwhelmingly favorable results.

After receiving a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science from LaSalle University in 1984, Joan attended Widener University where she earned her juris doctor in 1986. At Widener, she participated in the Philip C. Jessup International Law Moot Court Competition. Her legal education also included courses at Notre Dame School of Law in London, England, and The Dickenson Law School in Florence, Italy. Prior to joining Marshall Dennehey in 1997, Joan worked for a defense firm for nine years where she also concentrated on medical malpractice defense, primarily representing physicians.

Joan has lectured for various organizations over the course of her career, and has given presentations to nursing and medical staff at multiple hospitals on litigation related issues. In addition, she has served as an instructor in the firm's annual Advanced Trial Advocacy Mock Trial Program.

In 2021, Joan received the James P. Fox Trial Lawyer of the Year Award from the Montgomery Bar Association Trial Lawyers Section. The award recognizes not only exceptional skill as a civil litigation and trial lawyer, but also a dedication to promoting a positive image for attorneys through one’s professional demeanor, service and integrity. 

    • Widener University Delaware Law School (J.D., 1986)
    • La Salle University (B.A., 1984)
    • Pennsylvania, 1987
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 1988
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
    • 2021 James P. Fox Trial Lawyer of the Year Award, Montgomery Bar Association Trial Lawyers Section
    • American Board of Trial Advocates, 2013 to Present
    • Montgomery Bar Association, 1987 to present
    • Montgomery Bar Association - Board of Directors, 2017
    • Montgomery Bar Association - Bench Bar Committee, 2013 to present
    • Montgomery county Bar Association - Judiciary Committee Co-Chair, 2021 to present
    • Montgomery Bar Association - Trial Lawyers Section, 2013 to present
    • Montgomery County Inns of Court - Past President, 2012-2014, Vice President 2011, Treasurer 2010, Secretary 2009
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Piercing the Corporate Veil, Montgomery County Bar Association, April 29, 2025
    • Civility in Practice, Montgomery County Bar Association, February 26, 2025
    • Medical/Legal Issues in Dealing with Behavioral Health Population, Cassatt webinar series, June 27, 2024 and February 29, 2024
    • You Want How Much? The Rising Tide in Case Values, Settlement Demands and Verdicts, Marshall Dennehey Trends in Health Care and Health Law Seminar, May 9, 2024
    • Civility Matters: Ethical Concerns in the Courtroom, Drexel University Thomas R. Kline School of Law, March 6, 2023
    • Opioid Toxicity and Reversal: Attorney Perspective on Hospital Liability & Patient's Rights, American College of Medical Toxicology Seminar, December 11, 2017
    • Opioids in Civil Proceedings: Perspectives from the Defense, American College of Medical Toxicology Seminar, December 11, 2017
    • Trial Negotiation and Business Skills for Women Trial Attorneys, Pennsylvania Trial Lawyers Association, April 11, 2001
    • Treatment and Consent for Minors, Insurance Society of Philadelphia, February 21, 2001
    • Medical Treatment to Minors, Lehigh Valley Risk Management Society, March 1, 2000
    • "Long-Term Health Care Dealt Another Blow," Defense Digest, Vol. 23, No. 4, December 2017
    • “Nurses: Their Expanding Role as Expert Witnesses,” AgentsofAmerica.org, January 3, 2013
    • “Update on E-Discovery and the Electronic Medical Record,” Defense Digest, Vol. 18, No. 4, December 2012
    • "How to Avoid EMR Legal Pitfalls," The Family Practice News, September 14, 2012
    • “Nurses: Their Expanding Role as Expert Witnesses,” Defense Digest, Vol. 17, No. 1, March 2011
    • Defended a hospital in a case involving an alleged failure to diagnose and treat a brainstem stroke. Plaintiff was a 56-year-old man and was "locked in" as a result of the stroke. In addition to issues involving the medical care, plaintiffs were pursuing a corporate liability claim against the hospital. Plaintiff's claim for past and future medical bills and future wage loss was in excess of 17 million dollars. After a four week trial, the jury found in favor of the defense.
    • Defended two obstetricians in a case involving an alleged delay in the performance of a c-section resulting in severe brain damage to the infant. Future medical specials and wage loss were in excess of 145 million dollars. After a four week trial, the jury found in favor of the defendants.
    • Successfully defended a hospital in a wrongful death case. The plaintiff, a 50-year-old man, presented to the ER where he was diagnosed as suffering from a stroke. He received tPA and was transferred to the ICU. Plaintiff alleged there was a failure to monitor, diagnose and treat swelling in the brain and a midline shift that led to the plaintiff's death, three days later. Plaintiff's wage loss claim was in excess of five million dollars.
    • Defended an Institute and two psychologists in a case involving the wrongful death of a child adopted from Russia. Plaintiff alleged in the civil suit that the child sustained massive head injuries and died as a result of alleged abuse by the parents, codefendants in the civil case, and that the psychologists were negligent in failing to suspect the abuse and neglect which ultimately led to his death. The death of the child resulted in significant media exposure and Russia's suspension of adoptions to the United States. The parents were charged with the child's murder and convicted of involuntary manslaughter. Defendants settled for a confidential amount; the verdict against the parents was in excess of 14.7 million dollars.   
    • Defended a hospital in a case involving the care and treatment rendered to a patient who, after his discharge, murdered his wife and was then murdered by his son. The story was featured in an ESPN special and Philadelphia Magazine. The case was settled with no payment by the hospital.
    • Entered as trial counsel for a defendant psychiatrist on the second day of trial, with no prior involvement in the case. The claim involved a murder/suicide by a man who was the patient of the psychiatrist. When trial counsel for the defendant psychiatrist became ill in court, the defense moved for a mistrial. The judge denied the request and ordered that another attorney from the firm assume the doctor's representation. After a five day trial, the case went to verdict and the jury found in favor of the defendant.

Results

Plaintiff’s Claims Barred by Statute of Limitations and Immunity Provisions of the Pennsylvania Mental Health Procedures Act

The defense prevailed on preliminary objections in Philadelphia County as the court found that the ​case involved a medical malpractice action involving the plaintiff’s allegations of an alleged assault by three patients while the plaintiff was a patient at a behavioral health hospital. In the complaint, the plaintiff pleaded ordinary negligence. Preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer were filed by the defendant, raising immunity under the Pennsylvania Mental Health Procedures Act since there was no claim of gross negligence. After the preliminary objections were filed, the plaintiff attempted to cure the defect in the original pleading by filing an amended complaint, which added allegations of gross negligence and additional facts, in an attempt to support the claim of gross negligence. We again filed preliminary objections, arguing that the allegation of gross negligence was a new cause of action that was now barred by the statute of limitations. Since the amended complaint was filed more than two years after the event at issue and raised a new claim, the applicable two-year statute of limitations barred the claim. We also argued that the amended complaint failed to provide any factual support for gross negligence or willful misconduct and, therefore, the hospital was immune from suit. Plaintiff’s counsel did not file a response in opposition. The Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas agreed that the new claim was barred by the statute of limitations and the immunity provisions of the Mental Health Procedures Act, and dismissed the case with prejudice.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.

Thought Leadership

WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

In this case, the claimant sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employment as a registered nurse. The employer acknowledged the injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).  Subsequently, a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) expanded the description of injury. The employer then filed a Termination Petition, alleging the claimant was fully recovered from the injuries. Providers filed Utilization Review (UR) Petitions, challenging UR determinations finding their chiropractic treatment to be not reasonable and necessary. A settlement of the claim was eventually reached, and the employer filed a Petition to Seek Approval of a Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreement. The C&R outlined that the agreement fully resolved all future workers’ compensation claims except for the termination and UR Petitions. Briefs were filed and one day later, the WCJ issued an Interlocutory Order which stated if instructions were not followed regarding filing of a C&R, a settlement hearing date would not be given. The employer complied with the order, and filed the C&R. Subsequently, the WCJ notified the parties that the C&R must resolve all issues in the petitions, or would not be entertained. A settlement hearing was never held, and the WCJ then issued a decision, granting the Termination Petition and dismissing the UR Petitions. The WCJ also said that the Petition for Approval of a C&R was dismissed without prejudice, as the issues in the Termination and UR Petitions went to a decision. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board granted the claimant’s appeal, finding that the WCJ violated the requirement of Section 449 that an expedited hearing be held when a Petition for Approval of a C&R is filed.  The Board further held that it was legally incorrect for the WCJ to insist that the C&R resolve all issues raised by the pending Petitions. The Board remanded the case to a new WCJ, and Employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court affirmed the Board and held that the WCJ erred, as a matter of law, by refusing to hold an expedited hearing within 30 days, once the Petition for Approval of a C&R was filed.  The court noted that the language of Section 449(b) is mandatory, and a settlement hearing is not discretionary or dependent on a party’s separate request for a stay, or whether the record has been closed. The court further rejected Employer’s argument that the case should not be remanded to a new WCJ for a new decision on the termination and and UR Petitions, as the Board passed no judgment on whether the C&R Agreement resolved the termination and UR Petitions, and left it for the WCJ to decide in connection with the Petition for Approval of a C&R.