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Behavioral Health Risk & Liability

Litigation in the behavioral health sector can be arduous, with sensitive fact patterns and significant emotional overlay. The attorneys in our Behavioral Health Risk and Liability Practice possess the necessary experience, judgment and analytical skills to help guide these complex matters through trial or proper resolution. We counsel and defend behavioral health facilities and associated entities against professional liability claims in all states in which the firm practices. The focus of representation also includes social workers, nurses, administrators, case managers, technicians, therapists, psychiatrists, psychologists and other mental health professionals.

Our attorneys routinely handle matters involving:

  • Negligence claims following voluntary and involuntary commitments, with claims of medical errors, elopement, emotional/physical/sexual assaults and other improper medical treatment in psychiatric facilities.
  • Civil action claims for neglect and abuse of children in foster care, residential treatment facilities and community placement facilities.
  • Representation of behavioral health professionals in addiction treatment facilities.
  • Administrative law hearings.
  • Legislative hearings.
  • State licensing revocation hearings.
  • Prison health care negligence litigation.
  • Negligent care/treatment litigation on behalf of nursing homes and assisted living facilities
  • HIPAA/HITECH compliance and notifications. 
  • Fraud and abuse claims. 
  • Guardianship appointments in mental health facilities.

Our trial lawyers and appellate team have deep knowledge and an understanding of the intricacies of state mental health statutes, the Affordable Care Act (ACA), the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), CMS requirements and HIPAA requirements, in addition to various other local, state and federal regulations that impact the behavioral health care arena. We also provide counseling in risk management, offering personalized educational discussions aimed at eliminating and minimizing legal exposure related to behavioral health staff interaction with residents, and adherence to state and federal regulations.

Results

Summary Judgment Secured in 10-Year-Old Medical Malpractice Case

We won a very hard-fought motion for summary judgment based on the plaintiff’s failure to prosecute in a matter that is now 10 years old. Suzanne won oral argument to dismiss the suit, based on the plaintiff’s failure to prosecute his case, by proving both actual prejudice to the client, a psychologist, and an inexcusable seven-year delay in any activity by the plaintiff. This medical malpractice claim was brought in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, and was related to a psychological evaluation conducted of the plaintiff’s three children, whom he physically and psychologically abused for years.   

Plaintiff’s Claims Barred by Statute of Limitations and Immunity Provisions of the Pennsylvania Mental Health Procedures Act

The defense prevailed on preliminary objections in Philadelphia County as the court found that the ​case involved a medical malpractice action involving the plaintiff’s allegations of an alleged assault by three patients while the plaintiff was a patient at a behavioral health hospital. In the complaint, the plaintiff pleaded ordinary negligence. Preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer were filed by the defendant, raising immunity under the Pennsylvania Mental Health Procedures Act since there was no claim of gross negligence. After the preliminary objections were filed, the plaintiff attempted to cure the defect in the original pleading by filing an amended complaint, which added allegations of gross negligence and additional facts, in an attempt to support the claim of gross negligence. We again filed preliminary objections, arguing that the allegation of gross negligence was a new cause of action that was now barred by the statute of limitations. Since the amended complaint was filed more than two years after the event at issue and raised a new claim, the applicable two-year statute of limitations barred the claim. We also argued that the amended complaint failed to provide any factual support for gross negligence or willful misconduct and, therefore, the hospital was immune from suit. Plaintiff’s counsel did not file a response in opposition. The Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas agreed that the new claim was barred by the statute of limitations and the immunity provisions of the Mental Health Procedures Act, and dismissed the case with prejudice.

Thought Leadership

The Quarterly Dose

From Bedside to Bar

February 25, 2026

When I was young with asthma, my hero was never a doll or TV character, it was my pediatrician. He made house calls multiple times per day with his black bag, a multidose vial of epinephrine, and a reusable syringe. He quickly taught me how to draw up my own injection, and from that moment I knew I wanted to become a doctor to help save kids’ lives. I studied math, science, and Latin like a religion so I could excel in school. I had finished every AP math and science course that my high school had to offer by the end of my sophomore year, so the school partnered with Penn State to provide me with pre-med courses in the five-year Jefferson-Penn State pre-med/medical school program. In 1976, as an early admission candidate, I was one of very few women to be accepted into that med school program. Keeping in mind that this was the 70s, my parents and guidance counselors instructed me that “girls” are supposed to be nurses, teachers, and secretaries – not doctors. So I transferred to the Diploma Nursing program at Jefferson and managed expenses by working as a manager at an ice cream store in the Gallery. As a nurse in a Pediatric ICU, and then in an Emergency Department (ED), I worked with prominent physicians in numerous specialties. Details matter, especially when working with infants and children, and I have always been a stickler for details. It was my goal to always provide the best care possible, but sometimes even the mightiest efforts were not enough. After one especially tough and heartbreaking incident surrounding the death of a child, a mother came into the ED screaming at us, and eventually filed a lawsuit. We knew we had exceeded the standards of care, so we did not understand why the hospital settled the lawsuit. After the settlement, the Attending of the ED bought me an LSAT book and said “If you want to do more for the profession, go to law school.” So I did. Now, as an attorney, I bring the same meticulous care to my clients that I once brought to my patients. I take an assertive, detail-driven approach to achieving successful outcomes. I remain a Registered Nurse licensed in Pennsylvania and continue to volunteer in disaster-relief when needed. That dual identity—nurse and attorney—shapes how I advocate: with compassion, an understanding of the stress litigation creates, and unwavering attention to detail. My clinical background gives me an invaluable advantage throughout the litigation process, from understanding the medicine to working effectively with my clients, our experts and cross-examining opponents’ experts. Communicating fluently with healthcare professionals across specialties has strengthened my practice and continually reminds me of the pediatrician who once taught me to draw up my own epinephrine injection—an act that set the course for my future.

Case Law Alerts

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Broadens MHPA Immunity to Include Ordinary Negligence in Physical Care During Involuntary Commitment

January 1, 2026

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has recently expanded the scope of provider immunity under the Mental Health Procedures Act (MHPA), holding that the statute can shield providers from ordinary negligence claims arising from medical care for physical ailments provided during involuntary commitment. The case arose from a wrongful death and survival action following the death of a patient involuntarily committed for dementia-related aggression who developed severe pressure ulcers. Under 50 P.S. § 7114(a), facilities and practitioners participating in decisions to examine or treat individuals under the MHPA are immune from civil and criminal liability, absent a showing of willful misconduct or gross negligence. As § 114 does not define “treat,” the court looked to Section 104 of the MHPA, interpreting “treatment” to include medical care necessary to maintain “decent, safe, and healthful living conditions.” The court concluded that care for physical conditions is covered when it is coincident to the patient’s mental health treatment, even if the condition did not result from psychiatric care or advance psychiatric recovery. This decision significantly broadens the precedent established in Allen v. Montgomery Hospital, 696 A.2d 1175 (Pa. 1997). While Allen provided immunity for physical conditions caused by psychiatric care (such as medication side effects), Wunderly extends that protection to general medical care that simply occurs during the same timeframe as the commitment (such as treatment for pressure ulcers). The dissent warned that the majority’s interpretation risks lowering the standard of care for involuntarily committed patients by immunizing ordinary medical malpractice based solely on commitment status. The dissent argued that the patient’s pressure ulcers arose independently of his mental health condition and should not fall within MHPA immunity.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.