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Gregory P. Graham

Portrait of Gregory P. Graham

Greg is a member of the Professional Liability Department whose practice focuses on the defense of corporations and professionals in commercial, construction and class action litigation. He also defends attorneys in legal liability actions covering a wide range of malpractice claims including those arising from civil and family disputes, business transactions in the real estate and oil and gas industries, and commercial litigation. 

Greg has substantial experience defending high-value class action cases at both the state and federal level.  In doing so, he prioritizes the development of an early case strategy to defeat class certification in order to minimize his clients’ potential liability and damage exposure. He has successfully defeated class certification in multiple jurisdictions for clients facings claims of invasion of privacy, violations of state and federal electronic communication protection acts, and allegations of improper assessment and conversion of state sales taxes. When certification cannot be avoided, Greg develops an aggressive discovery strategy to minimize class size and damage exposure. He has obtained summary judgment dismissals and favorable settlements in class actions in both state and federal court.  

Greg's construction practice includes the representation of owners, contractors, and design professionals from defect and commercial loss claims related to the construction industry. He has litigated on behalf of clients in matters arising from publicly and privately-funded projects in state and federal court across the country. He also defends construction entities in the natural gas and energy industry facing high-exposure commercial loss and environmental claims. 

Greg has experience litigating on behalf of securities professionals in court and FINRA arbitration. He has successfully assisted financial management companies in responding to administrative investigations brought by state and industry regulatory agencies.  

He is also proficient in matters involving significant E-Discovery and document discovery.  His experience with managing large-scale E-discovery efforts minimizes unnecessary cost while also allowing Marshall Dennehey to provide the best defense possible for its clients in discovery-intensive cases.    

Greg was a 2013 graduate of the University of Pittsburgh School of Law. While in law school, Greg was invited to be a visiting research fellow at the Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International Private Law in Hamburg, Germany. He was also an Articles Editor for the Journal of Technology Law & Policy and a member of two award-winning moot court teams.  

    • University of Pittsburgh School of Law (J.D., 2013)
    • Michigan State University (B.A., 2007)
    • Pennsylvania, 2013
    • The Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch®, Commercial Litigation; Construction Law; Product Liability Litigation - Defendants (2021-2025)
    • The Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch®, Litigation – Construction; Professional Malpractice Law (2024-2025)
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyers Rising Star (2020-2022, 2024-2025)
    • Pennsylvania Defense Institute (PDI), Co-Chair Professional Liability Committee
    • AI in the Legal Profession, Marshall Dennehey Client Presentation, September 2024
    • Co-Taught "Business Law," Westminster College, Spring 2015
    • "Don't Reinvent the Wheel: Approaching Gen AI Usage in Litigation,"The Legal Intelligencer, October 10, 2024
    • "Retooling the Client Engagement Letter to Minimize Liability Claim Exposure,"PLUS Blog, March 23, 2023
    • "Demand for Remote Desktop Access and Cloud Computing Services Necessitates a Refined Approach for Civil Litigation Electronic Discovery," Lawyers Journal, November 18, 2022
    • "Supreme Court's Halliburton Ruling May Be Curse in Disguise for Securities Defendants" Defense Digest, Vol. 20, No. 3, September 2014
    • "Storm Fronts and Filmmaking: Cloud Computing Regulation and the Impact on Independent Filmmakers," University of Pittsburgh School of Law Journal of Technology Law & Policy, Vol. 13, 2012
    • "Lost in a Cloud: Overview of Legal Obstacles to the Growth of Cloud Computing in European Markets," Croatian Journal of Media & Technology, Vol. 18, 2012

Thought Leadership

Legal Updates for Lawyers' Professional Liability

Pennsylvania Superior Court Effectively Expands Statute of Limitations for Legal Malpractice Claims in Pennsylvania

March 1, 2026

After much anticipation, the Pennsylvania Superior Court issued its en banc decision in Poteat v. Asteak on December 11, 2025.  In Poteat, the Superior Court sitting en banc confirmed an earlier opinion addressing the question of whether the “gist of the action” doctrine applies to legal malpractice claims. In a disappointing ruling for the defense bar, the court ruled that it does not.  In doing so, it has created uncertainty moving forward as to the defense of legal malpractice actions sounding in breach of contract. Poteat arose from a legal malpractice lawsuit following appellee-attorneys’ provision of legal services to an appellant in a criminal matter. In the legal malpractice action, the trial court granted the appellees’ preliminary objections seeking dismissal of the action via application of the gist of the action doctrine. The appellant set forth a breach of contract claim, arguing that since the breach of contract claim sounded in tort, namely negligence, it should be treated as such by application of the gist of the action doctrine. Accordingly, the two-year statute of limitations applicable to negligence barred the claim. Appellees further argued that the complaint was legally insufficient because it failed to allege a breach of a specific executory promise in the retainer agreement. The plaintiff appealed. The Superior Court’s en banc decision held that hiring an attorney automatically creates an implied contract term that the attorney will provide competent legal services, regardless of whether the contract includes any explicit contractual term promising such. In doing so, the Superior Court has provided authority for plaintiffs in legal malpractice claims to assert the existence and breach of an implied duty that arises from a specific legal contract, without regard to the expressed language of that agreement. In essence, the court eviscerated any gist of the action application to legal malpractice claims and ignored prior precedent which also held that breach of contract claims must be based upon the contract itself, rather than implied terms. Even more problematic for the defense of legal malpractice lawsuits is the fact that this ruling effectively means that all Pennsylvania lawyers’ professional liability claims will be subject to a four-year contract statute of limitations. A negligence claim that an attorney deviated from a professional standard of care that may have been dismissed for falling outside the two-year statute of limitations time period may now be pursued under an alternate breach of contract theory which is subject to a four-year statute. There was a vigorous dissent which was joined by three Superior Court judges. This decision has been appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court given the severity of its potential implications.

Legal Updates for Real Estate E&O Liability

Invoking the Mandatory Mediation Clause Against Buyers – A Beneficial Strategic Tactic

November 1, 2025

When facing claims, Pennsylvania real estate agents too often view the mandatory mediation paragraph found within the Standard Agreement for the Sale of Real Estate as little more than boilerplate. In practice, however, this clause can be a valuable and strategic tool for the successful defense of claims. Rather than overlooking such a useful tool, real estate agents should consider invoking the mandatory mediation provision to obtain significant advantages in cost management, liability clarity, and settlement posture. The mandatory mediation provision typically contains the following language: Buyer and Seller will submit all disputes or claims that arise from this Agreement, including disputes and claims over deposit monies, to mediation. Mediation will be conducted in accordance with the Rules and Procedures of the Home Sellers/Home Buyers Dispute Resolution System, unless it is not available, in which case Buyer and Seller will mediate according to the terms of the mediation system offered or endorsed by the local Association of Realtors®. Mediation fees, contained in the mediator’s fee schedule, will be divided equally among the parties and will be paid before the mediation conference. This mediation process must be concluded before any party to the dispute may initiate legal proceedings in any courtroom, with the exception of filing a summons if it is necessary to stop any statute of limitations from expiring. Any agreement reached through mediation and signed by the parties will be binding. Any agreement to mediate disputes or claims arising from this Agreement will survive settlement. This section precludes either the buyer or seller from initiating a legal action without first attempting to mediate the dispute. The only exception identified within the provision allows for the filing of a summons to halt the application of any potential statute of limitations.  At first glance, the provision would not appear to be available to agents involved in the transaction; however, the language is clear that all disputes that arise from the agreement are subject to the mandatory mediation requirement. Upon receipt of a pre-suit claim, real estate professionals should consider invoking this provision to bring all claims and involved parties to mediation. Alternatively, if a lawsuit has already been filed, real estate agents should consider the merits of filing a Motion to Stay and to Compel Mediation pursuant to the provision.  There are numerous benefits to do so.  Cost Savings Through Early Resolution Pre-suit mediation offers a controlled, confidential, and relatively inexpensive forum for resolving the dispute while the parties are still evaluating their willingness to engage in the costs of discovery, depositions and motion practice. By invoking the mediation provision promptly after a buyer identifies a pre-suit claim or upon the receipt of a complaint, an agent and their counsel can participate in a structured discussion aimed at resolution without the procedural overhead of court involvement. Even if mediation does not result in a full settlement, narrowing the issues can dramatically reduce later litigation expenses. Insurers can separately consider the benefits of early mediation for their insureds, as it signals proactive risk management and can help avoid unnecessary defense costs. Clarifying Responsibility Through Information Exchange Claims made by the buyer against real estate agents are often defended on the grounds that the seller’s or buyer’s own actions are the cause of the buyer’s damages. Forcing those parties to mediation encourages the early and informal exchange of key documents—inspection reports, disclosure forms, repair records—that can help inform the parties’ assessment of who bears actual responsibility. When the facts are developed cooperatively, rather than through adversarial discovery, the mediation process often highlights that the real estate agent’s role was limited to communication rather than concealment. This can refocus the dispute toward the truly responsible party and may even resolve the matter without further involvement of the agent.  Managing Plaintiff Expectations for Future Negotiations Even if resolution cannot be achieved during the mediation process, a mandatory attempt early in the life of a claim also serves as an effective opportunity to set realistic expectations for a buyer-plaintiff’s potential recovery. Through the mediator’s neutral perspective, plaintiffs often gain a clearer understanding of the legal limits on agent liability, the availability of defenses—such as the reliance on seller representations—and the challenges of proving causation and damages, especially if the buyer waiver or failure to inspect questions are involved. Even if mediation does not fully settle the case, it can temper inflated expectations and create a more productive environment for subsequent negotiations. In short, mediation under the Pennsylvania Standard Agreement is not merely a procedural requirement—it is a strategic defense opportunity. By embracing early mediation, real estate agents can reduce costs, clarify liability and shape the tone of any future dispute toward resolution rather than escalation.  Legal Update for Real Estate E&O – November 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

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Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.