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Adam is a member of the Casualty Department where he handles all sorts of civil litigation matters involving claims of personal injury and property damage. He frequently advises insurance carriers and defends clients in matters of premises liability (residential, commercial, restaurant, and retail) and motor vehicle torts, including for claims of wrongful death and punitive damages. Adam also has experience defending against claims of construction defect, employment discrimination, negligent security, asbestos exposure, and products liability.

Adam has drafted countless motions for summary judgment that have resulted in the parties reaching a mutually amenable settlement agreement before the outcome of the motion was decided. He has also had numerous such motions decided in favor of his clients, resulting in the immediate dismissal of all claims against them.

Adam has assisted clients in navigating through the civil court system, some for their first time. He takes additional time to counsel and advise his clients and their carriers, partnering with them to develop effective and efficient strategies for resolving their claims.

Prior to practicing civil litigation, Adam spent years practicing personal bankruptcy law in the Federal Districts of New Jersey and Eastern Pennsylvania. This has given him a unique approach to engaging in settlement negotiations, particularly when on behalf of potentially “judgment-proof” clients.

Adam graduated magna cum laude from The College of New Jersey in 2003. Thereafter, he attended Rutgers School of Law – Camden, where he was Managing Editor of the Rutgers Law Journal. He graduated in 2007. Before practicing law, Adam clerked for the Honorable Thomas A. Brown, Jr., Presiding Judge of the Criminal Division of the New Jersey Superior Court in Camden, New Jersey.

Adam calls Burlington County, New Jersey home with his wife and three children.

    • Rutgers Law School (J.D., 2007)
    • The College of New Jersey (B.S., magna cum laude, 2003)
    • New Jersey, 2007
    • Pennsylvania, 2007
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey, 2007
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2009
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
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    • Camden County Bar Association
    • New Jersey Bar Association
    • New Jersey Defense Association
  • Obtained summary judgment in a construction site accident matter in which the plaintiff alleged he was injured after lifting a cover and falling into a hole at an active worksite. Our client was the owner of the building under construction at the time of the accident. Based on the contractual agreements and testimony of the parties involved, we successfully argued that the subcontractors and the plaintiff’s employer were solely responsible for worker safety, supervision, and site conditions. We further argued that our client could not be held liable for the alleged negligence of independent contractors. The court agreed, finding that our client owed no duty to the plaintiff, and dismissed all claims against our client.

    Obtained summary judgment relief for the owner of a property where a construction site accident occurred. Our client was a local board of education, which hired a general contractor to perform an HVAC renovation project at a high school.  Plaintiff was a subcontractor working on that project and became injured when a light fixture fell on him as he was replacing ceiling tiles in a suspension grid. Summary judgment was granted as there was no evidence to suggest the injury was caused by negligence of the property owner. Instead, an exception to the general duties of a commercial property owner applied because the client had not retained control over the manner/means of the contractor’s work; there was no evidence that the contractor was incompetent; and the contracted work did not constitute a nuisance per se.

    Obtained summary judgment relief for a property manager in a lawsuit based on a drive-by shooting. The shooting occurred on a public roadway adjacent to our client's managed property in Elizabeth, New Jersey. Our client was contracted to manage an adjacent apartment complex, owned by a co-defendant. The court agreed that neither the property owner nor the property manager owed a duty to protect the plaintiffs from this drive-by shooting given the location of the shooting and the lack of foreseeability. Our client's duty was further limited by the terms of the property management agreement. 

    Obtained a summary judgment for a nail salon owner against negligence and product liability claims by a plaintiff who slipped and fell off-site while still wearing pedicure slippers. Plaintiff had received a pedicure at our client’s nail salon.  When she left the premises, she continued to wear the disposable pedicure slippers.  Plaintiff then walked in the rain and eventually slipped and fell upon entering a retail store. Plaintiff brought general negligence and product liability claims against the nail salon’s owner.  At the conclusion of discovery, the Court granted our motion for summary judgment based on plaintiff’s admission that there was nothing wrong with the slippers and the failure of plaintiff to provide expert opinion as to the existence of any defect in the slippers.

    Obtained summary judgment relief for owner and driver of tow truck involved in multi-vehicle fatality crash. Our clients’ truck was struck from behind while towing another vehicle. The striking vehicle was a correctional facility transport van, which was transporting two inmates and two correctional officers. The impact caused injuries to both occupants of the tow truck and to all four occupants of the van, including fatal injuries to one of the inmates. Our clients were target defendants of the plaintiff correctional officer who was a passenger in the van, given the immunity provided to the Department of Corrections and its driver by the worker’s compensation bar.  At the conclusion of discovery, the Court accepted our motion based on the argument that a jury could not reasonably find our driver negligent despite the allegation that he had been driving too slow and despite the fact that he had received numerous citations for motor vehicle and towing violations.  Our argument relied upon the uncontroverted expert opinions reached by the State Police’s accident investigator and our own accident reconstruction expert.

    Obtained summary judgment in a motor vehicle accident case in Atlantic County, New Jersey. The accident occurred at the intersection of a county road and a side street, which was controlled by stop signs. Plaintiffs were back seat passengers in the client's commercial Ford F-150. The client was driving the speed limit down the 45 mile-per-hour county road. When the client was approximately 200 feet from the 25 mile-per-hour intersecting side street, co-defendant, an inexperienced young-adult driver, proceeded from the side-street-stop-sign into the intersection, crossing into the client's direct path of travel and causing the vehicles to collide. We moved for summary judgment on two grounds. We argued there was no evidence the client negligently operated his motor vehicle at the time of the accident. We also argued that co-defendant's negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident since co-defendant misjudged the speed and distance of the client's oncoming vehicle which had the right of way at the intersection. The trial court agreed and granted our motion. 

    Obtained summary judgment relief for residential owner-occupants in two fall-down premises liability cases. The first lawsuit was filed in by a neighbor claiming personal injuries from a slip and fall on ice on the sidewalk abutting the defendants' residential property. It had snowed five days prior, at which time the defendants had shoveled the snow from the sidewalk onto the adjacent lawn. The plaintiff alleged the resulting snow pile subsequently melted back onto the sidewalk and eventually re-froze, creating the ice on which the plaintiff would eventually fall. At the conclusion of discovery, the defendants moved for summary judgment based on the argument that New Jersey residential property owners have no duty to maintain sidewalks from naturally occurring conditions. The court granted the motion, agreeing that even though the defendants had created the snow pile adjacent to the sidewalk, snow melting and refreezing is a naturally-occurring phenomenon and is therefore not within the scope of a residential property owner's duty of care owed to pedestrians. As such, the court found there was no legal basis on which one could reasonably conclude that the defendants were responsible for the plaintiff's injuries. The second lawsuit was filed by an individual claiming injuries from an incident in the backyard of the defendants' residential property. The plaintiff had entered the property in an attempt to contact the owner of an undeveloped lot where a tree had supposedly fallen across the access road, leading to an adjacent lot that the plaintiff owned. The plaintiff believed the owner of the lot lived at the subject premises, but had never spoken with anyone from, nor ever been to, the premises before. After entering the premises and observing yellow caution tape hanging across the steps leading to the front porch, the plaintiff walked around the house and began ascending steps leading to the rear deck. The plaintiff claims that as he reached the top of the steps, he touched a handrail that was allegedly unhinged. He claims the unhinged rail fell on him, causing him to fall from the stairs, lose consciousness, and sustain other injuries. At the conclusion of discovery, the court granted summary judgment for the defendants, upon finding that the plaintiff was a trespasser at the time of the alleged incident. As a trespasser, the plaintiff was owed only a limited duty of care by the defendants, and the court found the motion record lacked sufficient evidence from which a trier of fact could reasonably conclude such a duty had been breached. 

    Obtained summary judgment in favor of defendant in a fall down premises liability case. The lawsuit was filed by an individual claiming personal injuries from a fall down incident in a parking lot after leaving the defendant's bank. The defendant was successful in obtaining summary judgment relief, without having to incur the costs of participating in the formal exchange of discovery. The motion was granted based upon concessions obtained from the plaintiff and co-defendant that the subject parking lot was municipally owned, and therefore not within the control of the defendant. Moreover, the court agreed the location of the parking lot in relation to the defendant's bank was such that it was not necessary to the defendant's patrons to use the parking lot in order to access the bank. The court agreed there was no basis upon which one could reasonably conclude the defendant was responsible for maintaining the parking lot.

  • The Art of Mediation, Marshall Dennehey Client Presentation, May 5, 2026

    The Fundamentals of Premises Liability in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, Marshall Dennehey Client Presentation, May 5, 2026

    Preparing A Claim for Trial, Marshall Dennehey Client Webinar, February 4, 2025

Results

Jury Defense Verdict Secured in a Case Involving Negligent Propane Services

We obtained a jury defense verdict in Cumberland County, New Jersey. We defended a major propane company where it was claimed that they provided negligent service to a stove which allegedly caused a trailer fire. The plaintiffs lost everything in the fire, including their pets. They also sustained serious and permanent burn injuries. Total medical bills were in excess of $1.5 million, and there was a $227,000 Medicare lien. The plaintiffs’ demand was $5 million. In less than two hours, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defense.

Defense Clips Product Liability Lawsuit on Behalf of Nail Salon Owner

The defense prevailed on summary judgment for a nail salon owner against negligence and product liability claims by a plaintiff who slipped and fell off-site while still wearing pedicure slippers. The plaintiff had received a pedicure at our client’s nail salon. When she left the premises, she continued to wear the disposable pedicure slippers. The plaintiff then walked in the rain and eventually slipped and fell upon entering a retail store. The plaintiff brought general negligence and product liability claims against the nail salon’s owner. At the conclusion of discovery, the court granted our motion for summary judgment based upon the plaintiff’s admission that there was nothing wrong with the slippers and her failure to provide expert opinion as to the existence of any defect in the slippers.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.