.

Suzanne M. Utke

Senior Counsel

SMUtke@mdwcg.com

Portrait of Suzanne M. Utke

Suzanne defends physicians, nurses, and all manner of health care professionals and corporate health care facilities against medical and psychiatric malpractice claims and lawsuits. She also focuses her practice on the defense of behavioral health claims and claims involving medical devices and associated liability. In addition, she represents physicians and physician practice groups in negotiation with health care systems for employment matters and mergers. Suzanne has also handled cases involving peer and credentialing reviews and State Board investigations. 

Prior to earning her law degree, Suzanne was a Critical Care Nurse working in clinical settings at some of Philadelphia’s most prestigious medical hospitals. She also was a Nursing Administrator for several years, tenured in area hospitals’ Intensive Care Units, Emergency Rooms and Obstetric Departments. Suzanne maintains her Nursing license in Pennsylvania and is an active volunteer for the local medical community. 

An experienced trial attorney, Suzanne draws from her Nursing background and institutional knowledge of health care systems and operations to guide clients in managing litigation efforts. She has an intimate understanding of the unique issues involved in defending medical professional liability claims and leverages this knowledge to achieve successful results. 

Suzanne is rated AV-Preeminent by Martindale-Hubbell, the highest rating for an attorney’s professional and ethical competence. Among her numerous professional affiliations, she is a member of the New Jersey Trial Attorneys Association, Philadelphia Association of Defense Counsel, Society of Healthcare Risk Managers (Philadelphia chapter), Defense Research Institute (Medical Liability & Health Care Law, and Drug and Medical Device Committees), and the National Association of Professional Women.

    • Widener University Delaware Law School (J.D.)
    • Saint Joseph's University (MHA)
    • Widener University School of Nursing (BSN)
    • Thomas Jefferson University College of Nursing (RN)
    • New Jersey
    • Pennsylvania
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Michigan
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 4th Circuit
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 5th Circuit
    • Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
    • Cambridge Who’s Who Among Executive and Professional Women in Nursing Healthcare
    • National Academy of Jurisprudence – Premier 100
    • National Association of Excellence in Jurisprudence: Top 100 - Judicial Appointment – Pennsylvania
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
    • American Association of Critical Care Nurses
    • Defense Research Institute, member, Medical Liability and Health Care Law, Drug and Medical Device Committees
    • National Association of Female Professionals
    • National Association of Professional Women
    • New Jersey Trial Attorneys Association
    • Philadelphia Area Society of Healthcare Risk Managers
    • Philadelphia Association of Defense Counsel
    • Trucking Industry Defense Association
    • Medical Legal Issues for Physicians Assistants, Thomas Jefferson University School of Physicians Assistants Program, East Falls, PA and Voorhees, NJ campuses, November 10, 2022  
    • Received a defense verdict in a binding arbitration, representing a doctor and her practice group in Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas. This was a Wrongful Death / Survival Action alleging malpractice against the primary care physician (PCP) and her practice, as well as numerous other physicians and two hospitals. The plaintiffs' decedent was a 42-year-old female with chronic respiratory problems including asthma, sinusitis, hypertension, morbid obesity, diabetes and other issues. The doctor was the plaintiff's long-standing PCP and saw the plaintiff three days prior to her emergent admission to the Emergency Department where she was diagnosed with a PE. When the plaintiff was seen by the PCP, she showed no signs of leg swelling, which would be consistent with deep vein thrombosis (DVT). While in the hospital, the plaintiff suffered a massive event which left her pulseless. She was coded without success. The PCP and her practice group were sued for allegations of a failure to diagnose a DVT and/or evolving PE. Suzanne negotiated a transfer from the Civil Trial Attachment in January to Binding Arbitration. After a two-day arbitration, she received a defense verdict. Plaintiff's demand immediately preceding the trial attachment was $4 million, which included a $1.3 million future wage loss. No offer was ever extended. (We negotiated a high low with the low being $30,000.)

Results

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Defense Verdict After Five-Day Jury Trial in Medical Malpractice Action Where Initial Demand was $5 Million

We received a defense verdict in a five-day jury trial in Philadelphia County involving multiple defendants. We defended the medical malpractice claim alleging a violation of HIPAA privacy and an intrusion upon plaintiff's seclusion resulting in his eviction and severe emotional distress. The plaintiff claimed an anonymous email he sent to our client, a social worker, purporting to seek mental health therapy was a "mental health record" and subject to HIPAA privacy laws. When it was discovered that the email was from the same individual stalking and harassing the client’s sister who worked at the apartment complex where he lived, our client provided the email to her sister, who then gave it to her employer to support legal action against the plaintiff. The email was used in an eviction proceeding, and the plaintiff claimed that the disclosure of the email violated his privacy rights under HIPAA and that he suffered humiliation and severe emotional distress as a result. The claim involved counts for medical and legal professional negligence, negligence per se, intrusion upon seclusion, conspiracy to commit an intrusion upon seclusion, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and a plea for punitive damages. The initial demand of $5 million was reduced to $125,000 before trial. No offer was made and a unanimous defense verdict was rendered in less than three hours.

Summary Judgment Secured in 10-Year-Old Medical Malpractice Case

We won a very hard-fought motion for summary judgment based on the plaintiff’s failure to prosecute in a matter that is now 10 years old. Suzanne won oral argument to dismiss the suit, based on the plaintiff’s failure to prosecute his case, by proving both actual prejudice to the client, a psychologist, and an inexcusable seven-year delay in any activity by the plaintiff. This medical malpractice claim was brought in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania, and was related to a psychological evaluation conducted of the plaintiff’s three children, whom he physically and psychologically abused for years.   

Thought Leadership

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The Quarterly Dose

From Bedside to Bar

February 25, 2026

When I was young with asthma, my hero was never a doll or TV character, it was my pediatrician. He made house calls multiple times per day with his black bag, a multidose vial of epinephrine, and a reusable syringe. He quickly taught me how to draw up my own injection, and from that moment I knew I wanted to become a doctor to help save kids’ lives. I studied math, science, and Latin like a religion so I could excel in school. I had finished every AP math and science course that my high school had to offer by the end of my sophomore year, so the school partnered with Penn State to provide me with pre-med courses in the five-year Jefferson-Penn State pre-med/medical school program. In 1976, as an early admission candidate, I was one of very few women to be accepted into that med school program. Keeping in mind that this was the 70s, my parents and guidance counselors instructed me that “girls” are supposed to be nurses, teachers, and secretaries – not doctors. So I transferred to the Diploma Nursing program at Jefferson and managed expenses by working as a manager at an ice cream store in the Gallery. As a nurse in a Pediatric ICU, and then in an Emergency Department (ED), I worked with prominent physicians in numerous specialties. Details matter, especially when working with infants and children, and I have always been a stickler for details. It was my goal to always provide the best care possible, but sometimes even the mightiest efforts were not enough. After one especially tough and heartbreaking incident surrounding the death of a child, a mother came into the ED screaming at us, and eventually filed a lawsuit. We knew we had exceeded the standards of care, so we did not understand why the hospital settled the lawsuit. After the settlement, the Attending of the ED bought me an LSAT book and said “If you want to do more for the profession, go to law school.” So I did. Now, as an attorney, I bring the same meticulous care to my clients that I once brought to my patients. I take an assertive, detail-driven approach to achieving successful outcomes. I remain a Registered Nurse licensed in Pennsylvania and continue to volunteer in disaster-relief when needed. That dual identity—nurse and attorney—shapes how I advocate: with compassion, an understanding of the stress litigation creates, and unwavering attention to detail. My clinical background gives me an invaluable advantage throughout the litigation process, from understanding the medicine to working effectively with my clients, our experts and cross-examining opponents’ experts. Communicating fluently with healthcare professionals across specialties has strengthened my practice and continually reminds me of the pediatrician who once taught me to draw up my own epinephrine injection—an act that set the course for my future.

Firm Highlights

Event

CLM 2026 Focus Conference

Allison joins three insurance industry leaders to discuss how cyber coverage disputes, the growing impact of social inflation on bodily injury claim valuation, and the use of artificial intelligence are reshaping the bad faith landscape. The panel will examine emerging sources of extra-contractual exposure, including evolving cyber insurance coverage issues and the challenges of accurately valuing bodily injury claims. Practical approaches to claim evaluation using AI, along with defense strategies designed to help prevent or successfully defend against bad faith litigation, will also be addressed. 

Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter

Result

Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.

Marshall Dennehey Named a Standout in Litigation by BTI Consulting Group

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Marshall Dennehey Named a Standout in Litigation by BTI Consulting Group

Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

Result

Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

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Result

Summary Judgment Obtained in Insurance Coverage Case

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News

Marshall Dennehey Announces 2027 New Jersey Super Lawyers And Rising Stars

Thought Leadership

WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

In this case, the claimant sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employment as a registered nurse. The employer acknowledged the injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).  Subsequently, a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) expanded the description of injury. The employer then filed a Termination Petition, alleging the claimant was fully recovered from the injuries. Providers filed Utilization Review (UR) Petitions, challenging UR determinations finding their chiropractic treatment to be not reasonable and necessary. A settlement of the claim was eventually reached, and the employer filed a Petition to Seek Approval of a Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreement. The C&R outlined that the agreement fully resolved all future workers’ compensation claims except for the termination and UR Petitions. Briefs were filed and one day later, the WCJ issued an Interlocutory Order which stated if instructions were not followed regarding filing of a C&R, a settlement hearing date would not be given. The employer complied with the order, and filed the C&R. Subsequently, the WCJ notified the parties that the C&R must resolve all issues in the petitions, or would not be entertained. A settlement hearing was never held, and the WCJ then issued a decision, granting the Termination Petition and dismissing the UR Petitions. The WCJ also said that the Petition for Approval of a C&R was dismissed without prejudice, as the issues in the Termination and UR Petitions went to a decision. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board granted the claimant’s appeal, finding that the WCJ violated the requirement of Section 449 that an expedited hearing be held when a Petition for Approval of a C&R is filed.  The Board further held that it was legally incorrect for the WCJ to insist that the C&R resolve all issues raised by the pending Petitions. The Board remanded the case to a new WCJ, and Employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court affirmed the Board and held that the WCJ erred, as a matter of law, by refusing to hold an expedited hearing within 30 days, once the Petition for Approval of a C&R was filed.  The court noted that the language of Section 449(b) is mandatory, and a settlement hearing is not discretionary or dependent on a party’s separate request for a stay, or whether the record has been closed. The court further rejected Employer’s argument that the case should not be remanded to a new WCJ for a new decision on the termination and and UR Petitions, as the Board passed no judgment on whether the C&R Agreement resolved the termination and UR Petitions, and left it for the WCJ to decide in connection with the Petition for Approval of a C&R.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

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Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department