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Michael G. Archibald

Portrait of Michael G. Archibald

Michael is a shareholder in the firm's Casualty Department where he represents some of the nation's largest insurance carriers and their insureds in a wide variety of product liability, premises liability, motor vehicle negligence and contract disputes. A former public defender and Marine, he brings his "hard-charging" work ethic to every engagement, whether he's assisting clients in evaluating claims made against them or defending them at trial.

With more than 20 years of experience, Michael handles all phases of litigation, from pre-suit negotiations to the courtroom, when necessary. He has successfully represented clients in routine and complex litigation involving uninsured/underinsured motorist claims, personal injury slip-and-fall matters, property damage cases, product liability matters, negligent security, and wrongful death cases.

    • University of Florida Levin College of Law (J.D., 1998)
    • Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University
      • B.S., B.C.J., magna cum laude, 1995
    • Florida, 1999
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Florida, 2003
    • U.S. District Court Northern District of Florida, 2003
    • U.S. District Court Southern District of Florida, 2003
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 11th Circuit, 2004
    • Defense verdict in lawsuit filed against a major, nationally recognized retail chain alleging both intentional torts and negligence. Client was entitled to recover attorneys' fees and costs based on issuance of Proposal for Settlement/Offer of Judgment.
    • Favorable verdict in motor vehicle accident trial in which client admitted negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle. Verdict was favorable in that jury awarded far less than what client had previously offered plaintiff at mediation.
    • Dismissal of premises liability case after deposition of third party plaintiff. Upon careful interrogation of claimant, it was revealed during the deposition that the documents offered in support of the claim were not what they were purported to be.
    • Apartment complex owner defense: An invitee fell down a flight of concrete steps breaking bones and incurring substantial medical bills. She brought suit against the apartment complex to recover her damages. Witnesses that came to the plaintiff's aid immediately after the fall inspected the stairs and found nothing that would have caused the fall. Additionally, during her deposition testimony the plaintiff was unclear as to what she believed caused her to fall. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment was granted, with the defendant entitled to recover fees and costs. 
    • Retailer subrogation defense: Plaintiff insurer alleged that defective installation of a dryer caused a fire that destroyed an entire floor of an apartment complex. After paying its insured based on its contract of insurance, the insurer then filed a subrogation suit against the retail merchant. The jury returned a defense verdict  in favor of the retail merchant.  Defendant entitled to recover costs. 
    • Apartment complex owner negligent security/wrongful death defense: A 21-year-old apartment complex tenant was shot and killed during the night while in the playground area of the apartment complex. The assailant was never identified and the crime remained unsolved. He was survived by his parents and 3-year-old daughter. Lawyers for the estate made a demand in the amount of $9,000,000.00. The jury found the defendant liable for not having any security measures in place but also found the decedent to be 68 percent liable for his own death. The jury award to the estate was $333,000.00. The estate's appeal was unsuccessful. 
    • Insurance company uninsured/under-insured motorists defense: Plaintiff filed an under-insured motorists claim against his insurer based on auto accident. He had already received the policy limits from the other driver's insurance policy and sought to benefit from his UM policy. The jury agreed that the accident in question was the plaintiff's fault and rendered a defense verdict in favor of the plaintiff's insurance company.
    • Grocer defense: Plaintiff filed suit alleging that he slipped and fell in liquid that was left unattended on defendant's floor. The plaintiff had multi-level lower back surgery.  Plaintiff's key witness was a friend who was less than credible. Under cross-examination the plaintiff's and his key witness's stories diverged. The jury found in favor of the defendant. Defendant entitled to recover fees and costs.
    • Corporate defendant in rear-end auto accident: Corporate defendant fleet vehicle approached intersection wherein the traffic light was red for his lane. The fleet vehicle was second in line. The light turned green. The plaintiff  who was in the vehicle just ahead of the corporate defendant's vehicle began to go and then abruptly stopped. The fleet vehicle rear-ended the plaintiff's vehicle. In the 2 years to follow, the plaintiff had three surgeries (TMJ, knee and shoulder) all allegedly due to the rear end collision.  Defendant stipulated to liability and challenged causation. Defense verdict with defendant entitled to recover fees and costs due to offer of judgment. 
    • Retail merchant slip and fall: Plaintiff alleged that the floor was wet with liquid which caused her to slip and fall incurring an injury requiring surgery. Her key witness was her adult son who was with her when the alleged incident occurred. Despite giving deposition testimony favorable to his mother's case, at trial on cross-examination he admitted that when he inspected the floor immediately after the alleged fall, he saw nothing that would have caused her to fall. Defense verdict with defendant entitled to recover fees and costs. 
    • Retail merchant defense: Plaintiff alleged that his 2-year-old child suffered a fractured femur while inside defendant's store. The child's leg was broken due to heavy unsecured merchandise falling on his leg when he disturbed it. The jury found plaintiff/child's father 65 percent negligent for his lack of supervision of the child. Defendant entitled to recover fees based on offer of judgment. 
    • Liquor merchant slip and fall: Plaintiff patron enters liquor store out of the rain. She walked across the entire wet parking lot into the store and slipped and fell as she went to make a turn down an aisle. Defendant stipulated to the absence of a wet floor sign – jury found 65 percent negligence on plaintiff; appeal by plaintiff unsuccessful.
    • Car dealership defense/auto accident: Defendant auto dealer's employee took a newly  purchased vehicle across the street to get the tank filled for the new owner. On his way back from the gas station, the employee attempted to make a right turn on a one-way street. He did not see the plaintiff riding a bicycle on the sidewalk coming from the opposite direction of the traffic on the one-way street. 70% liability attributed to the bicycle riding plaintiff. Defendant entitled to recover fees based on offer of judgment. 
    • Retail Merchant Assault and Battery, Invasion of Privacy, Defamation: Plaintiff alleged that her privacy was invaded by defendant's employee when the employee physically assaulted her and strewn her lingerie across the parking lot of its business.  Plaintiff claimed that the employee used racial epithets against her in the course of the physical and very public assault.  Defense verdict.  Defendant entitled to fees and costs.
    • The Best Lawyers in America®, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants (2024-2027)
    • Florida Bar Association
    • Hillsborough County Bar Association
    • National Bar Association
    • Using Crime Grids in Negligent Security Claims, Marshall Dennehey Florida Claims Symposium - The Best Defense is a Good Offense, Orlando, FL, September 17, 2014
    • “Negligent Security Claims In Florida: the “Victim-Targeted” Defense,” Defense Digest, Vol. 23, No. 1, March 2017
    • "Florida's Proposals for Settlement in Dangerous Instrumentality Cases," Defense Digest, Vol. 16, No. 2, June 2010
    • United States Marine Corps, 1987-1991

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.