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Audrey L. Copeland

Portrait of Audrey L. Copeland

Audrey Copeland, who joined the firm in 1986, is a member of the Post-Trial Appellate Advocacy Practice Group. She concentrates her practice in the state and federal appellate courts and has litigated matters involving a wide range of substantive and procedural issues including professional liability, civil rights claims, land use, coverage, medical malpractice, product liability, workers' compensation and premises liability.

    • William & Mary Law School (J.D., 1983)
    • Colgate University (B.A., cum laude, 1980)
    • Pennsylvania, 1985
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 3rd Circuit, 1986
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyer (2018-2021)
    • Bar Association for the Third Federal Circuit
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • "Did the Commonwealth Court Decide the Retroactive Effect of 'Protz'? Pennsylvania Law Weekly, October 12, 2017
    • "Protz: Problems for Practitioners and Politicians," Pennsylvania Law Weekly, August 22, 2017
    •  “Land Use Litigation – Trends, Exposures and Moral Hazards,” Defense Digest, Vol. 22, No. 3, September 2016
    • "Running Afoul of the Appellate Rules," The Pennsylvania Lawyer, March-April, 2006
    • "On Line Is On Target: the Astonishing Utility of Computer Research," Pittsburgh Legal Journal, Vol. 121, No. 114, June, 1995
    • "The Empire Strikes Back: Payback for the Costs of Proving Yourself Right, " Defense Digest, July, 1995
    • "Pennsylvania Supreme Court Declines Review in Bad-Faith Case, " Defense Digest, July, 1995
    • "Hurry Up and Wait: Consequences for Defendants Under the New Appellate Rules, " Defense Digest, Summer, 1994
    • "High Court Reins in Repose Defense, " Defense Digest, Spring, 1994
    • "Services or Sales? Hospitals, Physicians and Pharmacists and 402A Liability, " Defense Digest, Spring, 1994
    • "Live Birth of a Non-Viable Fetus is Line of Demarcation in Wrongful Death and Survival Act Cases, " Defense Digest, Winter 1993, 1994
    • "Third Circuit Applies "Inferred Intent" in Sexual Abuse of Minors Case, " Defense Digest, Fall, 1993
    • "Third Circuit Affirms Swimming Pool Judgment, " Defense Digest, Summer, 1993
    • "The Sexual Abuse of Minors: Coverage Issues, " Defense Digest, Spring, 1992
    • In a Pickle: The Implications of Protz, Marshall Dennehey Workers' Compensation Seminar, October 19, 2017
    • Lighthouse Inst. for Evangelism, Inc. v. City of Long Branch, 510 F. 3d 253 (3d. Cir. 2007) was initiated by plaintiff, a self-described" church," to challenge the defendant City's zoning ordinance and superseding Redevelopment Plan. The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the RLUIPA, 40 U.S.C. 2000cc et seq. claim as to the City's Redevelopment Plan holding that the "Equal Terms" provision of RLUIPA requires a plaintiff to show that it was treated less well than a secular organization that has a similar negative impact on the aims of the challenged land-use regulation and reasoning that the purported church was not treated on less than equal terms from secular entities, largely because of a New Jersey State statute which prohibits the issuance of a liquor license to establishments located within 200 feet of a church. The Court also affirmed the dismissal of the alleged church's Free Exercise claim as to both the Redevelopment Plan and the original C-1 Ordinance because its religious exercise was not burdened by the fact that it was excluded from this area of the City. The Third Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment for the City as to Lighthouse's RLUIPA Claim as to the original, since superseded C-1 Ordinance. 
    • In Essex Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 60 Fed. Appx. 367, 368 (3d Cir. 2003), the Assault and Battery exclusion in insurance policy applied and insurance company was not required to defend or indemnify its insured; additionally, the exclusion applied even though it appeared in an unsigned addendum, thus insurance company was entitled to summary judgment.
    • Micromanolis v. Woods Sch., Inc., 989 F.2d 696, 697 (3d Cir. 1993) concerned a plaintiff who climbed over a defendant property owner's fence and dove into an unlit "winterized" pool at night, without checking its water level, and who was rendered a quadriplegic. The Third Circuit held that even assuming that the plaintiff was a foreseeable trespasser, the property owner could not be charged with actual or constructive knowledge that a trespasser might dive into the unlit pool without checking the water level and could not be liable for wanton misconduct in failing to take steps to prevent the injuries caused by this activity. 
    • Heath v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd. (Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole), 860 A.2d 25 (Pa. 2004), remanding to Heath v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd. (Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole), 867 A.2d 776 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005) concerned a claim for workers' compensation benefits for psychological injury brought by a claimant who alleged that she was sexually harassed by her supervisor. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that although the personal animus exception could not be raised sua sponte, a remand was required, whereupon the Commonwealth Court denied the claim due to the claimant's failure to provide the objective evidence necessary for corroboration.
    • In Rossino v. Kovacs, 718 A. 2d 755 (Pa. 1998) summary judgment was affirmed for the defendant property owners, who neither knew nor had reason to know that a police officer was going to enter their property in order to aid the execution of a search warrant, were not liable for the injuries sustained by the officer, who was not a licensee but rather a trespasser on the property under a privilege.
    • Bethea v. Phila. AFL-CIO Hosp. Ass'n, 871 A.2d 223 (Pa. Super. 2005), appeal denied, 934 A.2d 71 (Pa. 2007) involved the retroactive application of the MCARE Act and the Superior Court affirmed the trial judge's dismissal of the case. The Superior Court held that qualifications for a medical expert under the Act must be met even though the medical malpractice claim was filed prior to the enactment of the Act and the expert's testimony was heard after the enactment. The practical consequences of this ruling were that the expert, who did not possess a valid medical license at the time of trial, was barred from testifying and the plaintiff could not sustain her action.
    • In Brown v. Philadelphia College of Osteopathic Med., 760 A.2d 863 (Pa. Super. 2000) the judgment on jury verdict for the plaintiffs vacated and case remanded for entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of defendant-appellant PCOM, where plaintiffs failed to prove that defendant's conduct in erroneously informing plaintiff that her infant daughter had been born with syphilis was a proximate cause of the alleged harm or show the requisite physical impact to recover for emotional harm as to claims that the diagnosis caused the breakdown of the couples' marriage, physical violence, and loss of employment.
    • In Armstrong v. W.C.A.B. (Haines and Kibblehouse), 931 A.2d 827 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) a work injury was deemed accepted by the employer by virtue of a notice of temporary compensation payable acknowledging the injury and a notice of compensation denial disputing length and extent of disability, but not the occurrence or nature of the injury, pursuant to 77 Pa. Stat. Ann. 717.1.
    • Schachter v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd. (SPS Technologies), 910 A.2d 742 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006) involved the effect of a disability rating. The Commonwealth Court held that the workers' compensation employer was not precluded from seeking termination of disability benefits by virtue of prior 6 % impairment rating and the reversal of the Judge's attorney's fees award was not error.
    • Ball v. Bayard Pump & Tank Co., 2013 Pa. LEXIS 1039 (Pa. May 28, 2013)
    • Krushaukus v. WCAB (General Motors), 56 A.3d 64 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2012)
    • Papadoplos v. Schmidt, Ronca & Kramer, PC, 21 A.3d 1216 (Pa. Super. 2011)
    • Rossino v. Kovacs, 718 A.2d 755 (1998) 
    • Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company v. Johnson, 704 A.2d 127 (1998)

Results

Successfully Affirmed Workers’ Compensation Decision Before the Appeal Board

We convinced the Commonwealth Court to affirm the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board in favor of our client, the employer, which upheld the workers’ compensation judge’s denial of a claim petition. By memorandum opinion, the court found that the judge’s credibility findings were neither contradictory nor arbitrary and capricious, and the decision was reasoned. The court agreed with the employer that the defense experts’ opinions constituted substantial evidence, also noting that the Social Security Administration’s findings of disability were irrelevant to the issue of work-relatedness. The court concluded that the claimant failed to sustain her burden of proving a work-related injury, and since the causal connection between her “lingering symptoms and her work duties” was not obvious, she was required to present unequivocal medical evidence establishing that connection, which she failed to do.

Successfully Represented an Insurance Company in a Workers’ Compensation Appellate Matter

We successfully represented an insurance company before the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania. The court agreed with our argument that the claimant needed to provide notice of his work-related injury to the defendant insurance company within 120 days of the occurrence of the injury due to his combined status as sole proprietor/owner and also the employee in this matter. The judges distinguished the facts of the case due to the fact that the claimant was a sole proprietor, owner and the only employee of his own business. The court agreed that allowing the claimant to pursue a claim, by claiming that he provided notice to himself immediately when the accident occurred, but did not bother to report the injury to the insurance company for over a year thereafter, would result in an absurdity and put the insurance company at a disadvantage in the investigation of the claim. The court also noted that the definition of “employer” in certain portions of the Act includes not only the actual employer as a business itself, but also the employer’s duly authorized agent or its insurer, if such insurer has assumed the employer’s liability. Since the claimant failed to provide notice to the insurance company within 120 days of his injury, the court held that the Claim Petition was barred. The Claim Petition was dismissed, and the claimant was not entitled to any benefits at all.

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

On the Pulse…Recent Appellate Victories

September 30, 2026

Kimberly Berman (Fort Lauderdale) and Sontho SaintGermain (Orlando) succeeded in obtaining an affirmance by the Second District Court of Appeal of a final judgment in a slip-and-fall premises liability matter on behalf of a business establishment and property owner. The plaintiff was a business invitee who sued the property owner for negligence after she fell while riding her electric bicycle through its landscaped parking lot. During discovery, the plaintiff claimed the fall occurred while she was traversing through a section “covered heavily in leaves” though she could not identify how she fell nor whether there were any objects or foreign substances causing her fall. The property owner moved for summary judgment, asserting the accumulation of leaves on the parking lot was an open and obvious, naturally occurring condition that could not constitute a dangerous condition to impose liability on a property owner. The court granted summary judgment in the property owner’s favor. After oral argument, the Second District Court affirmed per curiam the final judgment in the property owner’s favor. Carrie Collier v. Cars MTI-4 L.P. d/b/a Lazydays RV Resort, No. 2D2025-1980 (Fla. 2d DCA May 13, 2026). Kimberly House (Philadelphia) succeeded in obtaining a victory in the Superior Court of Pennsylvania that reversed the trial court’s decision and remanded the case for reinstatement of the jury verdict which was originally won by Gary Samms (King of Prussia/Philadelphia). (The underlying medical malpractice case involved claims seeking more than $5 million in damages for serious eye injuries including a detached retina and macular hole.) At trial, the jury returned a defense verdict finding that the defendant’s negligence was not a cause of the plaintiff’s injuries. The trial judge granted the plaintiff’s post-trial motions and ordered a new trial solely on the issue of damages. The Superior Court found that the trial court abused its discretion in finding that causation was not disputed and that the jury’s finding of no causation was against the weight of the evidence. Busanic v. Premier Orthopaedic & Sports Medicine Physical Therapy, 2026 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1140 (Pa. Super. Apr. 28, 2026). Suzanne Tighe (Scranton/Philadelphia), Allison Krupp (Harrisburg)  and Christopher Woodward (Harrisburg) succeeded in obtaining an affirmance by the Superior Court of Pennsylvania of a non-jury trial decision in favor of an insurance company. Plaintiffs asserted claims under the Pennsylvania Bad Faith Statute, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8371, following a statutory arbitration award in excess of the available underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage. The trial court held the plaintiffs failed to prove bad faith in the handling of the UIM claim and entered judgment in favor of the insurer. The Superior Court rejected the plaintiffs’ contentions that the trial court misapplied the applicable bad faith law, set forth in Rancosky v. Washington Nat’l Ins. Co. 170 A.3d 364 (Pa. 2017), and affirmed the trial court. The Superior Court further held that plaintiffs’ waived their requests for judgment notwithstanding verdict (JNOV) and new trial by failing to properly preserve these issues at trial and in post-trial motions. Brown v. U.S. Auto. Ass’n, 2026 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1393 (May 27, 2026). *Results do not guarantee a similar result.

Defense Digest

On the Pulse…Recent Appellate Victories*

June 30, 2026

Shane Haselbarth (Philadelphia) succeeded in obtaining summary judgment in a federal district court and an affirmance on appeal to the Third Circuit in a police shooting case resulting in a fatality. Dispatch relayed news of a 911 call for a stabbing, and two police officers approached the scene. Multiple bystanders informed them that the suspect had a gun, and the officers converged toward him. With the benefit of a body-mounted camera recording, the officers ordered the suspect to drop his gun. He did so, and the officers ordered him to step away from the gun, but the suspect inexplicably reached down and picked up the gun again. The officers held their fire and ordered him again to drop his gun—until the suspect raised his gun and aimed it in the direction of one officer and the suspect’s mother, whom the suspect had brutally stabbed (leading to the 911 call from the suspect’s terrorized sister). Since the suspect aimed his gun at his mother and/or the police officer, the officers used deadly force against him, and only did so when the suspect repeatedly raised his gun as though to shoot it.  The district court held that the police officers’ conduct violated no clearly established right under the Fourth Amendment despite the suspect’s death from gunshot wounds. On appeal, the Third Circuit went further and held that the police officers’ conduct did not violate any right at all under the Fourth Amendment. Their use of deadly force, while tragic, was wholly reasonable given the facts and circumstances which they encountered on the night in question.  Carol VanderWoude (Philadelphia) succeeded in obtaining reversal of a trial court’s order overruling preliminary objections as to venue. The plaintiff filed suit in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas alleging negligence for injuries sustained in a car accident. The accident occurred in Lebanon County between the plaintiff’s vehicle and a school bus driven by an employee of the defendant transportation company. The corporate defendant provided transportation services to school districts in Lebanon and Lancaster Counties, and had no clients in Philadelphia County. The trial court overruled the preliminary objections to venue, reasoning the act of transporting students into Philadelphia for approximately two-dozen field trips during the pertinent school-year satisfied the quality-quantity venue analysis. The Superior Court agreed with the arguments raised on appeal and held that the field trips simply aided in the corporate defendant’s main purpose of providing transportation services as directed by its clients located outside Philadelphia County and that those field trips were not conducted regularly enough to satisfy the quantity portion of the venue analysis. Kimberly Berman (Fort Lauderdale) and Jonathan Kanov (Fort Lauderdale) succeeded in obtaining an affirmance by the Fourth District Court of Appeal of a final judgment entered in favor of Marshall Dennehey’s clients, a law firm and managing lawyer. The law firm and lawyer issued an opinion letter on behalf of his clients as part of a commercial loan transaction for $7.5 million. After the client defaulted on the loan, the plaintiffs, sophisticated lenders, sued 20 different named defendants involved in the transaction. They sued the law firm and lawyer for negligent misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty for its role in issuing the third-party opinion letter. The trial court granted summary judgment in the law firm and lawyer’s favor, finding in an arm’s length transaction, there was no duty owed to nonclients. The lender appealed, phrasing the issue as a pure legal question of an attorney’s professional responsibility: “When an attorney issues an opinion letter – (i) knowing that the letter is attendant to a transaction in which a non-client party to that transaction will necessarily rely on the letter (as a condition precedent to the transaction); and (ii) invites reliance on the letter without qualification—does that attorney owe any duty of care to the intended non-client recipient?” After oral argument, the Fourth District rejected the lender’s arguments attempting to extend a duty in these circumstances and affirmed the final judgment. Kimberly Berman (Fort Lauderdale) and Dante Rohr (Orlando) succeeded in obtaining an affirmance by the Second District Court of Appeal of a final judgment on a cross-claim for defense and indemnity in a construction defect matter for Marshall Dennehey’s client, a window and door subcontractor. The plaintiffs were residential homeowners who sued the general contractor for construction defects following the construction of their luxury home. They also sued the window and door subcontractor for negligent misrepresentation in its recommendation to install windows and doors manufactured by a German manufacturer. The general contractor filed a cross claim against the window and door subcontractor and third-party claims against the other subcontractors involved in the construction for defense and indemnification. During litigation, the case was referred to nonbinding arbitration, where the arbitrator found that the general contractor was not negligent, but that it breached the contract and warranties. The arbitrator also found there was no negligent misrepresentation on behalf of the window and door subcontractor. The arbitrator awarded the plaintiffs $3.1 million in damages. The general contractor moved for trial de novo on the cross claim and third-party claims only, accepting the $3.1 million award entered against it. Thereafter, the window and door subcontractor moved for summary judgment on the cross claim, asserting there was no obligation to defend or indemnify based on the express terms of the indemnification clause in the subcontract. The court granted summary judgment in the window and door subcontractor’s favor. After oral argument, the Second District Court of Appeal affirmed the final judgment in the window and door subcontractor’s favor. Patricia McDonagh (Roseland) succeeded in obtaining an affirmance by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York, First Department, of an order granting summary judgment to Marshall Dennehey’s client, a building owner. Plaintiffs brought suit against the building owner after allegedly sustaining injuries when ceiling tiles fell onto them. The First Department held that defendant established that it was an out-of-possession landlord with no course of conduct of making repairs after the tenant assumed possession and control of the premises. The court further held that plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact in opposition and improperly made arguments for the first time on appeal. Walter Kawalec (Mt. Laurel) succeeded in obtaining an affirmance from the New Jersey Appellate Division of a directed verdict in a medical malpractice action. The plaintiff’s decedent was a patient in our client’s nursing home and suffered from dysphagia, or difficulty swallowing. As a result, he was on a mechanically soft diet along with moderate supervision by the nursing staff. Plaintiff’s nursing expert opined that this level of supervision required the nurse to be in the room or at least the doorway when the decedent ate. The decedent was fed an appropriate meal of eggs for his breakfast, but choked on the meal while the nurse was outside the room, and eventually died as a result. The Appellate Division agreed with our argument that because the plaintiff’s experts only established a breach of the standard of care, and the cause of death, but did not establish proximate causation between the breach and the decedent’s death, a directed verdict was warranted, and the case was properly dismissed. *Results do not guarantee a similar result.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

U.S. Department of Education Reports to Congress on Disciplinary Removals of Children with Disabilities

In June 2026, the United States Department of Education, through the Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services (OSERS), published its “47th Annual Report to Congress on the Implementation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 2025.” In its report, OSERS provided detailed data and information on the discipline and removal of students from their educational placements, specifically for the school year 2022-2023. To obtain this data, all 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Bureau of Indian Education, Puerto Rico, and other U.S. territories, were asked to report on pre-school and school-aged students, ages 3-21, who were served under IDEA, Part B, and removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons during the school year in question. Not all jurisdictions had data available; OSERS’ reporting to Congress was based on the information supplied by the jurisdictions that responded.  First, OSERS examined the total number of served students who were removed to an interim alternative educational setting. From the reporting data, this number totaled 7,204,199 students. Of this total, 11,364 students were removed unilaterally by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury to themselves or others. These figures reflected the unilateral removal of served students at a rate of 16 per 10,000 students. Of this total, 545 students were removed by a due process hearing officer for likely serious bodily injury, a rate of one per 10,000 students.  Next, OSERS examined data for students who were suspended (in school and out of school) or expelled for more than 10 school days. The total number of students in this category was 7,623,095. Of this total, 65,104 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions, a rate of 85 per 10,000 students. A total of 21,878 students received in school suspensions, a rate of 29 students per 10,000.  OSERS evaluated this particular data and drilled down further, examining the rate of interim removal, expulsion, and suspension per 10,000 students based specifically upon each IDEA disability category. Perhaps not surprisingly, children primarily identified with emotional disturbance were the most affected.    For every 10,000 students who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance, 65 were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel (not the IEP team) for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury, and four out of every 10,000 students were removed following a hearing officer finding that there was a substantial likelihood of serious bodily injury to the student or others. By contrast, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who were unilaterally removed by school personnel was 25 or less per 10,000 students in each category. No more than two students per 10,000 in each of the other categories were removed by a hearing officer. Other Health Impairment was the second leading category.  For every 10,000 students identified primarily with emotional disturbance, 411 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days, and 107 of every 10,000 students in this category received in-school suspensions. In comparison, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days was no more than 172 per 10,000. Students identified in all other disability categories received in-school suspensions at a rate of no more than 57 per 10,000 students. Again, Other Health Impairment was the second leading category. OSERS then examined discipline data with a state-by-state comparison, once more at a ratio of 10,000 students served. The overall data of students who were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury showed that removal occurred most frequently in Texas (92 per 10,000 students), Montana (62 per 10,000 students), and Tennessee (42 per 10,000 students). The mean was 12.1.  In Pennsylvania, the rate of removal was 12 out of every 10,000 students, just below the mean.  OSERS also considered, on a state-by-state basis, the number of students who received out-of-school suspensions or expulsions of greater than 10 days. The most significant rate of discipline here occurred in North Carolina (256 per 10,000 students), Missouri (250 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (250 per 10,000 students).  The mean was 85.83. In Pennsylvania, the rate of discipline was 57 per 10,000 students, well below the mean.  Finally, OSERS evaluated, on a state-by-state comparison, the ratio of students per 10,000 who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance and who received out of school suspensions or expulsions for greater than 10 days. The suspension or expulsion of students with emotional disturbance occurred most often in North Carolina (1,723 per 10,000 students), Missouri (1,127 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (1,098 per 10,000). The mean was 485.81. In Pennsylvania, the suspension or expulsion of students identified with emotional disturbance occurred at a rate of 260 per 10,000, again well below the mean. Although OSERS did not draw any specific conclusions about the disciplinary data it collected, it is nonetheless evident that students primarily identified with emotional disturbance were removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons at a rate much higher than students in any other disability category. Relatively speaking, however, Pennsylvania acquitted itself well in the state-by-state disciplinary data collection.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania HB 2307: Special Education Contingency Fund Reform

Pennsylvania school districts and school law attorneys are aware of the increasing cost of special education services. In an effort to address this growing squeeze on school district budgets, a bi-partisan group of Pennsylvania House Representatives introduced House Bill 2307. The bill is a special education funding measure intended to reform Pennsylvania's reimbursement system for extraordinarily high-cost special education students. As written, HB 2307 would increase funding dedicated to Pennsylvania's Extraordinary Special Education Program Expenses reimbursement program. Beginning with the 2026-27 school year, the bill would increase the set-aside from 1% to 2% of the annual Special Education appropriation. The increased funding is aimed at assisting school districts and charter schools address the costs of serving students whose needs generate exceptionally high special education expenses. The proposal specifically targets situations involving students whose annual special education costs exceed the state's highest cost threshold and represent a significant burden on a district's special education budget. HB 2307 includes key eligibility requirements such as: 1) extraordinary special education expenses approved by the Secretary of Education; 2) student costs exceeding the state's highest Category 3A threshold; 3) costs representing at least 1% of the district's total special education expenditures; 4) student enrolled in the district for no more than two consecutive school years for the proposed reimbursement category; and 5) application and documentation requirements for districts and charter schools. HB 2307 successfully passed the Pennsylvania House of Representatives on June 16, 2026, by a unanimous vote of 202-0. It was subsequently transmitted to the Senate and was referred to the Senate Education Committee on June 22, 2026, where it currently remains pending. While there is currently no scheduled Senate committee or floor vote publicly listed for HB 2307, the next step would be for the Senate Education Committee to consider the bill and determine whether to report it to the full Senate for consideration. If approved by the committee, the bill would proceed through the Senate's three-consideration process before a final vote. Because the General Assembly is still within the 2025-26 legislative session, the bill remains eligible for action during the remainder of the session. However, absent committee action, it will not become law before the start of the 2026-27 school year. If enacted, HB 2307 could have several important effects: Greater financial stability for districts serving students with exceptionally expensive educational and related-service needs. Increased reimbursement opportunities for high-cost placements, specialized transportation, intensive behavioral supports, and other extraordinary services. Reduced pressure on local special education budgets, particularly in smaller districts where one or two high-cost students can significantly affect annual expenditures. Potential reduction in litigation and placement disputes driven by financial constraints, although the bill does not alter substantive IDEA rights or district obligations to provide FAPE.