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What's Hot in Workers' Comp

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp - News and Results*

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 29, No. 6, June 2025

June 1, 2025

NEWS

Michele Punturi (Philadelphia, PA) and Michael Duffy (King of Prussia, PA) have again been selected to the 2025 edition of Pennsylvania Super Lawyers magazine. A Thomson Reuters business, Super Lawyers is a rating service of lawyers from more than 70 practice areas who have attained a high degree of peer recognition and professional achievement. Each year, no more than five percent of the lawyers in the state are selected for this honor. The selection process is multi-phased and includes independent research, peer nominations and peer evaluations. A description of the selection methodology can be found here.

On June 12, Michael Duffy (King of Prussia, PA) will present as part of a panel on “Surveillance and Using Social Media to Win Your Case” at the PBI and PBA Workers’ Compensation Law Section “Tough Problems in Workers’ Compensation 2025.” Designed specifically by and for the experienced workers’ compensation practitioner, this webcast highlighted select challenges in workers’ compensation practice and offered techniques for managing them. 
 


 

RESULTS*

Benjamin Durstein (Wilmington, DE):

  • Successfully defended against a Petition to Determine Compensation Due, where the claimant sought payment of outstanding medical expenses and payment of total disability benefits for an alleged work-related low back injury. The injury resulted in a lengthy hospital stay and lumbar fusion surgery. The Industrial Accident Board concluded that the back injury was “idiopathic” and unrelated to his employment. Because the claimant failed to meet his burden of proof with respect to the occurrence of a work accident, his petition was denied.

Ryan Hauck (Pittsburgh, PA):

  • Secured a complete defense victory, saving our client over $500,000 in known exposure and likely millions in long-term liability. The workers’ compensation judge granted our Termination Petition and denied the Claim Petition, finding the claimant fully recovered and not entitled to wage loss or medical benefits. Through medical discovery, Ryan uncovered pre-injury treatment that directly contradicted the claimant’s testimony—a key factor in the judge’s finding that she lacked credibility. The judge also favored our medical expert, citing no changes on pre- and post-injury MRIs as further evidence undermining the claim. This outcome highlights the importance of not accepting a claimant’s version of events at face value, fully engaging in medical discovery, and preparing throughout litigation to equip your medical expert with the facts needed to win.

Anthony Natale (King of Prussia, PA):

  • Successfully defended a Claim Petition where the claimant alleged that while using a company vehicle, the hydraulic seat mechanism began to malfunction, causing the seat to slowly drop and strike the bottom of the vehicle repeatedly during the workday. Resultantly, the claimant alleged severe injuries to the spine with radiculopathy. He testified that his symptoms began in 2020, and he was surprised to learn on cross examination that he did not begin his employment with the company he sued until 2022. The claimant’s expert (a pain specialist) testified that the claimant had degenerative disc problems in his spine that must have been caused by the alleged work injury since there are no pre-existing MRIs available prior to the work injury. Tony’s medical expert emphasized that all of the claimant’s spinal issues are degenerative, pre-existed any work injury and were symptomatic as far back as 2020, before the claimant even worked for the employer. The court dismissed the claim in its entirety, offering a full defense verdict.
  • Successfully defended a police officer Fatal Claim Petition. The widow made an allegation that the decedent, a police K-9 officer, died in his home as a result of exercising with his police dog before heading to work. The decedent routinely would warm up the dog by playing outside with the animal before work hours. The Fatal Claim Petition alleged that the decedent died of hypertrophic cardiomyopathy brought on by “vigorous exercise.” The widow presented an expert who held himself out to be a cardiologist. Tony established during voir dire examination that the expert had no Board Certification in cardiology and his license had been suspended for a period of time due to writing fraudulent prescriptions. Tony also forced the expert to admit that cardiomyopathy was a pre-existing condition and, further, that in a vast majority of cases it causes death without exertional activity (usually in the morning hours). The widow testified in the matter, but on cross examination, and could not assert that the decedent had been doing anything by way of exertional activities on the morning of his death because she was asleep at the time. The widow presented a detective and a police chief who asserted that the decedent was in the course and scope of employment at or near the time of death, but both witnesses on cross examination were not present on the morning of the decedent’s death and could not verify that the decedent was undertaking exertional activities. Tony presented a Board Certified Cardiologist who definitively testified that cardiomyopathy is an hereditary condition and not caused or aggravated by activities. The decedent’s death was, therefore, characterized as death by natural causes. The court delivered a full defense verdict, dismissing the Fatal Claim Petition in its entirety. 

*Prior Results Do Not Guarantee a Similar Outcome 



 

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 29, No. 6, June 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.