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Defense Digest

Reconsidering Reconsideration

Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 5, December 2021

December 1, 2021

by Walter F. Kawalec III

Key Points:

  • The standards applicable to reconsideration vary depending on whether it is a motion from an interlocutory order or a final order.
  • Reconsideration of final orders is a much harder standard, whereas reconsideration of interlocutory orders only requires consideration of the court’s “sound discretion” and the “interest of justice.”
  • Parties who want to seek interlocutory appeal after requesting reconsideration should take special care to file a timely motion for reconsideration so as not to miss the time limit for petition for interlocutory appeal.

Let us take a moment to reconsider reconsideration. In a recent case before the New Jersey Appellate Division, Lawson v. Dewar, 256 A.3d 388 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2021), the court took the opportunity to clarify the different standards that apply to reconsideration.

In Lawson, the plaintiff filed suit against a municipality and a number of police officers, alleging the officers used excessive force when arresting him. After a case management conference, the plaintiff moved for an additional extension of discovery, the right to take certain depositions, reconsideration of an order barring a witness from testifying after the witness failed to appear for a subpoenaed deposition, leave to file an amended complaint, and for the defendant to turn over all use-of-force reports.

On May 14, 2020, the court denied most of the relief sought, and the plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration. While the reconsideration motion was pending, the venue of the case was changed from Somerset to Middlesex County. The parties argued the reconsideration motion, and the Middlesex County judge denied it. The plaintiff filed a petition for leave to appeal, which the Appellate Division granted. 

On appeal, the Appellate Division first set out the legal principles that the Middlesex County judge invoked, including the coordinate-jurisdiction rule, which cautions against reversing the decisions of coequal members of the judiciary, and the law-of-the-case doctrine, that cautions against reconsidering decisions that have already been determined in the case. It also noted that the Middlesex County judge found that the reconsideration motion presented no new facts; that the plaintiff failed to show that the Somerset County judge acted in an arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable manner; that the initial decision was not based on a palpably incorrect or irrational basis; and that the previous judge did not fail to appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence.

The Appellate Division then took the opportunity to clarify the rules that apply to the two general species of reconsideration: reconsideration of an interlocutory order and reconsideration of a final order or judgment. The New Jersey Rules of Court and case law treat each differently, but they are often confused.

The court noted that the principles the Middlesex County judge discussed apply to a motion for reconsideration from a final order. In that situation, Rule 4:49-2 applies, and a party must file within 20 days. Further, the standard that the Middlesex Court described—usually credited to the case of Cummings v. Bahr, 685 A.2d 60 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1996)—applies. In motions for reconsideration after a final order, a party must demonstrate that the judge who issued the order sought to be reconsidered decided it in an arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable manner; that the decision was based on a palpably incorrect or irrational basis; or that the judge failed to appreciate the significance of probative, competent evidence.

However, on motions for reconsideration of interlocutory orders, by contrast, the same standard does not apply. Rule 4:42-2 governs reconsideration of interlocutory orders and provides a far more liberal approach. Until a final order is issued, the “interest of justice” and the judge’s “sound discretion” guide reconsideration of an interlocutory order. Moreover, there is no time limit to reconsider interlocutory orders.

Additionally, the Appellate Division restated that neither the coordinate-jurisdiction rule nor law-of-the-case doctrine apply to interlocutory reconsideration motions and should correct errors made by other judges when justice requires.

The Lawson court, however, did not address an important consideration regarding reconsideration. While there is no time limit to petition for reconsideration of an interlocutory order, if a party wants to seek an immediate appeal of an interlocutory order, a 20-day time limit applies. A motion for reconsideration tolls that time limit, but only if the reconsideration motion is filed within 20 days. Therefore, while there is no time limit for filing a reconsideration motion on an interlocutory order, a party wishing to file a motion for interlocutory appeal after filing for reconsideration must file the reconsideration motion within 20 days or they may be out of time to seek interlocutory appeal.

*Walt is a shareholder in our Mount Laurel, New Jersey, office and is a member of our Appellate Advocacy and Post-Trial Practice Group. He can be reached at 856.414.6024 or wfkawalec@mdwcg.com.

 

Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 5, December 2021 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

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