.

The Quarterly Dose

Florida Tort Reform: The Impact of House Bill 837 on Health Care Litigation

The Quarterly Dose - May 2024

May 1, 2024

by Megan J. Nelson

On March 24, 2023, Florida Governor Ron DeSantis signed House Bill 837 into law. Also known as the “Civil Remedies” or “Tort Reform” law, HB 837 has changed civil litigation in Florida, including providing a uniform standard for calculating the accurate value of past and future medical expenses in personal injury or wrongful death actions. Florida Statute 768.0427 now defines how past and future medical expenses may be entered into evidence at trial and how letters of protection are admission as to medical expenses and discovery related to the treating provider and a plaintiff’s attorney’s relationship.

House Bill 837 changes how cases will be evaluated for settlement negotiations and potentially increases the ability to reasonably settle claims before trial. It is important to note that these changes apply to causes of action filed after the effective date of March 24, 2023. However, if a complaint was filed before March 24, 2023, but is amended after March 24, 2023, there may be an argument that the changes from HB 837 should apply to the amended complaint.

If you find yourself wondering why these changes matter, it’s because a plaintiff’s damages are evaluated based on multiple factors, including past and future medical expenses. For example, if the medical bills are $100,000 but the amount paid is $10,000, a plaintiff should not be able to assert $100,000 in medical expenses. Knowing what can be presented to a jury will help to provide a better evaluation and strategy for settlement negotiations.

Before the new law, a plaintiff was permitted to board the full amount of medical bills charged for services rendered, with the exception of services paid by Medicare or Medicaid. Evidence of adjustments, reductions and setoffs could not be entered into evidence, unless paid by Medicare or Medicaid. Now, under HB 837, the evidence offered to prove the amount of damages related to medical expenses for past medical bills is limited to what was actually paid, regardless of the source of payment.

Example: If the medical bill is $1,000 but the contractual reimbursement rate (private insurance, Medicare, Medicaid) is $450 and the plaintiff’s co-pay is $50, then the amount paid for the bill can be presented to the jury as $500, not the $1,000 billed.

For any unpaid medical bills (past and future), the claim can only be for an amount deemed necessary and reasonable. The amount that may be presented will depend on whether the plaintiff has health care coverage. If a plaintiff has Medicare, Medicaid or no coverage, the amount that may be offered into evidence is 120% of the Medicare reimbursement rate in effect on the date of the medical treatment or service obtained. For future medical expenses, the amount would be the reimbursement rate in effect on the date of trial.

Example: If the medical bill is $1,000 but the Medicare reimbursement rate is $400, then the reasonable value of the unpaid services would be $480.

If there is no Medicare rate for a service, then the amount that may be offered into evidence is 170% of the applicable state Medicaid rate in effect on the date of the medical treatment or service obtained. For future medical expenses, the amount would be the reimbursement rate in effect on the date of trial.

Example: If the medical bill is $1,000 but the state Medicaid reimbursement rate is $400, then the reasonable value of the unpaid services would be $680.

New Definition for Letters of Protection
Florida Statute 768.0427 now defines a letter of protection as “any arrangement by which a health care provider renders treatment in exchange for a promise of payment for the claimant’s medical expenses from any judgment or settlement of a personal injury or wrongful death action. The term includes any such arrangement, regardless of whether referred to as a letter of protection.” This means any document showing an agreement for services can be called a “Letter of Protection,” “LOP,” or anything else. If there is an agreement to provide medical services to a plaintiff and not to charge the insurance carrier, it falls under the definition of a letter of protection.

If a plaintiff has health coverage (private insurance, Medicare, Medicaid) but does not submit the medical treatment or services to the insurance carrier (i.e., treating under a letter of protection), the amount that may be offered into evidence is limited to what the insurance carrier would have paid plus the plaintiff’s co-pay.

Example: If the medical bill is $1,000 but the contractual reimbursement rate (private insurance, Medicare, Medicaid) is $450 and the plaintiff’s co-pay is $50, then the amount paid for the bill can be presented to the jury as $500, not the $1,000 billed.

If the letter of protection is subsequently transferred to a third party, the amount that may be offered into evidence is limited to the amount the third party paid or agreed to pay in exchange for the right to receive payment pursuant to the letter of protection.

Example: If the medical bill is $1,000 but a third party bought the letter of protection for $700, then the amount paid for the letter of protection can be presented to the jury as $700, not the $1,000 billed.

The law also places new obligations on a plaintiff to disclose information related to the letter of protection, including identifying whether the plaintiff was referred for treatment and the identity of the person who made the referral. If the referral is made by the plaintiff’s attorney, disclosure of the referral is permitted, and evidence of such referral is admissible, notwithstanding attorney client privilege. Moreover, in such situations, the financial relationship between a law firm and a medical provider, including the number of referrals, frequency and financial benefit obtained, is relevant to the issue of the bias of the testifying medical provider. This effectively overturns the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Worley v. Central Florida Young Men’s Christian Ass’n, Inc., 228 So. 2d 185 (2017).

As the new law allows evidence of reasonable amounts for necessary treatments, it is important to be aware that a doctor may claim that their bills are reasonable and medically necessary due to the limited availability of doctors willing to treat patients under a letter of protection. However, a proactive defense that actively pursues what the reasonable and customary cost is for the medical treatment and services received, is likely the best course of action. Florida has implemented price transparency related to minimizing the surprise bills that arrive after medical treatment and services have been provided by hospitals. This price transparency allows the defense to argue what constitutes a reasonable and customary value. 


 

The Quarterly Dose – May 2024, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.