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Megan J. Nelson

Portrait of Megan J. Nelson

Megan devotes her practice to representing hospitals, physicians, nurses, long-term care facilities, skilled nursing facilities, and other healthcare providers in the defense of medical malpractice and negligence claims, along with premises and general liability claims.

Megan also represents nurses and other medical providers who are facing administrative or regulatory discipline by their governing medical licensing boards.

In addition to health care defense, Megan assists hospitals, long-term care facilities, and skilled nursing facilities with the initiation of petitions for determination of incapacity and the appointment of plenary guardians for patients who are unable to make their own medical and financial decisions. Megan also assists hospitals, long-term care facilities, and skilled nursing facilities with patients and family who "stay against medical advice."

Megan began her career as a firefighter for her hometown volunteer fire department and has utilized her knowledge as a firefighter to represent fire academies in lawsuits.

Megan has been a Registered Nurse since 2010. Before becoming a lawyer, she worked as a neonatal and pediatric critical care nurse in various settings, including the neonatal intensive care unit, pediatric intensive care unit, pediatric cardiac intensive care unit, and pediatric emergency room. She received The Daisy Award For Extraordinary Nurses in August 2013. Her experience also included patients on ECMO (extracorporeal membrane oxygenation) and cardiac bypass. Megan's background in nursing helps to bridge the gap between medicine and the law.

Megan is a frequent lecturer on medical and nursing topics, including incident reporting, guardianships, and AI (artificial intelligence). She is a member of the Florida State Guardianship Association, Central Florida Medical Malpractice Claims Council, and the Orange County Bar Association.

Megan graduated from Del Mar College with an Associate's Degree in Nursing and Texas A&M University Corpus Christi with a Bachelor of Science in Nursing. Megan graduated cum laude from Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad College of Law with a Juris Doctor.

When she is not working, Megan volunteers her time at The Sanctuary at Lakota Farms, where she helps care for horses that have been rescued.

    • Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad College of Law (J.D., cum laude, 2019)
    • Texas A&M University-Corpus Christi (B.S., 2014)
    • Del Mar College (ADN, 2009)
    • Florida, 2019
    • Central Florida Medical Malpractice Claims Council
    • Florida State Guardianship Association
    • Orange County Bar Association
    • Secured multiple favorable rulings granting Florida Rule 5.900 petitions for expedited judicial intervention concerning medical treatment procedures, enabling hospitals to safely discharge medically cleared patients despite significant resistance from guardians and family decision-makers. Across several matters, Megan successfully addressed situations where guardians, health care surrogates, or family members refused to consent to appropriate discharge plans, declined to provide necessary financial documentation for ICP Medicaid evaluations, or failed to cooperate with case management teams—often causing prolonged, unnecessary hospital stays. Through emergency and evidentiary hearings, courts consistently granted relief, ordering patient transfers to skilled nursing facilities or assisted living facilities, requiring the production of financial records, mandating Medicaid application compliance, and, in one case, appointing an emergency temporary co-guardian to facilitate discharge. As a result of these efforts,patients were promptly and appropriately discharged—sometimes within 24 hours of court orders—demonstrating Megan’s effective advocacy in resolving complex guardianship and discharge disputes to ensure proper patient care and hospital throughput.
    • Was successful in having a Florida Rule 5.900 Petition for Expedited Judicial Intervention Concerning Medical Treatment Procedure granted. The alleged incapacitated person had been medically cleared for discharge to a skilled nursing facility. However, his brother, who had been appointed as the health care surrogate and power of attorney, had refused to consent to his brother's transfer to any skilled nursing facility. After numerous unsuccessful attempts by the hospital case management team to transfer the patient, Megan was retained to file a Florida Rule 5.900 Petition for Expedited Judicial Intervention Concerning Medical Treatment Procedures. After the emergency evidentiary hearing, the court granted the petition and ordered the brother to consent to the transfer of the patient to a skilled nursing facility.
    • Obtained final summary judgment in an equine-related case involving fraud, negligent misrepresentation, warranty, and consumer protection claims arising from the sale of a horse, resulting in dismissal of all claims against the clients.
    • You've Been Served! What's Next and How to Manage the Risk of Corporate Representative Depositions, Florida Society for Healthcare Risk Management & Patient Safety Annual Meeting & Education Conference, Fort Lauderdale, FL, August 27, 2026
    • Protecting Patients in Real Time: A Guide to Rule 5.900 Petitions, Florida Hospital Association’s General Counsel Roundtable, June 30, 2026
    • The Latest on Medical AI Innovation, Legal Liability and Claims, Florida Society for Healthcare Risk Management & Patient Safety Annual Meeting & Education Conference, Orlando, FL, August 14, 2025
    • Tort Reform: Where Do We Go From Here?, Florida Society for Healthcare Risk Management & Patient Safety Annual Meeting & Education Conference, Orlando, FL, August 16, 2024
    • Adversity in the World of Adverse Incident Reporting: A Panel Discussion on Reporting Requirements and Addressing Related Discovery, Florida Society for Healthcare Risk Management & Patient Safety Annual Meeting & Education Conference, Orlando, FL, August 13, 2021
    • Florida Nursing License

Results

Thought Leadership

The Quarterly Dose

From Bedside to Bar

June 11, 2026

Tyler R. Price, Esquire Former Nationally Registered Paramedic Working in emergency medicine demanded sharp critical thinking — recognizing life-threatening conditions, delivering timely interventions, uncovering relevant medical history, and shaping a treatment plan that aligned with a patient’s ultimate needs. I was taught to always “bring a shovel” to every encounter, because careful digging almost always revealed the details that mattered most. As an attorney, I still bring that shovel. Thorough investigation and deliberate “digging” into the facts of each case are essential to understanding potential theories of liability, assessing exposure, and evaluating every viable defense. Examining a case from multiple angles and points in the timeline allows me to appreciate how each fact fits into the broader strategy. Although I’m no longer making split second medical decisions, the same disciplined approach guides my litigation work. Every detail counts. For every client, in every matter, my goal is to identify the key facts that allow us to build the strongest possible defense. My training in emergency medicine gave me the tools, mindset, and discipline that now make me an effective litigator. Megan J. Nelson, Esquire Registered Nurse My nursing career has been a significant asset to my work as a medical malpractice defense attorney. A Registered Nurse since 2010, I have extensive, hands-on clinical experience across high-acuity settings. My background in neonatal and pediatric critical care (including work in the NICU, PICU, pediatric cardiac ICU, and pediatric emergency department) and experience managing critically ill patients (including those requiring ECMO and cardiac bypass) gives me a practical understanding of complex medical care, clinical decision-making, and the realities of fast-paced health care settings often central to malpractice claims. This firsthand knowledge allows me to analyze medical records with precision, communicate effectively with experts and providers, and identify nuances that may be overlooked by those without clinical training. In my current work on Rule 5.900 petitions for expedited judicial intervention regarding medical treatments, this clinical foundation is especially critical, as I am often tasked with effectively “educating” the court during emergency hearings—translating complex medical conditions, interventions, and risks into understandable terms for the judge. I am also able to prepare providers for testimony in a way that ensures clarity and accuracy under pressure. Ultimately, my clinical foundation enables me to bridge the gap between medicine and law, strengthening my ability to build compelling defenses grounded in real-world health care practice.

Documentation Do’s and Don’ts: Know What Really Matters

January 1, 2026

“Document, document, document!” is the mantra of healthcare risk management. If it was not documented, did it really happen? If it was documented, was it documented properly? Knowing the right and wrong ways to document can make the difference when defending a malpractice claim or conducting a root cause investigation.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.