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Defense Digest

Did the Cat Move the Ladder?

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 1, March 2025

March 1, 2025

by Keith M. Andresen

Key Points:

  • New York appellate decision gives defense counsel firm ground on which to defend a standard § 240(1) case. 
  • In Simpertegui v. Carlyle House Inc., 209 N.Y.S.3d (1st Dept. May 9, 2024), a “ladder-fall” case, the First Department found that the defendants raised triable issues of fact by identifying inconsistencies in plaintiff’s account of the accident and “calling into question his overall credibility and circumstances underlying his claimed injuries.” 

In 2024 there were several important New York labor law decisions across the Appellate Divisions and even at the Court of Appeals. It is easy to ignore some of these cases given the ongoing “Fraudemic.” However, in the midst of this storm, one appellate decision has given defense counsel some firm ground on which to defend a standard § 240(1) case, particularly one involving a fall from a ladder. So, what does a cat have to do with anything? Let me explain. 

New York Labor Law § 240(1), also known as the scaffold law, provides in relevant part:

"All contractors and owners and their agents, except owners of one- and two-family dwellings who contract for but do not direct or control the work, in the erection, demolition, repairing, altering, painting, cleaning or pointing of a building or structure shall furnish or erect, or cause to be furnished or erected for the performance of such labor, scaffolding, hoists, stays, ladders, slings, hangers, blocks, pulleys, braces, irons, ropes, and other devices which shall be so constructed, placed and operated as to give proper protection to a person so employed."

Once judgment under this statute is granted, liability is absolute, and it doesn’t matter what the plaintiff was doing or if they were comparatively negligent. 

While there are some limited defenses available—such as an uncovered worker, a non-covered activity, a recalcitrant worker, sole proximate cause—these are all very fact-specific and are typically not available in a standard fall-from-a-ladder case. Unfortunately, the majority of cases involving a fall from a ladder are simply liability dead-ends, where the plaintiff testifies they climbed up the ladder to do work, it shook, and they fell. Often times the plaintiff will testify they knew the ladder was unsafe, but they “wanted to get the job done.” These facts pled bare in an affidavit are enough for a plaintiff to move for early summary judgment after joinder of issue and before any depositions or initial discovery have taken place. 

Again, defendants are hard pressed to come up with a defense. The purpose of the statute itself, which was created to protect workers by charging owners and general contractors with absolute liability, seems to fall by the wayside. Ladder cases in recent years seem to follow the same exact fact pattern. Still, the courts seem to simply adopt the circular logic without even looking at the underlying facts—the plaintiff fell because there was a violation; there was a violation because the plaintiff fell. 

Anyone who has defended a ladder case has found it extremely frustrating. The testimonies are usually the exact same: “The ladder moved.” “The ladder shifted.” “The ladder shook.” This testimony is enough to trigger liability, no matter how ridiculous or unbelievable the remainder of the plaintiff’s testimony may be or what led up to the ladder mysteriously moving. I am tempted, sometimes, to ask the plaintiff, “Did a cat move it? Were there cats on the jobsite?” Because, frankly, that would be a much more credible explanation than the ladder just moved. 

Enter Simpertegui v. Carlyle House Inc., 209 N.Y.S.3d (1st Dept. May 9, 2024). In this matter, the plaintiff alleged he fell from a ladder while performing brickwork. He claimed that the ladder “suddenly shook” while he was about seven feet off the ground (shocking) and he fell. The plaintiff moved for summary judgment pursuant to Labor Law § 240(1), which was granted by the Bronx Supreme Court. 

The defendants appealed to the First Department. In a short, but powerful decision, the Appellate Division found the defendant raised triable issues of fact to defeat the summary judgment motion and reversed the lower court’s ruling. 

First, the plaintiff provided two separate dates of accident. He cited July 28, 2017, as the accident date in a workers’ compensation form and at a hearing. Later, at his deposition, he stated his accident date was on July 31, 2017. While mixing up accident dates is usually not dispositive, video evidence shows the plaintiff working on both days. Furthermore, no accidents were reported on those days. 

Second, he claimed he personally reported his accident to his supervisor, Abraham Diaz. Mr. Diaz confirmed the plaintiff did not report an accident to him on either date. He also provided phone records to prove the plaintiff never called him to report the accident. 

Finally, the court noted the plaintiff first went to the hospital just days after the employer fired him for absenteeism. 

The defendants also argued on appeal that the plaintiff never put forth any evidence that the ladder itself was defective, either from his own recollection or witnesses. Specifically, the plaintiff testified he was not aware if his feet came off the ladder. The court did not mention these issues, and it seems they were more concerned with his overall credibility: “Defendants raised triable issues of fact sufficient to defeat the motion by identifying various inconsistencies in plaintiff’s account of the accident, thus calling into question his overall credibility and circumstances underlying his claimed injuries.” 

This decision is important because it highlights the importance of getting all specific facts surrounding the plaintiff’s accident, not just those facts focusing on the happening of the accident itself. Defendants should seek to obtain testimony from all co-workers, supervisors, or anyone else at the jobsite who can testify as to whether an accident happened or was reported at all. Even if an accident was reported, the initial complaints or accident reports, workers’ compensation filings, testimony provided by the plaintiff, and the first medical treatment should all be compared and analyzed when assessing the plaintiff’s credibility. Obviously, phone, video, and metadata also must be scrutinized to the extent they are available. 

This may be the first in a significant line of cases where the New York State courts start seriously looking at the circumstances of ladder falls, not just providing the typical rubber-stamp treatment. After all, a cat was not on the jobsite.

*Keith is Co-Chair of our New York Construction & Labor Law Practice Group and works in our New York City office. 


 

Defense Digest, Vol. 31, No. 1, March 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2025 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

U.S. Supreme Court Decides Key Issue Regarding Interstate Freight Broker Liability

Freight brokers are intermediaries.  They connect shippers of goods with trucking companies that transport those goods.  Freight brokers match a load of freight with a trucking company and oversee the logistics of the transportation. For a number of years there has been a division among the Federal Circuits regarding the potential liability of freight brokers when the trucking companies that they retain for interstate loads are involved in accidents.  At the center of this division was the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 (FAAAA).  Some Federal Circuit Courts have held that state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers were preempted by the FAAAA .  Other Federal Circuits Courts have held that even if preemption applied, the “safety exception” in the FAAAA saved state law negligent hiring claims from federal preemption.  On May 14, 2026, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the conflict in Montgomery v. Caribe Transport II, LLC, et al, No24-1238. In that case freight broker C.H. Robinson selected Caribe Transport to haul an interstate load. The commercial truck driver employed by Caribe Transport allegedly caused an accident and the plaintiff, Montgomery, was seriously injured. Montgomery brought an action against the driver, Caribe Transport and C.H. Robinson. The allegation against C.H. Robinson was that it negligently retained Caribe Transport when it knew, or should have known, that it was an unsafe company. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Montgomery’s claims against C.H. Robinson were preempted by the FAAAA. The plaintiff appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision focused primarily on the safety exception in the FAAAA.  That provision provides that the FAAAA preemption “…shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles.” C.H. Robinson argued, as freight brokers historically have, that their function was not “with respect to motor vehicles” because they do not own trucks or employ drivers. They are merely intermediaries, connecting entities who need freight moved with entities who can do that job. Therefore, C.H. Robinson argued that preemption applied, not the safety exception. The U.S. Supreme Court did not accept that argument. The Court focused on the meaning of the phrase “with respect to” in the safety exception. The Court held that it means “referring to”, “concerning” or “regarding”. Therefore, writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Barrett concluded that “[r]equiring C.H. Robinson to exercise ordinary care in selecting a carrier therefore “concerns” motor vehicles—most obviously, the trucks that will transport the goods. So, Montgomery’s negligent-hiring claim falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception, which saves it from preemption.” Justice Kavanaugh, in his concurring opinion, noted the effect this ruling may have on freight brokers and their insurers throughout the country: Importantly, the Court's decision today should not be read to mean that brokers will routinely be subject to state tort liability in the wake of truck accidents. As even plaintiff's counsel stressed, brokers should be able to successfully defend against state tort suits if the brokers have acted reasonably and arranged transportation with reputable trucking companies. Tr. of Oral Arg. 27-29. In plaintiff's counsel's words, the brokers "just have to hire carriers that actually have a reasonable policy," and "the broker is not going to have a problem if it's asking the hard questions of the carrier." Id., at 42, 45. In addition, the proximate-cause requirement in typical state tort law should help protect brokers from excessive liability. Id., at 25. That said, the brokers rightly caution against naivete. In the real world, as the brokers forcefully respond, state tort law can be unpredictable, and the costs to brokers of litigation and insurance may be significant even when brokers prevail in lawsuits. Moreover, the costs of litigation and insurance, as well as the costs of brokers' conducting more substantial inquiries into trucking companies, will cascade through the economy and be paid in part by American consumers in the form of higher prices. The concerns expressed by the brokers are legitimate and weighty. The key point here is that freight brokers can no longer claim they are protected from negligent retention claims by the FAAAA (in cases involving interstate transportation). The challenge will be to determine what is considered ”reasonable efforts” used by brokers when retaining transportation companies. 

Thought Leadership

PA Middle District Dismisses Claims Against School District and its Superintendent, Principal, Special Education Director, and Classroom Teacher

A five-year-old special education student was enrolled in the Wyoming Valley West School District and attended the State Street Elementary School during the 2024-2025 school year. The student refused to clean up classroom toys at dismissal. When his teacher allegedly grabbed him by the wrist to walk him back to his seat, the student dropped to the floor and began crying. The teacher then allegedly grabbed the student by the ankle and dragged him across the floor. Following an investigation, criminal charges were not advanced by the county DA, and the school permitted the teacher to return to the classroom. The student’s parents sued, lodging thirteen legal counts under both state and federal law, which sought monetary damages from the teacher, the school district, the superintendent, the principal, and the director of special education. The plaintiff’s 42 USC 1983 claims were dismissed as to the school district for failure to allege a policy or custom violation, and the failure to alleged deliberate indifference in the failure-to-train context. As to the superintendent, building principal, and special education director, the Section 1983 claims were also dismissed for failure to allege personal involvement on the part of the individuals. Regarding an equal protection claim asserted against all defendants, the motion to dismiss was also granted for a failure to advance a plausible equal protection claim, holding that “plaintiffs' single-act allegations do not include a factual basis to even infer that the act was motivated by discriminatory animus rather than some other non-discriminatory impulse.” The court further dismissed the plaintiff’s negligence-based claims including negligence against the teacher and district administrators, NIED, and vicarious liability under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (PSTCA). The federal claims under the IDEA, Section 504, and the ADA were also dismissed in various respects. The IDEA claim was dismissed against all defendants with prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The Section 504 claims against the individual defendants were also dismissed with prejudice, as districts, not individuals, are the recipients of federal funds under Section 504. However, the Section 504 and ADA claims were dismissed without prejudice as to defendant Wyoming Valley West, and the plaintiff was permitted leave to amend.