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Defense Digest

Better Not Be Late! Workers’ Compensation Occupational Exposure Claims and the Statute of Limitations

Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 2, March 2021

March 1, 2021

by Robert J. Fitzgerald

Key Points:

  • There is a two-year statute of limitations to report workers’ compensation claims in New Jersey.
  • The discovery rule will extend the statute of limitations until a worker knew or should have known of the work-relatedness of their injury.
  • A petitioner’s failure to file a timely claim petition for several traumatic accident claims does not give rise to an occupational exposure claim.

In its recent decision, Bender v. Township of North Bergen, 2020 WL 7663482 (N.J. App. Div. Dec. 24, 2020), New Jersey’s Appellate Division addressed the statute of limitations defense for workers’ compensation claims stemming from traumatic and occupational exposures . In that case, Robert Bender, the petitioner, worked as a police officer with the Township of North Bergen from 1979 until his retirement in 2004. In October 2007, the petitioner filed a claim petition alleging psychiatric and orthopedic injuries from occupational exposure. The claim petition was dismissed based on the petitioner’s failure to file the claim within the two-year statute of limitations.

On appeal, the Appellate Division upheld the dismissal of the psychiatric component of the claim petition based on the statute of limitations. However, the case was remanded on the orthopedic claim for the Workers’ Compensation Judge to make particularized findings. Specifically, the judge had to determine whether the petitioner’s orthopedic claim was filed within the appropriate statute of limitations. On remand, the remaining orthopedic component of the claim petition was dismissed for “for failure to sustain the burden of proof.”

The petitioner then filed an appeal of the dismissal of the orthopedic claim. He contended he did not realize until 2007 (more than two years after his 2004 retirement) that his orthopedic injuries were work-related. He claimed this his injuries resulted from “numerous falls, motor vehicle accidents, lifting stretchers” and fights during his tenure as a police officer.

The petitioner returned to work after each traumatic injury, including three for which he had filed claim petitions and received workers’ compensation benefits. He further testified that his condition after each injury was tolerable. He stated: “You never heal completely from those things, but it’s tolerable. You can live with it. You heal the best you can.” With regard to his physical complaints, he indicated that he had pain in his right knee for almost a year before seeking treatment in 2007. With regard to his shoulder, he did not seek treatment until after he filed his 2007 claim petition. For his back and neck complaints, he did not have symptoms until after he retired.

On remand, the Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal of the orthopedic claim petition. In its opinion on the statute of limitations issue, the court noted the Workers’ Compensation Judge’s reference to the New Jersey Supreme Court’s ruling in Brunell v. Wildwood Crest Police Dep’t.:

that in the limited class of cases in which an unexpected traumatic event occurs and the injury it generates is latent or insidiously progressive, an accident for workers’ compensation/filing purposes has not taken place until the signs and symptoms are such that they would alert a reasonable person that he had sustained a compensable injury.

822 A.2d 576, 594 (N.J. 2003).

In Brunell, the court held that the requirements of the workers’ compensation statute, that an injured worker “must give notice to the employer within ninety days . . . ‘of an injury,’ N.J.S.A. 34:15-17, and must file a claim petition within two years of the date the ‘accident’ occurred, N.J.S.A. 34:15-51,” 822 A.2d at 591, “do not begin to run until the worker is, or reasonably should be, aware that he has sustained a compensable injury.” Id. at 592. Based on Brunell and its “discovery rule,” the Appellate Division determined that the Workers’ Compensation Judge had correctly reasoned that, had the orthopedic condition been related to an occupational exposure, then clearly one would expect some manifestation arising during the work exposure or within two years of the work exposure. Finding “a lack of nexus,” the judge correctly dismissed the orthopedic claims because there was “no meaningful showing of any insidious progression of an orthopedic disability.”

In completing its decision, the Appellate Division noted that the discovery rule was intended narrowly, so as to give some leeway to avoid a legitimately injured worker from losing an occupational exposure claim. However, it remains a fact that the traumatic accident calculation begins when the worker knows or should know he has incurred any compensable injury. The worker “must act” when he or she knows “any compensable injury” is sustained. Moreover, applying a discovery-type rule to that narrow class of accident cases will not result in the obliteration of the distinction between accidental injury and occupational disease for notice and filing purposes.

While there may be nothing particularly new about the this decision or the principles discussed, the case does highlight a common scenario when dealing with alleged occupational exposure claims. Often, occupational exposure claims are filed when a petitioner misses the statue of limitations on a traumatic accident claim. The court here confirms that a failure to timely file a claim for a few specific accident claims does not generate a theory for an occupational exposure scenario. The court will also be less apt to allow the discovery rule argument where you have a petitioner who had already timely filed traumatic claims previously. Oftentimes, an occupational claim petition is the first notice of a work injury. Employers and carriers should always investigate prior claims through an index check and docket request to see if a new occupational exposure claim is really an untimely traumatic claim in disguise.

*Bob is a shareholder in our Mount Laurel, New Jersey office. He can be reached at 856.414.6009 or rjfitzgerald@mdwcg.com.

Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 2, March 2021 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Reversed Trial Judge's Orders Granting a Plaintiff's Section 40 Summary Judgement Motion

In Haskins v. Casey, et al., the plaintiff Dane Haskins worked for defendant Ekornes, Inc. (Ekornes) as a material handler. In June 2021, he filed a workers’ compensation claim petition for benefits due to a left shoulder injury in December 2020. He then resolved his workers’ compensation claim in November 2022 under an Order Approving Settlement. In January 2023, he filed a lawsuit against Ekornes and later amended to add additional claims and name other defendants, including the Ekornes president, chief financial officer, and director of human resources. In May 2025, a second amended complaint alleged that after he filed the workers compensation claim, Ekornes placed him on leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), denied his request for a work accommodation, and ultimately terminated him from employment in December 2021. He pleaded several causes of action asserting violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) as well as fraudulent concealment and wrongful discharge. The plaintiff then moved for partial summary judgment, seeking an order enforcing Section 40 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) as well as summary judgment on his FMLA claims. The defendants opposed the motions and cross-moved for summary judgment on the FMLA claims. After arguments, the court entered an order in December 2025, denying the FMLA motion and cross motion and granting the plaintiff’s Section 40 motion. In the order, the court permitted the plaintiff to pursue compensatory damages at trial in connection with the bodily injury claim. The court also allowed the plaintiff to present evidence of any workers’ compensation benefits to support his claim. The court then denied the defendant's subsequent reconsideration motion in February 2026. The defendants that appealed the Section 40 aspect of the orders. In reviewing the appeal de novo, the Appellate Division rejected the plaintiff's argument that the work-related injury arose out of his discrimination claims under the LAD. The plaintiff argued that he should be able to pursue a personal injury claim as a part of his LAD claim, noting that the employer’s compensation carrier would be able to assert a lien against any recovery against his LAD claims. In distinguishing between the Richter vs. Oakland Board of Education, 246 N.J. 507 (2021) case, in which the Court found that any recovery would be subject to a Section 40 lien as the allegation was that the defendants failed to accommodate her pre-existing diabetic condition, which resulted in bodily injury. In this case, the Appellate Division indicated that there was no bodily injury caused by Ekornes’ failure to accommodate a pre-existing disability. Rather, the shoulder injury was a result of a workers compensation claim, for which he received appropriate benefits previously. The Appellate Division noted that if the plaintiff was successful in proving his LAD claims, he would be entitled to damages caused by the discriminatory discriminatory conduct such as lost wages and emotional distress damages and that there will be no Section 40 lien. In addition, the Appellate Division disagreed that the petitioner could present evidence about and seek damages for his shoulder injury at trial. Although the petitioner argued that a defendant who retaliated against an employee for filing a workers’ compensation claim should not benefit from the exclusivity provision of the WCA, the Appellate Division noted that the Legislature did not include this type of scenario in the statue nor did any of the case law recognize this type of claim as a remedy. As such, the Appellate Division reversed the December 2025 order granting the the plaintiff’s Section 40 summary judgment motion as well as the February 2026 reconsideration motion order. The Appellate Division noted that they did not intend to limit the plaintiff in his pursuit of his other claims on under the LAD, FMLA, and workers’ compensation retaliation causes of action.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

In this case, the claimant sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employment as a registered nurse. The employer acknowledged the injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).  Subsequently, a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) expanded the description of injury. The employer then filed a Termination Petition, alleging the claimant was fully recovered from the injuries. Providers filed Utilization Review (UR) Petitions, challenging UR determinations finding their chiropractic treatment to be not reasonable and necessary. A settlement of the claim was eventually reached, and the employer filed a Petition to Seek Approval of a Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreement. The C&R outlined that the agreement fully resolved all future workers’ compensation claims except for the termination and UR Petitions. Briefs were filed and one day later, the WCJ issued an Interlocutory Order which stated if instructions were not followed regarding filing of a C&R, a settlement hearing date would not be given. The employer complied with the order, and filed the C&R. Subsequently, the WCJ notified the parties that the C&R must resolve all issues in the petitions, or would not be entertained. A settlement hearing was never held, and the WCJ then issued a decision, granting the Termination Petition and dismissing the UR Petitions. The WCJ also said that the Petition for Approval of a C&R was dismissed without prejudice, as the issues in the Termination and UR Petitions went to a decision. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board granted the claimant’s appeal, finding that the WCJ violated the requirement of Section 449 that an expedited hearing be held when a Petition for Approval of a C&R is filed.  The Board further held that it was legally incorrect for the WCJ to insist that the C&R resolve all issues raised by the pending Petitions. The Board remanded the case to a new WCJ, and Employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court affirmed the Board and held that the WCJ erred, as a matter of law, by refusing to hold an expedited hearing within 30 days, once the Petition for Approval of a C&R was filed.  The court noted that the language of Section 449(b) is mandatory, and a settlement hearing is not discretionary or dependent on a party’s separate request for a stay, or whether the record has been closed. The court further rejected Employer’s argument that the case should not be remanded to a new WCJ for a new decision on the termination and and UR Petitions, as the Board passed no judgment on whether the C&R Agreement resolved the termination and UR Petitions, and left it for the WCJ to decide in connection with the Petition for Approval of a C&R.