Appellate Court Affirms State Liability in Intersection Crash, Finds Other Driver’s Negligence Not a Superseding Cause

In a case involving an automobile collision, the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division affirmed a decision in favor of the claimants, holding that the other driver’s negligence was not a superseding cause, thus precluding the State of New York’s liability, and it declined to reapportion fault among the State of New York and the other driver. 

The claimant brought this negligence action against the defendant, the State of New York, after the plaintiff’s motorcycle was struck by another driver at an intersection. The claimant alleged that the defendant knew or should have known about certain visual obstructions at the intersection and failed to adequately respond to the dangerous condition thus created. The court of claims found the defendant 75% liable. 

In support of its appeal, the defendant asserted that other driver’s negligence was the sole cause or that its liability was limited by the same. Upon reviewing relevant substantive state case law, the appellate court noted that proximate cause is at issue when the defendant’s negligence is a substantial cause of the events which produced the injury. 

Here, the court held that the claimant established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant’s uncontested negligence in failing to study and adequately remedy the known dangerous condition of the intersection may be deemed a proximate cause of the subject accident. It further held that when a proximate cause analysis involves an intervening act by a third party that liability turns upon whether the intervening act is a normal or foreseeable consequence of the situation created by the defendant’s negligence. Therefore, the appellate court held that other driver’s negligence in failing to yield the right-of-way was a normal and foreseeable consequence of the situation created by defendant’s negligence. The appellate court concluded by declining to reapportion fault to 50/50 because of the nature of the respective risk-creating conduct, as well as the comparative strength of the causal connection. 

_{Case Law Alerts, 3rd Quarter, July 2025 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.}