.

Brittany E. Bakshi

Portrait of Brittany E. Bakshi

Brittany has developed valuable litigation experience in several defense practice areas including personal injury, automobile liability, premises liability, property damage and products liability as a member of the Casualty Department. Through her practice, Brittany has represented a variety of clients, including contractors, non-profit organizations, corporations, small businesses and individuals.

Within her diverse practice, Brittany has taken cases to trial, arbitration, and magistrate court and obtained favorable results at all levels. Moreover, she has resolved numerous cases through effective settlement negotiations and mediation. Brittany has represented clients in both state and federal courts.

Brittany earned her juris doctor in 2011 from The University of Pittsburgh School of Law. Brittany attended Franklin & Marshall College where she received her Bachelor of Arts degree in Psychology in 2008.

    • University of Pittsburgh School of Law (J.D., 2011)
    • Franklin & Marshall College (B.A., 2008)
    • Pennsylvania, 2011
    • U.S. District Court Western District of Pennsylvania, 2011
    • U.S. District Court Middle District of Pennsylvania, 2015
    • Obtained a defense verdict following a trial in a matter where the plaintiff sustained personal injuries following a slip and fall on snow and ice.
    • Successfully obtained dismissal of clients from premises liability and personal injury lawsuits after the Court's favorable rulings on Motions for Summary Judgment.
    • Obtained a client's dismissal in a matter following the Court's entry of a favorable ruling on Preliminary Objections to the Plaintiff's Complaint.
    • Defense verdicts at the arbitration and magistrate levels in personal injury, property damage and premises liability matters.
    • The Best Lawyers in America©, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants (2026-2027)
    • The Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch©, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants (2024-2025)
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyers Rising Star (2019-2026)
    • Dauphin County Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Pennsylvania State Bar    

Results

Summary Judgment Obtained in a Pennsylvania Trip-and-Fall Case

We obtained summary judgment for residential renters in a trip-and-fall case. The plaintiff tripped and fell on a set of porch steps at our clients’ home while attending a barbeque, breaking her ankle. She brought claims against the homeowner. The homeowner then joined our clients, asserting claims of negligence and contractual indemnity under the lease agreement. During her deposition, the plaintiff testified that she was familiar with the poor condition of the steps, had spoken with the renters about the steps prior to her fall, and witnessed two people, an adult and a child, trip on the steps during the same barbeque event. The homeowner also testified at his deposition that it was his responsibility to repair and maintain the subject stairs. We argued that our clients were not required to indemnify the homeowners under the Perri-Ruzzi rule, and that they owed no duty to the plaintiff, a licensee, as she knew of the condition of the steps and the risks involved in using them. The court agreed and dismissed all claims against the clients.

Summary Judgment Secured in Slip and Fall Case

We obtained summary judgment on behalf of a university in a slip and fall case. The plaintiff, a university student, slipped and fell during an active winter storm as she was walking from one campus building to another. Discovery showed that the plaintiff received an emergency alert from the university warning of potentially icy conditions prior to exiting the building and that freezing rain was still falling as the plaintiff was walking. We argued, and the court agreed, that the university owed no duty to the plaintiff to protect against general slippery conditions or to pretreat sidewalks prior to, during or immediately after the storm.

Thought Leadership

Case Law Alerts

Appellate Division Dismisses Contribution Claim Against Employer for Lack of Notice

November 3, 2026

In Rosenblatt v. Mora, the Appellate Division addressed whether defendants could pursue a third-party contribution claim against the decedent's employer, Lots O Bagels, based on allegations of negligent training and supervision. The underlying action arose from a fatal collision involving a vehicle and an employee operating an electric scooter while performing deliveries. Rosenblatt v. Mora, 2026 NY Slip Op 04220, 251 A.D.3d 599 (App. Div.). The court held that the third-party complaint failed to state a viable contribution claim and dismissed it. The court explained that a negligent supervision or training claim requires allegations that the employer knew or should have known of the employee's propensity for the conduct that caused the injury and failed to take appropriate action. Because the complaint contained no factual allegations showing the employer had notice of any dangerous or negligent conduct by the employee, or explaining how the employee's scooter operation was negligent, the allegations were conclusory and insufficient. Accordingly, the court reversed the lower court's ruling and dismissed the contribution claim against the employer.

Case Law Alerts

Emergency Doctrine Bars Claims in Pedestrian-Vehicle Accident

November 3, 2026

In a personal injury action, the Appellate Division considered whether defendants were entitled to summary judgment in a pedestrian-vehicle collision involving an infant pedestrian who ran onto a highway where pedestrian access was prohibited. Defendants argued that the pedestrian's conduct was the sole proximate cause of the accident and that the driver acted reasonably when confronted with a sudden emergency. Danielle W. v. Li, 2026 NY Slip Op 04821, 251 A.D.3d 477 (App. Div.) The court agreed and granted summary judgment to the defendants. It held that the infant pedestrian's unlawful entry onto the highway was the sole proximate cause of the collision and that the driver was protected by the emergency doctrine. The evidence showed that when the pedestrian suddenly ran into the roadway, the driver immediately reacted by removing his foot from the accelerator and attempting to change lanes. The court found these actions reasonable under the circumstances and concluded that neither the driver's common-law duty of care nor his statutory duty to exercise due care toward pedestrians was breached. The court therefore dismissed the claims against all defendants.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.