Supreme Court reverses Appellate Division’s decision (injury was not compensable as it occurred at an employer-sponsored social/recreational event), finding petitioner entitled to compensation as her role at the event was neither social nor recreational.
In this unanimous opinion, the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed an Appellate Division’s decision—that the petitioner’s injury was not compensable because it occurred at a social/recreational event sponsored by her employer—finding that the petitioner’s role at the event was neither social nor recreational as required under the New Jersey workers’ compensation statute. The Supreme Court held that because the petitioner’s role at the event was the same as her normal job duties and she would not have been asked to volunteer for the event but for her employment, the petitioner satisfied the two-part statutory exception under N.J.S.A. 34:15-7. The court further noted that the employer received a benefit from the event in the form of community outreach and goodwill.
The petitioner was employed as a cook with the respondent, a non-profit organization that provides vocational training and clinical services to individuals with developmental issues. The petitioner prepared and cooked meals for the respondent’s members during lunchtime and for afterschool programs from Monday to Friday. On Saturday, September 23, 2017, the respondent hosted a “Family Fun Day” event in the rear parking lot of its premises. The event was planned to provide recreational and social services to the respondent’s members and their families, and included food, music, games, prizes and other recreational activities. The respondent sought volunteers from its pool of employees to service the event. Volunteers were not compensated for their time. Some employees agreed to volunteer their time, and others declined. The petitioner chose to volunteer as a cook for the event, and while returning from a bathroom break, she stepped into a pothole, injuring her right foot and ankle.
The petitioner filed a claim with the Division of Workers’ Compensation, along with a simultaneous motion for medical and temporary total disability benefits. The respondent denied the claim based on its assertion that the petitioner was not in the course and scope of her employment at the time of the accident. The Judge of Compensation determined that the petitioner’s injury did not arise out of and in the course of her employment. In her analysis, the judge noted the two-prong test established for determining compensability for an injury sustained during recreational or social activity. Under N.J.S.A. 34:15-7, an employer must compensate an employee for accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of employment. However, the statute excludes any injuries that arise from “recreational or social activities,” unless those “recreational or social activities are a regular incident of employment and produce a benefit to the employer beyond improvement in employee health and morale.” The judge found that the Family Fun Day in which the petitioner participated was a recreational activity, not a regular incident of her employment, and that the respondent derived no benefit from it beyond the health and morale of its members. Accordingly, the judge dismissed the petitioner’s claim. The petitioner appealed.
In affirming the Judge of Compensation’s dismissal of the petitioner’s claim, the Appellate Division relied on Lozano v. Frank DeLuca Constr., 178 N.J. 513 (2004). In Lozano, the Supreme Court held that if an employer requires or compels participation in a recreational or social activity, that activity should be viewed as would any other compensable work-related assignment. However, if an employer merely sponsors or encourages a recreational or social activity, such activities are excluded from compensability under the Act. Based on the Lozano holding, the Appellate Division reasoned:
[Petitioner] contends . . . that she was not engaged in a recreational or social activity at the time of her injury because the activity she was participating in was cooking—her job. We disagree. [Petitioner] volunteered her time to participate at an event designed by her employer to celebrate its members. The Family Fun Day included food, games, music and other recreational activities. Respondent’s employees were not compelled to attend or help. Many declined to volunteer without ramification. We are satisfied that the Family Fun Day, held on a Saturday for which employees chose whether to offer their time, was a recreational or social activity.
Accordingly, the Appellate Division found that the petitioner’s accident did not arise out of and in the course of her employment, and as such, her injuries were not compensable. The petitioner again appealed.
In reversing the Appellate Division’s ruling and remanding the matter to the Division of Workers’ Compensation for further findings, the New Jersey Supreme Court considered whether the specific non-compulsory activity in which the petitioner participated was a recreational or social activity within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 34:15-7.
The Supreme Court expressed disagreement with the Appellate Division’s view that that the petitioner’s volunteering at Family Fun Day was a social or recreational activity because she was not compelled to volunteer and because the event celebrated clients, had food, music and games, and was held outside of working hours. The Supreme Court found that the Appellate Division’s opinion failed to consider the employee’s role in the activity. As the Supreme Court reasoned:
It is undisputed that Goulding, unlike the employee in Lozano, was not compelled to volunteer for Family Fun Day. However, compulsion is not the only instance in which an activity can be removed from the social or recreational activity label. Goulding was not playing softball on her lunch break; she was volunteering to cook (her regular job) for an event her employer was hosting, and which it planned to hold annually. [A]lthough Family Fun Day as a whole may have been a social or recreational event, Goulding did not participate in a social or recreational role because she was there to facilitate it. The statute applies to ‘recreational or social activities’ – not ‘recreational or social events.’
The Supreme Court further found that the petitioner would have been entitled to compensation under N.J.S.A. 34:15-7 even if her volunteer work at Family Fun Day could be deemed a recreational or social activity. As the Supreme Court opined:
N.J.S.A. 34:15-7 contains an exception to the general rule of no recovery for injuries sustained during a recreational or social activity that is (1) a ‘regular incident of employment,’ and that (2) ‘produces a benefit to the employer beyond improvement in employee health and morale.’ Family Fun Day was designed to be a recurring annual event. It is difficult to imagine that the Legislature intended to preclude compensation for injuries sustained by an employee who was volunteering at the employer’s behest to assist in facilitating an employer-sponsored event designed to celebrate the employer’s clients. [As to the second prong,] Friendship House received the ‘intangible benefits’ from Family Fun Day of promoting itself and fostering good will in the community.
The Supreme Court’s ruling illustrates that the determination as to whether an activity is social or recreational should turn not on the event itself but, rather, on the employee’s role in the activity. The appropriate inquiry is whether the employee is participating as a guest or providing services for her employer at the event. If the employee is helping to facilitate the event in the manner that occurred in this case, the event cannot be deemed a social or recreational activity as to that employee, and any injuries sustained by the employee while acting in that capacity will be found to be compensable.
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