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Legal Updates for Insurance Agents & Brokers

To Read or Not to Read (Insurance Policies)? That Is the Question

Legal Update for Insurance Agents & Brokers – August 2024

The rule throughout the Commonwealth has long been that an insured’s failure to read the language of an insurance policy does not prohibit them from relying on the representations of an insurance agent in securing insurance. Pennsylvania’s Supreme Court first made this finding in Rempel v. Nationwide Insurance Company, Inc., 471 Pa. 404 (1977), where the beneficiary under a mortgage protection life insurance policy alleged the agent of an insurer misrepresented the extent of coverage under the policy. There, the beneficiary/insured admittedly did not read the language of the policy, however, given the complicated nature of the insurance business as well as the trust that one generally has in their insurance agent, the court found it was not unreasonable for a consumer to rely on the representations of her agent. Thus, to an extent, the old adage, “never sign anything before you read it,” does not apply across the board in insurance context. 

Subsequently, in Pressley v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Corp., 817 A.2d 1131 (Pa. Super. 2003), the Superior Court further lessened the duty of the consumer by finding an insured was not required to read the policy where they had requested a specific type of coverage and were told by the agent that it would be provided. In such a situation, the duty is on the agent to inform the insured that the policy differs from what was requested if, in fact, that is the case. Where the agent fails to discharge that duty, an insured is under no duty to read the policy to uncover the misrepresentation. Thus, insureds are allowed to presume the coverage they have requested is in place, unless they are told otherwise. Conversely, in matters where an insured received precisely the coverage they requested, courts have consistently enforced the plain language of the exclusions and limitations, despite an agent’s failure to inform the insured of the same. 

The courts’ decisions in this context are all based on the “reasonable expectations of the insured.” In Pennsylvania, the traditional rules with respect to contracts do not always apply in the realm of insurance. Instead of the policy language being the guiding light, even where the terms of the policy are clear and unambiguous, the reasonable expectations of the insured are controlling. This “reasonable expectation” analysis is to be employed in matters where an insured alleges deceptive practices, whether it be the misrepresentation of the terms of the policy or the issuance of a policy different than that which was requested by the insured. 
    
More recently, however, the protections afforded by the “reasonable expectations” standard and the insured’s lack of a duty to investigate were somewhat eroded. In Palek v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Company, 535 F. Supp. 3d 382 (W.D. Pa., April 4, 2021), the homeowners alleged the insurer’s agent misled them regarding the kinds of damages to their in-ground swimming pool that were covered under their homeowners’ insurance policy. In fact, the homeowners alleged the insurer’s agent specifically informed them the policy would “cover their in-ground pool in the event the [pool] was damaged from foreseeable types of harm.” After purchasing the policy, the homeowners’ pool suffered damage as a result of hydrostatic pressure, or a “pool pop.” 

In analyzing the homeowners’ claim for justifiable reliance, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania observed the decisions throughout the Commonwealth, noting consumers do not possess a duty to investigate and read the underlying policy where there are allegations of fraud against an insurer or its agent. The Palek court, however, pointed out that, where there are no allegations of fraud, the duty of an insured to read the language of the policy depends on whether it would be unreasonable not to read the policy under the circumstances. As applicable in Palek, the insurer’s agent represented the policy would cover the “foreseeable” damages to the homeowners’ in-ground pool. It was the presence of this vague representation, or qualifier, that triggered the homeowners’ duty to read the language of the policy. The court noted that:

It is objectively unreasonable for a consumer in [the homeowners’] position to rely, without further inquiry, on an unadorned representation that an insurance policy will provide coverage for ‘foreseeable’ types of harm from the simple reason that such a representation says nothing about what is or is not ‘foreseeable.’  

While consumers are provided latitude with respect to their duty to read the language of an insurance policy, that does not permit cart blanche to claim they justifiably relied on the representations of the insurance company or its agents. As Palek establishes, there is a “reasonable under the circumstances” analysis that must be undertaken by the courts on this issue. While insureds may not have a definitive duty to read the policy language, such a duty can arise depending upon the extent and specifics of any alleged representation by the insurer, or its agent, upon which the insured relied. 


 

Legal Update for Insurance Agents & Brokers, August 2024, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note tgventura@mdwcg.com. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2024 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

WCJ Improperly Refused to Conduct C&R Hearing and Erroneously Required Settlement of All Pending Petitions

In this case, the claimant sustained injuries in the course and scope of her employment as a registered nurse. The employer acknowledged the injury by a Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP).  Subsequently, a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) expanded the description of injury. The employer then filed a Termination Petition, alleging the claimant was fully recovered from the injuries. Providers filed Utilization Review (UR) Petitions, challenging UR determinations finding their chiropractic treatment to be not reasonable and necessary. A settlement of the claim was eventually reached, and the employer filed a Petition to Seek Approval of a Compromise and Release (C&R) Agreement. The C&R outlined that the agreement fully resolved all future workers’ compensation claims except for the termination and UR Petitions. Briefs were filed and one day later, the WCJ issued an Interlocutory Order which stated if instructions were not followed regarding filing of a C&R, a settlement hearing date would not be given. The employer complied with the order, and filed the C&R. Subsequently, the WCJ notified the parties that the C&R must resolve all issues in the petitions, or would not be entertained. A settlement hearing was never held, and the WCJ then issued a decision, granting the Termination Petition and dismissing the UR Petitions. The WCJ also said that the Petition for Approval of a C&R was dismissed without prejudice, as the issues in the Termination and UR Petitions went to a decision. The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board). The Board granted the claimant’s appeal, finding that the WCJ violated the requirement of Section 449 that an expedited hearing be held when a Petition for Approval of a C&R is filed.  The Board further held that it was legally incorrect for the WCJ to insist that the C&R resolve all issues raised by the pending Petitions. The Board remanded the case to a new WCJ, and Employer appealed to the Commonwealth Court. The court affirmed the Board and held that the WCJ erred, as a matter of law, by refusing to hold an expedited hearing within 30 days, once the Petition for Approval of a C&R was filed.  The court noted that the language of Section 449(b) is mandatory, and a settlement hearing is not discretionary or dependent on a party’s separate request for a stay, or whether the record has been closed. The court further rejected Employer’s argument that the case should not be remanded to a new WCJ for a new decision on the termination and and UR Petitions, as the Board passed no judgment on whether the C&R Agreement resolved the termination and UR Petitions, and left it for the WCJ to decide in connection with the Petition for Approval of a C&R.

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Reversed Trial Judge's Orders Granting a Plaintiff's Section 40 Summary Judgement Motion

In Haskins v. Casey, et al., the plaintiff Dane Haskins worked for defendant Ekornes, Inc. (Ekornes) as a material handler. In June 2021, he filed a workers’ compensation claim petition for benefits due to a left shoulder injury in December 2020. He then resolved his workers’ compensation claim in November 2022 under an Order Approving Settlement. In January 2023, he filed a lawsuit against Ekornes and later amended to add additional claims and name other defendants, including the Ekornes president, chief financial officer, and director of human resources. In May 2025, a second amended complaint alleged that after he filed the workers compensation claim, Ekornes placed him on leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), denied his request for a work accommodation, and ultimately terminated him from employment in December 2021. He pleaded several causes of action asserting violations of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD) as well as fraudulent concealment and wrongful discharge. The plaintiff then moved for partial summary judgment, seeking an order enforcing Section 40 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA) as well as summary judgment on his FMLA claims. The defendants opposed the motions and cross-moved for summary judgment on the FMLA claims. After arguments, the court entered an order in December 2025, denying the FMLA motion and cross motion and granting the plaintiff’s Section 40 motion. In the order, the court permitted the plaintiff to pursue compensatory damages at trial in connection with the bodily injury claim. The court also allowed the plaintiff to present evidence of any workers’ compensation benefits to support his claim. The court then denied the defendant's subsequent reconsideration motion in February 2026. The defendants that appealed the Section 40 aspect of the orders. In reviewing the appeal de novo, the Appellate Division rejected the plaintiff's argument that the work-related injury arose out of his discrimination claims under the LAD. The plaintiff argued that he should be able to pursue a personal injury claim as a part of his LAD claim, noting that the employer’s compensation carrier would be able to assert a lien against any recovery against his LAD claims. In distinguishing between the Richter vs. Oakland Board of Education, 246 N.J. 507 (2021) case, in which the Court found that any recovery would be subject to a Section 40 lien as the allegation was that the defendants failed to accommodate her pre-existing diabetic condition, which resulted in bodily injury. In this case, the Appellate Division indicated that there was no bodily injury caused by Ekornes’ failure to accommodate a pre-existing disability. Rather, the shoulder injury was a result of a workers compensation claim, for which he received appropriate benefits previously. The Appellate Division noted that if the plaintiff was successful in proving his LAD claims, he would be entitled to damages caused by the discriminatory discriminatory conduct such as lost wages and emotional distress damages and that there will be no Section 40 lien. In addition, the Appellate Division disagreed that the petitioner could present evidence about and seek damages for his shoulder injury at trial. Although the petitioner argued that a defendant who retaliated against an employee for filing a workers’ compensation claim should not benefit from the exclusivity provision of the WCA, the Appellate Division noted that the Legislature did not include this type of scenario in the statue nor did any of the case law recognize this type of claim as a remedy. As such, the Appellate Division reversed the December 2025 order granting the the plaintiff’s Section 40 summary judgment motion as well as the February 2026 reconsideration motion order. The Appellate Division noted that they did not intend to limit the plaintiff in his pursuit of his other claims on under the LAD, FMLA, and workers’ compensation retaliation causes of action.

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.