The Appellate Division affirms the dismissal of a third-party complaint filed by a general contractor seeking indemnification from its subcontractor for a tort action filed by the subcontractor’s injured employee.
In this decision involving the exclusive remedy provision of the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act, the Appellate Division found the third-party action filed by a general contractor against its subcontractor for indemnification from tort liability was barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Act because the plaintiff was an employee of the subcontractor and had not asserted his employer committed any intentional wrongs against him. The Appellate Division found the Act did not authorize a third-party complaint against an employer in these circumstances.
The plaintiff was employed as a laborer with the third-party defendant, Guiliano Environmental. A school district awarded Laumar Roofing Company a contract to perform a roof tear down and replacement at an elementary school. Laumar subcontracted with Guiliano to perform a portion of the work. While working at the job site, the plaintiff fell from the school’s roof and sustained significant bodily injury. At the time of the accident, the plaintiff was not using the safety harness provided by his employer. The plaintiff testified that his supervisor, a Guiliano employee, instructed him not to use the harness except when federal inspectors were present at the worksite. He further testified that his fall resulted from his climbing onto the roof from the edge of a dumpster and that he was instructed by his supervisor to access the roof in this fashion in order to save time, rather than taking a safer route via a ladder on the opposite side of the building. After the plaintiff’s fall, OSHA cited Guiliano for “lack of fall protection and inadequate fall hazard training.” It was noted that OSHA had cited Guiliano in the past for fall-related safety infractions.
The plaintiff filed a claim against Guiliano with the Division of Workers’ Compensation for work-related injuries and received benefits pursuant to the Act, N.J.S.A. 34:15-1 et seq. He also filed a complaint in the Law Division against Laumar, alleging that as the general contractor, Laumar was negligent in failing to provide a reasonably safe place to work. The plaintiff did not name Guiliano as a defendant in his complaint, nor did he allege that his injuries were the result of an intentional wrong by Guiliano or its employees. Laumar subsequently filed a third-party complaint against Guiliano, alleging that any injuries which the plaintiff may have suffered were the result of the intentional wrongs of Guiliano or its employees. Laumar sought indemnity from Guiliano for damages it might owe the plaintiff under the Joint Tortfeasors Contribution Law, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-1 to 5, the Comparative Negligence Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:15-5.1 to 5.8, and common law indemnity.
Guiliano moved for summary judgment, arguing that Laumar’s third-party complaint was barred by the Act because the plaintiff received workers’ compensation benefits for his injuries and did not allege that either Guiliano or its employees committed intentional wrongs against him. Laumar opposed Guiliano’s motion, arguing that Guiliano and its employees harmed the plaintiff with intentional wrongs within the meaning of N.J.S.A. 34:15-8, constituting an exception to the Act’s bar against an employee bringing a tort action against his employer.
The trial court granted Guiliano’s motion and dismissed Laumar’s third-party complaint. The court concluded that the claims of a third-party tortfeasor against an employer do not fall within the exception created by N.J.S.A. 34:15-8 when an employee has not alleged an intentional wrong by the employer. Laumar appealed.
In affirming the trial court’s dismissal of Laumar’s third-party claim, the Appellate Division found that N.J.S.A. 34:15-8 precludes a third-party tortfeasor from seeking statutory or common law indemnification from an employer with respect to a judgment obtained by an employee who received workers’ compensation benefits. The Appellate Division explained:
In Ramos v. Browning Ferris Industries, Inc., 103 N.J. 177 (1986), the Supreme Court held that N.J.S.A. 34:15-8 precludes a third-party tortfeasor from seeking statutory or common law indemnification from an employer with respect to a judgment obtained by an employee who received workers’ compensation benefits. [The Act] removes the employer from the operation of the Joint Tortfeasors Contribution Law. Because the employer cannot be a joint tortfeasor, it is not subject to the provisions of the Joint Tortfeasors Contribution law, and a third-party tortfeasor may not obtain contribution from an employer, no matter what the comparative negligence of the third party and the employer.
The Appellate Division rejected Laumar’s argument that the exception to the Act’s recovery bar not only allows an employee to file suit against his employer for intentional wrongs, but also permits a third-party tortfeasor who is sued by an employee to file a common law claim for contribution against the employer for intentional wrongs that harmed the employee. As the Appellate Division concluded:
[T]he overall context of the Act makes apparent that the legislative intent reflected in the exemption is to provide an election of remedies only for the injured employee. [Here,] Gonzalez has accepted workers’ compensation benefits as his sole remedy against Guiliano. He and his representatives as defined by the statute are bound by that election. In the absence of a claim by him that Guiliano or its employee committed an intentional wrong, the exception to recovery bar established in N.J.S.A. 34:15-8 is not triggered.
This decision demonstrates the strong judicial proclivity to protect the immunity provided employers under the exclusive remedy provision of the Act. As the Appellate Division discussed in its opinion, the Act accomplishes a trade-off whereby employees relinquish their right to pursue common-law remedies in exchange for entitlement to certain, but reduced, benefits whenever they suffer injuries by accidents arising out of and in the course of their employment. In turn, employers are immune from liability to injured workers under laws other than the Act. Such protections eliminate the unpredictable nature of tort actions and allow employers to effectively manage their risk-related costs.
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