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Melissa Devich Cochran

Portrait of Melissa Devich Cochran

Melissa Cochran focuses her practice on product liability, particularly asbestos litigation, where she represents and defends numerous and varied equipment manufacturers, outside contractors and supplier companies.  Melissa's day-to-day asbestos practice includes overseeing and directly participating in all phases of litigation, from investigation to trial, throughout Western Pennsylvania.  She also frequently participates in discovery in Eastern Pennsylvania, Delaware and Madison County, Illinois. In addition, Melissa serves as assistant national counsel for two manufacturing defendants, where her duties include coordination of discovery responses and communication with local trial counsel.  Melissa's concentration on her asbestos practice enables her to provide clients with attentive, insightful and cost-effective strategies to combat the ever-evolving challenges of this fast-paced litigation.

As an experienced property and casualty attorney, Melissa represents clients in magistrate and arbitration level trials involving automobile accidents, premises liability claims and product liability suits.  She is also actively involved in the investigation, discovery and pre-trial phases of complex multi-vehicle accidents, dram-shop and bad faith cases.

In 2000 Melissa graduated from Saint Vincent College in Latrobe, Pennsylvania where she earned her B.A. in English and political science. While attending Saint Vincent, she founded the Saint Vincent College Mock Trial Team and served as its captain. In 2003, Melissa earned her juris doctor from Duquesne University School of Law in Pittsburgh, where she was a member of the Trial Moot Court Honor Society. Melissa competed on the law school's Trial Moot Court team in 2002, when her team placed in the finals at the regional tournament, and in 2003, when her team placed in the semi-finals at the regional tournament.

    • Thomas R. Kline School of Law of Duquesne University (J.D., 2003)
    • Saint Vincent College (B.A., 2000)
    • Pennsylvania, 2003
    • U.S. District Court Western District of Pennsylvania, 2004
    • Best Lawyers in America®, Commercial Litigation; Mass Tort Litigation/Class Actions - Defendants; Product Liability Litigation - Defendants (2020-2027)
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyer Rising Star (2012-2013)
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Causation Decisions Around the Country, Defense Research Institute (DRI) - Asbestos Medicine Conference - November 2017
    • Defending Damages, Panel Moderator, Defense Research Institute (DRI) Asbestos Medicine conference, November 5, 2015
    • The Fair Share Act, Transparency, and the Effect of Bankruptcy Claims on Pending Civil Litigation, National Business Institute CLE Seminar on Asbestos Litigation, August 12, 2014
    • "PA Superior Court Permits Incomplete Deposition Testimony and Affidavit of 'Unavailable Witness' to Oppose Summary Judgment in Asbestos Claim," - Steptoe & Johnson, PLLC - Client Alert October 31, 2019 - cross published on LinkedIn
    • "Pennsylvania Superior Court Questions Voir dire Procedure in Recent Opinion" - Steptoe & Johnson, PLLC - Client Alert  May 22, 2018 - cross published on LinkedIn
    • "PA Superior Court Answers Question of Whether Fair Share Act Applies to Strict Liability Asbestos Claims" - Steptoe & Johnson, PLLC - Client Alert - January 9, 2018 - crossed published on LinkedIn
    • “Eastern District Court of Pennsylvania Predicts Applicability of the “Bare Metal” Defense in Pennsylvania Asbestos Litigation,” Defense Digest, Vol. 22, No. 3, September 2016
    • "Ford Motor Company Obtains Defense Verdict in Allegheny County Mesothelioma Case," Legal Updates for Toxic Torts Litigation, December 2, 2016

Thought Leadership

Defense Digest

Forum Non Conveniens: It Really Has Little To Do With Convenience

June 30, 2026

Key Points: In evaluating a challenge for forum non conveniens, deference must be given to plaintiff’s choice of forum. “Congested centers of litigation” alone are not a reason to transfer a case to another forum. When a defendant is incorporated in the chosen forum, that forum has a legitimate interest in adjudicating disputes involving its corporate entities. Codified at 42 Pa.C.S. § 5322(e), the Pennsylvania doctrine of forum non conveniens allows a court to stay or dismiss a matter in whole or in part where it “finds that in the interest of substantial justice the matter should be heard in another forum.” In evaluating a challenge for forum non conveniens, deference must be given to plaintiff’s choice forum, “but somewhat to a lesser degree when plaintiff’s residence and place of injury are located somewhere else.” See McConnell v. B. Braun Medical, Inc., 221 A.3d 221, 227-228 (Pa. Super. 2019). The Pennsylvania Superior Court’s March 25, 2026, opinion in Duxbury v. Reconstructive Orthopedic Associates II, P.C. d/b/a/ The Rothman Institute of New Jersey, et al., 354 A.3d 551 (Pa. Super. 2026) illustrates just how the application of forum non conveniens does not necessarily lead to the forum that the facts and everyday considerations may suggest is “convenient.” The Duxburys filed their medical negligence case in Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania, against Reconstructive Orthopedic Associates II, P.C. (ROA), Atlantic Surgery Care (ASC), and Dr. Alyson Axelrod, who was employed by ROA and The Rothman Institute of New Jersey (RINJ). Notably, the Duxburys are New Jersey residents and the medical care giving rise to their claim was rendered at locations in New Jersey. ROA is a New Jersey corporation with its principal place of business in Philadelphia. ROA also maintained its principal place of business in Philadelphia, and Dr. Axelrod was licensed to practice medicine in Pennsylvania and New Jersey. The medical defendants filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 5322(e) and forum non conveniens. The trial court permitted discovery as to the forum issue. Finding “weighty reasons” in support of dismissal, the trial court granted the motion and directed the Duxburys to refile their claim in New Jersey. The trial court found the following factors as “weighty reasons” justifying dismissal: (1) the injuries were sustained in New Jersey; (2) treatment was rendered in New Jersey; (3) relevant medical providers were residents of New Jersey; (4) defendants’ witnesses resided in New Jersey, with the exception of one; and (5) the relevant medical records were located in New Jersey. On appeal, the Duxburys argued that the trial court erred in its application of existing precedent regarding forum non conveniens, and that a consideration of the facts under a correct application of the law did not support transfer of the action to New Jersey. The Superior Court agreed, reasoning that the trial court had not conducted the full analysis set forth in McConnell, in finding “weighty reasons” alone enough to justify its decision to dismiss the plaintiff’s action with directions to refile it in New Jersey. McConnell explains that the determination of “weighty reasons” overcomes the deference afforded to a plaintiff’s choice of forum. To make this determination the trial court must examine both the private and public interest factors involved in the case. McConnell, 221 A.3d at 227-228. The “private factors” include: The relative ease of access to sources of proof; availability of compulsory process for attendance for unwilling, and the cost of obtaining attendance of willing, witnesses; possibility of view of the premises, if view would be appropriate to the action; and all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive. The public factors to be considered include: Administrative difficulties follow for courts when litigation is piled up in congested centers instead of being handled at its origin. Jury duty is a burden that ought not to be imposed upon the people of a community which has no relation to the litigation. There is an appropriateness, too, in having the trial … in a forum that is at home with the state law that must govern the case, rather than having a court in some other forum untangle problems in conflict of laws, and in law foreign to itself. The Superior Court reiterated that it is the burden of the moving party (i.e. the appellees/medical defendants) to establish that Pennsylvania is a less convenient forum than another available forum. The appellate court found that the trial court committed an error of law in failing to consider the circumstances linking the case to Pennsylvania as well, and to determine whether Pennsylvania was an inconvenient forum, not simply that New Jersey was more convenient for appellees. Regarding the private factors, the Superior Court noted that Dr. Axelrod’s proximity to Philadelphia, and concerns about her commute into town were not grounds to dismiss for inconvenience. The appellate court also found that the trial court gave no consideration to whether any witness would not or could not travel to Pennsylvania. Additionally, the court reasoned that the sources of proof—the medical records—while located in New Jersey, likely could just as easily be produced in Pennsylvania. Addressing the medical defendants’ principal place of business in Philadelphia as an “address,” the court “recognized that that for foreign defendants with corporate offices in Pennsylvania,” in terms of convenience for those defendants, that forum state seems as good as any other. McConnell, 221 A.3d at 230; see also Wright v. Aventis Pasteur, Inc., 905 A.2d 544, 551 (Pa. Super. 2006). Though the trial court failed to consider any public factors, the Superior Court did first find error in the trial court’s focus on Philadelphia as opposed to the state of Pennsylvania. The court then determined that “congested centers of litigation” alone are not a reason to transfer a case to another forum. Second, the court emphasized that “when a defendant is incorporated in the chosen forum, that forum has a legitimate interest in adjudicating disputes involving its corporate entitles.” Finally, the Superior Court found that the medical defendants provided medical care in Pennsylvania and New Jersey, and Dr. Axelrod was licensed to provide medical care in Pennsylvania and New Jersey. As to the question of what state’s law would apply, the parties agreed that New Jersey law would, and there was no showing that the Philadelphia trial judge would be incapable of applying it. The Superior Court concluded that the medical defendants failed to provide sufficient evidence of public factors to support overriding the Duxbury’s choice of forum. What litigants can learn from the Duxbury opinion is that “convenience” in considering a plaintiff’s choice of forum for litigation is not necessarily a matter of ease, little trouble, or less effort. Melissa works in our Pittsburgh, PA office. She can be reached at (412) 803-3477 or MDCochran@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.