.

John H. Osorio

Chair Emeritus, Architectural, Engineering and Construction Defect Litigation Practice Group

Portrait of John H. Osorio

John serves as Chair Emeritus of the Architectural, Engineering & Construction Defect Litigation Practice Group. In this capacity, he oversees a large group of attorneys throughout many of the firm's offices dedicated in the defense of construction professionals.

For over 30 years, John has handled more than 500 matters in the defense of architectural and engineering firms, general contractors, subcontractors, developers, and owners in litigation matters involving personal injury and property damage. The scope of his representation includes construction and design defect matters, breach of contract, delay damage cases, indemnity and coverage, and construction code and safety violation claims.

In addition to John's vast experience in an all matters of construction litigation, he has handled many hundreds of matters involving personal injury, product liability, and catastrophic loss matters. 

John graduated from the University of Montana in 1979 with a Bachelor of Arts in history and political science. He then went on to receive his juris doctor from Southwestern University School of Law in Los Angeles, California.

    • Southwestern University School of Law (J.D., 1984)
    • University of Montana (B.A., 1979)
    • New Jersey, 1985
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey, 1985
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
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    • The Best Lawyers in America©, Personal Injury Litigation - Defendants (2026-2027)

    The Best Lawyers in America® list is published by Best Lawyers®. A description of the selection methodology can be found here. No aspect of this advertisement has been approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.

    • New Jersey Super Lawyer (2005)
      The Super Lawyers list is issued by Thomson Reuters. A description of the selection methodology can be found here. No aspect of this advertisement has been approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
    • American Bar Association
    • Camden County Bar Association
    • Defense Research Institute
    • Gloucester County Bar Association
    • New Jersey Defense Association
    • New Jersey State Bar Association
    • Construction Defect Litigation in New York and New Jersey, Client Webinar, December 2020
    • Construction Defect Conference Architect & Engineers in Construction Defect Claims, Panelist at Perrin
    • Struggles and Successes of the Past 25 Years, Panelist at West Coast Casualty Conference
    • Risk Transfer in Construction Defect Litigation, client seminars 
    • The Professional (Architect & Engineer) Part in Construction Defect Claims, Panelist, 2nd Annual National Construction Defect Conference, November 2016
    • Minimizing Risk and Avoiding Consequences as a Design Professional in the State of New Jersey
    • Defending Roof Collapse Cases
    • Defending Architect and Engineer Malpractice Claims in New Jersey
    • The Applicability of the Economic Loss Doctrine to Design Professional Claims
    • "Additional Insured Status of Design Professionals," Defense Digest, Vol. 4, No. 3, 1998
    • Proceedings of the 42nd Annual Meeting of Invited Attorneys
    • Successfully argued before the Supreme court of New Jersey in defense of a general contractor defending allegations of construction defect brought by a subsequent condominium association owner.  The Supreme Court held that a construction defect lawsuit must be filed within six years from when the building's original or subsequent owner first knew or, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have known of the basis for a cause of action. A subsequent owner stands in no better position than a prior owner in calculating the limitations period. If a prior owner knew or reasonably should have known of the basis for a construction defect action, the  limitations period began at that point. If the building's owner knew or reasonably should have known of construction defects at the time of the sale of the property, the purchaser takes title subject to the original owner's right – and any limitation on that right – to file a claim against the architect and contractors. Thus, a subsequent owner will stand in the shoes of a prior owner for statute of limitations purposes.
    • Successfully argued before the Supreme Court of New Jersey on behalf of a major amusement park owner resulting in the seminal Supreme Court decision on the allocation of liability on behalf of the client as against a sovereign entity that was dismissed from the case due to the plaintiff’s failure to add the sovereign as a direct defendant prior to the expiration of the notice provisions of the torts claim act. Based on our representation, the jury would be instructed to allocate liability for the sovereign’s negligence thus offsetting any potential negligence against the client
    • Represented and successfully resolved a $10 million plus claim brought by a railroad company alleging damage to a bridge as the result of a dam removal and stream restoration project. The matter involved the assertion of design deficiency claims involving geotechnical and hydrological investigation and the means and methods of construction implemented by the general contractor. 
    • Represented a large general contractor in over ten construction defect cases involving high rise condominium and apartment complexes brought by condominium associations and owners.  
    • Successfully represented a solar energy contractor in a breach of contract suit involving the installation of solar panels on numerous public schools in the State of Hawaii, islands of O’ahu and Kauai. The matter was tried for over three weeks heard by a three person binding arbitration panel. After the conclusion of our case in chief, the plaintiff accepted a settlement upon client’s terms. 
    • Successfully tried engineering malpractice claim where the demand was $1.3 million by proving client's design was altered and not the proximate cause of community wastewater treatment facility's failure.
    • Successfully settled multi-plaintiff burn and personal injury case by orchestrating a settlement fund with equal contributions by multiple defendants, thus, capping catastrophic exposure and resolving liability among defendants.
    • Successfully settled multimillion dollar claim by high-rise condominium owners by way of mediation.
    • Successfully resolved multi-plaintiff burn case by way of mediation and use of extensive experts to reduce potential liability.
    • Successfully resolved wrongful death construction case and convinced mediator that general contractor client was the least culpable of all defendants.
    • Amicably resolved $25 million burn claim through negotiated settlement in multiple defendant litigation wherein we represented design professional who contributed to the design of a hydrogen furnace which exploded. Obtained settlement through small contribution by establishing limited liability for proximate cause of the accident.
    • Obtained summary judgment for a developer and general contractor in a construction defect case. The plaintiff, a homeowners association, sued multiple parties seeking $2.5 million in damages related to water infiltration due to the allegedly negligent installation of roofing, exterior cladding, windows, doors, railings and decks. We also represented several previous developer/association board members who were sued individually. Prior to filing suit, the plaintiff filed a claim with the state of New Jersey under the Home Owners Warranty program.
    • Obtained a defense verdict on behalf of a defendant engineering firm in a two week jury trial alleging negligence in the design of a subsurface disposal field.
    • Obtained dismissal of a negligent design claim against a design professional, after a three day Evidentiary Hearing (Lopez hearing) to establish the accrual date for the applicable Statute of Limitations. 

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.