.

Christopher J. DiCicco

Co-Chair, Aviation and Complex Litigation Practice

Co-Chair, Maritime Litigation Practice

CJDicicco@mdwcg.com

Portrait of Christopher J. DiCicco

Chris is a shareholder in the Casualty Department where he concentrates his practice mostly in the areas of product liability, admiralty and maritime litigation, and aviation litigation. He previously served as Chair of the firm's Executive Committee Advisory Council.

In the area of product liability, Chris primarily defends the manufacturers and distributors of tools, automatic doors, machinery, and other heavy industrial equipment.

As Co-Chair of the Maritime Litigation Practice, Chris handles maritime personal injury defense cases, including recreational boating cases, marine construction cases, cases involving the Jones Act and Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, and maritime product liability matters. He also handles cargo matters, including those involving warehouses and transportation brokers. Other maritime experience includes claims involving allisions, collisions, groundings, shipboard fires, and marine insurance disputes. 

As Co-Chair of the Aviation and Complex Litigation Practice, Chris has experience representing airports in aircraft crash cases, as well as representing a flight training provider and one of its pilots. He also has experience handling matters on behalf of a major airline, including baggage and ticket disputes, and claims involving travel agencies. Through his experiences with these matters, he has gained knowledge about airport operations, flight operations, manufacture of aircraft and engine components, aircraft repair and maintenance, Federal Air Regulations and FAA oversight. Chris is also a member of the Aviation Insurance Association, as well as a member of the Insurance Law Global Aviation Subgroup.     

Chris graduated with honors from Villanova University with a bachelor's degree in Political Science. He obtained his juris doctor from Brooklyn Law School.

Chris has been recognized for the last several years as a New York Metro and New Jersey Super Lawyer Rising Star.

Chris is admitted to practice in New York, New Jersey and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and he actively handles litigation in all of those jurisdictions.

    • Brooklyn Law School (J.D., 2011)
    • Villanova University (B.A., cum laude, 2008)
    • New Jersey, 2011
    • U.S. District Court District of New Jersey, 2011
    • New York, 2012
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of New York, 2012
    • U.S. District Court Southern District of New York, 2012
    • U.S. Court of Appeals 2nd Circuit, 2014
    • Pennsylvania, 2021
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 2021
    • The Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch®, Transportation Law (2023-2024)
      The Best Lawyers list is issued by Woodward & White. A description of the selection methodology can be found here. No aspect of this advertisement has been approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
    • The Best Lawyers: Ones to Watch®, Personal Injury Litigation – Defendants (2024)
      The Best Lawyers list is issued by Woodward & White. A description of the selection methodology can be found here. No aspect of this advertisement has been approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
    • New Jersey Super Lawyer Rising Star (2018-2026)
      The Super Lawyers list is issued by Thomson Reuters. A description of the selection methodology can be found here. No aspect of this advertisement has been approved by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
    • New York Metro Super Lawyer Rising Star (2015-2021)
    • New York Metro Super Lawyer (2024-2025)
    • Aviation Insurance Association
    • Maritime Law Association of the United States
    • Around the World in 45 Minutes, ILG 360º London Annual Conference 2023, March 15, 2023
    • (Not So) Straight Forward and Freight Forward: Claims Handling Under Shipper's Interest Cargo Insurance, AIMU/MICA Seminar “Marine Insurance: A Global Perspective,” New York, June 2018
    • Schoenbaum Longshore & Harbor Workers Compensation Act - Chapter 5, Marshall Dennehey Client Presentation, March 2018
    • Chapter 3 –Schoenbaum's Admiralty and The General Maritime Law (3-14 through 3-24), Client Seminar, December 16, 2015
    • Chapter 3 –Schoenbaum's Admiralty and The General Maritime Law (3-1 through 3-13), Client Seminar, November 17, 2015
    • Impact of Long Shore and New York Labor Law, the Jones Act and McBride Decision on Punitive Damages Under Maritime Law, Client Seminar, April 2015
    • Brief Overview of New York No-Fault Insurance Law, April 2012
    • Case Law Alerts, regular contributor, 2016-present
    • “Brief Overview of Shipowner’s Limitation of Liability Act – History, Procedure and Recent Trends,” Defense Digest, Vol. 20, No. 1, March 2014
    • Successfully obtained summary judgment dismissing all claims against our client in a marine construction NY Labor Law case pending in Supreme Court Rockland County. The case involved bodily injuries sustained to an employee of our client which was a sub-subcontractor at the site of the new Mario Cuomo Bridge. The property owner, general contractor and the subcontractor each cross-claimed and/or third-partied our client into the case seeking contractual and common law indemnity and contribution pursuant to the terms and conditions of the various contracts.  We argued and the Court agreed, since there was no finding of negligence against our client causing the injuries sustained to plaintiff, the indemnification clauses were not implicated. The Court found that there was no evidence demonstrated that our client caused in whole or in part the injuries plaintiff sustained. The plaintiff and general contractor made  motions to reargue which  were both denied. The parties also filed appeals which are currently pending in the Appellate Division.
    • Obtained summary judgment in a maritime personal injury case in favor of The City of New York and the New York City Economic Development Corp. (NYCEDC). ​The suit was for personal injuries sustained to a dock builder. The City was the owner of the East River Ferry Landing’s Project at a pier on East 34th Street in Manhattan. The NYCEDC acted as The City’s project manager. Suit was brought under the New York State Labor Law Sections 200, 240(1), and 241(6), as well as common law negligence. As to the Labor Law 240(1), the court determined that this section did not apply to the facts as the plaintiff’s alleged injury (caused by the repetitive nature of receiving buckets of epoxy, which were lowered down to him from a barge, and then he carried the buckets across a float stage and poured the epoxy into pile jackets) was only tangentially related to gravity and was not caused by the kind of gravity-related risks that Labor Law 240(1) intended to cover. As to the plaintiff’s Labor Law 200 and common law negligence claims, plaintiff’s counsel conceded during oral argument that there was no basis to proceed with such claims against The City and NYCEDC. Lastly, with respect to the plaintiff’s Labor Law 241(6) claims, the plaintiff did not oppose our motion to dismiss that claim. 
    • Obtained the dismissal for our client by motion as a result of plaintiff's failure to comply with the applicable two-year statute of limitations.  Our client was the owner of the facility at which plaintiff was operating a loaded trailer while in the employ of the lessee of the yard, when the trailer tipped over while plaintiff was moving it from the loading bay to the other side of the yard.  Plaintiff sustained very serious bodily injuries.  In addition to the dismissal of plaintiff's Complaint, we also recovered approximately 50% of our attorney's fees incurred on behalf of our client on our third-party claims against the plaintiff’s employer and lessee of the yard, pursuant to the lease agreement between our client and the lessee of the yard.
    • Obtained the dismissal of plaintiff's cargo claims against our client, a non-vessel operating common carrier, during a bench trial in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Union County, Special Civil Part, following the successful cross-examination of the plaintiff.
    • Obtained summary judgment on behalf of the owner and property management company of a senior housing complex in a case in which the elevator car doors on one of the elevators in the building struck plaintiff as she was entering the elevator, resulting in personal injuries.  The plaintiff alleged that our clients were negligent in allowing a hazardous condition to exist on the property.  At the conclusion of discovery, we moved for summary judgment on liability, arguing the lack of any evidence of a defect or malfunction with respect to the elevator doors on the incident date, or alternatively, the lack of any actual or constructive notice of the alleged hazardous condition, if it even existed in the first place.  The court (Monmouth County Superior Court) agreed, focusing on the lack of notice to the owner and property manager, and granted our motion for summary judgment dismissing all claims and cross-claims against our clients, with prejudice. 
    • Obtained the dismissal of the plaintiff’s personal injury action, which arose from a boating accident that occurred during a regatta that took place in the waters off of Little Egg Harbor in Beach Haven, New Jersey.  At the time of the accident, the plaintiff was sixteen years old.  The lawsuit was not commenced until more than three years after the accident.  We filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint on the basis that it was barred by the three (3) year Uniform Statute of Limitations (46 U.S.C. § 30106 (formerly 46 U.S.C. § App’x 763a)) applicable to all maritime tort actions and was not subject to New Jersey’s infant tolling statute.  The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey agreed and granted our motion dismissing the plaintiff's Complaint.

Results

View all

Claims Dismissed in Marine Construction NY Labor Law Case

Our team successfully obtained summary judgment dismissing all claims against our client in a marine construction NY Labor Law case pending in Supreme Court Rockland County. The case involved bodily injuries sustained to an employee of our client, which was a sub-subcontractor at the site of the new Mario Cuomo Bridge. The property owner, general contractor and the subcontractor each cross-claimed and/or third-partied our client into the case. They sought contractual and common law indemnity and contribution pursuant to the terms and conditions of the various contracts. We argued, and the court agreed, that since there was no finding of negligence against our client causing the injuries sustained by the plaintiff, the indemnification clauses were not implicated. The court found that there was no evidence demonstrating that our client caused in whole or in part the injuries the plaintiff sustained.

Successful Defense of Marine Construction New York Labor Law Case

Marshall Dennehey successfully obtained summary judgment, dismissing all claims against our client in a marine construction New York Labor Law case in the Supreme Court in Rockland County. ​The case involved bodily injuries sustained to an employee of our client, a sub-subcontractor at the site of the new Mario Cuomo Bridge. The property owner, general contractor and the subcontractor each cross-claimed and/or third-partied our client into the case, all seeking contractual and common law indemnity and contribution pursuant to the terms and conditions of the various contracts. We argued, and the court agreed, that since there was no finding of negligence against our client in causing the injuries sustained to the plaintiff, the indemnification clauses were not implicated. The court found there was no evidence demonstrating that our client caused, in whole or in part, the injuries the plaintiff sustained. The plaintiff and general contractor filed motions to reargue, which were denied.

Thought Leadership

View all

Case Law Alerts

U.S. Supreme Court Held that Choice-of-Law Clauses in Maritime Contracts Are Presumptively Enforceable Under Federal Maritime Law

April 1, 2024

On February 21, 2024, the Supreme Court of the United States, in a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Kavanaugh, held that choice-of-law clauses in maritime contracts are presumptively enforceable under federal maritime law, subject to two narrow exceptions: (1) when the chosen law would contravene a controlling federal statute or established federal maritime policy; or (2) when the contracting parties cannot show any reasonable basis for the chosen jurisdiction. The second exception must be applied with “substantial deference to the contracting parties.” Great Lakes Insurance SE v. Raiders Retreat Realty Co., LLC, Case No. 22-500, Slip Op. at 10-11 (Feb. 21, 2024). The Court stated that “the uniformity and predictability resulting from choice-of-law provisions are especially important for marine insurance contracts given that marine insurance is ‘an integral of virtually every maritime transaction, and maritime commerce is a vital part of the nation’s economy.’” Id. at 9 (quoting M. Sturley, Restating the Law of Marine Insurance: A Workable Solution to the Wilburn Boat Problem, 29 J. Mar. L. & Com. 41, 45 (1998). This decision is a very favorable and significant result for marine insurers and the principle of maritime uniformity.  Case Law Alerts, 2nd Quarter, April 2024 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2024 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

Case Law Alerts

SCOTUS Grants Certiorari to Hear Marine Insurance Dispute

April 1, 2023

The Supreme Court of the United States recently granted certiorari to decide whether, under federal admiralty law, “a choice of law clause in a maritime contract can be rendered unenforceable if enforcement is contrary to the ‘strong public policy’ of the state whose law is displaced.” The underlying claim involved damage to a vessel that ran aground, which resulted in the vessel owner filing a coverage claim under its marine insurance policy. The insurer denied coverage and subsequently filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to rescind the policy. The vessel owner then filed multiple counterclaims, including extra-contractual claims under Pennsylvania law. The insurer subsequently moved for judgment on the pleadings on the Pennsylvania law counterclaims, arguing that the policy’s choice of law provision required the application of New York law, precluding those counterclaims. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania ruled in favor of the insurer, and the vessel owner appealed to the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. The Third Circuit reversed and remanded, finding that a choice of law provision is unenforceable if it “would contravene a strong public policy of the forum in which suit is brought.” The Third Circuit instructed the District Court to consider whether Pennsylvania “has a strong public policy that would be thwarted by applying New York law.” In turn, the insurer filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which the Supreme Court granted, limited to the above-referenced question. The Supreme Court’s decision on this issue may have wide-ranging implications on contract cases going forward, particularly those involving choice-of-law provisions.  Case Law Alerts, 2nd Quarter, April 2023 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. Copyright © 2023 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm.

News

View all

Firm Highlights

Marshall Dennehey Named a Standout in Litigation by BTI Consulting Group

News

Marshall Dennehey Named a Standout in Litigation by BTI Consulting Group

Thought Leadership

Florida Supreme Court Rules Florida Statute §627.70152 Does not Apply Retroactively

In a decision that resolves years of appellate uncertainty and confirms that insurers and insureds alike can rely on the legal framework in place when a policy is issued, the Supreme Court of Florida last week found that Florida Statute §627.70152, which involves an insured’s requirement to provide an insurer with pre-suit notice before filing a suit, cannot be applied retroactively. In Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company v. Hughes, the Court was presented with the issue of whether the statutory pre-suit notice requirement applied retroactively and whether it would apply to a breach of contract of an insurance policy that was issued before the statute went into effect. Before the Court was an appeal from a homeowner, Ms. Hughes, who sued her insurance carrier, Universal Property & Casualty Insurance Company (Universal) for breach of contract under an insurance policy that was in effect from April 24, 2019 through April 24, 2020. During the policy period, Ms. Hughes suffered a loss and, on May 29, 2019, made a claim for water damage. The carrier investigated the loss and issued payment; Ms. Hughes disputed the payment, finding the amount insufficient for repairs. On July 1, 2021, Florida Statute §627.70152 went into effect, which required insureds to provide notice of intent to initiate litigation against the carrier prior to filing a lawsuit; if an insured filed the lawsuit without complying with §627.70152, a court must dismiss the case without prejudice. On August 4, 2021, Ms. Hughes filed her lawsuit against Universal for breach of contract. Universal moved to dismiss based on her failure to comply with §627.70152. Ms. Hughes contended the notice requirement could not be applied retroactively. The trial court disagreed and dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice, and Ms. Hughes appealed. During the appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal, in Cole v. Universal Property & Casualty, 363 So. 3d 1089 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023), ruled that Florida Statute §627.70152 did apply retroactively to policies issued before the effective date of §627.70152. However, the Sixth District Court agreed with Ms. Hughes and overturned the trial court’s ruling, finding the statute could not retroactively apply to policies issued prior to the statute effective date. Thereafter, the other district courts weighed in, with the Third District Court agreeing with the Fourth District Court, and the First, Second and Fifth District Courts agreeing with the Sixth District Court. In resolving the conflict amongst the district courts, the Supreme Court advised “as a general rule, ‘the statute in effect at the time an insurance contract is executed governs substantive issues arising in connection with that contract.’ Hassen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 674 So. 2d 106, 108 (Fla. 1996). The Court applied the two-step test when deciding whether a statute has retroactive application: “First, the Court must ascertain whether the Legislature intended for the statute to apply retroactively. Second, if such an intent is clearly expressed, the Court must determine whether retroactive application would violate any constitutional principles.” Menendez v. Progressive Exp. Ins. Co., 35 So. 3d 873, 877 (Fla. 2010). In analyzing the Legislature’s intent, the Court must determine whether the Legislature has manifested a clear command for retroactivity in the statutory text.  In review of the statutory text, the Court found nothing in the language of the statute to indicate that the phrase “all suits” was serving another purpose of expanding its reach to suits based on policies that both predate and postdate the enactment of the statute. Buis v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 394 So. 3d 738, 741 (Fla. 2d DCA 2024). Further, the Court noted the statute has an effective date, which has long been considered to be evidence against retroactive application of a statute. The Court concluded that, on its face, no provision of §627.70152 speaks to application of the statute to insurance policies issued before the statute’s effective date and therefore, the Legislature did not clearly command retroactivity of the statute to include insurance policies issued prior to the enactment of the statute. The Court briefly reviewed Universal’s argument that the presuit notice requirement was procedural, not substantive, and therefore should be applied retroactively; however, the Court agreed with the Sixth District Court’s finding that, in its entirety, §627.70152 transformed an insured’s ability to sue an insurance company under a property insurance policy and an insurer’s obligations to respond to and pay insurance claims, thus making the requirement a substantive change. The Court thereby upheld the decision of the Sixth District and disapproved the decision of the Fourth District in Cole.

business meeting photo

Result

Summary Judgment Obtained in Insurance Coverage Case

Event

CLM 2026 Focus Conference

Allison joins three insurance industry leaders to discuss how cyber coverage disputes, the growing impact of social inflation on bodily injury claim valuation, and the use of artificial intelligence are reshaping the bad faith landscape. The panel will examine emerging sources of extra-contractual exposure, including evolving cyber insurance coverage issues and the challenges of accurately valuing bodily injury claims. Practical approaches to claim evaluation using AI, along with defense strategies designed to help prevent or successfully defend against bad faith litigation, will also be addressed. 

Thought Leadership

Commonwealth Court Reaffirms the Constitutionality of Act 111's IRE Provisions

In this case, the claimant sustained a work injury of January 6, 1994, which was acknowledged by Notice of Compensation Payable (NCP). After the claimant’s receipt of 104 weeks of temporary total disability benefits, the employer filed a Request for an Impairment Rating Examination (IRE). The IRE was performed in May 2023 and the IRE physician found that the claimant had a 5% whole person impairment, under the AMA Guides. The employer filed a Petition based on the IRE results, and the Petition was granted by the WCJ. During litigation, the claimant argued that the IRE provisions of Act 111 (Section 306(a.3) of the Act) were not applicable to her injury, since it predated June 24, 1996, the date Act 57 went into effect, and that the IRE provisions were unconstitutional. The Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ)) granted the Petition and the Board affirmed. On appeal to the Commonwealth Court, the claimant argued that Act 111 violated the nondelegation doctrine and that its retroactive application to the claimant’s injury was unconstitutional. The court rejected the arguments on the basis that they had already found the same arguments without merit in multiple, prior cases. The court also addressed an argument made by the claimant that Act 111 was procedurally defective under the Pennsylvania Constitution because it was only considered on two days in each House after having undergone amendments and reassignments. The court noted that the Pennsylvania Constitution requires every bill to be considered on three different days in each House. The claimant maintained that, according to the legislative history, the bill did not receive three separate days of consideration from each House when it was assigned a new bill number. The court pointed out, however, that the bill number, H.B. 1840 remained constant and was considered on three occasions by the House. Further, the court concluded that minor amendments to the bill were germane to its original subject, which was to modify the Act’s IRE process, in accordance with Protz II.

Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

Result

Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

Thought Leadership

The Tolling Trap: Filing Alone Will Not Toll the Statute Without Good-Faith Service

The Eastern District of Pennsylvania recently reinforced a critical limitation on bad faith claims, holding that a timely filing alone will not preserve a cause of action absent a good-faith effort to serve the original process. The plaintiff had presented a claim for underinsured motorist benefits to his auto insurer. The insurer evaluated the claim and determined that the plaintiff’s accident-related damages did not exceed the bodily injury liability insurance limits of the at-fault driver and denied his claim. Among other claims, the plaintiff sought to present a claim for insurance bad faith under 42 Pa. C.S.A. § 8371, to which a two year statute of limitation applies. He first filed a praecipe for writ of summons before the expiration of the statute of limitation. However, the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the praecipe or writ until after the statute of limitations had expired. Additionally, the service failed as the plaintiff had mailed the original process to an incorrect address. Despite receipt of the Postal Service’s failure to deliver the original process, the plaintiff did not attempt to re-serve the writ. Two months later, the plaintiff filed a complaint and then successfully served that complaint. The insurer sought to dismiss the plaintiff’s bad faith claim as time-barred by the statute of limitations. The district court agreed. Though the plaintiff had filed a praecipe for a writ of summons prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, the statute is only tolled if there is a good faith effort to serve that original process. In this case, the court determined that the plaintiff had failed to perform a “good faith effort to serve the original process”. Additionally, though the filing and service of a complaint can serve as alternative original process when the lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a praecipe for a writ of summons, the plaintiff filed his complaint after the statute of limitations had expired. The plaintiff’s bad faith claim was therefore determined to be barred by the statute of limitations and dismissed by the court, with prejudice. A key takeaway for the defense is not to assume that the statute of limitations has been successfully tolled by a plaintiff merely because a praecipe for a writ of summons or complaint has been filed prior to the expiration of the statute. A filed complaint or writ is only part of the equation. The defense should carefully review the docket and filings to confirm that the plaintiff also performed the requisite good faith effort to serve that original process. A thorough review of the docket may reveal that the plaintiff failed to make the good-faith service efforts necessary to toll the statute of limitations.

graphic announcing our 6 2027 Super Lawyers & Rising Stars

News

Marshall Dennehey Announces 2027 New Jersey Super Lawyers And Rising Stars

Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter

Result

Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter

Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department

News

Bret E. Dubbert Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Orlando Office as Special Counsel in the Casualty Department