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New York Construction & Labor Law

In the world of personal injury litigation, perhaps no claim is more difficult to defend than one brought under the incredibly burdensome New York State Labor Law Statutes. Almost any accident on a construction site, especially those involving elevation-related hazards, may subject owners, general contractors and subcontractors to liability and, in some cases, absolute liability. The defense must focus on defeating liability, transferring risk and reducing the damages claim.

The attorneys in Marshall Dennehey's New York Construction and Labor Law Practice devote almost the entirety of their practices to New York Labor Law litigation. Our team has decades of experience handling the most complex construction site accident cases throughout the state. From issues involving contractual indemnification and insurance coverage to the ever-evolving application of Labor Law 240, our attorneys remain at the forefront of this rapidly changing area of law.

Representing public and private owners and developers, general contractors, construction managers and all manner of subcontractor trades, our attorneys defend claims arising out of all aspects of the construction industry. These include claims involving the use of scaffold systems, shoring, demolition and heavy machinery in industrial, commercial and residential projects.

Our attorneys are familiar with the full range of construction business practices, management and field personnel, and record-keeping procedures which help yield a cost-efficient and strategic defense. With a proactive and aggressive approach, the team anticipates issues and potential problems with ready and creative solutions. Marshall Dennehey's construction litigators are experienced in successfully resolving New York Labor Law cases through mediation or motion practice and, when necessary, provide a vigorous defense at trial.

Marshall Dennehey's New York Construction and Labor Law Practice serves clients in the five boroughs of New York City and throughout the state of New York.

Results

Notable Victory Obtained in a New York Labor Law Action

We obtained a significant win in a New York Labor Law action, securing partial summary judgment for a municipal library and defeating the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on liability. The plaintiff alleged negligence and violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240 and 241(6) after sustaining injuries when roof trusses collapsed on a construction project managed by a co-defendant on property owned by the municipal library. He claimed the collapse resulted from inadequate bracing. Following discovery, the plaintiff sought summary judgment under Labor Law § 240, asserting absolute liability against the library as the property owner. We opposed the motion and sought partial summary judgment dismissing all claims against the non-property-owning clients, all but the § 240 claim against the library, dismissal of the co-defendant’s cross-claims, and contractual and common law indemnification from the plaintiff’s employer. The court denied the plaintiff’s motion after finding questions of fact as to whether the plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of the accident. The court also granted our motion, dismissing all claims against the non-property-owning clients, all but the § 240 claim against the library, dismissing the co-defendant’s cross-claims, and granting the library unconditional contractual indemnification from the plaintiff’s employer prior to any finding of liability.

Affirmance Achieved in Dismissal of All Claims in New York Labor Law Matter

We successfully achieved affirmance of the trial court’s decision to dismiss all claims against a property owner and designer in a New York labor law matter. The plaintiff was injured when he fell from a ladder stacked atop a bakers scaffold while performing renovation work on a four-story brownstone. The 16-foot ladder and the scaffold were provided by his employer—the general contractor—and set up at his employer’s discretion. The plaintiff filed an action against the owner of the property and the designer, alleging violations of various labor law claims, including labor law Sections 240(1), 241(6) and 200. The defendants’ motion for summary judgment, seeking a dismissal of all claims, was filed after the plaintiff’s depositions but before any of the defendants were deposed and with extensive discovery outstanding. The plaintiff opposed the motion and cross moved to compel further discovery. The Supreme Court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, dismissing all claims as the property owners qualified for the owner and two-family dwelling exception to the labor law. The trial court held that the defendants did not direct, supervise or control any of the plaintiff’s activities. Therefore, according to the affidavit, the single-family home exception did not apply. After oral argument, the Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s decision with costs.

Thought Leadership

Case Law Alerts

Court of Appeals Narrows “Arising Out of Performance of Work” Standard

April 1, 2026

In Dibrino v. Rockefeller Center North, Inc., (2025 N.Y. Slip Op 070077, December 18. 2025), the plaintiff-carpenter was injured while using an electrical subcontractor’s ladder at the worksite. The general contractor and owner sought contractual indemnification against the electrical subcontractor citing the “arising out of the performance of the work” provision within the contract. The electrical subcontractor moved to dismiss the contractual indemnification claims. The court of appeals found that the provision was not triggered due to the plaintiff’s unauthorized use of an unattended ladder instead of using the scaffold and ladder supplied by his co-worker. This seems to narrow the “arising out of work” trigger for contractual indemnity analysis. A subcontractor’s specific work and actions at any construction site must be scrutinized under this case in order to ascertain whether indemnity provisions are triggered.

Case Law Alerts

New York’s AVOID Act Imposes Strict Deadlines on Third-Party Actions Starting April 2026

January 1, 2026

On December 19, 2025, Governor Kathy Hochul signed the Avoiding Vexatious Overuse of Impleading to Delay (AVOID) Act (L. 2025, ch. 704), amending CPLR § 1007 to impose, for the first time, strict deadlines on third-party practice in New York civil litigation. Effective April 18, 2026, the Act is intended to streamline cases and curb delay tactics caused by late or excessive impleading, while shifting greater responsibility to both defendants and plaintiffs to identify all potentially liable parties early in the case. Under the new rules, defendants must file third-party complaints within 60 days of serving an answer when based on contractual indemnification, or within 60 days of learning of a potentially liable party under common-law theories. Second-tier third-party actions must be filed within 45 days, with subsequent tiers limited to 30 days and then 20 days. Extensions are capped at 30 days absent a court order, and no impleader is permitted after the filing of the Note of Issue; late filings will be severed or dismissed without prejudice and may not later be consolidated back into the main action. Limited exceptions apply, including certain workplace injury claims against employers (such as “grave injury” cases or when the employer’s identity was unknown), where parties have up to 120 days from the relevant triggering event. While designed to accelerate litigation, the AVOID Act may introduce new practical challenges. Counsel—particularly in complex matters like construction cases—will need to investigate liability and pursue tenders much earlier, potentially leading to expanded discovery, additional depositions, and increased motion practice. Although rights to contribution or indemnity are preserved through separate actions, settlements with plaintiffs may waive contribution rights, complicating resolution and potentially giving plaintiffs a strategic tool to restrict third-party practice and risk transfer.

Firm Highlights

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Featured Conversations... Key Takeaways from A.M. Best’s Webinar on the Misuse Defense in Product Liability Claims, Featuring Michael Salvati

Michael Salvati, shareholder in our Philadelphia office, was a panelist for the April A.M. Best webinar, “The Misuse Defense: Strategic Approaches to Defending Product Liability Claims for Insurers.” During the program, Michael and his fellow panelists offered practical, jurisdiction‑specific guidance on how misuse and failure‑to‑warn theories intersect in modern product liability litigation. Michael emphasized the unique challenges these claims present—particularly in states like Pennsylvania, where evidentiary rules diverge sharply from those applied in many other jurisdictions. Failure to Warn as the “Flip Side” of Misuse Salvati explained that failure‑to‑warn allegations often arise as a direct counter to a misuse defense. As he noted, “If our misuse defense is that the plaintiff didn't use a product properly or safely, then the failure to warn claim is that we didn't tell them how to use it properly.” He emphasized that these claims can stem from either the absence of warnings or criticisms of existing warnings, such as insufficient specificity or lack of clarity about risks. Pennsylvania’s Unique Evidentiary Landscape One of Salvati’s most notable points was the stark difference in how Pennsylvania treats evidence of compliance with industry standards. He highlighted that Pennsylvania is “one of the only states…where that evidence is not admissible” in strict liability cases. Manufacturers cannot rely on compliance with ANSI, UL, ISO, or even federal safety standards to defend the product against a strict liability claim—because the focus is solely on the product itself, not the manufacturer’s conduct. Salvati acknowledged the challenge this creates for defense counsel and clients who expect such compliance to carry weight. Understanding the Three Defect Theories Salvati also walked through the three primary defect theories recognized in many jurisdictions: - Design defect – a flaw in the product’s intended design - Manufacturing defect – a deviation affecting a specific unit - Failure to warn – inadequate instructions or warnings He noted that warnings claims are increasingly significant and sometimes stand alone when design or manufacturing theories are weak. As he put it, plaintiffs often default to warnings claims because “the default position seems to be, ‘If I got hurt, there must be something wrong.’” Warranties and State‑by‑State Variations Salvati addressed how breach‑of‑warranty claims fit into the broader framework, explaining that implied warranties—such as merchantability—often overlap with strict liability in Pennsylvania. He emphasized the importance of understanding local nuances, as warranty law and admissibility rules vary widely across states. Looking Ahead: The Growing Importance of Warnings In his closing remarks, Salvati stressed that warnings should never be treated as an afterthought in product liability defense. He observed that warnings‑only claims are becoming more common and urged manufacturers and insurers to continually evaluate the clarity and completeness of their instructions and warnings. His takeaway: “We should always be talking about what are the instructions that come with our products…to bolster a misuse defense.” Listen to the complete webinar here: https://www3.ambest.com/conferences/events/eventregister.aspx?event_id=WEB1074.

Thought Leadership

The Enforceability of Online Arbitration Agreements Remains Unresolved in Pennsylvania, But the Pennsylvania Superior Court has Provided Substantive Guidance on the Issue

Key Points: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court confirms that an order compelling arbitration is not immediately appealable as collateral orders. The outcome of Chilutti II has generally left the substantive enforceability issues with browsewrap agreements unresolved in Pennsylvania. Until this issue is resolved by the Pennsylvania courts, companies operating in the Commonwealth should strive to ensure that their registration websites and/or application screens conspicuously present arbitration agreements in manners which ensure their users and consumers assent to the terms of the agreements by following the standards set forth in Chilutti I. Browsewrap agreements have been defined as agreements “‘in which a website offers terms that are disclosed only through a hyperlink and the user supposedly manifests assent to those terms simply by continuing to use the website,’ and typically do not require an electronic signature.” See, Cobb v. Tesla, Inc., 2026 WL 458470, at *1 n. 2 (Pa. Super. Feb. 18, 2026) (citation omitted). They are largely regarded as the “if you keep using this, you agree to everything buried in this link” terms embedded into almost every online agreement consumers and users sign before proceeding with purchases of goods and/or services. While consumers are generally aware of them, many almost never click on the link, nor read them in their entirety. This leaves many consumers and users ignorant of the terms and impact of such agreements. However, one’s ignorance of the otherwise neatly-tucked-away terms rarely renders them unenforceable. The issue of the enforceability of browsewrap agreements has been up for debate for some time in many jurisdictions, including Pennsylvania. Indeed, Pennsylvania had a brief grip on this issue for a period in time. Specifically, in 2023, an en banc Superior Court set forth heightened standards for companies to meet in order to secure assent and enforce browsewrap arbitration agreements. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 300 A.3d 430 (Pa.Super. 2023) (en banc) (“Chilutti I”) Chilutti I involved a husband and wife who sued Uber and its subsidiaries after the wife, a wheelchair bound passenger using Uber’s rideshare service, fell, struck her head, and lost consciousness due to her uber driver failing to provide a seatbelt and making an aggressive turn during the trip. The Chilutti’s filed a negligence lawsuit against Uber and its subsidiaries. In response, the defendants moved to compel arbitration, arguing that “the couple’s conduct on the company’s website and application — when they registered for the ridesharing service — signified that they agreed to be bound by the mandatory arbitration provision found in the hyperlinked terms and conditions.” The trial court granted the defendants’ petition and stayed the proceedings pending the results of arbitration, and the Chilutti’s appealed. On appeal, the Superior Court addressed two issues. First, it addressed the issue of whether it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal. A divided Superior Court determined that it did, with its basis for the holding being that the order from which the Chilutti’s appealed was a collateral order. Next, the Superior Court set out to address the merits of the Chilutti’s substantive claim. The Superior Court concluded that the parties lacked a valid agreement to arbitrate. Its rationale was that Uber’s website and application did not provide reasonably conspicuous notice of the terms to the Chiluttis. In reaching this decision, the en banc Superior Court held that browsewrap arbitration agreements are enforceable in Pennsylvania only if the registration website and application screens explicitly inform consumers that they are waiving the right to a jury trial, the registration process cannot be completed until the consumer is fully informed of this waiver, and, when the agreement is available via hyperlink, the waiver appears at the top of the first page of the terms in bold, capitalized text. Since the ruling, Pennsylvania courts have applied Chilutti I to determine if browsewrap agreements are enforceable.  For instance, the Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas invoked Chilutti I to reject an agreement that lacked an express jury-trial waiver on the assent screen.  See Miller v. Festival Fun Parks, LLC, 92 WDA 2025 (C.P. Alleg. Cnty. Mar. 24, 2025). Similarly, the Superior Court has held that notice which failed to explicitly state the consumer was waiving a jury-trial right did not “me[e]t the strict burden set forth by our en banc Court in Chilutti I.” Pierce v. FloatMe Corp., 348 A.3d 1077, 1088 (Pa. Super. 2025). While the issue of enforceability of browsewrap agreements appeared to have been resolved by Chilutti I, Pennsylvania courts’ grip on this issue has been slackened by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s January 21, 2026, opinion in Chilutti II. See Chilutti v. Uber Techs., Inc., 349 A.3d 826 (Pa. 2026) (“Chilutti II”). Therein, the Supreme Court did not address the merits of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim, but rather the issue of whether the Superior Court had appellate jurisdiction to immediately review the orders staying litigation pending arbitration. The Court ultimately vacated the en banc opinion on jurisdictional grounds, holding that the Superior Court did not have appellate jurisdiction because the trial court’s order from which the Chiluttis appealed did not qualify as a collateral order and, thus, the Superior Court erred in holding to the contrary and lacked jurisdiction to entertain the merits” of the Chiluttis’ substantive claim. As such, Chilutti II has rendered Chilutti I nonbinding, and the issue of enforceability of online arbitration agreements remains unresolved. However, in light of the fact the Supreme Court did not address or comment on the merits of the Chiluttis’ appeal, Chilutti I is still meaningful. Specifically, it provides guidance as to the standards a company should strive to meet to ensure they have obtained users’ assent so that they are able to enforce online arbitration agreements. Additionally, it may serve as persuasive authority in judges’ evaluations of petitions and/or motions to compel browsewrap arbitration agreements until this particular issue is properly put before our appellate courts. Keanna works in our Pittsburgh, PA office. She can be reached at (412) 803-1174 or KASeabrooks@MDWCG.com.