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Allison L. Krupp

Co-Chair, Insurance Services Practice Group

ALKrupp@mdwcg.com

Portrait of Allison L. Krupp

Allison is a member of the Professional Liability Department where she concentrates her practice on insurance coverage and bad faith litigation.  She routinely represents national/global insurance carriers in insurance coverage disputes and first-party automotive claims brought against them.  Allison is experienced in many types of coverage issues, including: policy cancellation, policy reformation, phantom vehicle cases, and a variety of policy exclusions.  She also defends clients in the area of bad faith litigation. She practices in Pennsylvania state and federal court, as well as before arbitration panels and appellate courts.

For two years prior to joining the firm, Allison served as a judicial law clerk for the Honorable Judge Donald R. Totaro in the Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas.  During her final year of law school, Allison served as a legal extern for the Honorable Justice J. Michael Eakin of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.  She also served as a certified legal intern for the Pennsylvania State Civil Service Commission in the Hearings and Appeals Department. 

In 2006, Allison graduated magna cum laude from York College of Pennsylvania.  She then attended the Widener University School of Law and graduated cum laude in 2009.  During her time in law school, Allison served on Widener’s Law Journal and was the president of the Moot Court Honor Society from 2008 to 2009.

    • Widener University Delaware Law School (J.D., cum laude, 2009)
    • York College of Pennsylvania (B.A., magna cum laude, 2006)
    • Pennsylvania, 2009
    • The Best Lawyers in America®, “Lawyer of the Year,” Harrisburg, Insurance Law (2025)
    • The Best Lawyers in America©, Insurance Law (2024-2027)
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyers Rising Star (2019)
    • American Inns of Court
    • Cumberland County Bar Association
    • Dauphin County William J. Lipsitt Inn of Court, Associate
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • Bad Faith 2022, Pennsylvania Bar Institute CLE, September 2022
    • Exploring Bad Faith – Practical Discussion of Bad Faith Law in Pennsylvania and New Jersey, Marshall Dennehey Insurance Fraud 360 Seminar, Lafayette Hill, PA, June 2022
    • All things UM/UIM & Bad Faith in PA, Marshall Dennehey Virtual Client Presentation, February 2021
    • An Overview of Pennsylvania Law for Auto Law & Premises Claims, Marshall Dennehey Virtual Client Presentation, February 2021
    • Proper Handling of UM/UIM Claims:  The Good, The Bad, And The Ugly, Marshall Dennehey Client Seminar, June 17, 2016
    • Regular Use Exclusions in Pennsylvania -- Coverage Issues and Practical Applications, Marshall Dennehey Client Seminar, June 2015
    • Recent Pennsylvania Trial and Appellate Case Law, Cumberland County Lunch and Learn, March 2015
    • "'Regular Use Exclusions' Stand: Pa. Supreme Court's Latest Ruling Post-'Gallagher',"The Legal Intelligencer Insurance Law Supplement, August 20, 2024
    • "Federal District Court’s Discretionary Jurisdiction Over Declaratory Judgment Actions: Recent Trends and Developments," Pennsylvania Association of Mutual Insurance Companies (PAMIC), Winter 2022 Edition
    • "Pa. Ruling Leaves Auto Policy Stacking Questions,"Law360, November 10, 2021
    • “Just How Hard Does Gallagher Hit the Household Vehicle Exclusion?,” Defense Digest, Vol. 25, No. 2, June 2019
    • "Airbnb and Insurance Coverage: Is It Up in the Air?" The Legal Intelligencer's Insurance Law Supplement, page 7, August 29, 2017
    • “A Perfectly Imperfect Process: Dauphin County’s First Post-Koken Jury Trial: Oaks v. Erie Insurance Exchange and Austin,” Defense Digest, Volume 20, No. 3, September 2014 
    • “Where to Sue Since Summy,” Defense Digest, Volume 20, No. 3, September 2014
    • Legal Updates for Coverage and Bad Faith, Editor, 2014-present
    • "Reservations Over Reserving Your Rights," Defense Digest, Volume 19, No. 4, December 2013
    • "Predicting the Future of Predictive Coding," Defense Digest, Volume 18, No. 1, March 2012
    • Assisted with obtaining summary judgment in favor of the insurer in federal court on all 7 counts of the complaint, including breach of contract, insurance bad faith, misrepresentation, negligence, deceit, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unfair trade practices.
    • Assisted with obtaining a decision from the Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirming the trial court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of the insurer on counts of insurance bad faith and violations of the MVFRL.
    • Assisted with obtaining a decision from the Commonwealth Court affirming the Insurance Commissioner’s decision in favor of the insurer, where the policyholder had challenged a homeowner’s policy cancellation.
    • Assisted with obtaining summary judgment in favor of the insurer in Pennsylvania state court on counts of breach of contract and insurance bad faith.
    • Worked on multiple cases regarding the validity and applicability of stacking waivers on Pennsylvania auto policies, and obtained summary judgment in several of those cases.
    • Assisted with successfully opposing a Motion for Class Certification in a Philadelphia County TCPA case.
    • Obtained a defense verdict from a Philadelphia County arbitration panel, where the underlying issue was permissive use of a vehicle.
    • Obtained defense verdicts from Lancaster County arbitration panels in two separate property damage cases involving a neighbor dispute.
    • Obtained a defense verdict from a magisterial district judge for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
    • Second-chaired and received a defense verdict in a high-profile casualty case, where the plaintiff sustained serious injury in a sprint car accident. 

Results

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Achieved Dismissal of an Appeal of Our Defense Verdict

We won dismissal of the plaintiff’s appeal of a defense verdict. Our client issued a professional liability insurance policy to the plaintiffs. When the plaintiffs were sued for legal malpractice, they notified our client of the suit and asked them to provide counsel to defend the matter. However, the plaintiffs never agreed to counsel proposed by our client. The plaintiffs then proceeded to mediation in the legal malpractice action and settled the matter without notifying our client. As a result, our client denied the plaintiffs’ request for indemnification. The plaintiffs then brought suit against our client for breach of contract and bad faith, alleging they wrongly denied indemnification and failed to provide counsel. The matter went to jury trial from April 8–11, 2024, where we successfully defended our client as the jury returned a defense verdict. The plaintiffs filed post-trial motions and then appealed the decision to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, arguing the trial court erred in allowing the jury to see a copy of the insurance contract during their deliberations. The Superior Court dismissed the appeal and found that the plaintiffs waived their argument by failing to cite relevant legal authority in their appellate brief. The Superior Court also stated in a footnote that, should the court have reached the issue on appeal, it would have found it meritless because the insurance contract was a central piece of evidence to which the plaintiffs did not object during trial.

Jury Verdict Received in a Breach of Contract Action

We secured a jury verdict in a breach of contract/statutory bad faith action that arose under a legal malpractice policy issued to a law firm by our insurance company client. The plaintiffs settled a malpractice claim set forth against them without our client’s knowledge or consent. The insurance company then denied coverage for that claim, and the plaintiffs filed suit. Because the case included a bad faith claim, if the plaintiffs prevailed on both counts, the damages could have been seven figures or more. We took the case to trial before Judge Patrick in Philadelphia County. The jury returned a verdict on the breach of contract claim, finding that the plaintiffs failed to establish their damages by a preponderance of the evidence. The judge then dismissed the statutory bad faith claim.

Thought Leadership

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‘Regular Use Exclusions’ Stand: Pa. Supreme Court’s Latest Ruling Post-’Gallagher’

August 20, 2024

After the Pennsylvania Superior Court determined in 2021 that “regular use exclusions” in UM/UIM policies violate the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL), and in a post-Gallagher legal landscape, some were ready to put the regular use exclusion to rest for good. Now, however, in Rush v. Erie Insurance Exchange, 308 A.3d 780 (Pa. Jan. 29, 2024), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in a lengthy majority opinion, has confirmed that the regular use exclusion remains very much alive.

Legal Updates for Coverage & Bad Faith

New Jersey Legislature Passes Bad Faith – What’s Next??

January 14, 2022

New Jersey is on the brink of its first insurance bad faith statute after clearing both the Senate and Assembly by vote on January 10, 2022. While the New Jersey Legislature website does not indicate when it may happen, it is anticipated that Governor Murphy will sign this Bill into law. The Bill is titled “New Jersey Insurance Fair Conduct Act.” The statute provides “claimants” with a private cause of action for conduct deemed “unfair and discriminatory,” as delineated in the Act, N.J.S.A. 17:B29-4. The earliest version of the Bill applied to all lines of insurance. However, the Assembly and Senate Committees pared the initial legislation down, and the current form of the law applies only to underinsured and uninsured motorist claims.  Per the language of the statute, a claimant may file a civil action against an automobile insurer for “(1) an unreasonable delay or unreasonable denial of a claim for payment of benefits under an insurance policy; or (2) any violation of the provisions of section 4 of P.L. 1947, c.379 (C.17:29B-4) [The New Jersey Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act].” It is important to note that in New Jersey, a private right of action did not exist under the Act. Instead, the state could take administrative action against the insurer for violations of the Act, but only if the violations constituted a “general business practice.” This Bill not only creates a private cause of action under the Act, but (unlike the state) a private claimant is not required to prove that the insurer’s actions were of such a frequency as to indicate a general business practice. If the claimant establishes that a violation has occurred, he/she “shall” be entitled to actual damages caused by the violation and prejudgment interest, reasonable attorney’s fees and all reasonable litigation expenses. Thus, the Bill turns a law designed to deter “general business practices” into a sword to punish violations on a case-by-case basis, which was never its original intent.  It is unclear at this point how the courts will interpret “unreasonable delay” and/or “unreasonable denial”; however, they are certainly issues that will generate a great deal of litigation in the coming years.  The attorneys in Marshall Dennehey’s Insurance Services Practice Group are highly experienced in handling such litigation and stand ready to answer questions and help you defend these cases once the Bill is signed into law.  Click here to view the Bill: https://www.njleg.state.nj.us/bill-search/2020/S1559 or contact us for a copy.   Legal Updates for Insurance Services – January 14, 2022, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments, and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2022 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. All Rights Reserved.

News

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Events

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Speaking Engagement

CLM 2026 Focus Conference

December 3, 2026

Chicago, Illinois

Allison L. Krupp and David Derigiotis, John Hackett, Dale Diamond

Portrait of Allison L. Krupp

Speaking Engagement

2026 Pennsylvania Association of Mutual Insurance Companies (PAMIC) Claims Summit

April 8, 2026

Jeffrey G. Rapattoni, James H. Cole, and Allison L. Krupp

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

business meeting photo

Result

Summary Judgment Obtained in Insurance Coverage Case

MD Selected a 2027 Best Law Firm in Multiple Practice Areas by Best Lawyers

News

Marshall Dennehey Named a 2027 Best Law Firm in Multiple Practice Areas by Best Lawyers®

Event

CLM 2026 Focus Conference

Allison joins three insurance industry leaders to discuss how cyber coverage disputes, the growing impact of social inflation on bodily injury claim valuation, and the use of artificial intelligence are reshaping the bad faith landscape. The panel will examine emerging sources of extra-contractual exposure, including evolving cyber insurance coverage issues and the challenges of accurately valuing bodily injury claims. Practical approaches to claim evaluation using AI, along with defense strategies designed to help prevent or successfully defend against bad faith litigation, will also be addressed. 

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Four Marshall Dennehey Attorneys Selected 2026 “Top Lawyers” by Delaware Today Magazine

News

Four Marshall Dennehey Attorneys Selected 2026 “Top Lawyers” by Delaware Today Magazine

Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter

Result

Complete Victory Obtained in a Workers’ Compensation Matter

Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

Result

Defense Victory Obtained in Workers’ Compensation Case

Marshall Dennehey Welcomes Special Counsel David Farkouh and Michele P. Rannie to New York City Office

News

Marshall Dennehey Welcomes Special Counsel David Farkouh and Michele P. Rannie to New York City Office

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.