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Defense Digest

When Favors Feel Like Obligations: A Closer Look at the Special-Mission Exemption to the Going-and-Coming Rule

Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 1, March 2023

March 1, 2023

by Lela N. Eke

Key Points:

  • An employee’s off-site accident may be compensable under the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act, pursuant to the “special-mission” exception to the going-and-coming rule, even if the employee is doing a favor for the employer.
  • When determining an employee’s job duties and scope of employment, indirect pressure on an employee can be as powerful as an explicit order.
  • A workers’ compensation claim may still be compensable even if the employee fails to follow the employer’s work guidelines.

To determine whether an injury is compensable under the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act, the court must find that the injury arose out of and occurred in the course of employment, among other factors. In New Jersey, the “going-and-coming” rule governs and generally states that compensable accidents occur at the place of employment. There are few exceptions to this rule which allow for an employee’s off-site injury to be compensable, and they are extremely fact-specific.

In Gregory Van Sciver v. Jersey Mech. Contractors, Inc., 2022 WL 16936881 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 15, 2022), the Appellate Division held that an employee met the “special-mission” exception to the going-and-coming rule when he was injured by an explosion in his personal vehicle. Mr. Van Sciver was a pipe fitter and truck driver for his employer. On September 29, 2020, Van Scriver was instructed to exchange two empty tanks that hold acetylene gas (B-Tanks) for full ones, deliver one of the full B-Tanks to a jobsite in Livingston, and deliver paychecks to a jobsite located in Bordentown.

While in Bordentown, a jobsite foreman asked Van Sciver about his B-Tank delivery, but it was not on the employee’s list of tasks, so he returned to the main jobsite to ask his supervisor. Later that day, Van Sciver (acting on his own initiative) decided to deliver a full B-Tank to Bordentown using his personal vehicle since he would pass by Bordentown on his way home. However, the employee did not stop at the Bordentown jobsite that night because it was too late in the day.

The next morning, the employee forgot to drop off the B-Tank in Bordentown. As he was driving his personal vehicle to work, the company’s project manager/estimator asked him for a ride to work. Van Sciver agreed. However, he heard a hissing noise from his vehicle while driving to the company executive’s house. When Van Sciver opened the rear hatch of his vehicle to investigate the sound, the B-Tank exploded and significantly injured him. He required numerous surgeries and extensive medical treatment after an eight-day coma, traumatic brain injuries, and the loss of use of one eye.

At trial, all parties agreed that Van Sciver was not instructed to use his personal vehicle to deliver the B-Tank. In fact, the employer and the union agreement both instructed Van Sciver to NOT use personal vehicles for company business. Furthermore, the parties agreed that Van Sciver was trained to not store B-Tanks in confined places, such as his vehicle’s hatchback.

Nonetheless, the trial judge found that: (1) the employee placed the B-Tank in his personal vehicle with the sole intent and motive to deliver it to the Bordentown jobsite; (2) the tank was a “workplace instrumentality” of the employer; (3) the employee’s work responsibilities required him to be away from the main facility; (4) before the accident, the company’s executive asked the employee to pick him up for work; (5) the employee was en route to pick up the company’s executive when the accident occurred; and (6) the employee had an “objectively reasonable basis in fact for believing that… he was in essence ‘compelled’ to say yes to picking up” the project manager/estimator because of his high-level position at the company.

Thus, the trial judge found that Van Sciver was completing work-related duties when the injury occurred. It held that he was entitled to compensation under the “special-mission” exception of the going-and-coming rule on two grounds: (1) the employee was on a special mission delivering the B-Tank to Bordentown and the mission had not ended before the accident, and (2) the employee was engaged in a special mission for the company when he was driving to pick up the executive.

The company appealed the trial judge’s decision. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial judge’s decision, stating that Van Sciver met the special-mission exception when he attempted to pick up the company’s high-level officer. The Appellate Division noted that the Workers’ Compensation Act requires employers to compensate employees for accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of employment and occurring away from the place of employment if the employee is engaged in duties directed by the employer (i.e. the special-mission exception).

The company argued that Van Sciver was not directed by the employer to pick up the company’s executive because he could have declined. However, the Appellate Division reiterated that indirect pressure on an employee can be as powerful as an explicit order, indicating that implied direction from high-level officers can expand an employee’s job duties.

Finally, the company argued that the trial court’s legal determinations were not supported by the facts. In its review, the Appellate Division noted that they do not re-determine the factual findings of the trial judge, but they determine whether the trial judge’s findings had sufficient credible evidence. Thus, once a trial judge makes a factual determination, it can be quite difficult to change such a finding on appeal.

It is clear that “special-mission” cases are heavily fact-specific. Employers must quickly investigate how an accident occurred, what the employee was asked to do, and the employee’s job responsibilities. Just as the court considered an executive’s request for a ride to work as an extension of the employee’s job duties, other requests could impact an employee in the same manner. Thus, employers must be careful not to blur the line between an employee’s professional responsibilities and personal favors.

To determine whether an injury is compensable under the New Jersey Workers’ Compensation Act, the court must find that the injury arose out of and occurred in the course of employment, among other factors. In New Jersey, the “going-and-coming” rule governs and generally states that compensable accidents occur at the place of employment. There are few exceptions to this rule which allow for an employee’s off-site injury to be compensable, and they are extremely fact-specific.

In Gregory Van Sciver v. Jersey Mech. Contractors, Inc., 2022 WL 16936881 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Nov. 15, 2022), the Appellate Division held that an employee met the “special-mission” exception to the going-and-coming rule when he was injured by an explosion in his personal vehicle. Mr. Van Sciver was a pipe fitter and truck driver for his employer. On September 29, 2020, Van Scriver was instructed to exchange two empty tanks that hold acetylene gas (B-Tanks) for full ones, deliver one of the full B-Tanks to a jobsite in Livingston, and deliver paychecks to a jobsite located in Bordentown.

While in Bordentown, a jobsite foreman asked Van Sciver about his B-Tank delivery, but it was not on the employee’s list of tasks, so he returned to the main jobsite to ask his supervisor. Later that day, Van Sciver (acting on his own initiative) decided to deliver a full B-Tank to Bordentown using his personal vehicle since he would pass by Bordentown on his way home. However, the employee did not stop at the Bordentown jobsite that night because it was too late in the day.

The next morning, the employee forgot to drop off the B-Tank in Bordentown. As he was driving his personal vehicle to work, the company’s project manager/estimator asked him for a ride to work. Van Sciver agreed. However, he heard a hissing noise from his vehicle while driving to the company executive’s house. When Van Sciver opened the rear hatch of his vehicle to investigate the sound, the B-Tank exploded and significantly injured him. He required numerous surgeries and extensive medical treatment after an eight-day coma, traumatic brain injuries, and the loss of use of one eye.

At trial, all parties agreed that Van Sciver was not instructed to use his personal vehicle to deliver the B-Tank. In fact, the employer and the union agreement both instructed Van Sciver to NOT use personal vehicles for company business. Furthermore, the parties agreed that Van Sciver was trained to not store B-Tanks in confined places, such as his vehicle’s hatchback.

Nonetheless, the trial judge found that: (1) the employee placed the B-Tank in his personal vehicle with the sole intent and motive to deliver it to the Bordentown jobsite; (2) the tank was a “workplace instrumentality” of the employer; (3) the employee’s work responsibilities required him to be away from the main facility; (4) before the accident, the company’s executive asked the employee to pick him up for work; (5) the employee was en route to pick up the company’s executive when the accident occurred; and (6) the employee had an “objectively reasonable basis in fact for believing that… he was in essence ‘compelled’ to say yes to picking up” the project manager/estimator because of his high-level position at the company.

Thus, the trial judge found that Van Sciver was completing work-related duties when the injury occurred. It held that he was entitled to compensation under the “special-mission” exception of the going-and-coming rule on two grounds: (1) the employee was on a special mission delivering the B-Tank to Bordentown and the mission had not ended before the accident, and (2) the employee was engaged in a special mission for the company when he was driving to pick up the executive.

The company appealed the trial judge’s decision. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial judge’s decision, stating that Van Sciver met the special-mission exception when he attempted to pick up the company’s high-level officer. The Appellate Division noted that the Workers’ Compensation Act requires employers to compensate employees for accidental injuries arising out of and in the course of employment and occurring away from the place of employment if the employee is engaged in duties directed by the employer (i.e. the special-mission exception).

The company argued that Van Sciver was not directed by the employer to pick up the company’s executive because he could have declined. However, the Appellate Division reiterated that indirect pressure on an employee can be as powerful as an explicit order, indicating that implied direction from high-level officers can expand an employee’s job duties.

Finally, the company argued that the trial court’s legal determinations were not supported by the facts. In its review, the Appellate Division noted that they do not re-determine the factual findings of the trial judge, but they determine whether the trial judge’s findings had sufficient credible evidence. Thus, once a trial judge makes a factual determination, it can be quite difficult to change such a finding on appeal.

It is clear that “special-mission” cases are heavily fact-specific. Employers must quickly investigate how an accident occurred, what the employee was asked to do, and the employee’s job responsibilities. Just as the court considered an executive’s request for a ride to work as an extension of the employee’s job duties, other requests could impact an employee in the same manner. Thus, employers must be careful not to blur the line between an employee’s professional responsibilities and personal favors.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

U.S. Department of Education Reports to Congress on Disciplinary Removals of Children with Disabilities

In June 2026, the United States Department of Education, through the Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services (OSERS), published its “47th Annual Report to Congress on the Implementation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 2025.” In its report, OSERS provided detailed data and information on the discipline and removal of students from their educational placements, specifically for the school year 2022-2023. To obtain this data, all 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Bureau of Indian Education, Puerto Rico, and other U.S. territories, were asked to report on pre-school and school-aged students, ages 3-21, who were served under IDEA, Part B, and removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons during the school year in question. Not all jurisdictions had data available; OSERS’ reporting to Congress was based on the information supplied by the jurisdictions that responded.  First, OSERS examined the total number of served students who were removed to an interim alternative educational setting. From the reporting data, this number totaled 7,204,199 students. Of this total, 11,364 students were removed unilaterally by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury to themselves or others. These figures reflected the unilateral removal of served students at a rate of 16 per 10,000 students. Of this total, 545 students were removed by a due process hearing officer for likely serious bodily injury, a rate of one per 10,000 students.  Next, OSERS examined data for students who were suspended (in school and out of school) or expelled for more than 10 school days. The total number of students in this category was 7,623,095. Of this total, 65,104 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions, a rate of 85 per 10,000 students. A total of 21,878 students received in school suspensions, a rate of 29 students per 10,000.  OSERS evaluated this particular data and drilled down further, examining the rate of interim removal, expulsion, and suspension per 10,000 students based specifically upon each IDEA disability category. Perhaps not surprisingly, children primarily identified with emotional disturbance were the most affected.    For every 10,000 students who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance, 65 were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel (not the IEP team) for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury, and four out of every 10,000 students were removed following a hearing officer finding that there was a substantial likelihood of serious bodily injury to the student or others. By contrast, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who were unilaterally removed by school personnel was 25 or less per 10,000 students in each category. No more than two students per 10,000 in each of the other categories were removed by a hearing officer. Other Health Impairment was the second leading category.  For every 10,000 students identified primarily with emotional disturbance, 411 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days, and 107 of every 10,000 students in this category received in-school suspensions. In comparison, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days was no more than 172 per 10,000. Students identified in all other disability categories received in-school suspensions at a rate of no more than 57 per 10,000 students. Again, Other Health Impairment was the second leading category. OSERS then examined discipline data with a state-by-state comparison, once more at a ratio of 10,000 students served. The overall data of students who were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury showed that removal occurred most frequently in Texas (92 per 10,000 students), Montana (62 per 10,000 students), and Tennessee (42 per 10,000 students). The mean was 12.1.  In Pennsylvania, the rate of removal was 12 out of every 10,000 students, just below the mean.  OSERS also considered, on a state-by-state basis, the number of students who received out-of-school suspensions or expulsions of greater than 10 days. The most significant rate of discipline here occurred in North Carolina (256 per 10,000 students), Missouri (250 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (250 per 10,000 students).  The mean was 85.83. In Pennsylvania, the rate of discipline was 57 per 10,000 students, well below the mean.  Finally, OSERS evaluated, on a state-by-state comparison, the ratio of students per 10,000 who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance and who received out of school suspensions or expulsions for greater than 10 days. The suspension or expulsion of students with emotional disturbance occurred most often in North Carolina (1,723 per 10,000 students), Missouri (1,127 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (1,098 per 10,000). The mean was 485.81. In Pennsylvania, the suspension or expulsion of students identified with emotional disturbance occurred at a rate of 260 per 10,000, again well below the mean. Although OSERS did not draw any specific conclusions about the disciplinary data it collected, it is nonetheless evident that students primarily identified with emotional disturbance were removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons at a rate much higher than students in any other disability category. Relatively speaking, however, Pennsylvania acquitted itself well in the state-by-state disciplinary data collection.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania HB 2307: Special Education Contingency Fund Reform

Pennsylvania school districts and school law attorneys are aware of the increasing cost of special education services. In an effort to address this growing squeeze on school district budgets, a bi-partisan group of Pennsylvania House Representatives introduced House Bill 2307. The bill is a special education funding measure intended to reform Pennsylvania's reimbursement system for extraordinarily high-cost special education students. As written, HB 2307 would increase funding dedicated to Pennsylvania's Extraordinary Special Education Program Expenses reimbursement program. Beginning with the 2026-27 school year, the bill would increase the set-aside from 1% to 2% of the annual Special Education appropriation. The increased funding is aimed at assisting school districts and charter schools address the costs of serving students whose needs generate exceptionally high special education expenses. The proposal specifically targets situations involving students whose annual special education costs exceed the state's highest cost threshold and represent a significant burden on a district's special education budget. HB 2307 includes key eligibility requirements such as: 1) extraordinary special education expenses approved by the Secretary of Education; 2) student costs exceeding the state's highest Category 3A threshold; 3) costs representing at least 1% of the district's total special education expenditures; 4) student enrolled in the district for no more than two consecutive school years for the proposed reimbursement category; and 5) application and documentation requirements for districts and charter schools. HB 2307 successfully passed the Pennsylvania House of Representatives on June 16, 2026, by a unanimous vote of 202-0. It was subsequently transmitted to the Senate and was referred to the Senate Education Committee on June 22, 2026, where it currently remains pending. While there is currently no scheduled Senate committee or floor vote publicly listed for HB 2307, the next step would be for the Senate Education Committee to consider the bill and determine whether to report it to the full Senate for consideration. If approved by the committee, the bill would proceed through the Senate's three-consideration process before a final vote. Because the General Assembly is still within the 2025-26 legislative session, the bill remains eligible for action during the remainder of the session. However, absent committee action, it will not become law before the start of the 2026-27 school year. If enacted, HB 2307 could have several important effects: Greater financial stability for districts serving students with exceptionally expensive educational and related-service needs. Increased reimbursement opportunities for high-cost placements, specialized transportation, intensive behavioral supports, and other extraordinary services. Reduced pressure on local special education budgets, particularly in smaller districts where one or two high-cost students can significantly affect annual expenditures. Potential reduction in litigation and placement disputes driven by financial constraints, although the bill does not alter substantive IDEA rights or district obligations to provide FAPE.