.

What's Hot in Workers' Comp

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp - News and Results*

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 27, No. 9, September 2023

September 1, 2023

NEWS

Elias Hassinger (Philadelphia, PA) will co-present at the 2023 Philadelphia Bar Association’s Bench-Bar & Annual Conference on September 22, 2023. In “Proper Identification of Pain Generators in Work Injuries/Personal Injuries and Novel Treatment Options,” Eli and the other panelists will explore proper identification of pain generators and novel treatment options and how they may affect the workers' compensation claim.

Michele Punturi (Philadelphia, PA) will co-present “Getting Caught with Your Hand in the Proverbial Cookie Jar” at this year’s ClaimsXchange in Philadelphia. In this presentation, the panel will discuss best strategies for investigating, uncovering, and deterring fraudulent acts while exploring methods to recover monies paid out to fraudulent actors. They will also examine how fraud impacts the claim value and how to counteract its debilitating effects. For more information, visit: https://www.theclaimsx.org/getting-caught-with-your-hand-in-the-proverbial-cookie-jar.  
 

 

RESULTS*

Greg Bartley (Roseland, NJ) successfully defended a case involving the cancellation of a workers’ compensation policy. The case involved a company that had failed to pay their insurance premium on its workers’ compensation policy. The carrier notified the insured company that the premium had not been received and that the carrier was taking the necessary steps to cancel the policy. The carrier complied with rules for policy cancellation pursuant to the New jersey Department of Labor. The case involved a worker who was injured on the day after the policy was cancelled. The company, on the day after the worker’s injury, electronically paid the premium. The day following receipt of the policy premium, the carrier issued a new policy covering the company. When given notice of the claim, the carrier denied it based upon the cancellation of the policy. The petitioner filed a claim petition, alleging that the failure to pay the premium should not deny him coverage, as the payment of the premium and subsequent issuance of the new policy amounted to a mere lapse in coverage and the carrier’s acceptance of the premium should result in the coverage being reinstated as of the date of cancellation, not the date of the new policy. After numerous hearings over more than two years and two judges, who supported the position of the petitioner, Greg argued the case with all parties present. The court agreed that the cancellation was legally effective and, therefore, entered an order of dismissal as to the carrier.

Ben Durstein (Wilmington, DE) was successful in having the Delaware Superior Court affirm the Industrial Accident Board’s decision that the employer correctly paid for ketamine infusion treatments. The Board had found that these treatments were properly paid pursuant to the Delaware Workers’ Compensation Fee Schedule. The court rejected the claimant’s argument that Section 2322(b) of the Workers’ Compensation Act required a higher payment for the “reasonable cost” of the treatment.

Adam Huber (Mount Laurel, NJ) successfully obtained orders for dismissal with prejudice on two Medical Provider Applications. Two separate New Jersey medical providers alleged they were entitled to additional money for medical treatment provided in New Jersey to a New Jersey resident. Each provider claimed that, because the injured worker who received the treatment was a current resident of New Jersey and treatment was rendered in New Jersey, that provided sufficient contact for the court to exercise jurisdiction for a Medical Provider Application and bills should be paid at a usual and customary rate, as opposed to New York’s fee schedule. The worker’s compensation claim that resulted in the Medical Provider Applications was a New York claim, with no New Jersey contacts for the parties at the time of the injury. The injured worker only later moved to New Jersey and received medical treatment with New Jersey providers, who were then paid per the New York fee schedule. The providers’ billed amounts were $221,591.55, $6,157.50, and $6.157.50 for three dates of service. The employer made payments in the amount of $55,488, $1,401.83, and $740.42, respectively, per the New York fee schedule. Adam successfully argued to the court that, because it would not have been able to exercise jurisdiction over the underlying worker’s compensation claim, it would not be able to exercise jurisdiction over the two resulting Medical Provider Applications. Therefore, the providers could not seek additional money in New Jersey based on its usual and customary standard, as opposed to New York’s fee schedule. This saved the employer up to $176,276.30 in potential medical payments. Both Medical Provider Applications were dismissed with prejudice.

William Murphy (Roseland, NJ) successfully obtained orders for dismissal with prejudice where two New Jersey medical providers alleged they were entitled to additional monies for medical treatment provided in New Jersey to a New Jersey resident. The underlying accident involved a truck driver who resided in New Jersey, regularly worked in New Jersey, but sustained injuries in Massachusetts. While the injured worker initially filed a New Jersey workers’ compensation claim, he subsequently opted to pursue his claim in Massachusetts, in part, because Massachusetts allowed him to select his own treatment providers (unlike New Jersey, where the employer designates the treatment providers). Each provider claimed that, because the injured worker was a resident of New Jersey, worked in New Jersey and treatment was rendered in New Jersey, there was sufficient contact for the court to exercise jurisdiction for a Medical Provider Application. As such, they claimed their bills should be paid at New Jersey’s standard of a usual and customary rate, as opposed to Massachusetts’s fee schedule. The providers’ billed amounts were $173,927.52 and $128,088.00. The employer made payments in the amount of $13,872.87 and $7,149.01, respectively, per Massachusetts’ fee schedule. William successfully argued to the court that, because the injured worker had opted to pursue a Massachusetts workers’ compensation claim and had selected these medical providers pursuant to said claim (as a New Jersey claim would have required employer-approval), the payment of these medical providers should be governed by Massachusetts’ workers’ compensation system. Therefore, the providers could not seek additional money in New Jersey based on its usual and customary standard, as opposed to Massachusetts’ fee schedule. This saved the employer up to $280,993.64 in potential medical payments. Both Medical Provider Applications were dismissed with prejudice.

Tony Natale (Philadelphia, PA) successfully defended a claimant’s reinstatement and review petitions and prosecuted the employer’s termination petition. The claimant sustained traumatic injuries when the vehicle he was operating was targeted for collision by a mentally disturbed individual trying to commit suicide. The claim was accepted as compensable, and eventually, the claimant was able to return to work full duty. Nine years later, the claimant alleged his right to reinstatement to total disability and payment of medical bills that quizzically were not submitted to the carrier but were paid, in part, by a personal health carrier. The claimant was also pursuing Heart & Lung benefits, and the township’s bargaining agreement allowed the H&L claim to be governed by the ruling in the workers’ compensation claim. Both sides submitted expert evidence on the issues of full recovery and recurrence of disability and factual evidence on the payment of medical bills. The court found in the favor of the employer on all issues. 

Tony Natale (Philadelphia, PA) successfully prosecuted a termination petition involving a knee injury where claimant’s job duties required him to fill a basket with mushrooms, pivot or sidestep and dump the basket into a slicer machine. During his course and scope of employment, it was judicially determined that he sustained injuries in the form of meniscal tears of the knee and the rather vague “injury” of patellar subluxation. On cross examination of claimant’s medical expert, Tony forced him to admit that the meniscal tears had fully recovered. As for the subluxation, Tony exposed the fact that the expert did not diagnose such a condition in the medical treatment notes but, instead, referred to a “chondromalacia” condition that was NOT judicially part of the work injury. The claimant’s medical expert went as far as to indicate on cross examination that the claimant remained totally disabled from his pre-injury job, even though Tony forced him to admit that he had no idea of the claimant’s pre-injury job. 

Robin Romano (Philadelphia, PA) successfully defended the claimant’s petition to review to add a right hip injury. The claimant had already succeeded in having a claim petition granted that acknowledged the left hip and left hip surgery. The Workers’ Compensation Judge carefully considered the testimony of both medical experts. Importantly, the judge rejected the claimant’s surgeon’s testimony, which found a causal relationship between the right hip and the work injury. Robin presented the defense medical expert, who credibly testified that the mechanism of the original injury would not have caused a right hip injury and, also, that an altered gait, suffered by claimant as a result of the accepted left hip surgery, did not lead to a right hip injury or aggravation of what was clearly pre-existing osteoarthritis. 

Michael Sebastian (Scranton, PA) successfully defended a claim petition alleging a specific loss of the right eye from being hit in the eye with the top of a box. The Workers’ Compensation Judge rejected the claimant’s expert’s testimony that the macular scar, which is in the back of the eye, was caused by the work injury and believed the defense expert, who opined there was insufficient force from the top of the box to cause the injury to the back of the eye. The defense expert testified that the claimant’s loss of vision was unrelated to the work event because the claimant did not have any visible damage to the front of the eye at the time of the accident and that there are dystrophies that can cause macular degeneration in one eye. 

*Prior Results Do Not Guarantee a Similar Outcome
 

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 27, No. 9, September 2023, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2023 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

News

Stacey R. Gorin Installed as President of the Burlington County Bar Association

Portrait of Thomas Glassman. Text: Joining our Cincinnati Office as a Shareholder in the Casualty Department

News

Marshall Dennehey Adds Shareholder Thomas F. Glassman in Cincinnati, Expands Casualty Practice in Ohio and Kentucky

Thought Leadership

Court Reaffirms That Actual Cash Value Includes Labor and Overhead, Not Just Materials

Greenaker v. Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., Case No. 2D2024-1964, (Fla. 2nd DCA May 8, 2026). The plaintiffs filed a breach of contract suit against Universal for refusal to pay for all of plaintiffs’ damages from a storm in November 2020. Universal filed a motion in limine to prevent the plaintiffs from introducing evidence concerning both actual cash value and replacement cost value of the loss. They argued that the plaintiffs did not complete repairs or incur any expenses in repairing the damaged property, thus being limited to actual cash value as their measure of damage and the plaintiffs’ submitted estimate of damages contained labor costs necessary for repair and, therefore, not an actual cash value estimate. Universal further asked for a directed verdict at the hearing because the plaintiffs would have no evidence to support the claim for damages. The trial court agreed and granted Universal’s motion, entering a final judgment in Universal’s favor.  The plaintiffs filed a motion for rehearing and reconsideration due to the court improperly converting Universal’s motion in limine to a motion for final summary judgment. The court denied plaintiffs’ motion and the plaintiffs appealed. The Second District Court of Appeal agreed with the plaintiffs and determined that the trial court improperly entered a final judgment based on a pretrial ruling in limine, advising there was recognized procedures, including summary judgment, judgment on the pleadings, and default judgment that could have been exercised. Further, the court continued that the improper procedure was not the only reason for the judgment to be reversed. They noted the insurance policy did not provide a definition of actual cash value nor how to calculate it, and the parties disputed the definition and calculation of such.  Universal argued that actual cash value is defined as the value of the property that suffered the direct physical loss less depreciation and deductible, i.e. costs of physical materials that were damaged.  The plaintiffs argued that actual cash value includes the amount of repair costs in addition to the value of the property that suffered direct physical loss because it is calculated as the replacement cost minus depreciation.  The court agreed with the plaintiffs, noting that Universal’s definition was not supported by the insurance contract, the statute governing replacement value insurance contracts, nor decisional authority.  The court noted that Universal “cherry-picked” the phrase “direct physical loss” from the perils insured against provision and applied it to the loss settlement provision, which doesn’t state “direct physical loss,” but instead states “insured loss.”  Further, the court conveyed that application of “direct physical loss” would be used on both actual cash value and replacement cost value, as they are both present in the loss settlement provision, which would mean insureds never got payments beyond costs of physically damaged material, which is contradictory to the replacement cost value definition.  The court advised that the Florida Supreme Court had approved the court’s interpretation of actual cash value as including costs other than damaged physical property, including overhead and profit, noting that these costs can be included in actual cash value to which a portion, like all other costs, could be depreciated. The court noted the difference between actual cash value and replacement cost value is not between types of costs, i.e. materials vs. labor, but between the valuation of the costs with the distinction of being a depreciated vs. undepreciated value. The court refused to exclude intangible costs such as labor, profit and overhead from actual cash value, finding these costs inclusions were consistent with statutory and contractual language as well as Florida Supreme Court precedent. The court reversed the judgment and remanded the case back to the trial court.

Thought Leadership

Perlmutter Provides Predictability for Punitive Damages Claims in Florida

In a much anticipated decision, the Florida Supreme Court provided clarity for the standards of proof for punitive damages claims in Perlmutter v. Federal Insurance Company, SC2024-0058 (Fla. June 11, 2026). Litigants and trial judges must be mindful of the standards laid out by the Court. And, defense practitioners must be prepared to alter their strategies to defend against such claims. Perlmutter came to the Court from the Fourth District, based on conflict jurisdiction with decisions from the Second and Fifth District and on certification of a question of great public importance as to the standard of proof for punitive damages claims at the pleading stage. Fed. Ins. Co. v. Perlmutter, 376 So. 3d 24, 29 (Fla. 4th DCA 2023). In the underlying case, the Fourth District made two conclusions. First, it held that a “trial court must consider the evidentiary showing by all parties at the hearing on the motion to amend, that is, evidence ‘in the record’ and evidence ‘proffered by the claimant.’”  376 So. 3d at 33. Second, the Fourth held that it “interpreted section 768.72(1) and (2) to require the trial court to make a preliminary determination of whether a reasonable jury, viewing the totality of proffered evidence in the light most favorable to the movant, could find by clear and convincing evidence that punitive damages are warranted.  Id. at 34 (underscoring in the original). In making these conclusions, the court cautioned trial courts that the “preliminary determination” analysis did not entitle the trial court to decide whether the evidence is clear and convincing and noted that the trial court should not weigh evidence and should not determine witness credibility. Id. The Florida Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction and answered the certified question in the negative. It quashed the decision below and remanded the case for application of the following standards: The trial court should consider only the evidence identified or proffered by the claimant; it should not entertain an evidentiary counter-submission from the opponent. The trial court should consider whether a reasonable person could conclude based on the claimant’s evidence, that the defendant committed “intentional misconduct” or “gross negligence” as defined in section 768.72(2) or section 768.72(3). The trial court must review the request for punitive damages in the context of the underlying claims. The trial court should not apply the clear and convincing standard of proof in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence at the pleading stage. The trial court does not act as a fact-finder; the trial court must not weigh the claimant’s evidence—it cannot decide the truth of the matter. The trial court must consider the record evidence and the proffered evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, but the allegations in the proposed amended complaint are not themselves evidence. Perlmutter, SC2024-0058 at 13-15 (emphasis added). In explaining these standards, the Court interpreted the text of the statute and compared it to a related statute which governs punitive damages in the nursing home context. The nursing home statute expressly calls for evidentiary submissions by “the parties” and expressly tells the trial court to determine whether there is a reasonable basis to believe the claimant could satisfy the “clear and convincing evidence” standard at trial. Id. at 17-18 (comparing the text of section 768.72(1), Florida Statutes, with section 400.0237, Florida Statutes). Without that express language in section 768.72, the statute could not be applied in the same manner. With these standards specially delineated for the trial courts, the Court is “confident that its interpretation of section 768.72(1) will not frustrate the effectiveness of the statute in accomplishing the Legislature’s textually evident purposes.” Id.  at 22 (cleaned up). This remains to be seen. While Perlmutter provides predictability and clarity for trial courts when reviewing the evidentiary submissions in support of a punitive damages claim, the decision will not likely impact the numbers of punitive damages motions filed. Rather, these new parameters will change the way claims are defended, reminiscent of a time when rulings on punitive damages were only subject to certiorari review and appellate courts were limited in reviewing procedural errors. This decision will likely deflate the level-playing field that Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.130(a)(3)(G) addressed by allowing appeals of orders granting and denying punitive damages amendments. Further, Perlmutter may have impliedly created a call to action for the Legislature to amend section 768.72(1) in the same manner it amended section 400.0237 to allow the courts to analyze “admissible evidence submitted by the parties” and determine at a hearing whether there is a reasonable basis to believe the claimant at trial would be able to demonstrate by “clear and convincing evidence” that the recovery of punitive damages is warranted. Until then, defendants must adjust their strategies. To adapt to these new standards, defense practitioners will need to tailor their strategy for defending punitive damages claims since they can no longer submit a counter-proffer or urge a court to apply the clear and convincing standard at the pleading phase. Instead, defendants will need to attack the deficiencies in the claimant’s pleadings and proffer. If the trial court fails to serve as a gatekeeper, and does not apply the above standards, then defendants can pursue an interlocutory appeal under Rule 9.130(a)(3)(G). If a nonfinal appeal is taken, then defendants should move to stay any intrusive financial discovery while the appellate court analyzes the issues on appeal. Finally, defendants should utilize Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.510 to serve as a screening device to allow the trial court to analyze all evidence and prevent nonmeritorious punitive damages claims from proceeding to a jury.

Thought Leadership

Appeals Court Reverses Trial Court Order Striking Complaint as Sanction for Violating Discovery Order

All Dry USA v. Savell, 2026 WL 816093 (Fla. 1st DCA 2026) The First District Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s order denying All Dry USA’s complaint as a sanction for violating a discovery order. The appellate court found that All Dry USA’s failure to comply with the trial court’s case management order did not give the trial court the authority to strike All Dry USA’s pleadings. All Dry USA provided water mitigation, mold remediation, and a restorative tarp at the property owned by the Savells. The property had been damaged by Hurricane Sally. All Dry USA provided invoices for the three services it performed in the amount of $90,130.61. The Savells refused to pay the invoices, stating that while they had retained All Dry USA, there was no agreement reached regarding the cost of the services. All Dry USA proceeded to file a lawsuit against the Savells, alleging breach of contract and unjust enrichment. The Savells answered the lawsuit and served discovery upon All Dry USA. All Dry USA failed to respond to the discovery requests and the Savells moved for an order compelling discovery. The trial court issued an order compelling All Dry USA to respond to Savells discovery requests and comply with all outstanding discovery deadlines per the case management order. On the day its responses were due, All Dry USA filed a motion to extend the deadline to comply with the court’s order. Before the motion was ruled upon, the Savells filed a motion to have All Dry USA’s complaint stricken for violating the trial court’s order compelling All Dry USA’s responses. The trial court granted the motion to strike, and then granted the Savell’s request for entry of default final judgment, based upon there no longer being an operative complaint. The First District Court of Appeal reversed, ruling that an order striking pleadings is justified if it is found that a party has violated numerous discovery orders, or has shown a “deliberate and contumacious disregard of the court's authority.” Mercer v. Raine, 443 So. 2d 944, 946 (Fla. 1983). The appellate court stated that a trial court’s authority to strike pleadings is not unbridled and that the situation before the court did not justify the striking of All Dry USA’s pleadings. In reaching its decision, the First District focused on the fact that the trial court only addressed the potential prejudice to Savell by All Dry USA failing to respond to discovery and seeking an extension of the deadline. The appellate court stated that prejudice is not the only factor to be considered and that the trial court needed to address if All Dry USA’s behavior in failing to comply with the discovery order was willful and deliberate.  The First District also stated that nothing in rule 1.200 or 1.380 grants a trial court the authority to strike a pleading because certain case management deadlines are not met. The appellate court held that the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure allow trial courts to bring the parties in, order them to comply with the case management discovery deadlines, and then strike pleadings if the subsequent discovery orders are disobeyed. This ruling shows the importance of understanding the authority that is binding on the trial court a party is appearing in front of. The First District’s view on a trial court’s ability to strike pleadings is in contrast with other appellate court’s throughout Florida.

Result

Summary Judgment Secured, Preserving $750,000 in Coverage for Insured in Major Trucking Liability Dispute

Ray Freudiger and Michael A. Roberts (both of Cincinnati) successfully obtained summary judgment on behalf of their client in a coverage dispute arising from a May 19, 2022, motor vehicle accident. A permissive driver operated a box truck for an interstate trucking company and caused severe injuries to two tort victims. Prior to the accident, the insured had procured a commercial auto policy for the trucking company with stated limits of $1,000,000. Following the accident, the insurer initiated a declaratory judgment action asserting that only reduced bodily injury limits of $25,000/$50,000 applied and later counterclaimed, alleging it would not have insured the driver had he been properly submitted for approval under the policy. After extensive discovery, briefing, and oral argument, the court rejected the insurer’s attempt to shift responsibility for the $750,000 in coverage it was legally required to provide for permissive drivers under Ohio law, granting summary judgment in favor of the insured and preserving $750,000 in liability exposure.

Result

Unanimous Verdict Obtained in a Medical Malpractice Matter in Bergen County, New Jersey

News

Marshall Dennehey’s John J. Hare Brings Home Attorney of the Year Honors; Firm Named Litigation Department of the Year in Two Categories

Marshall Dennehey took home top honors in three categories at the The Legal Intelligencer’s 2026 Pennsylvania Legal Awards, held June 11 in Philadelphia. The first place awards include: Attorney of the Year: John J. Hare, Chair of the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post-Trial Practice Group and Executive Committee member, together with Charles “Chip” Becker of Kline & Specter Litigation Department of the Year, Appellate – Third Win in a Row! Litigation Department of the Year, Product Liability/Mass Torts “There is no one more deserving of Attorney of the Year honors than John. This award is a testament to his exceptional skill, dedication, and leadership—qualities that truly exemplify the very best of our firm,” said G. Mark Thompson, Marshall Dennehey’s President & CEO. “These honors also reflect the strength and depth of our product liability, mass torts, and appellate practices across Pennsylvania and beyond, underscoring our ongoing commitment to delivering outstanding results for our clients.” Attorney of the Year – John J. Hare, Marshall Dennehey, together with Charles “Chip” Becker, Kline & Specter Over the past year, John and Charles were opposing counsel in many of the highest-profile civil appeals in Pennsylvania. John is renowned as a preeminent appellate lawyer on the defense side, and Chip on the plaintiff's side. They have opposed each other repeatedly, exhibiting peerless professionalism and exceptional civility, while zealously litigating under the unremitting pressure of high-profile litigation and record-setting verdicts totaling more than $3.5 billion. They have also collaborated, outside of litigation, on many commissions, committees, and projects of importance to the Pennsylvania judiciary and legal community. Litigation Department of the Year – Appellate Law, Winner (previous winner, 2025 and 2024) 2025 was another standout year for the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post‑Trial Practice Group, led by John J. Hare, which was retained to challenge many of Pennsylvania’s “nuclear” verdicts—awards exceeding $10 million. Notably, the department persuaded the Pennsylvania Superior Court to reverse a Philadelphia judgment of $1.09 billion, the largest judgment ever overturned by a Pennsylvania appellate court. The group’s 11 full‑time Pennsylvania‑based appellate lawyers are at the center of Pennsylvania’s most high-profile matters, bringing more than 150 years of combined appellate experience. They routinely handle post‑trial and appellate matters and are frequently engaged to participate in and monitor trials in high‑exposure cases to ensure that critical legal issues are properly raised and preserved for appeal. Litigation Department of the Year – Product Liability/Mass Torts, Winner This marks the first win for the firm’s Pennsylvania Product Liability and Mass Torts practices, which operate within our Casualty Department, managed by Matthew Schorr and Jeff Rapattoni. For almost five decades, Fortune 500 product manufacturers/distributors and their insurers have turned to these groups to defend their litigation. Led by Bradley D. Remick and Vlada Tasich, our Product Liability group’s success can be attributed to its commitment to keeping abreast of ever-changing legal theories, judicial viewpoints, and evolving technology impacting the product liability landscape. Our attorneys have successfully handled thousands of product liability matters in all jurisdictions across the state. Likewise, our mass tort litigation practice – divided into Asbestos & Mass Tort, and Environmental & Toxic Tort Litigation –  has defended manufacturers, distributors, contractors, and premises owners in thousands of personal injury and other claims. Led by Kevin E. Hexstall and Patrick T. Reilly, most attorneys in these groups have more than 20 years of experience, and our seasoned trial team has tried hundreds of cases to verdict, consistently achieving strong results through both trials and settlements. In addition to these awards, Marshall Dennehey was a Litigation Department of the Year finalist for Professional Liability.

blue facade of a hospital sign against blue sky

Result

Defense Verdict in Complex Medical Malpractice Trial

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.