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Legal Updates for Insurance Services

Property Insurance Reform Laws Passed in Florida-Now What?

Legal Updates for Insurance Services – Florida Alert – December 20, 2022

December 20, 2022

by Michael A. Packer

On December 16, 2022, Florida Governor DeSantis signed into law potentially historic insurance reform, commonly referred to as SB 2A. This comprehensive and sweeping legislation will require insurance companies to investigate claims more efficiently, while changing the landscape in which first-party property claims are litigated into the future. Unless otherwise stated expressly, the provisions in SB 2A take effect on December 16, 2022 (the date the act became law). The following provisions of the new and amended laws* will most significantly impact insurance companies and insurance litigation.

BAD FAITH

  • FS 624.1551 was amended to address the dilemma carriers faced paying an appraisal award after a Civil Remedy Notice of Insurer Violation (CRN) has expired. Under the amended statute, an insured will only be permitted to bring a bad faith action where the property insurer breached the insurance contract and a final judgment or decree has been rendered against the insurer. Further, the acceptance of an offer of judgment under s. 768.79 or the payment of an appraisal award does not constitute an adverse adjudication under this section.

ATTORNEY FEES

  • Florida Statute 626.9373, subsections (1) and (3) which apply to suits brought against surplus lines carriers, are amended to eliminate any rights to attorneys fees for suits arising under a residential or commercial property insurance policy; 
  • Florida Statute 627.428(4) is amended to provide there is no right to attorneys’ fees in lawsuits which arise under a residential or commercial property insurance policy under this section. IT SHOULD BE NOTED, attorneys’ fees may still be awarded under Florida Statutes 57.105 and 768.79; 
  • The attorneys’ fees provisions and calculations contained in Florida Statute 627.70152, just enacted in 2021, have all been deleted from the statute and are no longer applicable to first party property claims arising under residential or commercial property insurance policies. This amendment is consistent with the legislative intent of the second special session of 2022, the elimination of the “one way” attorneys’ fees in first-party property litigation in Florida.

MODIFICATION OF TIME PERIODS TO TAKE ACTION

  • Florida Statute 627.71031 is amended to shorten the time periods in which the insurance companies must take certain actions (effective March 1, 2023):

(1)(a) Upon an insurer’s receiving a communication with respect to a claim, the insurer shall, within 7 (previously 14) calendar days, review and acknowledge receipt of such communication;

(3)(a) Unless otherwise provided by the policy of insurance or by law, within 7 days (previously 14) after an insurer receives proof-of-loss statements, the insurer shall begin such investigation as is reasonably necessary;

(3)(b) If such investigation involves a physical inspection of the property, the licensed adjuster assigned by the insurer must conduct any such physical inspection within 30 days after its receipt of the proof-of-loss statements;

(3)(e) The insurer must send the policyholder a copy of any detailed estimate of the amount of the loss within 7 days after the estimate is generated by an insurer’s adjuster;

(7)(a) Within 60 days after an insurer receives notice of an initial, reopened, or supplemental property insurance claim from a policyholder, the insurer shall pay or deny such claim or a portion of the claim unless the failure to pay is caused by factors beyond the control of the insurer.

  • Florida Statute 626.9541(1)(i)4. is amended to shorten the time for surplus lines carriers to make payment from 90 to 60 days from the date the insurer receives notice of of residential property damage claim unless payment of the undisputed benefits is prevented by factors beyond the control of the insurer as defined in s. 627.70131(5).

TIME TO FILE CLAIM

  • Florida Statute 627.70132(2) is amended to shorten the time for an insured to report a new claim. Specifically, a claim or reopened claim, but not a supplemental claim, is barred unless notice of the claim was given to the insurer within one year (previously two years) after the date of loss. A supplemental claim is barred unless notice of the supplemental claim was given to the insurer within 18 months (previously three years) after the date of loss.

BINDING ARBITRATION

  • Another goal of the December 2022, special session was the creation of Florida Statute 627.70154, which permits insurance companies to issue property policies which contain mandatory binding arbitration endorsements to resolve disputes with policy holders. There are very specific requirements for the insurers that wish to incorporate mandatory binding arbitration into their policies, including reduced premiums; signed election forms; and the option to purchase a policy that does not include mandatory binding arbitration.

HOMEOWNER BILL OF RIGHTS

  • Effective March 1, 2023, pursuant to Florida Statute 627.7142, insurers will be required to amend the Homeowner Claims Bill of Rights to include the following:

YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO:

3. Receive from your insurance company a copy of any detailed estimate of the amount of the loss within 7 days after the estimate is generated by the insurance company’s adjuster.

4. Within 60 (previously 90) days, subject to any dual interest noted in the policy, receive full settlement payment for your claim or payment of the undisputed portion of your claim, or your insurance company’s denial of your claim.

5. Receive payment of interest, as provided in s. 627.70131, Florida Statutes, from your insurance company, which begins accruing from the date your claim is filed if your insurance company does not pay full settlement of your initial, reopened, or supplemental claim or the undisputed portion of your claim or does not deny your claim within 60 (previously 90) days after your claim is filed.

OFFERS OF JUDGMENT

  • Florida Statute 768.79 (Offer of Judgment and Demand for Judgment) was amended to address recent appellate court decisions and subsection (6) was added to provide,

768.79(6) For a breach of contract action, a property insurer may make a joint offer of judgment or settlement that is conditioned on the mutual acceptance of all the joint offerees.

ASSIGNMENT OF BENEFITS

  • Finally, one of the most important aspects of the December 2022 special session was to once and for all address and eliminate “assignment of benefits” or “AOBs” in property damage claims. Accordingly, Florida Statute 627.7152, just enacted in 2019, was amended to eliminate AOBs in residential and property damage claims. Specifically, 

627.7152(2)(a)1. provides an assignment agreement must be executed under a residential property insurance policy or under a commercial property insurance policy, issued on or after July 1, 2019, and before January 1, 2023; and most importantly, 

627.7152(13) was added to state, except as provided in subsection (11)**, a policyholder may not assign, in whole or in part, any post-loss insurance benefit under any residential property insurance policy or under any commercial property insurance policy as that term is defined in s. 627.0625(1), issued on or after January 1, 2023. An attempt to assign post-loss property insurance benefits under such a policy is void, invalid, and unenforceable.

Readers are cautioned that the above information is intended to merely highlight the most significant portions of the amended and new property laws and is not intended to be comprehensive or complete. Recipients are encouraged to review the new and amended statutes in their entirety and contact us with specific questions about how they may apply to claims and policies.

 

Footnotes:

*The amendments primarily apply only to residential and commercial property damage claims.

**(11) This section does not apply to:

(a)An assignment, transfer, or conveyance granted to a subsequent purchaser of the property with an insurable interest in the property following a loss;

(b)A power of attorney under chapter 709 that grants to a management company, family member, guardian, or similarly situated person of an insured the authority to act on behalf of an insured as it relates to a property insurance claim; or

(c)Liability coverage under a property insurance policy.

 

Legal Updates for Insurance Services – Florida Alert – December 20, 2022, has been prepared for our readers by Marshall Dennehey. It is solely intended to provide information on recent legal developments and is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We welcome the opportunity to provide such legal assistance as you require on this and other subjects. If you receive the alerts in error, please send a note to tamontemuro@mdwcg.com ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2022 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

New Jersey Appellate Division Affirms Exclusion of Legal Malpractice Expert as Impermissible Net Opinion

Jack Slimm and Jeremy Zacharias obtained a favorable decision on behalf of their client in a case centering on the admissibility of expert testimony in legal malpractice actions. In Martin v. Loury, the New Jersey Appellate Division affirmed the exclusion of a plaintiff's legal malpractice expert, holding that the expert's opinions on causation and damages were too speculative to support the malpractice claim. The legal malpractice action arose from an underlying employment dispute involving claims for damages stemming from the breach of an employment agreement. The plaintiff alleged that defense counsel committed malpractice during a second trial by failing to recall the plaintiff as a rebuttal witness after the employer's CEO testified. According to the plaintiff's expert, additional rebuttal testimony would have bolstered the plaintiff's damages claims and led to a more favorable result. Both the trial court and the Appellate Division rejected that theory. The courts found that the expert could not explain how the proposed rebuttal testimony would have altered the outcome of the underlying case or resulted in any additional recoverable damages. Notably, the trial judge in the underlying employment matter had already rejected the CEO's testimony as not credible and had accepted the damages analysis advanced by the plaintiff. The court had also determined that the amount of damages was not genuinely disputed. As a result, the expert's opinion that additional rebuttal testimony would have produced a better outcome was unsupported by the record and based on speculation rather than evidence. The Appellate Division agreed that neither the plaintiff nor the expert could identify any actual damages attributable to the alleged malpractice or demonstrate the required element of proximate causation. The court further upheld the trial court's application of New Jersey's net opinion doctrine, finding that the expert failed to provide the necessary "why and wherefore" supporting his conclusion that the attorney's conduct caused a compensable loss. Because the opinions rested on unquantified possibilities rather than demonstrable facts, they were inadmissible. Key Takeaway for Legal Malpractice Defendants For attorneys and firms defending legal malpractice claims, Martin v. Loury underscores the importance of closely scrutinizing an opponent's expert report on the critical elements of proximate causation and damages. The decision demonstrates that a malpractice claim cannot survive where an expert merely speculates that different litigation tactics might have produced a better result. Instead, the plaintiff must present admissible expert testimony grounded in the record that explains how the alleged attorney error probably changed the outcome of the underlying matter and resulted in measurable damages.

Thought Leadership

Court Allows Recklessness and Punitive Damages Claims to Proceed After Work‑Zone Crash

In a case where a defendant filed preliminary objections against allegations of recklessness and punitive damages, the Susquehanna County Court of Common Pleas denied these preliminary objections. This case stems from a motor vehicle accident, where the defendants car struck the plaintiffs car after the defendant allegedly fell asleep at the wheel, going at a high rate of speed, through a construction work zone. Defendant first objected to the general allegations throughout the plaintiff’s complaint pertaining to “reckless” conduct contending that there were insufficient factual allegations to support the claim of reckless conduct. Defendant next objected to the plaintiffs claim for punitive damages, as punitive damages may only be assessed against a motorist for falling asleep while driving if there is further evidence to prove driver was aware of their drowsiness and risk of falling asleep. Lastly, defendant objected to plaintiffs complaint, claiming it lacked specificity. The court here found that the plaintiff had included in the complaint specific allegations related to the defendant’s alleged recklessness, including allegations regarding speeding in a work zone, almost striking the flagger, falling asleep at the wheel, and striking the plaintiffs vehicle which was stopped. Additionally, the court noted that falling asleep does not come without warning. The court found that these allegations were sufficient to support an allegation of recklessness at the pleadings stage.

Thought Leadership

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Holds That Public Policy Does Not Prevent Insurance Coverage for Sex Trafficking Claims

On July 21, 2026, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania issued an opinion emphasizing the limited circumstances in which courts may invoke public policy to bar insurance coverage, holding in Samsung Fire & Marine Insurance Co., Ltd. (U.S. Branch) v. RI Settlement Trust that Pennsylvania public policy does not preclude coverage for claims alleging that insureds enabled or profited from human sex trafficking. The decision rejects a line of federal district court decisions predicting otherwise and reinforces that Pennsylvania courts will invoke the public policy doctrine only in the clearest of circumstances. RI Settlement is particularly significant because it arose on certified questions from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, giving the Supreme Court the opportunity to resolve an issue on which federal courts had predicted Pennsylvania law differently. RI Settlement arose out of four separate civil complaints in which the underlying plaintiffs alleged that, as minors, they were the victims of human sex trafficking at various hotels in Philadelphia. The plaintiffs claimed that the hotel owners were negligent in failing to stop the sex trafficking from happening at their hotels. After the filing of the lawsuits, the hotel owners sought coverage under their Commercial General Liability policies. The insurers initially defended the hotels under Reservation of Rights letters, though the carriers later filed Declaratory Judgment actions seeking declarations that they did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify. In short, the insurers argued in the alternative that they did not owe any obligation to provide coverage based upon Pennsylvania public policy (because the claims violated the Human Trafficking Law – 18 Pa.C.S. § 3011) and the terms and conditions of the policy. On motions for judgment on the pleadings, the District Court found for the insurers on the basis of public policy: There is no duty to defend or indemnify against actions arising out of an insured's criminal conduct related to the sex trafficking of minors. The Court appreciates that it may make public policy the basis of a judicial decision only in “the clearest of cases.” See Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 589 A.2d 854, 868 (Pa. 2004) (quoting Hall v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 755, 760 (Pa. 1994)). Yet, the Court strains to imagine a clearer case than the one presented here in which the facts alleged indicate that Policyholders engaged in criminal conduct in violation of Pennsylvania's Human Trafficking Law. The hotel owners appealed the matter to the Third Circuit, which petitioned the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania to grant review of two certified questions of law: (1) whether Pennsylvania law had an “overriding public policy” against sex trafficking, such that an insurer’s duty to defend and/or indemnify is abrogated when an insured is alleged to have enabled or profited from such trafficking; and (2) if yes, is that duty abrogated whenever the insured’s alleged conduct would constitute a violation of the Pennsylvania Human Trafficking statute. Importantly, the certified questions did not ask the Supreme Court to determine whether the policies afforded coverage under their terms. Rather, the court was asked only whether Pennsylvania public policy independently barred coverage. As a result, the court assumed for purposes of answering the certified questions that the insurers otherwise owed a duty to defend and addressed only the public policy issue, leaving all policy-based coverage defenses for further proceedings. Because the court concluded that the answer to the first certified question was “no”, it did not reach the second issue. In reaching its determination that Pennsylvania public policy does not prohibit insurance coverage for sex trafficking claims, the court limited the impact of its decision in Minnesota Fire & Cas. Co. v. Greenfield, 855 A. 2d 854, 855 (Pa. 2004), which the RI Settlement opinion emphasized as having been an “Opinion Announcing Judgment of the Court” – or a plurality opinion. In Greenfield, the insured homeowner was sued by the estate of his houseguest who overdosed from heroin that he sold to her. The matter wound its way to the Supreme Court, which determined that the insurer did not owe a duty to defend or indemnify based upon Pennsylvania public policy, which criminalized the sale and use of heroin as a Schedule I narcotic. In RI Settlement, the court “decline[d] the invitation” to extend the rationale of the three-justice plurality in Greenfield beyond cases involving Schedule I controlled substances. In so holding, the justices in RI Settlement refused to “divine an overriding public policy pronouncement by the General Assembly by virtue of its enactment of the Human Trafficking Law.” The opinion further states that it is not “within the purview of this Court to rank the magnitude of the public policy underlying the various crimes defined in the Crimes Code. It is sufficient for the work of the courts to know that the General Assembly has identified conduct it deems harmful and dangerous to the maintenance of an orderly society and criminalized it.” While the court declined to declare that Pennsylvania public policy prohibits coverage for sex trafficking claims, the opinion in RI Settlement expressly states that insurers are free to include appropriate exclusionary language for such causes of actions in their policies if they desire to do so. It will certainly be interesting to see whether the insurance industry accepts the court’s invitation, or perhaps whether the Pennsylvania legislature steps in to clarify that sex trafficking claims are indeed of the type or magnitude that they should not be covered by insurance. In any event, we will, of course, continue to monitor this and other insurance coverage issues that arise before courts in Pennsylvania, New Jersey and throughout our firm’s geographic footprint and around the country.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict.