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Defense Digest

On the Horns of a Trial Dilemma: Addressing a Prior Conviction on Direct Examination or Waiving the Right to Contest the Admissibility on Appeal

Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 2, June 2023

June 1, 2023

by Elizabeth A. Underwood

Key Points:

  • A recent Superior Court case found the filing of an unsuccessful motion in limine to preclude a prior conviction does not preserve the issue on appeal if the defendant strategically chooses to then introduce the evidence on direct. 
  • A defendant must now choose whether to preserve the appellate right and allow the opponent to bring up the conviction, or seek to address it during direct, but lose the right to appeal.

The recent Pennsylvania Superior Court case Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 287 A.3d 903 (Pa. Super. 2022), addressed the intersecting issues of how a party may preserve an adverse evidentiary ruling on a motion in limine for appellate review with the competing interests of the trial strategy that the party may seek to pursue as a result of the adverse ruling. Specifically, the Superior Court held that a criminal defendant who testified on direct examination regarding a prior conviction, after the trial court ruled the conviction was admissible pursuant to a motion in limine, waived the right to challenge that ruling because the defendant introduced the evidence himself.

Raheem Stevenson, the defendant, was charged with robbery, burglary, and criminal conspiracy for events occurring on December 3, 2017. Stevenson had previously pled guilty to burglary in 2005. Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 609 addresses the admissibility of prior criminal convictions for purposes of impeachment. While Pa. R.E. 609(a) allows for the impeachment of a witness with a prior crime involving dishonesty or false statements (crimen falsi) if that conviction or release from confinement is more than ten years old, as was the case in Stevenson, the court is required to conduct a balancing test weighing the probative versus the prejudicial value of admitting the prior conviction. Stevenson made an oral motion to preclude his prior conviction as too remote and, thus, too prejudicial. The court denied the motion. Stevenson was then faced with a common dilemma parties are faced with at trial: bring out the unfavorable evidence on direct examination in an attempt to lessen the impact, or wait to see if the opponent chooses to use the evidence on cross examination and risk appearing less than forthcoming to the jury. In this case, Stevenson chose to address the conviction on direct examination. He was subsequently convicted and, on appeal, claimed that the trial court improperly admitted the conviction without performing the appropriate balancing test. 

On appeal, however, the Superior Court first addressed whether the issue of admissibility was appropriately preserved because defendant had introduced the evidence himself on direct. In holding that the defendant did, in fact, waive the right to appeal the initial ruling on the motion in limine by testifying on direct examination about his conviction, the court relied upon the general proposition that a defendant who introduces evidence at trial cannot subsequently claim on appeal that such evidence was improperly admitted. The court also cited to the United States Supreme Court case, Oher v. U.S., 529 U.S. 753 (2000), which interpreted the Federal Rules of Evidence related to impeachment by prior criminal conviction, wherein a 5-4 majority held that a criminal defendant, by choosing to testify and to address a prior conviction on direct examination, was executing a trial strategy and, thus, waived the right to complain on appeal as to the admissibility of the prior conviction. 

The Stevenson ruling must now be taken into consideration for any witness with a prior criminal conviction a defendant intends to call on direct examination at trial. Strategically, a defendant can still file a motion in limine seeking to preclude the evidence. However, if that motion is denied, they will have to decide if the trial strategy of bringing the conviction out on direct overrides waiving the potential appellate issue. The ruling should also be taken into consideration when deciding whether or not to call a specific witness. Many case-specific factors will weigh into the decision, including how a jury may view the prior conviction, i.e., will the nature of the conviction likely prejudice the jury such that the appellate right is more importantly preserved, the likelihood of success on appeal, whether there are other facts that are admissible that will make testimony regarding the prior conviction more prejudicial or, conversely, that will cast a witness in a dishonest light if they do not bring the conviction out on direct? 

Further, a defendant should also consider withholding filing a motion in limine at all if it is unclear whether the opposing side is aware of the conviction or whether, in fact, they will seek to use the conviction. In this instance, a defendant can seek to rely on Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 609(b)(2), which requires that, prior to the use of a conviction more than ten years old, the party seeking to introduce the evidence give the adverse party “reasonable written notice of the intent to use it so that the party has a fair opportunity to contest its use.” If notice was not given prior to the attempt to impeach, in addition to the admissibility objection, the defendant also can raise the procedural objection pursuant to Pa. R.E. 609(b)(2) in an attempt to keep the evidence out while simultaneously preserving the appellate issue. Ultimately, this is a consideration that must now be weighed for any witness with a prior conviction which the defense would normally seek to preclude as either: (1) not a crime of dishonesty or false statement admissible under Pa. R.E. 609(a); or (2) a conviction of more than ten years old where the prejudicial value outweighs any probative effect.

*Beth is a shareholder in our Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, office. She can be reached at 215.575.2599 or EAUnderwood@mdwcg.com.


 

Defense Digest, Vol. 29, No. 2, June 2023, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2023 Marshall Dennehey. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

U.S. Department of Education Reports to Congress on Disciplinary Removals of Children with Disabilities

In June 2026, the United States Department of Education, through the Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services (OSERS), published its “47th Annual Report to Congress on the Implementation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 2025.” In its report, OSERS provided detailed data and information on the discipline and removal of students from their educational placements, specifically for the school year 2022-2023. To obtain this data, all 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Bureau of Indian Education, Puerto Rico, and other U.S. territories, were asked to report on pre-school and school-aged students, ages 3-21, who were served under IDEA, Part B, and removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons during the school year in question. Not all jurisdictions had data available; OSERS’ reporting to Congress was based on the information supplied by the jurisdictions that responded.  First, OSERS examined the total number of served students who were removed to an interim alternative educational setting. From the reporting data, this number totaled 7,204,199 students. Of this total, 11,364 students were removed unilaterally by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury to themselves or others. These figures reflected the unilateral removal of served students at a rate of 16 per 10,000 students. Of this total, 545 students were removed by a due process hearing officer for likely serious bodily injury, a rate of one per 10,000 students.  Next, OSERS examined data for students who were suspended (in school and out of school) or expelled for more than 10 school days. The total number of students in this category was 7,623,095. Of this total, 65,104 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions, a rate of 85 per 10,000 students. A total of 21,878 students received in school suspensions, a rate of 29 students per 10,000.  OSERS evaluated this particular data and drilled down further, examining the rate of interim removal, expulsion, and suspension per 10,000 students based specifically upon each IDEA disability category. Perhaps not surprisingly, children primarily identified with emotional disturbance were the most affected.    For every 10,000 students who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance, 65 were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel (not the IEP team) for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury, and four out of every 10,000 students were removed following a hearing officer finding that there was a substantial likelihood of serious bodily injury to the student or others. By contrast, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who were unilaterally removed by school personnel was 25 or less per 10,000 students in each category. No more than two students per 10,000 in each of the other categories were removed by a hearing officer. Other Health Impairment was the second leading category.  For every 10,000 students identified primarily with emotional disturbance, 411 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days, and 107 of every 10,000 students in this category received in-school suspensions. In comparison, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days was no more than 172 per 10,000. Students identified in all other disability categories received in-school suspensions at a rate of no more than 57 per 10,000 students. Again, Other Health Impairment was the second leading category. OSERS then examined discipline data with a state-by-state comparison, once more at a ratio of 10,000 students served. The overall data of students who were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury showed that removal occurred most frequently in Texas (92 per 10,000 students), Montana (62 per 10,000 students), and Tennessee (42 per 10,000 students). The mean was 12.1.  In Pennsylvania, the rate of removal was 12 out of every 10,000 students, just below the mean.  OSERS also considered, on a state-by-state basis, the number of students who received out-of-school suspensions or expulsions of greater than 10 days. The most significant rate of discipline here occurred in North Carolina (256 per 10,000 students), Missouri (250 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (250 per 10,000 students).  The mean was 85.83. In Pennsylvania, the rate of discipline was 57 per 10,000 students, well below the mean.  Finally, OSERS evaluated, on a state-by-state comparison, the ratio of students per 10,000 who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance and who received out of school suspensions or expulsions for greater than 10 days. The suspension or expulsion of students with emotional disturbance occurred most often in North Carolina (1,723 per 10,000 students), Missouri (1,127 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (1,098 per 10,000). The mean was 485.81. In Pennsylvania, the suspension or expulsion of students identified with emotional disturbance occurred at a rate of 260 per 10,000, again well below the mean. Although OSERS did not draw any specific conclusions about the disciplinary data it collected, it is nonetheless evident that students primarily identified with emotional disturbance were removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons at a rate much higher than students in any other disability category. Relatively speaking, however, Pennsylvania acquitted itself well in the state-by-state disciplinary data collection.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania HB 2307: Special Education Contingency Fund Reform

Pennsylvania school districts and school law attorneys are aware of the increasing cost of special education services. In an effort to address this growing squeeze on school district budgets, a bi-partisan group of Pennsylvania House Representatives introduced House Bill 2307. The bill is a special education funding measure intended to reform Pennsylvania's reimbursement system for extraordinarily high-cost special education students. As written, HB 2307 would increase funding dedicated to Pennsylvania's Extraordinary Special Education Program Expenses reimbursement program. Beginning with the 2026-27 school year, the bill would increase the set-aside from 1% to 2% of the annual Special Education appropriation. The increased funding is aimed at assisting school districts and charter schools address the costs of serving students whose needs generate exceptionally high special education expenses. The proposal specifically targets situations involving students whose annual special education costs exceed the state's highest cost threshold and represent a significant burden on a district's special education budget. HB 2307 includes key eligibility requirements such as: 1) extraordinary special education expenses approved by the Secretary of Education; 2) student costs exceeding the state's highest Category 3A threshold; 3) costs representing at least 1% of the district's total special education expenditures; 4) student enrolled in the district for no more than two consecutive school years for the proposed reimbursement category; and 5) application and documentation requirements for districts and charter schools. HB 2307 successfully passed the Pennsylvania House of Representatives on June 16, 2026, by a unanimous vote of 202-0. It was subsequently transmitted to the Senate and was referred to the Senate Education Committee on June 22, 2026, where it currently remains pending. While there is currently no scheduled Senate committee or floor vote publicly listed for HB 2307, the next step would be for the Senate Education Committee to consider the bill and determine whether to report it to the full Senate for consideration. If approved by the committee, the bill would proceed through the Senate's three-consideration process before a final vote. Because the General Assembly is still within the 2025-26 legislative session, the bill remains eligible for action during the remainder of the session. However, absent committee action, it will not become law before the start of the 2026-27 school year. If enacted, HB 2307 could have several important effects: Greater financial stability for districts serving students with exceptionally expensive educational and related-service needs. Increased reimbursement opportunities for high-cost placements, specialized transportation, intensive behavioral supports, and other extraordinary services. Reduced pressure on local special education budgets, particularly in smaller districts where one or two high-cost students can significantly affect annual expenditures. Potential reduction in litigation and placement disputes driven by financial constraints, although the bill does not alter substantive IDEA rights or district obligations to provide FAPE.