.

Defense Digest

Federal Court Cautions Lawyers on Pleading Affirmative Defenses

Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 4, September 2021

September 1, 2021

by Holli K. Archer

Key Points:

  • Affirmative defenses that do not give rise to a good faith basis to plead such defenses violate Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.
  • A court may impose sanctions for violating Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11.
  • The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure give other options to filing an answer without a factual basis when there is not enough time to conduct an investigation.

It is common for lawyers to want plead any and all affirmative defenses in answers to complaints in order to prevent a waiver. However, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not allow this tactic or the assertion of boilerplate affirmative defenses. Specifically, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that a lawyer who presents to the court a “pleading, written motion, and other paper” confirms “to the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances” that the “claims defenses and other legal contentions are warranted by existing law” and that the “factual contentions have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2), (3). If Rule 11 is violated, a lawyer may be sanctioned by the court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1), (3).

In Greenspan v. Platinum Healthcare Group, LLC, 2021 WL 978899 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 16, 2021), the court imposed sanctions under Rule 11 by striking affirmative defenses from an answer, without prejudice. The case arose out of a fall suffered by Ruth Greenspan at a Platinum Healthcare facility due to the alleged negligent care provided by the facility, which caused Ms. Greenspan’s death. According to the court’s opinion, a complaint was filed by the Administrator of the decedent’s estate against Platinum Healthcare and others on November 23, 2020. The plaintiff served Platinum Healthcare on December 7, 2020, which would have made their answer due on December 28, 2020. However, Platinum Healthcare did not file an answer by the deadline. Then, on January 28, 2021, the court issued an order directed to the plaintiff, stating that if he did not seek a default by February 22, 2021, the case would be dismissed for failure to prosecute. Thereafter, on February 22, 2021, Platinum Healthcare filed an answer, asserting 25 affirmative defenses, including: lack of personal jurisdiction, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff’s execution of a jury waiver or an arbitration agreement, comparative or contributory negligence, assumption of risk, the statute of limitations, res judicata or collateral estoppel, and accord and satisfaction.

The court opined that the defendant failed to aver any allegations or provide any facts or evidence that would give rise to a good faith basis to plead the defenses asserted. Rather, the court found that they were raised to prevent waiver. The court held that the defendant’s affirmative defenses violated Rule 11 because they were pleaded with conditional language, signaling to the court that the defendant did not have evidentiary support as to the assertion of its defenses.

The court went on to further reject two of Platinum Healthcare’s arguments in its memorandum defending its answer. First, Platinum Healthcare stated that the assertion of the above-named affirmative defenses was supported through experience in defending other similarly situated health care providers in similar cases, as these affirmative defenses often arise throughout the course of discovery. The court opined that Rule 11 does not allow counsel to merely “assert defenses that might apply based on experience in a particular field. It only allows affirmative defenses that the evidence supports in this case.” Second, Platinum Healthcare attempted to further defend its answer by stating that their counsel had became aware of the case just 12 days before filing the answer and that its investigation of the facts was reasonable given the short amount of time it had to file its answer. The court stated that Rule 11 allows for a bit of factual inaccuracy, but “a short time to investigate does not obviate the requirement that a lawyer have a good faith basis to contend that there is an evidentiary basis for each affirmative defense that is in an answer.” Therefore, the court concluded that Platinum Healthcare did not meet that requirement.

The court opined that stating such boilerplate affirmative defenses is harmful and magnifies discovery in cases, making it harder for them to come to a resolution. It compels a plaintiff’s lawyer to serve discovery to determine the factual basis for each affirmative defense that can result in motions to withdraw certain defenses—which tacks unnecessary time onto the litigation—for affirmative defenses that should not have been asserted to begin with.

The court reminded lawyers that there are options to comply with Rule 11, such as asking plaintiff’s counsel and/or the court for a brief extension to file an answer in order to conduct a reasonable investigation of the facts. Also, an answer without affirmative defenses can be filed and then amended pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1)(A). The court even goes further to state that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) orders that courts “freely give leave when justice so requires.” With these options in mind, the court stated that “the answer is never to file an answer—or any other pleading—without a factual basis.”

For a defense lawyer, it is important when asserting affirmative defenses in federal court that he or she have a good faith basis to plead such defenses. Otherwise, one might find oneself in the unfortunate situation of defending a Rule 11 motion.

*Holli is an associate in our King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, office. She can be reached at 610.354.8258 or hkbott@mdwcg.com.

Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 4, September 2021 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Takes Up the Gist of the Action Doctrine

The gist of the action doctrine has been a hot topic in legal malpractice cases in Pennsylvania over the last several years.  Beginning in 2014, the Pennsylvania courts applied the gist of the action doctrine to professional liability actions, following the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s opinion in Bruno v. Erie Ins. Co., 106 A.3d 48 (Pa. 2014).  In Bruno, the court applied the gist of the action doctrine to a professional negligence claim, and found that a negligence claim was not barred simply because the parties were in a contractual relationship where the gist of the claim sounded in negligence. Thereafter, courts in Pennsylvania applied the gist of the action doctrine to breach of contract claims as well, finding that where the allegations sounded in negligence, a plaintiff could not recast a negligence claim as one for breach of contract. This was important because of the distinction between statutes of limitations: negligence claims must be brought within two (2) years, while breach of contract claims can be brought within four (4) years.  Then, last year, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the gist of the action doctrine does not apply to breach of contract claims as seen through two opinions. These opinions were Swatt v. Nottingham Village, 342 A.3d 23 (Pa. Super. 2025) and Poteat v. Asteak, et al., 350 A.3d 198 (Pa. Super. 2025). That is, the gist of the action doctrine can bar a negligence claim but it cannot bar a breach of contract claim.  This month, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted the petition for allowance of appeal in Poteat.  The Supreme Court phrased the issue for consideration as follows: Whether the Superior Court majority’s holding conflicts with this Court’s holding in Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co., 160 A.3d 48 (Pa. 2014), as well as Superior Court opinions that applied Bruno, and departs from almost 200 years of controlling precedent that distinguishes between causes of action in contract and tort based upon the nature of the duty that was allegedly breached? Attorneys on both sides of legal malpractice matters no doubt look forward to clarification on these issues from our Supreme Court.

Thought Leadership

Delaware Superior Court Clarifies Pleading Standard for Legal Malpractice Claims

In the matter of Edelstein v. Kirschner, No. N25C-09-018 FJJ, 2026 Del. Super. LEXIS 45, at *1 (Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 2026), the plaintiff law firm sued its former client for unpaid legal fees in the amount of $4,399.35. The former client asserted a counterclaim alleging legal malpractice. More, specifically, the former client claimed that his lawyer committed malpractice be recommending that he settle an underlying lawsuit by entering into a stipulated judgment for an excessive amount with interest that was accruing at “an outlandish” interest rate. The law firm moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the basis that its former client had not alleged facts reflecting that he could prove the case within the case. That is, facts reflecting that his attorneys caused him to lose the underlying case. The Superior Court held that while a legal malpractice plaintiff in cases arising from underlying litigation must prove the case within the case to survive a summary judgment motion, he does not need to plead facts reflecting as much in order to survive a motion to dismiss. While this case addresses the pleading requirements of a legal malpractice case in Delaware, it also serves as reminder that chasing unpaid legal fees from a former client can often give rise to a legal malpractice counterclaim. Attorneys seeking to collect unpaid legal fees should ensure that the fees they seek are for a significant amount, which would be recoverable if a judgment is obtained. Otherwise, the effort could backfire.