.

Defense Digest

The Fair Share Act in Spencer Is Not the Law, But It Just Might Become the Law

Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 5, December 2021

December 1, 2021

by Thomas McKenzie

Key Points:

  • The Fair Share Act limits a judgment against a defendant to its proportionate share of an award if it is determined to be less than 60% negligent.
  • Dicta in Spencer v. Johnson, 249 A.3d 529 (Pa. Super. 2021) may create headaches for defense practitioners in that it suggests that the proportionate share limitation of the Fair Share Act does not apply if a plaintiff is not negligent.

The Fair Share Act was welcomed by defendants and insurance companies in 2011. For the past ten years, the Fair Share Act has been used to limit judgments against defendants to the defendant’s proportionate share of the damages award if they were determined to be less than 60% negligent. Under the previous joint and several liability, “the 1% negligence” strategy was used against “deep pocket” defendants to obtain a full recovery. It did not matter that other defendants were more liable for the accident. It only mattered that the “deep pocket” defendant, who could pay the entire award was found at least 1% negligent.

An example of the 1% negligence issue for joint and several liability, before 2011 is as follows: Car A disregards a red light and drives into an intersection. Commercial Bus B is proceeding through the intersection on a steady green light and hits the passenger side rear of Car A. The passenger in Car A and several passengers in Bus B are injured. One of the passengers has a claim worth more than $1 million. The driver/owner of Car A purchased the mandatory minimum insurance policy, which covers claims in the amount of $15,000 per injury and $30,000 in the aggregate for general liability, and has no recoverable assets. Commercial Bus B has a primary policy of $1 million and has a $10 million excess insurance policy. 

Generally speaking, most people would agree that the above accident was caused by Car A. The driver of Bus B could not anticipate that Car A would enter the intersection. However, when the injury claims of the individual plaintiff exceed $15,000 or the collective injury claims exceed $30,000 in exposure, then each plaintiff cannot obtain full compensation from Car A’s insurance or from the operator of Car A’s assets. The passengers in each vehicle are not negligent. 

Before the Fair Share Act, personal injury attorneys would develop a claim against the driver of Bus B. The plaintiff’s attorney would investigate whether the driver of Bus B did anything wrong leading up to the accident. When we examine anyone’s conduct thoroughly enough, we typically can find flaws, which may be minimal or even infinitesimal, but they are still flaws. Flaws can be used to obtain a finding of negligence. How long did it take the driver of Bus B to notice that Car A was running the red light? How fast was Bus B traveling when it first noticed the vehicle running the red light? When did Bus B’s driver apply the brakes? Did Bus B driver attempt to steer around the car running the red light and, if not, why not? The answers to these questions may be used to develop a claim of negligence against the driver of Bus B. For instance, if Bus B was traveling at 10 mph over the speed limit but applied the brakes immediately after seeing that the other vehicle was not stopping, then it is possible that Bus B may be assigned some negligence, but probably not more than 50%. Introducing the opinion of a liability expert, who opines that Bus B would have avoided the accident had it been travelling under the speed limit, could cause a jury to find some percentage of negligence against the driver of Bus B. An expert report would typically assist the plaintiff in defeating a summary judgment motion by Bus B. If Bus B’s driver was found 10% negligent, then Commercial Bus B and its insurance carriers could be required to pay the entire jury award for each injured passenger after the $30,000 recoverable from Car A’s insurance, which was found 90% negligent.

This strategy also had a significant impact on settlement negotiations. If a damages claim is potentially worth millions of dollars and the argument against the defendant is that they should have been able to avoid the accident, prior to the Fair Share Act, the defendant had to consider their level of certainty that a jury would find the defendant 0.0% negligent. The question was not whether a jury would find the defendant to be primarily responsible for the accident, but whether the jury would assign any negligence to the driver of Bus B. Certainly, defendants and insurance companies would not be willing to pay the full sum of the exposure in this scenario. However, the defendant and the insurance company would be remiss if they neglected to attempt to avoid responsibility for the full award, which could potentially be foisted upon them, after a finding of 1% negligence relative to the accident.

In the recent case of Spencer v. Johnson, 249 A.3d 529 (Pa. Super. 2021), the Pennsylvania Superior Court examined the Fair Share Act in “dicta.” Dicta basically means that the court is making statements which are not central to the ruling in the case. The ruling in Spencer becomes binding law for lower courts. The facts in Spencer involve an accident between a pedestrian and an unlicensed driver (husband) driving a company vehicle that was entrusted to an employee (wife) by her employer. There was a finding of negligence against the driver-husband in the amount of 36%, the driver’s wife in the amount of 19% and the driver’s wife’s employer in the amount of 45%. 

The actual ruling of the Superior Court in Spencer is that the trial court should have molded the verdict against the employer-defendant because the jury likely separately found vicarious liability for wife and primary liability for employer based on the “general verdict rule.” The finding of vicarious liability for the wife made the employer liable for the entirety of the award because the Superior Court combined it with a finding of primary negligence by the employer. The Superior Court decided that the finding against the wife and the employer should be combined against the employer for a total share of 64% negligence. Therefore, the entirety of the award could be collected against the employer under the Fair Share Act as the wife’s and the employer’s share combined was over 60%. 

The Superior Court did not stop there. Instead, the court created a hypothetical situation which was different than the findings upon which the court based its ruling. This portion of the court’s opinion begins, “Nevertheless, assuming arguendo that the jury’s verdict did not demonstrate PJB was vicariously liable, we would have found the court erred in failing to grant the motion to mold the verdict as the question of whether the Fair Share Act applies to this present matter remains.” “Nevertheless, assuming arguendo” means you are about to read dicta. The Superior Court proceeded to engage in a lengthy statutory interpretation and stated:

As noted, the general rule of the Fair Share Act continues to be focused on cases where plaintiff is found to have negligently contributed to her own injuries. The addition of subsection (a.1) does not clearly or explicitly expand the scope of the Fair Share Act to include cases where the plaintiff has not been found to be contributorily negligent. Therefore, for the minimum finding of 60% negligence portion of the Fair Share Act to apply, the plaintiff’s negligence must be an issue in the case.

Spencer, 249 A.3d at 559 (emphasis added). These statements will be used to argue that, in situations such as the above hypothetical of Car A and Bus B, all injured passengers may potentially recover the entirety of any awards from Bus B. 

Defense counsel will argue that since this was “dicta,” and was not the decision in Spencer, it is not binding on trial courts. Plaintiffs’ attorneys will argue that it is the law. Plaintiffs will also argue that, even if it is not the law, it is the proper way to interpret the Fair Share Act because it is how the Superior Court interprets the statute. It is also how the Superior Court will rule on the issue on appeal. Therefore, the lower courts should interpret the statute the same way to avoid an unnecessary appeal. 

Therefore, from a settlement posture, defendants may once again have to consider whether they could potentially be responsible for the entire award, even if they are found to be less than 60% negligent. Plaintiff attorneys will also consider this when they determine whether or not to file a lawsuit against Commercial Bus B. It is not the law, but it may become the law, which may cause litigants (and courts) to treat it as if it is the law.

*Tom is a shareholder in our Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, office. He can be reached at 215.575.3562 or tjmckenzie@mdwcg.com.

 

Defense Digest, Vol. 27, No. 5, December 2021 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1. © 2021 Marshall Dennehey Warner Coleman & Goggin. All Rights Reserved. This article may not be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.