United Parcel Service v. Hawkins, No. 233, 2023, 2024 WL 666726 (Del. Feb. 19, 2024)

Delaware Supreme Court affirms IAB decision and rejects employer’s arguments that Superior Court Civil Rule 41(a)(1) and the doctrine of collateral estoppel barred claimant from filing a petition for a recurrence of total disability benefits.

The claimant was injured in a work accident on October 28, 2018. On December 9, 2019, he filed a Petition to Determine Additional Compensation Due that sought total disability benefits (TTD) and two surgeries, including a spine surgery. The employer filed a petition for review to terminate TTD in response. The claimant withdrew the TTD petition without prejudice. The petition for review was resolved via a settlement of the parties. Per a stipulation of the parties approved by the Industrial Accident Board, the claimant’s TTD was terminated as of February 7, 2020, and he was placed on temporary partial disability benefits (TPD) as of October 17, 2020.

On April 20, 2021, the claimant filed a Petition to Determine Additional Compensation Due (DACD) that again sought acknowledgment of two spine surgeries, resulting in periods of total disability beginning on January 10, 2022, and extending beyond the TPD Agreement. Before the hearing, the claimant voluntarily withdrew the petition. The claimant re-filed an identical petition on December 10, 2021. The employer moved to dismiss the petition on multiple bases, including that it was barred by: (1) the doctrine of collateral estoppel, (2) the doctrine of res judicata and (3) Superior Court Civil Rule 41(a)(1)’s “Two Dismissal” rule. 

The Board rejected the employer’s arguments regarding collateral estoppel and res judicata because the issues and claims presented by the DACD were new and different from prior agreements between the parties. Additionally, the Board explained that it is not bound by the Superior Court’s Rules of Civil Procedure. Its own rules and the rules of the Administrative Procedures Act do not include a similar provision; accordingly, it did not regard the petition as dismissed with prejudice. The employer’s motion was denied. The Superior Court agreed with the Board’s conclusions.

The Supreme Court affirmed that the Board is not required to follow the Superior Court’s Rules of Civil Procedure in its proceedings. Whether to rely on or consider court rules is within the Board’s discretion. No provision of the Board’s Rules, the Workers’ Compensation Act or the Administrative Procedures Act indicates otherwise.

Additionally, the court agreed with and expanded on the collateral estoppel rulings below. The court explained that a consent judgment—such as the Board-approved Read-In Order terminating TTD as of February 7, 2020—generally cannot support claims of issue preclusion. Collateral estoppel only applies when the facts have been “actually litigated and determined” in the first case. The stipulation did not clearly manifest the parties’ intention to be bound by the employer’s allegation that the “claimant’s disability had terminated as of February 7, 2020.” Accordingly, collateral estoppel did not bar the claimant from bringing the claim for a recurrence of total disability. 


 

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