Commonwealth Court Affirms Dismissal of Fire Police Volunteer’s Cancer Claim as Time-Barred Under Section 315

The Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania upheld the dismissal of a cancer-related workers’ compensation claim filed by a former fire police volunteer, finding that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations under Section 315 of the Workers’ Compensation Act. The claimant, who had served with both Woodlawn Volunteer Fire Department and Tri-Clover Fire Company, was diagnosed with prostate cancer in 2018 and attributed the illness to his exposure to carcinogens during his fire service. Although he informed his employer of the diagnosis and his belief that his cancer was work-related shortly after being diagnosed, he did not file a claim until January 2023—nearly five years later. The court rejected the claimant’s arguments that Section 301(f)’s firefighter cancer presumption extended the filing deadline and that the statute should be tolled due to his lack of awareness regarding his eligibility as a fire police officer. Emphasizing the claimant’s early acknowledgment of a work-related cause, the court held that the statute began to run in 2018 and that waiting for a physician’s confirmation would undermine the Act’s reasonable diligence requirement.

The claimant worked as a fire police volunteer for Woodlawn Volunteer Fire Department in 2006, a position that required his presence at active fires, but not active firefighting. Previously, the claimant worked as a volunteer firefighter for another fire company, Tri-Clover, beginning in 1992 or 1993. On February 8, 2018, the claimant was diagnosed with prostate cancer. He was out of work from March 5, 2018, to April 15, 2018. On January 23, 2023, the claimant filed a petition alleging that his cancer was compensable due to his direct exposure to Group I carcinogens while working as a fire police/volunteer firefighter. The employer took the position that the petition was time-barred by Section 315 of the Act. 

The claimant testified that when he received his diagnosis in February 2018, he advised Woodlawn of his belief that his work activities and exposure led to the cancer. The claimant also said he believed his work with Tri-Clover caused his cancer. However, because the claimant did not file his petition until January 2023, it was dismissed by the workers’ compensation judge on the basis that it was untimely under Section 315 of the Act. The judge rejected the claimant’s assertion that the statute of limitations should be tolled since he was not aware that he could file a Claim Petition based on his position as a member of the fire police rather than as a firefighter. 

The claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board, which affirmed, concluding that Section 315 applied and the petition was not timely. The Board rejected the claimant’s argument that Section 315’s limitation period was supplanted by the 600-week period in Section 301(f), relating to firefighter cancer claims, because his cancer was diagnosed after the effective date of the firefighter cancer presumption.

The claimant appealed to the Commonwealth Court, which affirmed the decisions below. The court dismissed the claimant’s argument that Section 301(f) was intended to supersede Section 315’s statute of limitations for firefighter cancer claims. The court further dismissed the claimant’s argument that, if Section 315 did apply, the petition was still timely since the claimant’s “uninformed” lay opinion of the connection between his work and his cancer was insufficient to begin the running of the statute of limitations. 

The court noted that when the claimant testified, he said that he communicated to Woodlawn his diagnosis and his belief that his cancer was related to his fire service with Woodlawn on the same day that he met with his diagnosing physician. The court said that to hold that the limitations period can only begin once a claimant receives a physician’s confirmation would be illogical, and would not only provide a claimant with a potentially unlimited timeframe in which to file a claim, but would also serve to nullify the reasonable diligence requirement of Section 315 of the Act. 

_{What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 29, No. 7, July 2025, is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2025 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.}