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Steven M. Christman

Portrait of Steven M. Christman

Steve concentrates his practice primarily in the defense of insureds and self-insureds involving casualty liability matters. His insurance coverage litigation experience includes the defense of reinsurers and excess insurers. Steve also focuses on a wide range of matters including construction litigation, professional liability, premises, product liability, toxic tort, automobile claims, and trucking and transportation litigation. He also serves as the Casualty Supervisor and Managing Attorney of the New York office, as well as a member of the firm's Board of Directors. In this capacity, he oversees the day-to-day operations for the entire office and team of attorneys ensuring that client matters are handled promptly, professionally and effectively.

Steve concentrates part of his practice in the area of retail liability.  He has defended hundreds of matters involving premises liability, retail theft, product liability and wrongful termination suits. Steve has represented numerous national retail chains including supermarkets, clothing stores, pet store chains, as well as distributors and manufacturers.

Steve is admitted to practice law in New York State Court, as well as the United States District Courts for the Southern and Eastern Districts. Steve has also litigated negligent roadway design cases in the New York Court of Claims. 

In 1994 Steve earned his B.A. degree in history from Providence College. He then attended the University of Dayton School of Law earning his juris doctor in 1997. During law school Steve was first introduced to the insurance defense industry working as a summer associate for the Law Office of Rumberger, Kirk and Caldwell in Tampa, Florida.

    • University of Dayton School of Law (J.D., 1997)
    • Providence College (B.A., with honors, 1994)
    • New York, 1999
    • U.S. District Court Eastern District of New York, 1999
    • U.S. District Court Southern District of New York, 1999
    • AV® Preeminent™ by Martindale-Hubbell®
    • New York County Bar Association
    • New York State Bar Association
    • Represented a carting company in which one of its garbage trucks backed into a main roadway striking the plaintiff’s vehicle.  This impact caused the plaintiff’s vehicle to careen off the roadway and strike a concrete wall.  The plaintiff clearly had the right of way and suffered catastrophic injuries requiring her to be airlifted from the scene. I was asked to investigate this case within days of the accident and assembled a team (investigator, accident reconstruction expert, etc…)  The plaintiff’s expert then completed his investigation but never inspected the seatbelt mechanism. Plaintiff’s counsel then agreed to allow his client’s vehicle to be destroyed. Our expert confirmed the seatbelt mechanism was not comprised allowing him to opine the plaintiff was not wearing it at the time of impact.  As a result, a case with a value in excess of $7 million, we were able to get resolved for more than an 80% reduction in value.
    • Plaintiff claimed a traumatic brain injury (TBI), as well as a leg injury after a ceiling collapse in our client’s building.  Our client had received numerous pre-accident violations from the Department of Buildings for leaks in the plaintiff’s apartment that were never addressed.  Plaintiff’s counsel was pressing the fact that our client had received these violations and did nothing to rectify the issue and as a result that they could win summary judgment on liability.  However, we met with our client early on and found out that he had a video camera outside the plaintiff’s apartment.  We then secured these post-accident videos before they looped over.  The videos established the plaintiff was going about his everyday life without issue, including no issues walking following this accident.   We then resolved this extremely poor liability case with significant exposure for nuisance value.
    • Represented a landlord in a mold exposure case and pro-actively served a motion by order to show cause to preclude the only arguable evidence that there was mold in our client’s home at the time the plaintiff was a tenant.  The basis for this motion was plaintiff’s sloppy handling of an air vent with no chain of custody and that allegedly contained mold when ultimately tested 5 months later.  We used the leverage of this emergency motion which would extremely limit the plaintiff’s ability to prove their case to resolve this matter for a mere fraction of the case value should this evidence been accepted by the court. 
    • In a hotly contested insurance coverage litigation action arising from an underlying labor law case, Steve was able to obtain summary judgment in favor of the defendant insurance carrier, convincing the court that based upon the carrier's extremely specific additional insured endorsement, the carrier not only did not have a duty to indemnify the insured seeking coverage, but also most importantly did not have any duty to defend this insured.
    • Participated in trial involving Labor Law 240(1) and 241(6) in Supreme Court, Bronx County case settled favorably following cross examination of plaintiff.
    • In a wrongful death action arising from alleged medical malpractice venued in Supreme Court, Bronx County, Steve's defense and investigation resulted in locating pertinent medical records regarding the decedent's treatment, which turned a case with significant exposure into forcing plaintiff to accept a nominal settlement.
    • Successful Strategies for Effective Mediation, Marshall Dennehey Client Seminar, July 20, 2022
    • Civil Litigation State of Affairs – The Impact of COVID-19 in New York and Connecticut& What’s Next, Marshall Dennehey Client Webinar, May, 2021
    • Jurisdictional Trends & The COVID-19 Impact on FL NY NJ & PA, Marshall Dennehey Virtual Client Presentation, December, 2020

Results

New York Labor Law Case Dismissed

We obtained summary judgment in New York County in a case where the plaintiff, a construction laborer, was struck by a rolling dumpster and sustained severe crush injuries to his left foot and leg. The plaintiff, the dumpster company and the subcontractors alleged our general contractor client was responsible for overall site safety. After obtaining billing and work records for the project, the client confirmed that it did not have any involvement in the project, and we moved for summary judgment. After oral argument, the court granted our motion in its entirety and dismissed the case and all cross-claims.

Defense Melts Plaintiff's Snow and Ice Claim.

We obtained summary judgment in the Supreme Court of Rockland County, New York. The plaintiff slipped and fell while walking to her mailbox during a severe winter storm in January 2016. The plaintiff initiated a lawsuit against her homeowners association and its snow removal contractor. We moved for summary judgment on behalf of the defendants, asserting that the plaintiff’s claim was barred by the storm-in-progress doctrine. In opposition to our motion, the plaintiff alleged the defendants failed to adequately salt the premises, that the defendants were aware of the icy conditions, and that the storm had ended prior to the plaintiff’s accident. In granting the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, the court found the defendants established that there was a storm in progress at the time of the plaintiff’s accident and that their efforts to prevent ice accumulation and remove snow did not create a hazardous condition. According to the court, the plaintiff’s testimony was self-serving, contradictory and a feigned attempt to create a material issue of fact as to when the storm came to an end.

Thought Leadership

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.