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Michele P. Frisbie

Portrait of Michele P. Frisbie

Michele defends a wide variety of cases and has a special interest in working closely with professionals to achieve the successful, cost-effective defense of suits against specialists such as those involved in the sale, appraisal and management of real estate; insurers and insurance brokers and agents; attorneys; mental health service providers and municipal entities. Michele also has extensive experience involving personal injury such as premises liability, dog bites, automobile accidents, dram shop and hotel, restaurant and store security.

Michele has direct experience as a past board member of the Bucks County Bar Association Board of Directors and its Mandatory Continuing Education and Member Services Committee and the Central Bucks Family YMCA and its Building and Grounds and Financial Development Committees.

In 1992, she joined Marshall Dennehey as a file clerk. Michele graduated cum laude from St. Joseph's University in 1993. She attended Villanova University School of Law in 1993 and served as a law clerk until her graduation in 1996, when she joined Marshall Dennehey as an attorney. During her free time, Michele is an ACE certified group fitness instructor and a personal trainer.

    • Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law (J.D., 1996)
    • Saint Joseph's University (B.A., cum laude, 1993)
    • Pennsylvania, 1996
    • Pennsylvania Super Lawyers Rising Star (2005-2006)
    • Bucks County Bar Association, Chair of Mandatory Continuing Legal Education Committee (2009-2012)
    • Bucks County Bar Association, Board of Directors (2002-2004)
    • Bucks County Bar Association, Chair Member Services Committee (2004-2007)
    • Pennsylvania Bar Association
    • "Personal Injury Exculpatory Clauses," Stafford Webinars, April 28, 2021
    • Board of Directors, Central Bucks Family YMCA
    • Obtained a dismissal with prejudice in a Magisterial District Court matter involving breach of duty allegations against members of a homeowners’ association board. The pro se plaintiff claimed the board officers violated the Pennsylvania Uniform Planned Community Act by failing to properly notice and conduct meetings, perform annual audits, and manage community funds. We successfully argued that the plaintiff’s claims were derivative in nature and therefore outside the jurisdiction of the Magisterial District Judge. “The Judge took no testimony or evidence,” and the matter was dismissed.
    • Obtained a summary judgment in favor of a HOA, with the court holding that the HOA had no duty to protect the plaintiffs from the attacks of a neighbors’ dangerous dog. On two occasions, the plaintiffs were attacked by their neighbors' dogs, causing serious injuries and permanent scarring. The plaintiffs alleged that the HOA had a duty to protect them from the co-defendants' dogs. The court granted summary judgment for the HOA, holding that under McMahon v. Pleasant Valley West Association, 952 A.2d 731 (Pa. Commw. 2008), an HOA has a “duty to the members of the common-interest community to use ordinary care and prudence in managing the property of the community that is subject to its control." However, that duty does not extend to removing an allegedly dangerous dog as the HOA has neither the obligation nor the ability to remove dogs from the community.
    • Won an arbitration in a premises liability case where the plaintiff claimed she slipped and fell on a container of clear hand sanitizer spilled on the floor of the baking goods aisle of a grocery store. The plaintiff acknowledged she was not looking where she was going. There was no evidence of how the substance got on the floor, how long it had been there, or that the store was aware of it. 
    • Obtained a dismissal with prejudice of a products liability case filed against an alcohol beverage manufacturer. The Plaintiffs are individuals who were seriously injured or killed when the alleged minor drunk driver of the vehicle in which they were passengers was involved in a single car accident. The Plaintiffs claimed that the manufacturer was liable to them because the product had more alcohol than other alcohol beverages, was improperly marketed to minors, like their driver, and did not warn of the dangers associated with the beverage. Our team argued several points including that Pennsylvania does not recognize such a products liability cause of action because the dangers of drinking alcohol and driving are obvious, and the manufacturer has no duty to warn potential users of such dangers.  Additionally, alcohol is not an unreasonably dangerous product.
    • Obtained a transfer and dismissal with prejudice on a motion to dismiss in a legal malpractice action. We argued that the plaintiff’s claim that the negligence of her daughter’s court-appointed guardian ad litem led to the award of custody of the child to the father following a dependency hearing. The custody award, the plaintiff alleged, put her at a disadvantage in the divorce and damaged her and the child. First, Michele successfully argued for the transfer of the matter from the county of the mother’s residence to the county of the dependency hearing. She then successfully argued that the plaintiff had no right to bring a cause of action for herself or the child.
    • Defense verdict for a real estate seller's agent in a claim of misrepresentation of the condition of the property.
    • Defense verdict in a coverage claim arising out of wind damage to a mobile home.
    • Motion to dismiss granted in a case claiming appraisers conspired with the builder of a residential development to conceal the presence of a Superfund site adjacent to the development.
    • Motion to dismiss granted in a case against attorneys who allegedly failed to timely file a legal malpractice cause of action arising from an underlying toxic tort claim.
    • Secured the voluntary withdrawal of a case against a local sewer authority which allegedly improperly removed trees from the easement that ran over the plaintiff's property.
    • Secured the dismissal of a claim that an insurance broker allegedly failed to secure a binder for a homeowners' policy which resulted in no coverage after a fire.
    • Secured the dismissal of a mental health institution in a case where the plaintiff, a convicted murderer, claimed that if the institution had not negligently treated him for his drug and alcohol addictions, he would not have committed the crime.

Firm Highlights

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court to Review Whether Legal Malpractice Claims May Be Recast as Breach of Contract Claims

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently granted allowance of appeal to consider whether a plaintiff may pursue a breach of contract claim against an attorney based on allegations that the attorney failed to provide competent legal services. The issue is significant in professional liability litigation because it concerns whether a plaintiff may avoid the statute of limitations applicable to professional negligence claims by characterizing the alleged misconduct as a breach of contract. Antoine Poteat retained attorneys Gary Asteak and Nino V. Tinari to represent him in a criminal matter. After his conviction was subsequently overturned through a Post Conviction Relief Act proceeding, Poteat filed suit against his former attorneys alleging that they breached their retainer agreements by failing to provide competent legal services. The attorneys argued that the claims sounded in professional negligence, rather than breach of contract, and were therefore time-barred. The trial court dismissed Poteat’s complaint, but the Superior Court, sitting en banc, reversed. The Superior Court held that the gist-of-the-action doctrine did not bar Poteat’s breach of contract claim because the alleged failure to provide competent legal services could constitute a breach of the parties’ agreement. The Court further held that a legal-services agreement contains an implied duty requiring an attorney to provide competent legal services, even where the agreement does not contain an express provision requiring such services. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted review in July 2026 and will consider whether the Superior Court’s decision conflicts with Pennsylvania precedent distinguishing contract and tort claims, including Bruno v. Erie Insurance Co. The Supreme Court will also address whether a plaintiff may maintain a breach of contract claim based on an implied duty to provide competent legal services without identifying a specific contractual provision that was breached. The Supreme Court’s decision could have significant implications for professional liability litigation in Pennsylvania, particularly where plaintiffs seek to characterize claims arising from alleged professional negligence as contractual claims.

Thought Leadership

The Search-Incident-to-Arrest Doctrine Does Not License Strip Searches

In Beatty v. Gardner, No. 25-2860 (3d Cir. Sept. 16, 2026), Kyle Beatty sued police officers Clinton Gardner and Calvin Irvin under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after they stopped, arrested, and searched him three times during a drug investigation in Williamsport, Pennsylvania. The officers initially smelled marijuana coming from the car in which Beatty was sitting and observed marijuana residue, giving them probable cause to arrest him. Beatty consented to the first pat-down, and the second search was conducted incident to his lawful arrest; neither search uncovered weapons or contraband. The officers then transported Beatty to the police station solely to strip-search him, but the strip search also revealed nothing. The District Court granted the officers summary judgment, concluding that the initial stop, arrest, and first two searches were reasonable and that qualified immunity protected the officers from liability for the strip search. The Third Circuit affirmed, but held that the strip search itself violated the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not automatically permit officers to strip-search an arrestee outside the jail or prison setting. Because strip searches are highly intrusive and the traditional justifications for searches incident to arrest (officer safety and preservation of evidence) did not justify the search of Beatty, the officers generally needed either the arrestee’s consent, exigent circumstances, or a warrant supported by probable cause to believe that a search beneath the clothing would reveal weapons, contraband, or evidence. Here, the officers had none of those justifications. Nevertheless, the court held that qualified immunity barred damages liability because, at the time of the search, the right against a warrantless strip search of an arrestee outside the institutional setting was not clearly established by Supreme Court or Third Circuit precedent. The court likewise upheld qualified immunity on Beatty’s First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed summary judgment for the officers.

Thought Leadership

Two Tracks, No Preclusion: Ohio Supreme Court Preserves Separate Damages Claims After Chapter 2506 Appeals

The Supreme Court of Ohio has clarified that an administrative appeal under Ohio Revised Code Chapter 2506 does not bar a separate action for damages and declaratory relief that could not have been pursued in the administrative appeal. The Ohio Supreme Court considered Sheetz, Inc. v. Centerville (2026-Ohio-3531) as a result of a certified question from the Southern District of Ohio. The question was whether Sheetz, the gas station/convenience store brand, was barred from seeking damages in a separate action since damages were not sought in their administrative appeal. Ultimately, the Ohio Supreme Court ruled that res judicata does not bar a separate action for damages after ruling on an administrative appeal because R.C. Chapter 2506 is limited to judicial review and cannot grant affirmative relief. The case arose after Centerville’s city council rejected a site plan proposed by Sheetz, Inc. that had received unanimous approval from the City’s planning commission. Sheetz filed an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C. 2506 in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, and two months later filed a complaint for damages and declaratory relief under 42 USC § 1983 as a takings action with the city, city council, and other objectors as improper takings and a violation of due process, as well as interference with business and contractual relationship. The city and city council removed the § 1983 action for damages to federal court. Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas reversed the city council’s denial, and allowed the Sheetz project to move forward. Upon that ruling, the federal court issued a show-cause order questioning whether the § 1983 action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata via claim preclusion (which includes all theories of recovery).  Sheetz argued that Ohio courts of common pleas do not have authority to award damages or declaratory relief as party of the R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal, therefore res judicata could not be triggered to apply to the § 1983 action. Additionally, Sheetz moved to certify the issue to the Ohio Supreme Court, citing differing results between the second and sixth districts on this same issue. Centerville approached the question, not from a claim preclusion standpoint, but from the holding in Grava v. Parkman, Twp which states that a final judgment rendered on the merits bars all subsequent action based on the same transaction or occurrence.  In yet another approach, an objector argued that claim preclusion was satisfied because Sheetz could have raised its damages claims in the administrative appeal – Sheetz disagrees. In their analysis, the Supreme Court of Ohio broke down the elements of a claim preclusion analysis: 1) a prior final, valid decision on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) a second action involving the same parties, or their privies, as the first; (3) a second action raising claims that were or could have been litigated in the first action; and (4) a second action arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action. The Court held that R.C. Ch. 2506 does not permit a party to argue damages as R.C. Ch. 2506 limits the common pleas jurisdiction as if it were sitting on appeal, and therefore can only affirm, reverse, vacate, or modify the appealed order, or can remand the case to the administrative body. Further, the Court held that Grava’s conclusion that a final judgment precludes additional litigation for different relief is inapplicable under this fact pattern because it was meant only to apply to those matters in which the plaintiff brings the exact same case twice, but for new relief. The Court found Grava was inapplicable because Sheetz could have requested damages or declaratory relief in the R.C. 2506 appeal. Therefore, Grava would be nothing more than dicta if it even did apply. Going further, the Ohio Supreme Court disavowed Sixth Circuit precedent which, in reliance on Grava and other district court decisions, permitted an owner to seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alongside an administrative appeal. See Moore v Hiram Twp., 988 F.3d 353 (6th Cir.2021). The Ohio Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had disregarded a critical decision in Community Concerned Citizens, Inc. v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 1993-Ohio-115, which clearly held that a R.C. Ch. 2506 appeal cannot be combined with a complaint seeking other claims for relief. Id. at ¶ 11. To that end, the Ohio Supreme Court has determined that the decisions Moore relied on (outside of Grava) are no longer good law, and that Moore was wrongly decided. The decision draws a clear procedural boundary: Chapter 2506 provides judicial review of an administrative decision, not a forum for independent claims seeking affirmative relief. Although Grava may place claims arising from a single transaction within the potential scope of claim preclusion, those claims are not barred unless the complete claim-preclusion test is satisfied. Because Sheetz could not have pursued damages or declaratory relief in its Chapter 2506 appeal, the separate action was not precluded. The remaining question for practitioners looking to apply or defend against this exception is when does the statute of limitations begin to run on damages and declaratory relief claims related to an administrative decision on appeal? A takings action in federal court has a 2-year statute of limitations, or as a state claim, 4 years (like the other tortious claims raised therein). Correlating this case with others, an administrative appeal will not likely toll the statute of limitations on claims based on a final decision by a municipal authority. Therefore, practitioners should look for these cases to be brought simultaneously.