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What's Hot in Workers' Comp

TOP 10 DEVELOPMENTS IN PENNSYLVANIA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION IN 2025

What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 29, No. 12, December 2025

December 1, 2025

by Francis X. Wickersham

1.    Pennsylvania Supreme Court holds that the compensation rate for specific loss benefits is controlled by Section 306(c) of the Act, not Section 306(a)
Jennifer Jackiw v. Soft Pretzel Franchise, 329 A.3d 1152 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2025) 

The claimant crushed her arm in a pretzel machine at work and needed it amputated. She and her employer agreed that this injury was a specific loss of the forearm, entitling her to compensation benefits for 390 weeks total: 370 weeks paired with 20 weeks of a healing period. The parties disagreed on how to calculate the weekly benefit amount. The claimant claimed that the employer’s position on her compensation rate, rooted in Section 306(a) of the Act, was too low. She argued that Section(c)(25) for specific loss benefits should apply. The workers’ compensation judge found that Section 306(a) should apply, and the Appeal Board and the Commonwealth Court affirmed. However, the Supreme Court reversed, finding that Section 306(c) was the proper formula for calculating the compensation rate for loss of use of a forearm. The court held that the General Assembly intended for the Act to utilize one formula for calculating total disability benefits and another for calculating specific loss benefits. 

 

2.    Pennsylvania Supreme Court: Treatment plan items, including cannabinoid oil, count as “medicines and supplies”; cost rules apply to providers, not claimants
Mark R. Schmidt v. Schmidt, Kirifides & Rassias, P.C., 333 A.3d 310 (Pa. 2025)

The claimant sustained a lower back injury while loading files into a trial bag. The workers’ compensation judge found that this aggravated the claimant’s pre-existing degenerative disc disease. The claimant filed a Penalty Petition against the employer for not covering his out-of-pocket expenses for CBD products to treat pain. The judge granted the petition, deeming CBD oil a “supply” under Section 306(f1)(1)(i) of the Act. Upon the employer’s appeal, the Appeal Board held that CBD oil is not a “supply” without FDA approval and the claimant did not provide necessary bills and records for payment. The Supreme Court affirmed what the Commonwealth Court held on appeal, that CBD oil is a “medicine” and “supply” under the Act, and said Act mandates providers to submit bills on specified forms for payment, not employees. Further, the Act does not require FDA approval for a “supply.” Thus, the claimant was entitled to full reimbursement from the employer for his out-of-pocket expenses. 

 

3.    Pennsylvania Supreme Court holds that a specific loss award is survivable and payable to claimant’s estate, even though claimant’s death was related to work injury 
Kristina Steets v. Celebration Fireworks, Inc., 335 A.3d 1076 (Pa. 2025)

The workers’ compensation judge granted the claimant’s Claim and Review Petitions that requested specific loss benefits, and the Appeal Board and Commonwealth Court affirmed. However, the claimant died from her injuries while the decision from the Commonwealth Court was pending. The claimant’s estate filed petitions seeking payment of the specific loss award by the judge that was under appellate review when the claimant died. The judge denied the estate’s petitions, notwithstanding the claimant’s funeral expenses. The Board and Commonwealth Court affirmed, but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the decedent’s pending benefits were survivable and payable to her estate. Per Sections 306, 307 and, in particular, the plain language in 410 of the Act, specific loss benefits may be awarded after a death caused by a work-related injury where benefits are pending at the time of the claimant’s death. 

 

4.    Commonwealth Court upholds employer’s full subrogation lien; refusal to negotiate not bad faith
Martha Garduno Mondragon v. Jo Jo Pizza, 329 A.3d 790 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2025) 

The claimant sustained slip and fall injuries on ice in the employer’s parking lot. Her Claim Petition was granted, and the workers’ compensation case was settled by a Compromise and Release Agreement (C&R), which recognized the employer’s right to subrogation against the property owner to the extent of the employer’s lien. Claimant’s counsel then began negotiations with the employer to voluntarily release its lien. However, the employer declined and filed a petition to recover its full lien. The employer also filed a petition in civil court to enforce a judge’s subpoena for the claimant to produce all copies of checks, releases and distribution sheets, which the claimant refused to do. The trial court held claimant’s counsel in civil contempt for willful noncompliance with the subpoena, and the Commonwealth Court rejected the claimant’s appeal, remanding the case to the workers’ compensation judge. The judge granted the employer’s petition, and the Appeal Board affirmed. The Commonwealth Court affirmed, holding that the employer’s refusal to reduce or negotiate its subrogation lien does not constitute bad faith, emphasizing that the claimant agreed in the C&R that the employer’s subrogation lien was intact.

 

5.    In seeking to add a distinct, consequential injury to NCP and to reinstate indemnity payments for related disability, petitions must be filed within three years of the date of most recent compensation payment, per Section 413(a) of the Act
Matthew Grow v. PECO Energy Company (WCAB), 329 A.3d 819 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2025) 

The claimant sustained a neck injury at work in 2013, and the employer suspended his benefits upon his return to work in 2014. The claimant underwent cervical surgery in 2021 and filed Reinstatement and Review Petitions in 2022. The workers’ compensation judge granted the petitions, and upon the employer’s appeal, the Appeal Board reversed. The claimant appealed, and the Commonwealth Court affirmed the Board’s decision, concluding that the claimant was untimely in filing the petitions. The court held that the 2021 surgery, while related to the accepted work injury of contusions and fractures at the C3-C4 level, was a distinct and consequential injury. Thus, the claimant had to file his petitions within three years of the date of the most recent compensation payment, which he did not file.

 


6.    Claimant’s receipt of administrative time while out on leave for COVID-19 is not payment in lieu of workers’ compensation benefits 
Jaime Brown v. City of Philadelphia (WCAB), 330 A.3d 12 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2025) 

The claimant, a police officer, was out of work for a work-related physical injury. The day after his November 3, 2020, return to work, he claimed that he contracted COVID-19 while in the office. He was off from work from November 4, 2020, until April 1, 2022; and at no point did he file a Claim Petition for COVID-19. While on leave, he received full pay without depleting sick or vacation time and was under the impression that his time off equated “E-time” (“excused time”/ET), which ended on March 5, 2022; from March 5 to April 1, 2022, the claimant received his normal salary through accrued vacation time. The employer then filed a Notice of Compensation Denial for the alleged COVID-19 exposure. The workers’ compensation judge dismissed the claimant’s Reinstatement and Penalty Petitions, finding that the ET payroll designation did not constitute payment of wages in lieu of workers’ compensation, that the employer did not intend to use ET pay as an agreement to pay workers’ compensation benefit and that discontinuation of ET did not constitute a unilateral cessation of benefits. The claimant appealed, and the Appeal Board and the Commonwealth Court affirmed, stating COVID-19 counts as E-time, regardless of whether the exposure is work-related. 

 

7.    Payments made by an employer to a claimant for a COVID-19 diagnosis were not in lieu of workers’ compensation’ therefore, unilaterally stopping them does not violate the Workers’ Compensation Act 
William Bolds v. City of Philadelphia, 333 A.3d 765 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2025) 

The claimant alleged that he contracted COVID-19 while working as a police officer in May 2020. He designated his time off from work due to COVID-19 as “E-Time” (“excused time”/ET), and he received full salary, with no loss of sick or vacation time. Payments continued through March 5, 2022, at which point the claimant began using accrued sick/vacation time. He did not return to work. On January 31, 2022, the claimant filed Reinstatement and Penalty Petitions, alleging the employer unilaterally terminated benefits in January 2022 and paid wages in lieu of workers’ compensation benefits. The employer filed a Notice of Workers’ Compensation Denial, denying liability for work-related COVID-19. The workers’ compensation judge denied the claimant’s petition, holding that payments made under E-Time do not constitute the employer’s agreement that the claimant had a work-related COVID-19 diagnosis. On appeal, the Appeal Board affirmed, as did the Commonwealth Court, which held that the employer’s signing off on E-Time was intended to protect workers as an emergent response to COVID-19 in 2020, regardless of whether the disability was work-related.

 

8.    Commonwealth Court: no reimbursement mechanism for insurers’ overpayments to pharmacies under Workers’ Compensation Act
Pioneer Construction Company, Inc., Eastern Alliance Insurance Company, and Employers Alliance, Inc. v. Insight Pharmaceuticals, LLC d/b/a Insight Pharmacy, 338 A.3d 234 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2025) 

A workers’ compensation carrier (the insurer) filed a Petition to Review Medical Treatment and/or Billing (Billing Review Petition), seeking reimbursement for an overpayment they made to a pharmacy for compound pain creams previously found to be not reasonable or necessary for treatment of the claimant’s work injury in a prior Utilization Review (UR) Determination. The insurer argued that the workers’ compensation judge had equitable powers under the Act to order the reimbursement. The pharmacy argued the judge lacked jurisdiction to order the reimbursement as the pharmacy could not be a party to the UR and that the Act contained no reimbursement provision for insurers who overpay providers. The judge granted the petition. The insurer then filed an enforcement action in the Court of Common Pleas, and the pharmacy’s motion to dismiss the action was denied. The pharmacy appealed to the Commonwealth Court, which held that because the pharmacy was not, and could not be, a party to the UR and the judge’s proceedings, the trial court erred by not striking the judgment against the pharmacy. The court further held that the reimbursement awarded by the judge was not contemplated by the Act, even as a matter of equity. The court said there was no mechanism in the Act, either expressly or by implication, for an employer/insurer to recoup monies it mistakenly paid or overpaid to a pharmacy.

 

9.    Commonwealth Court affirms claimant’s electrocution injury; employer received timely and adequate notice under Sections 311 and 312 of the Act
Kimberly-Clark Mill v. William Moss, Jr. (WCAB), 344 A.3d 443 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2025) 

The claimant worked for the employer for 17 years as a machine operator and firefighter. He filed a Claim Petition alleging he was electrocuted in 2018 while vacuuming at work, causing severe tremors and worsening tremors from a prior work-related electrocution in 2013. The workers’ compensation judge granted the Claim Petition, and the Appeal Board affirmed. The employer then appealed to the Commonwealth Court, primarily arguing that the claimant failed to establish that he gave timely notice of his work injury. The court, however, rejected this argument and dismissed the appeal, holding that under Sections 311 and 312 of the Act, which work together as to the timing and content of notice, the employer was provided with information concerning the time and place of injury, that it occurred at work and that a reasonable description of the injury was given.


 
10.    Commonwealth Court recognizes firefighter’s PTSD claim; infant CPR incidents were a singular, extraordinary event and deemed an abnormal working condition
Brian Ganley v. Upper Darby Township (WCAB), --- A.3d ---, (Pa. Cmwlth. 2025)

In his job as a firefighter, the claimant experienced two events within a period of roughly two and a half years in which he performed cardiac pulmonary resuscitation (CPR) on infants, both of whom were not resuscitated. The first event involved a two-week-old infant, and the claimant suffered mental issues related to the incident but continued working for the employer. The second incident involved a nine-month-old infant brought to the fire station who was not breathing. The claimant’s mental health symptoms from the first incident worsened after the second, and the claimant filed a Claim Petition, alleging he sustained post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). The workers’ compensation judge dismissed the petition, finding that administering CPR was not an abnormal working condition. The Appeal Board affirmed, but the Commonwealth Court reversed, holding that the incidents collectively were a singular, extraordinary event and, thus, constituted an abnormal working condition. 


What’s Hot in Workers’ Comp, Vol. 29, No. 12, December 2025 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2023 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact tamontemuro@mdwcg.com.

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Pennsylvania HB 2307: Special Education Contingency Fund Reform

Pennsylvania school districts and school law attorneys are aware of the increasing cost of special education services. In an effort to address this growing squeeze on school district budgets, a bi-partisan group of Pennsylvania House Representatives introduced House Bill 2307. The bill is a special education funding measure intended to reform Pennsylvania's reimbursement system for extraordinarily high-cost special education students. As written, HB 2307 would increase funding dedicated to Pennsylvania's Extraordinary Special Education Program Expenses reimbursement program. Beginning with the 2026-27 school year, the bill would increase the set-aside from 1% to 2% of the annual Special Education appropriation. The increased funding is aimed at assisting school districts and charter schools address the costs of serving students whose needs generate exceptionally high special education expenses. The proposal specifically targets situations involving students whose annual special education costs exceed the state's highest cost threshold and represent a significant burden on a district's special education budget. HB 2307 includes key eligibility requirements such as: 1) extraordinary special education expenses approved by the Secretary of Education; 2) student costs exceeding the state's highest Category 3A threshold; 3) costs representing at least 1% of the district's total special education expenditures; 4) student enrolled in the district for no more than two consecutive school years for the proposed reimbursement category; and 5) application and documentation requirements for districts and charter schools. HB 2307 successfully passed the Pennsylvania House of Representatives on June 16, 2026, by a unanimous vote of 202-0. It was subsequently transmitted to the Senate and was referred to the Senate Education Committee on June 22, 2026, where it currently remains pending. While there is currently no scheduled Senate committee or floor vote publicly listed for HB 2307, the next step would be for the Senate Education Committee to consider the bill and determine whether to report it to the full Senate for consideration. If approved by the committee, the bill would proceed through the Senate's three-consideration process before a final vote. Because the General Assembly is still within the 2025-26 legislative session, the bill remains eligible for action during the remainder of the session. However, absent committee action, it will not become law before the start of the 2026-27 school year. If enacted, HB 2307 could have several important effects: Greater financial stability for districts serving students with exceptionally expensive educational and related-service needs. Increased reimbursement opportunities for high-cost placements, specialized transportation, intensive behavioral supports, and other extraordinary services. Reduced pressure on local special education budgets, particularly in smaller districts where one or two high-cost students can significantly affect annual expenditures. Potential reduction in litigation and placement disputes driven by financial constraints, although the bill does not alter substantive IDEA rights or district obligations to provide FAPE.

Thought Leadership

U.S. Department of Education Reports to Congress on Disciplinary Removals of Children with Disabilities

In June 2026, the United States Department of Education, through the Office of Special Education and Rehabilitative Services (OSERS), published its “47th Annual Report to Congress on the Implementation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 2025.” In its report, OSERS provided detailed data and information on the discipline and removal of students from their educational placements, specifically for the school year 2022-2023. To obtain this data, all 50 states, the District of Columbia, the Bureau of Indian Education, Puerto Rico, and other U.S. territories, were asked to report on pre-school and school-aged students, ages 3-21, who were served under IDEA, Part B, and removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons during the school year in question. Not all jurisdictions had data available; OSERS’ reporting to Congress was based on the information supplied by the jurisdictions that responded.  First, OSERS examined the total number of served students who were removed to an interim alternative educational setting. From the reporting data, this number totaled 7,204,199 students. Of this total, 11,364 students were removed unilaterally by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury to themselves or others. These figures reflected the unilateral removal of served students at a rate of 16 per 10,000 students. Of this total, 545 students were removed by a due process hearing officer for likely serious bodily injury, a rate of one per 10,000 students.  Next, OSERS examined data for students who were suspended (in school and out of school) or expelled for more than 10 school days. The total number of students in this category was 7,623,095. Of this total, 65,104 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions, a rate of 85 per 10,000 students. A total of 21,878 students received in school suspensions, a rate of 29 students per 10,000.  OSERS evaluated this particular data and drilled down further, examining the rate of interim removal, expulsion, and suspension per 10,000 students based specifically upon each IDEA disability category. Perhaps not surprisingly, children primarily identified with emotional disturbance were the most affected.    For every 10,000 students who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance, 65 were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel (not the IEP team) for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury, and four out of every 10,000 students were removed following a hearing officer finding that there was a substantial likelihood of serious bodily injury to the student or others. By contrast, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who were unilaterally removed by school personnel was 25 or less per 10,000 students in each category. No more than two students per 10,000 in each of the other categories were removed by a hearing officer. Other Health Impairment was the second leading category.  For every 10,000 students identified primarily with emotional disturbance, 411 students received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days, and 107 of every 10,000 students in this category received in-school suspensions. In comparison, the ratio of students under each of the other disability categories who received out of school suspensions or expulsions of more than 10 days was no more than 172 per 10,000. Students identified in all other disability categories received in-school suspensions at a rate of no more than 57 per 10,000 students. Again, Other Health Impairment was the second leading category. OSERS then examined discipline data with a state-by-state comparison, once more at a ratio of 10,000 students served. The overall data of students who were unilaterally removed to an interim alternative educational setting by school personnel for drugs, weapons, or serious bodily injury showed that removal occurred most frequently in Texas (92 per 10,000 students), Montana (62 per 10,000 students), and Tennessee (42 per 10,000 students). The mean was 12.1.  In Pennsylvania, the rate of removal was 12 out of every 10,000 students, just below the mean.  OSERS also considered, on a state-by-state basis, the number of students who received out-of-school suspensions or expulsions of greater than 10 days. The most significant rate of discipline here occurred in North Carolina (256 per 10,000 students), Missouri (250 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (250 per 10,000 students).  The mean was 85.83. In Pennsylvania, the rate of discipline was 57 per 10,000 students, well below the mean.  Finally, OSERS evaluated, on a state-by-state comparison, the ratio of students per 10,000 who were identified under the category of emotional disturbance and who received out of school suspensions or expulsions for greater than 10 days. The suspension or expulsion of students with emotional disturbance occurred most often in North Carolina (1,723 per 10,000 students), Missouri (1,127 per 10,000 students), and South Carolina (1,098 per 10,000). The mean was 485.81. In Pennsylvania, the suspension or expulsion of students identified with emotional disturbance occurred at a rate of 260 per 10,000, again well below the mean. Although OSERS did not draw any specific conclusions about the disciplinary data it collected, it is nonetheless evident that students primarily identified with emotional disturbance were removed from their educational placements for disciplinary reasons at a rate much higher than students in any other disability category. Relatively speaking, however, Pennsylvania acquitted itself well in the state-by-state disciplinary data collection.