Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Carves Out Exception to Exclusive Remedy Provision of the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act for Late Manifesting Occupational Disease Claims

By Francis X. Wickersham, Esq.

Historically, the exclusive remedy provision of the Pennsylvania Worker’s Compensation Act has been strictly interpreted by Pennsylvania’s highest courts. But, history shows that, at times,   the courts will create exceptions to this provision. In November, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania issued an important decision that crafted an exception to the exclusivity doctrine for late manifesting occupational disease claims.

The case was Tooey v. AKA Steel, ARMCO Steel Crown Cork & Seal, et al., 2013 Pa. LEXIS 2816. In it, the Supreme Court was confronted with the issue of whether the manifestation of an occupational disease outside of the 300 week period proscribed by Section 301(c)(2) of the Act removes the claim from the purview of the Act, such that the exclusivity provision of Section 303(a) does not apply. Section 301(c)(2) requires that an occupational disease-based disability manifest within 300 weeks of an employee’s last exposure to the hazards of the disease.

The facts involved direct tort actions brought by employees against their employers for mesothelioma that had developed some ten to fifteenyears after the workers were exposed to asbestos. The employers sought to dismiss the claims on the basis that the causes of action were barred by the exclusive remedy provided for in Section 303(a) of the Act.  Employers’ motions to dismiss were granted at the trial court level, but reversed on appeal by the Superior Court, which found that the exclusivity provision of the Act still applied even though the claims were time barred under Section 301(c)(2).

However, the Supreme Court reversed the Superior Court, findingthat such a strict interpretation of these provisions defeated the purpose of the Act by leaving the employee with no remedy against the employer. The Court concluded that the exclusivity provision of Section 303(a) of the Act does not preclude employees from taking direct common law action against their employers for claims for disability or death resulting from occupational disease which manifests more than 300 weeks after the last occupational exposure.