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Defense Digest

Offensive, But Not Actionable: The Limits of Pennsylvania’s Real Estate Seller Disclosure Law

Defense Digest, Vol. 32, No. 1, March 2026

March 1, 2026

by James D. Greco

Key Points:

  • Objectively-quantifiable flaw is needed in order to assert a claim for violation of the RESDL.
  • Nazi floor design did not constitute a physical or structural problem with the property.
  • Subjectivity cannot drive RESDL claims.

As is well known among real estate agents and brokers, Pennsylvania’s Real Estate Seller Disclosure Law, 68 Pa.C.S. §§ 7301, et seq., places responsibility on sellers to disclose material defects with respect to their property during a real estate sale. Specifically, the RESDL states:

  • Any seller who intends to transfer any interest in real property shall disclose to the buyer any material defects with the property known to the seller by completing all applicable items in a property disclosure statement which satisfies the requirements of [§] 7304 (relating to disclosure form). A signed and dated copy of the property disclosure statement shall be delivered to the buyer in accordance with [§] 7305 (relating to delivery of disclosure form) prior to the signing of an agreement of transfer by the seller and buyer with respect to the property.

68 Pa.C.S. § 7303. Liability under the RESDL is extended to agents of the seller where they have actual knowledge of such defect.

While plaintiffs have attempted to expand the reach of the RESDL to more subjective claims, courts throughout the Commonwealth have historically limited permissible claims. Claims are restricted to those regarding defects that substantively impact the value of the real estate, while still being capable of recognition and quantification by objective standards.

The foregoing limitation was recently analyzed in Wentworth v. Steinmetz, 2025 WL 3157571 (Pa. Super. Nov. 12, 2025), which analyzed whether a symbol tiled into a floor of a home constituted a “material defect.” Wentworth involved a dispute between the buyers and seller of a residence in Beaver County, Pennsylvania. After closing, the buyers found the basement floor to be tiled with a swastika and what they believed to be a Nazi eagle. This area of the floor had been covered by a rug when they initially viewed the home, thus, the buyers were not aware of it until after the closing. The buyers claimed they could not be expected to live in a home with such condition and asserted that it would cost $30,000.00 to replace the floor, arguing that the seller was liable for compensatory and punitive damages for failing to disclose the condition. The trial court found for the seller, determining that the symbols did not constitute a material defect, which the buyers appealed.

The Superior Court looked to Milliken v. Jacono, 103 A.3d 806 (Pa. 2014), as modified on reconsideration (Nov. 12, 2014) (Milliken II), where the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that purely psychological stigmas are not material defects of property that sellers must disclose. Milliken II involved a claim for violation of the RESDL for the sellers’ failure to disclose a murder-suicide that took place in the residence. If such a duty was to be created, the Milliken II court opined, it should be imposed by the legislature.

Applying the analysis set forth in Milliken II, the Superior Court reiterated that an objectively-quantifiable flaw is needed in order to assert a claim for violation of the RESDL, agreeing with the trial court’s position that the floor design did not constitute a physical or structural problem with the property. The court further reiterated that this objective standard is necessary in order to not only apply the law with consistency, but also to limit the burden placed on sellers. Since the floor in question was sound and functional, the presence of the symbols, no matter how abhorrent, did not constitute a material defect.

While not involving real estate agents, Wentworth is instructive of how Pennsylvania’s courts analyze the wide variety of claims under the RESDL, and the fact that the court appears disinclined to permit subjectivity to drive such claims. Thus, sellers and agents alike can take solace in the fact that claims based on how a party feels about a feature or fixture of a property, without any physical or structural issue, does not pass muster when it comes to the RESDL. Certainly, this is helpful to real estate agents and brokers who are not only bound by the RESDL where they have actual knowledge of an alleged defect, but also owe a duty to their clients to represent them in a professional manner during the sale of the real estate, including advising sellers as to the information that needs to be disclosed.

Indeed, the RESDL does encompass a broad set of areas with respect to the necessary disclosures. However, the courts’ analyses in Milliken II and, more recently, Wentworth, limit the subjective nature of such claims, placing the onus on the legislature if there is to be any expansion with respect to the same.

James works in our Scranton, PA office. He can be reached at (570) 496-4662 or JDGreco@mdwcg.com.

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Appellate Division Affirms Dismissal of Legal Malpractice Counterclaim Against Martin Law Firm

In Martin v. Loury, 2026 N.J. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 1617 (App. Div. July 15, 2026), Martin Law Firm represented Kirk Loury in an employment matter Mr. Loury filed against his former employer, Concord Equity Group Advisors LLC (“Concord”). The allegations included, among other things, that Loury was not fairly compensated for his employment with Concord. After a bench trial finding in Loury’s favor, the Appellate Division remanded this matter in February 2016 for a second trial. During the second trial, Concord CEO, Lee Argush, testified to lower compensation estimate than first trial. On remand, the second trial judge awarded Mr. Loury the same damages as the first judge, finding Mr. Argush not credible. After the findings during the second trial, Martin Law Firm filed an action against Mr. Loury to recover legal fees and costs of representing Mr. Loury in a second bench trial and Mr. Loury filed a counterclaim against Martin Law Firm for legal malpractice, alleging he should have received an even higher award in the second bench trial. In this allegation, Mr. Loury, through his expert, claimed that Martin Law Firm should have recalled Mr. Loury to the stand to rebut Mr. Argush’s testimony to allege an alternative theory of damages. Mr. Loury’s expert admitted that the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's theory and accepted Loury's damages theory. The trial court barred Mr. Loury’s expert and dismissed Loury's counterclaim with prejudice before convening the collection trial, and the jury ruled in Martin Law Firm’s favor. Mr. Loury appealed the trial court's pretrial rulings barring his liability expert from testifying in support of his legal malpractice counterclaim, denying his motion for summary judgment on that counterclaim, and denying his motion to amend his counterclaim by adding attorney Joseph A. Martin as a codefendant. In affirming the trial court’s decision, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly excluded Loury’s expert testimony in the counterclaim against Martin Law Firm because the expert could not explain how calling Loury as a rebuttal witness would have increased damages when the second judge already rejected Mr. Argush's testimony and accepted Loury's damages theory, making the expert’s causation opinion speculative. The Appellate Division also held that the trial court properly denied Mr. Loury's summary judgment motion on his malpractice counterclaim because reasonable minds could differ on whether Mr. Martin's alleged failures would have changed the second judge's damages award, given the judge already found Mr. Argush not credible, creating genuine factual disputes precluding summary judgment. Also, the Appellate Division held that the trial court properly denied Loury's May 2023 motion to add Joseph Martin individually because the statute of limitations expired in February 2022, six years after the 2016 appellate remand when Mr. Loury incurred new legal costs, and relation back did not apply because Mr. Loury knew Mr. Martin's identity throughout and strategically chose to sue only Martin Law Firm in his 2019 counterclaim.