As a matter of first impression, the judgment imposed on a licensed driver under the Parental Liability Act did not warrant license suspension as the judgment did not arise under the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law.

As a matter of first impression, the Commonwealth Court affirmed the trial court's holding that a judgment imposed on a licensee under the Parental Liability Act was not a judgment arising from a motor vehicle accident under the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law. As a result, the licensee was not subject to suspension for nonpayment.

In this case, Licensee Deborah Raper Franklin's minor son, Charles Franklin, took an automobile belonging to Thomas and Deborah Kresch without their permission. While operating the vehicle, Charles was involved in an accident, which damaged the vehicle. The Kresches filed suit against Charles and Deborah, the licensee, asserting conversion and negligence against Charles and against the licensee for parental liability under the Parental Liability Act (PLA). A $2,500 default judgment was entered against the licensee under the PLA. Deborah has not paid the judgment. Upon receiving a notice of the unsatisfied judgment against the licensee, the Bureau of Driver Licensing issued a notice of suspension of Deborah's operating privileges under §1772(a) of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL).

Deborah appealed. The trial court sustained this appeal, concluding that a judgment imposed under the PLA was not a judgment "arising from a motor vehicle accident" under §1771 of the MVFRL. The Bureau appealed. The issue on appeal was whether the MVFRL mandates the suspension of a person's operating privilege for an unsatisfied judgment entered against that person under the PLA. The court disagreed with the Bureau's claim that the language "any judgment arising from a motor vehicle accident" in §1771(a) of the MVFRL includes a judgment entered under the PLA.

In this case, the licensee had no involvement in her son's motor vehicle accident, which did not involve the use of an automobile owned or operated by the licensee. Deborah's liability under PLA arose exclusively from her parental relationship to her son, not from the accident itself. The court refused to accept the Bureau's broad interpretation of the MVFRL in this case.

Case Law Alert - 2nd Qtr 2012