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Long Island, NY – Melville

Marshall Dennehey established an office on Long Island in October 2011, first opening in Hauppauge and then relocating in 2014 to Melville to accommodate the firm's clients and growth. Located in the heart of Suffolk County, the office services its clients' needs throughout all of New York State.

The lawyers in the Melville office have lived and worked on Long Island throughout their careers and are familiar with the needs of its business and professional communities. Melville is located within close proximity to all the major airports and traffic arteries, providing the attorneys with easy access to all of Long Island, as well as the entire state of New York. 

Well known for its businesses in the technology and service industries, Long Island has a varied and vast business community. The firm's location in Suffolk County gives it the ability to service all types of industries throughout the area.

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Legal Updates for Insurance Agents & Brokers

New York Court Rejects Tolling Argument in Negligent‑Procurement Suit Filed After Coverage Litigation

May 7, 2026

Johnson v. Northeast Agencies, Inc., 242 A.D.3d 414 (1st Dep’t 2025) One of the recurring challenges in professional liability litigation—especially in claims against insurance brokers—is determining exactly when a claim “accrues” for purposes of the statute of limitations. The case of Johnson v. Northeast Agencies, Inc., 242 A.D.3d 414 (1st Dep’t 2025), presented a twist on this familiar issue. It raised the question of when the statute of limitations began to run on a negligent‑procurement claim against an insurance broker. In this case, a claim under a general liability policy was made in March 2018, following the commencement of a personal injury action against the owner of a rental property. A month later, the insurer issued a disclaimer of coverage, explaining that, among other reasons, the property where the injury occurred was not listed as an “insured location” under the policy. Ordinarily, such a disclaimer would start the clock on any negligent‑procurement claim against the broker, but here, despite disclaiming coverage, the insured was not immediately negatively impacted by the coverage disclaimer because the insurer agreed to provide a defense to the insured while the parties litigated the validity of the disclaimer in a separate declaratory judgment action. Eventually, the court in the declaratory judgment action upheld the insurer’s disclaimer, confirming that the property was indeed not an insured location under the policy. Only after that ruling—more than five years after the original disclaimer—did the insured file suit against the broker for negligent failure to procure the requested coverage.  However, the statute of limitations for negligent failure to procure claims in New York State is three years. The insured argued that the insurer’s continued defense during the declaratory judgment action effectively masked the significance of the disclaimer and should be treated as tolling the statute of limitations. The insured contended that it was reasonable to wait for the outcome of the coverage litigation before pursuing a claim against the broker, because the insurer’s defense created uncertainty about whether the disclaimer would ultimately stand. Both the trial court and the Appellate Division rejected this argument. The courts held that the claim accrued when the disclaimer letter was issued, because that was the moment the insured was placed on notice of the broker’s alleged negligence. The insurer’s voluntary defense during the declaratory judgment action did not create ambiguity about the disclaimer or delay the accrual of the claim.  Going forward, insureds will likely not wait for a final coverage determination before pursuing a negligent‑procurement claim against insurance brokers. Insureds who prefer to wait for the outcome of a coverage dispute will need to secure tolling agreements to avoid losing their claims against brokers due to expired statute of limitations periods.

Legal Updates for Lawyers' Professional Liability

California Supreme Court Rejects Automatic Expungement of Attorney Disciplinary Records

January 1, 2026

Last year, we reported on a California State Bar initiative to expunge attorney discipline records, other than disbarment, after eight years. See Legal Updates for Lawyers’ Professional Liability – February 2025. The proposed change was intended to lessen the impact of what was perceived as racial disparities in attorney discipline in California. A 2019 State Bar-commissioned study had found that Black male attorneys in California were more than three times as likely to be placed on probation than white male attorneys. This past October, the California Supreme Court rejected the expungement proposal, without any explanation. The court may have been persuaded by opponents of the measure, many of whom felt that the public is entitled to complete transparency when hiring an attorney. The court may have also been influenced by more recent studies which showed that the racial disparities highlighted in the 2019 study were already narrowing. A study released by the California State Bar in May of 2025 found that while some racial gaps remained, “the discipline system is trending in the right direction.” Whether relied on by the California Supreme Court or not, the report from the 2025 study has some interesting findings which could benefit all attorneys faced with disciplinary complaints. The report suggested that sending letters to encourage attorneys who are subject to disciplinary proceedings to retain counsel may have helped narrow the racial disparities found in the 2019 study. Any attorney facing a disciplinary complaint is well-advised to consult an attorney who is experienced in handing such complaints. Many attorneys are not aware that their lawyers’ professional liability policy likely includes supplemental coverage to pay attorney fees incurred in responding to grievances. The carrier can also help find an attorney to help defend against the grievance should the responding attorney need one. The California Supreme Court’s rejection of the expungement proposal opens the door to the expanded use of the less controversial (and, perhaps, more effective) methods highlighted in the report from the 2025 study, including sending letters to attorneys subject to disciplinary complaints. In addition to encouraging attorneys to retain counsel, the letters could also advise them of the supplemental coverage available under their LPL policies. Legal Update for Lawyers’ Professional Liability – January 2026 is prepared by Marshall Dennehey to provide information on recent legal developments of interest to our readers. This publication is not intended to provide legal advice for a specific situation or to create an attorney-client relationship. We would be pleased to provide such legal assistance as you require on these and other subjects when called upon. ATTORNEY ADVERTISING pursuant to New York RPC 7.1 Copyright © 2026 Marshall Dennehey, all rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reprinted without the express written permission of our firm. For reprints or inquiries, or if you wish to be removed from this mailing list, contact MEDeSatnick@MDWCG.com. 

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Notable Victory Obtained in a New York Labor Law Action

We obtained a significant win in a New York Labor Law action, securing partial summary judgment for a municipal library and defeating the plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on liability. The plaintiff alleged negligence and violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240 and 241(6) after sustaining injuries when roof trusses collapsed on a construction project managed by a co-defendant on property owned by the municipal library. He claimed the collapse resulted from inadequate bracing. Following discovery, the plaintiff sought summary judgment under Labor Law § 240, asserting absolute liability against the library as the property owner. We opposed the motion and sought partial summary judgment dismissing all claims against the non-property-owning clients, all but the § 240 claim against the library, dismissal of the co-defendant’s cross-claims, and contractual and common law indemnification from the plaintiff’s employer. The court denied the plaintiff’s motion after finding questions of fact as to whether the plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of the accident. The court also granted our motion, dismissing all claims against the non-property-owning clients, all but the § 240 claim against the library, dismissing the co-defendant’s cross-claims, and granting the library unconditional contractual indemnification from the plaintiff’s employer prior to any finding of liability.

Arbitration Win Secured in a Case Involving Allegedly Unpaid Medical Bills

We secured an arbitration win, slashing a $83,000 claim to $625. The applicant, a major medical provider, filed an arbitration matter in the total amount of $83,625, alleging our client owed it for the claimant’s unpaid medical bills following a major motor vehicle accident. The claimant had been involved in the motor vehicle accident and sought payment for a series of medical treatments rendered post-accident. Counsel for the medical provider argued that the medical billing was never properly paid, therefore, payment of the claims was overdue. However, we successfully argued at the arbitration hearing that the applicant’s demand amount was greatly over exaggerated and that the amount in dispute must be limited to the appropriate fee schedule limit of $625.82. After arguments were heard, the arbitrator ruled in our client’s favor.

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Firm Highlights

Congratulations to our 2026 Florida Super Lawyers & Rising Stars: Elizabeth Ferguson, A.C. Nash, Taylor Naughton, Sophia Philor, Amara Rodriguez

News

Marshall Dennehey Announces 2026 Florida Super Lawyers & Florida Rising Stars

Result

Summary Judgment Secured, Preserving $750,000 in Coverage for Insured in Major Trucking Liability Dispute

Ray Freudiger and Michael A. Roberts (both of Cincinnati) successfully obtained summary judgment on behalf of their client in a coverage dispute arising from a May 19, 2022, motor vehicle accident. A permissive driver operated a box truck for an interstate trucking company and caused severe injuries to two tort victims. Prior to the accident, the insured had procured a commercial auto policy for the trucking company with stated limits of $1,000,000. Following the accident, the insurer initiated a declaratory judgment action asserting that only reduced bodily injury limits of $25,000/$50,000 applied and later counterclaimed, alleging it would not have insured the driver had he been properly submitted for approval under the policy. After extensive discovery, briefing, and oral argument, the court rejected the insurer’s attempt to shift responsibility for the $750,000 in coverage it was legally required to provide for permissive drivers under Ohio law, granting summary judgment in favor of the insured and preserving $750,000 in liability exposure.

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Marshall Dennehey’s John J. Hare Brings Home Attorney of the Year Honors; Firm Named Litigation Department of the Year in Two Categories

Marshall Dennehey took home top honors in three categories at the The Legal Intelligencer’s 2026 Pennsylvania Legal Awards, held June 11 in Philadelphia. The first place awards include: Attorney of the Year: John J. Hare, Chair of the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post-Trial Practice Group and Executive Committee member, together with Charles “Chip” Becker of Kline & Specter Litigation Department of the Year, Appellate – Third Win in a Row! Litigation Department of the Year, Product Liability/Mass Torts “There is no one more deserving of Attorney of the Year honors than John. This award is a testament to his exceptional skill, dedication, and leadership—qualities that truly exemplify the very best of our firm,” said G. Mark Thompson, Marshall Dennehey’s President & CEO. “These honors also reflect the strength and depth of our product liability, mass torts, and appellate practices across Pennsylvania and beyond, underscoring our ongoing commitment to delivering outstanding results for our clients.” Attorney of the Year – John J. Hare, Marshall Dennehey, together with Charles “Chip” Becker, Kline & Specter Over the past year, John and Charles were opposing counsel in many of the highest-profile civil appeals in Pennsylvania. John is renowned as a preeminent appellate lawyer on the defense side, and Chip on the plaintiff's side. They have opposed each other repeatedly, exhibiting peerless professionalism and exceptional civility, while zealously litigating under the unremitting pressure of high-profile litigation and record-setting verdicts totaling more than $3.5 billion. They have also collaborated, outside of litigation, on many commissions, committees, and projects of importance to the Pennsylvania judiciary and legal community. Litigation Department of the Year – Appellate Law, Winner (previous winner, 2025 and 2024) 2025 was another standout year for the firm’s Appellate Advocacy & Post‑Trial Practice Group, led by John J. Hare, which was retained to challenge many of Pennsylvania’s “nuclear” verdicts—awards exceeding $10 million. Notably, the department persuaded the Pennsylvania Superior Court to reverse a Philadelphia judgment of $1.09 billion, the largest judgment ever overturned by a Pennsylvania appellate court. The group’s 11 full‑time Pennsylvania‑based appellate lawyers are at the center of Pennsylvania’s most high-profile matters, bringing more than 150 years of combined appellate experience. They routinely handle post‑trial and appellate matters and are frequently engaged to participate in and monitor trials in high‑exposure cases to ensure that critical legal issues are properly raised and preserved for appeal. Litigation Department of the Year – Product Liability/Mass Torts, Winner This marks the first win for the firm’s Pennsylvania Product Liability and Mass Torts practices, which operate within our Casualty Department, managed by Matthew Schorr and Jeff Rapattoni. For almost five decades, Fortune 500 product manufacturers/distributors and their insurers have turned to these groups to defend their litigation. Led by Bradley D. Remick and Vlada Tasich, our Product Liability group’s success can be attributed to its commitment to keeping abreast of ever-changing legal theories, judicial viewpoints, and evolving technology impacting the product liability landscape. Our attorneys have successfully handled thousands of product liability matters in all jurisdictions across the state. Likewise, our mass tort litigation practice – divided into Asbestos & Mass Tort, and Environmental & Toxic Tort Litigation –  has defended manufacturers, distributors, contractors, and premises owners in thousands of personal injury and other claims. Led by Kevin E. Hexstall and Patrick T. Reilly, most attorneys in these groups have more than 20 years of experience, and our seasoned trial team has tried hundreds of cases to verdict, consistently achieving strong results through both trials and settlements. In addition to these awards, Marshall Dennehey was a Litigation Department of the Year finalist for Professional Liability.

Thought Leadership

Coverage Determined, Judgment Paid, Bad Faith Survives: Fourth DCA’s Opinion Highlights the Distinction Between Contractual and Extra-Contractual Damages

In Healthy Food Experts, LLC v. Amguard Ins. Co., No. 4D2025-0181 (4th DCA June 10, 2026), the Fourth District Court of Appeal explained that an insurer’s payment of a judgment in a breach of contract case does not automatically eliminate a later bad faith claim seeking extra-contractual damages. The decision provides guidance on when a first-party bad faith claim may still proceed after a coverage dispute has already been resolved by a judgment. Healthy Food Experts, LLC involved a dispute related to a property damage claim submitted under a commercial insurance policy issued by the insurer following a ceiling collapse at the insured’s restaurant. The insurer denied coverage for the insured’s losses for business personal property and business income, but extended coverage for the food spoilage losses. As a result, the insured filed a breach of contract action and ultimately obtained a jury verdict. The insurer appealed the verdict and, while the appeal was pending, the insured filed a Civil Remedy Notice (CRN) seeking payment for the judgment plus interest. The insurer failed to cure the CRN within the statutory sixty-day cure period, but paid the judgement in full with accrued interest following the appeals court’s per curiam affirmance. Nevertheless, the insured filed a first party bad faith lawsuit claiming to have suffered extra-contractual damages. In response to the bad faith suit, the insurer filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, relying on Fridman v. Safeco Insurance Co. of Illinois, 185 So. 3d 1214 (Fla. 2016) stating that damages were fixed by judgment of the breach of contract suit and the insured could not recover additional damages beyond those already awarded. The insurer also argued that the judgment did not exceed the insured’s policy limits, which was a required element of a first party bad faith claim. The trial court dismissed the bad faith action based on Fridman, concluding the insured could not seek any additional damages.  The insured appealed the court’s ruling to the Fourth DCA arguing the trial court’s order conflicts with Florida law and misapplies Fridman, as a contractual damage determination in the underlying suit establishes the “condition precedent to prosecute a first party bad faith action.” Cingari v. First Protective Ins. Co., 377 So. 3d 1169, 1174 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024). Further, the insured argued that the only purpose to the binding language in Fridman is to prevent the re-litigating of the same damages, which in this case are the contractual damages. The insured asserted the damages were not the “same” as they were seeking consequential damages from the insurer’s alleged bad faith. The Fourth District emphasized in its ruling that a first party bad faith claim is not ripe for litigation until there has been the following: a determination of the insurer’s liability for coverage; a determination of the extent of the insured’s contractual damages, and the required civil remedy notice is filed pursuant to §624.155(3)(a).  Demase v. State Farm Fla. Ins. Co., 239 So. 3d 218, 221 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018) The court concluded that the necessary conditions were satisfied as the jury verdict determined both coverage and the extent of the insured’s contractual damages, and the insured properly filed a civil remedy notice, so the bad faith claim was ripe for litigation. The Fourth DCA further explained the insured could not seek contractual damages in its bad faith action, which was previously litigated in its breach of contract suit. However, the court determined the insured could seek “extra-contractual damages,” which were not recoverable in the insured’s breach of contract suit, which may include interest, court cost, and reasonable attorney’s fees incurred by the insured. Further, the court held excess judgment is not essential in a first party bad faith claim and the insurer’s late payment of the judgment did not preclude the insured’s bad faith action. As a result, the Fourth District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s final dismissal order of the bad faith action. This opinion highlights the distinction between contractual and extra-contractual damages. Moreover, this case demonstrates that a judgment does not necessarily end the dispute in a first party property claim as it is could also serve as a prerequisite of a bad faith action. The decision serves as a reminder that insurers may face bad faith exposure notwithstanding the payment of a judgment in an underlying breach of contract action.

Thought Leadership

Unanimous New Jersey Supreme Court Holds That Personal Emails of Public Employees and Officials are Subject to OPRA

In Rosetti v. Ramapo-Indian Hills Regional High School Board of Education, the New Jersey Supreme Court unanimously held that government-related emails, which are contained within personal email accounts, are government records under the Open Public Records Act (OPRA), and a log of those emails must be produced when requested. In reaching this decision, the court conducted an analysis of the OPRA and cited previous cases that held that emails do in fact fall within OPRA’s definition of a record and must be produced when requested pursuant to the Act. The court in Rosetti then had to answer the question as to whether public officials’ personal email accounts that are used for government purposes are subject to OPRA, and found that they are. Rosetti made an OPRA request to the Board of Education seeking email logs from Board members’ personal email accounts. The Board refused to produce the logs and indicated that it was not under any obligation to produce personal email account logs, only from government-related email accounts. The issue was whether a log had to be produced for Board members’ personal email accounts, which they used to conduct Board business. The Board argued that while it was possible to create a log for government-related email accounts through its IT Department, it was not possible to do so for personal email accounts. The court rejected this argument and ruled that Board members are required to search their personal email accounts and create a log of government-related emails housed in those accounts. Once completed, each Board member then must submit a certification detailing the searches that were conducted. The court went one step further with a suggestion to government employees and officials, stating, “[g]overnment agencies should strongly advise their employees, elected officials, and others engaged in government-related business to refrain from using their personal email accounts when conducting government-related business.”  Please do not hesitate to contact me with any questions regarding this case and others pertaining to the OPRA. 

News

Veteran Trial Attorney Joseph M. Toddy Joins Marshall Dennehey’s Casualty Department in Philadelphia

Result

Unanimous Verdict Obtained in a Medical Malpractice Matter in Bergen County, New Jersey

blue facade of a hospital sign against blue sky

Result

Defense Verdict in Complex Medical Malpractice Trial

Result

No-Cause Jury Verdict Secured in Wrongful Death Trial

We successfully obtained a no-cause jury verdict in a 13-day wrongful death trial. The decedent, a 59-year-old man, was admitted to the emergency room on February 15, 2019, with complaints of abdominal pain, decreased appetite, and constipation, despite the use of laxatives. The patient did not complain of any nausea, vomiting, or diarrhea. He had a significant medical history including diabetes, hypertension, prior coronary artery stenting, morbid obesity (with past gastric bypass surgery), longstanding ventral hernia, and back pain. A CT scan revealed multiple hernias and a potential closed-loop bowel obstruction, leading to a surgery consultation. Our client, an emergency general surgeon, interpreted that the patient did not have a closed loop or any significant obstruction and recommended non-surgical management. The patient was approved to have clear liquids, and had a vomiting incident shortly after, but our client was not notified. The patient was returned to NPO status, and after improving overnight, he was returned to “clears” and additional medical and renal consults were ordered. Our client did not receive any communications from the residents/nurses of any changes in the patient’s condition. On February 18, 2019, two rapid responses were called due to increased heart rate and vomiting. It is believed that the vomiting resulted in aspiration, causing sepsis, ultimately leading to the patient’s death. During the trial, the plaintiff’s sole medical expert highlighted imaging on the wrong hernia, which called into question all of his opinions in the case. We made key objections related to the expert testimony, limiting what the allegations were, and preventing new allegations from being made. After approximately two and a half hours of deliberating, the jury returned a no-cause verdict. 

Thought Leadership

Pennsylvania Supreme Court Holds Self-Referral Prohibition Does Not Cover Prescriptions Written by Physicians with Ownership Interests in Dispensing Pharmacies

700 Pharmacy v. Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Fee Review Hearing Office (State Workers’ Insurance Fund); Nos. 97, 98, 99, 100, 101 MAP 2024; decided June 16, 2026; by Justice Mundy.   In this case, Drs. Miteswar Purewal and Shailen Jalali, treating physicians for workers’ compensation claimants, wrote prescriptions for various medications that were filled by 700 Pharmacy. The worker’s compensation insurer refused to pay for the prescriptions on the basis that they were illegal self-referrals under the Act. 700 Pharmacy subsequently filed fee review applications with The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation Medical Fee Review Office. At a fee review hearing, both physicians stipulated they had a financial interest in the pharmacy.  The physicians argued that the Anti-Referral Provision of the Act does not bar self-referrals on prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services, since the provision does not specifically identify prescription drugs. The Fee Review Hearing Officer rejected this argument and found that prescriptions for medications are prohibited under the “goods or services” language included in the provision. 700 Pharmacy appealed to the Commonwealth Court, and the court affirmed, agreeing with the Hearing Officer’s interpretation of “goods and services” as encompassing prescriptions. 700 Pharmacy appealed to the Supreme Court.  The Supreme Court reversed the decisions of the Hearing Officer and the Commonwealth Court, holding that the term “goods and services” in the Anti-Referral Provision of the Act did not include prescriptions. According to the Court, “goods and services” was not a catch-all, but simply explanatory as to the eight enumerated categories in the provision. The provision (Section 306(f.1)(3)(iii)) reads, in pertinent part: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it is unlawful for a provider to refer a person for laboratory, physical therapy, rehabilitation, chiropractic, radiation oncology, psychometric, home infusion therapy  or diagnostic imaging, goods or services pursuant to this section if the provider has a financial interest with the person or in the entity that receives the referral. The Court said that if the General Assembly wanted to specifically include prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services in the Anti-Referral Provision, they would have done so. They pointed out that prescription drugs and pharmaceutical services were included by the legislature in Section 306 (f.1)(3)(vi) of the Act as to reimbursement, and claimed that their omission from the Anti-Referral Provision supports the conclusion that those services are not included in the Anti-Referral Provision’s self-referral prohibition.